Command and Persuade by Baldwin, Peter
Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/books/book-pdf/1963888/book_9780262361507.pdf by guest on 27 December 2021
Command and Persuade
Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/books/book-pdf/1963888/book_9780262361507.pdf by guest on 27 December 2021
Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/books/book-pdf/1963888/book_9780262361507.pdf by guest on 27 December 2021
Command and Persuade





Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/books/book-pdf/1963888/book_9780262361507.pdf by guest on 27 December 2021
© 2021 Peter Baldwin
This work is subject to a Creative Commons CC BY- NC license. Subject to such 
license, all rights are reserved.
The MIT Press would like to thank the anonymous peer reviewers who provided 
comments on drafts of this book. The generous work of academic experts is essential 
for establishing the authority and quality of our publications. We acknowledge with 
gratitude the contributions of these otherwise uncredited readers.
This book was set in ITC Stone Serif and ITC Stone Sans by Westchester Publishing 
Services. 
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Baldwin, Peter, 1956- author.  
Title: Command and persuade : crime, law, and the state across history /  
 Peter Baldwin.
Description: Cambridge, Massachusetts : The MIT Press, [2021] |  
 Includes bibliographical references and index. 
Identifiers: LCCN 2020017932 | ISBN 9780262045629 (hardcover)
Subjects: LCSH: Crime—History. | Punishment—History. |  
 Criminal law—History. | Criminal justice, Administration of—History. 
Classification: LCC HV6251 .B4273 2021 | DDC 364.9—dc23 
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020017932
Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/books/book-pdf/1963888/book_9780262361507.pdf by guest on 27 December 2021
For Lisbet,
love of my life
Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/books/book-pdf/1963888/book_9780262361507.pdf by guest on 27 December 2021
Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/books/book-pdf/1963888/book_9780262361507.pdf by guest on 27 December 2021
Introduction: Crime and the State through the Ages 1
1 Crime’s Ever- Expanding Universe 13
2 Crime before the State 39
3 Crime as a Social Problem 57
4 The State as Victim: Treason 73
5 Parallel Justice 99
6 Why Punish? 107
7 How to Punish? 117
8 Moderating Punishment 139
9 Crimes of Thought 149
10 Obliged to Be Good 173
11 From Retribution to Prevention 197
12 The State as Enforcer: From Polizei to Police 247





Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/books/book-pdf/1963888/book_9780262361507.pdf by guest on 27 December 2021
Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/books/book-pdf/1963888/book_9780262361507.pdf by guest on 27 December 2021
Of the state’s many tasks, none is more crucial than security. To 
protect us against foreign enemies, we have the military. Against 
domestic unrest, violence, and crime, the police and judicial system 
are the first line of defense. Despite declining rates of offending, 
fear of crime dominates modern politics— egged on by sensation-
alist media and politicians of all stripes hoping to appear tough- 
minded. Under President Bill Clinton and Prime Minister Tony 
Blair, even the center- Left parties in the United States and Britain 
joined the hard- on- crime bandwagon.1 The last two US presiden-
tial campaigns have rung out with dog- whistle appeals to law and 
order. Public surveys routinely identify crime as among citizens’ 
most pressing concerns. Yet at the same time we live in a world that 
is by any measure better ordered, less violent, and more peaceful 
than any in human history. Even accounting for the carnage of the 
twentieth century’s world wars, violence has nosedived over the 
past two millennia.2 Compared to the bloodthirsty sacrifices of pre-
historic states or the unthrottled savagery of absolutist executions, 
modern democratic regimes police us with a velvet glove— with 
more subtlety and ever less force. They discipline us into adopting 
civilized behavior through the institutions that shape our psyches 
and instincts to become model citizens— kindergartens, schools, 
armies, hospitals, workplaces, and, only as a last resort, prisons. 
Despite the attention lavished on prisons, fines— a mere slap on the 
wallet— have become the most common sanction in most nations 
outside the United States and the former East Bloc.
Introduction: Crime and the 
State through the Ages
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Most of us pass our lives avoiding serious contact with the law. 
Even today, with prisons bursting, less than 5 percent of Americans 
on average will ever spend time there. In other nations, far fewer 
do. The chances of dying of either cancer or heart disease— the 
kinds of eventualities we all reckon with— are together eight times 
greater. For the average middle- class, mainstream citizen, years pass 
without meeting uniformed officers face- to- face, and policing is 
something that happens at society’s margins: to minorities, the dis-
enfranchised, addicted, poor, and outcast. Nevertheless, the sense 
that crime is serious and growing hangs heavy in the air.
Punishment may have been moderated since the days of absolut-
ist excess, but has crime really diminished? With the birth of crimi-
nology in the late nineteenth century, social science developed a 
stake in sounding the alarm over inexorably advancing criminal-
ity, thus buffing its own sheen. Not only now- forgotten alarmists 
such as Cesare Lombroso and Max Nordau but even the great soci-
ologist Émile Durkheim assumed that crime advanced in tandem 
with civilization.3 We are heirs to this cultural pessimism. Whether 
it is true that crime has grown over time depends on how the ques-
tion is framed. In some respects, crime has indeed increased. Using 
the penal code to help regulate the new technology of motor vehi-
cles created the now single- broadest interface between citizen and 
police— indeed, the large majority of all contacts.4 The decision to 
criminalize inebriants has likely occasioned the second- largest source 
of prosecutions, with the prohibition of first alcohol and then other 
substances. American drug arrests climbed twelvefold from 1965 to 
the end of the century.5
These are, however, crimes we inflict on ourselves. They are acts 
that society has decided to consider and treat as penal transgressions 
but that could equally well have been dealt with by other means— or 
not at all. Smuggling was widespread in eighteenth- century Eng-
land because high tariffs, imposed by a state with few other sources 
of tax revenue, made it a lucrative enterprise. And it was hard to 
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combat because smugglers were popular, offering the average per-
son cut- rate goods. When England made primary schooling com-
pulsory in 1870, almost one hundred thousand parents of truants 
were hauled before courts in the law’s first year.6 Had crime really 
increased? Or had it merely been redefined upwards? To lament 
today that criminality is skyrocketing because prisons are crammed 
with pushers and users says less about our narcotics problem than 
about how we have dealt with it. It is rather like worrying that 
Armageddon must be nigh because the executioner is busy hanging 
more infidels and apostates than ever.
For other offenses, ones that are indisputably the sort intended 
for the penal code, reliable statistical answers are hard to come by. 
Definitions of crime have varied, as has victims’ willingness to report. 
Not every transgression exists objectively out there as an evident 
offense, even though all crimes are obviously defined in and by the 
penal code. Novel technologies have created new crimes where once 
there were none— phishing, say. The most commonly committed 
crime today is the robocall— 180 million daily in the US, half of all 
phone calls.7 Awash, as we are, in a cornucopia of pilferable objects, 
little wonder that theft is up. Yet stealing an unguarded cell phone in 
a metropolitan bus terminal is a different act than larceny of a firearm 
or other prized singular possession from a home in a seventeenth- 
century village— especially considering how buffered we are from 
the consequences of theft by our hypertrophied insurance industry. 
Whether victims of rapes are willing to report them and whether 
such violations are legally actionable have varied dramatically. Acts 
once illegal (adultery) are no longer, whereas formerly tolerated 
behaviors (spousal abuse) have become prosecutable. Whether such 
shape- shifting offenses have increased or diminished is hard to track.
Homicide— indisputable and hard to conceal— is therefore the 
most studied crime. Here we see a dramatic decline. In Europe, where 
the data over long periods are available, killings plummeted from 
one hundred per one hundred thousand inhabitants in the Middle 
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Ages to one per one hundred thousand by the early twentieth cen-
tury.8 This bears restating: over the past five centuries, average rates 
of homicide have declined a hundredfold. Today’s English are one 
percent as likely to be killed as Chaucer’s contemporaries. Dur-
ing the early period of frontier violence, the American colonies of 
the Northeast had rates as bad as those in medieval Europe, which 
then declined starting in the early seventeenth century. In the mid- 
eighteenth and again in the early nineteenth century, US homicide 
rates were comparable to the rest of the Western world. In the nine-
teenth century, they then rose again. The slave- holding South and 
the frontier West suffered much higher levels, though the West was 
long so sparsely populated that its statistics may be misleading.9
This happy decline of killings holds over the long run. But in the 
long term, as Keynes famously lamented, we are all dead. Political 
debates are not framed against centuries- long secular oscillations 
but against what happened last year. Crime and then imprisonment 
did rise during the final decades of the twentieth century as a blip 
on these larger and longer downward trends. Such temporary rever-
sals of the overall decline have occurred before— for example, in 
Sweden between the 1790s and the 1840s and in England from the 
1580s to the 1610s.10 The larger trend eventually reasserted itself, 
as it has again today in the United States. By the early 1990s, crime 
rates had levelled off and once again began to decline. In the United 
States, the numbers not only of murder but also of almost all other 
offenses have drifted downward over the past three decades, with 
a small uptick for some crimes again starting in 2016.11 The cost 
of massive incarceration has made itself felt, and Americans now 
debate how to reverse three- strikes rules and other avenues of over-
filling prisons.
Paradoxically, we feel beleaguered by crime at the very moment 
in history when mainstream citizens objectively have the least to 
fear. Why? If we take a long historical approach to how the state 
has dealt with crime, a few conclusions emerge. First, the state took 
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its own sweet time accepting as its task what we now count among 
its primary functions— fighting crime and adjudicating disputes. 
For most of recorded history, crime was left to civil society’s mem-
bers to sort among themselves. If lucky, they did so via informal 
mechanisms of mediation, paying or accepting restitution for harm 
done. But if they arrived at no understanding, the disputants took 
vengeance and fought blood feuds— sometimes stretching over cen-
turies. The Greeks and Romans had the rudiments of a judicial and 
policing system, but it had to be rebuilt after each of these empires 
fell. An ancient and continuous empire, China had law and courts, 
but even it outsourced most legwork to civil society— holding kin 
and village communities responsible for their members’ conduct 
rather than intervening directly. By the European Middle Ages, 
administering justice had gradually become the state’s remit again. 
The law codes of the sixteenth century bristled with regulations of 
urban citizens’ behavior, conduct, and deportment, but they were 
enforced haphazardly by whatever muscle the administrations of the 
day could muster. Policing, in the modern sense of a uniformed state 
authority seeking to apprehend and punish misdeeds, had to await 
the nineteenth century.
The state came late to this crucial function. But once it had 
accepted its mandate, it never looked back. Dealing with crime became 
and has remained one of its core tasks. By the sixteenth century, 
absolutist monarchs tortured their errant subjects in orgies of agony 
to frighten and thus deter the crowd in the town square. Yet such 
brutality could not continue. Moralists worried about its coarsening 
effect on the audience, realists questioned its effectiveness. When 
first built, prisons were intended as an admittedly costly but also 
merciful and potentially reformatory alternative to the noose and 
the blade.
A second conclusion is that the state eventually moderated 
its punishments— not because it pulled its punches but because 
it no longer had to be brutal. It was not the state’s humanitarian 
Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/books/book-pdf/1963888/book_9780262361507.pdf by guest on 27 December 2021
inclinations that prompted a softening of sanctions but its ever- 
growing power. Dismembering criminals in the town square was the 
equivalent of smoke signals in the era before the telegraph: the best 
the authorities could do. The state had to shout loudly to convey 
its deterrent threat. As executions were eventually hidden behind 
walls starting in the eighteenth century, they remained a deterrent. 
The public did not have to witness them to fear them. The modern 
state no longer had to swagger in all its grisly brutality. It governed 
ever more subtly— detecting, prosecuting, punishing, and eventu-
ally even preventing crime, all without rattling sabers.
Multiplying its capabilities, the state grew better able to detect and 
punish transgression. Now that it was more reliably able to punish, its 
sanctions no longer had to be severe. The Enlightenment philosophes 
rightly argued that predictability deterred more than ferocity. Dur-
ing the early modern era, the death penalty was reserved for violent 
crimes and in most nations eventually abolished. Starting in the eigh-
teenth century, torture was officially banned. Offenders were impris-
oned rather than banished, executed, or otherwise directly pained. 
Even prison was eventually regarded as harsh, and alternatives found 
for misdemeanants and juveniles. Today, the most common punish-
ment is the fine. That marks just how little overtly violent policing 
and punishing are required of the modern state. Most citizens are law- 
abiding and prosperous enough to atone through property and not 
their bodies.
The state moderated punishment from a position of strength. 
The more it knew about us, the more lenient it could be. The better 
its information, the stronger and more pervasive its forces, the more 
effectively and therefore benignly it could police. But the state’s 
growing power was only half the story. Civil society also increas-
ingly policed itself, leaving the state with fewer overt duties. This is 
the other half of the equation and the third conclusion. Kin, family, 
community, and church have long been the forces most immediately 
molding our behavior, especially in the millennia before the state, 
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too, piled into the act. Civil society’s role in controlling its mem-
bers’ conduct is obvious. But this function has expanded. The civi-
lizing process, to use Norbert Elias’s term, means we have gradually 
internalized the behavioral restrictions that were once impressed 
on us from the outside by social and governmental institutions.12 
The reward for self- control has been to be spared the state’s imposi-
tions. Democracy rests on self- discipline.
Elias myopically saw this self- discipline as a process that began in 
fifteenth- century Europe, not one that was more ancient, ongoing, 
and widespread. And it was a bitter irony that he published a theory 
of cultural self- discipline in 1939, on the eve of Europe’s descent 
into barbarism. Nonetheless, Elias identified a crucial motor force 
in history’s longue durée. Largely ignoring the dark sides of repressing 
instinct, he sociologized Freud’s theory of sublimation, examining 
on the level of society as a whole how dark and primal impulses that 
otherwise mar human interaction were channeled into acceptable 
behaviors. Even allowing for the twentieth century’s genocidal bar-
barities and the persistence of assault, rape, and murder, a broad 
scholarly consensus concurs that our lives today are far less blighted 
by interpersonal violence than ever before. The state has largely dis-
armed us and it polices our interactions. But it would be farfetched 
to explain this pacification solely in terms of our fear of legal sanc-
tion were we to act on our untamed aggressive impulses. A more 
plausible explanation is that we have curbed our propensity to vio-
lence by elevating our thresholds of arousal and anger.
We have learned to control ourselves in ways that would have 
surprised even our recent forebears. Instead of the burping, belch-
ing, farting, spitting, sneezing, snorting, indiscriminately defecat-
ing creatures of the early modern era, we are now a people who 
fastidiously control and suppress our bodily eruptions— more Vul-
can than Viking. Consider venereal disease as an example of how we 
have learned to master our bodies in ways now considered second 
nature. Strictly speaking, there is no such thing as a solely sexually 
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transmitted disease. Illnesses spread through sexual contact can 
equally well be passed along via other blood or mucous- membrane 
interactions. In the eighteenth- century European countryside, syph-
ilis propagated via daily interactions that today are rare: sharing the 
use of filthy household implements, spitting in or licking the eye to 
remove sties, sleeping many to a bed, and following earthy child- 
minding practices such as sucking babies’ penises to calm them, 
licking clean their runny noses, and prechewing their food.13 It is 
because of our changed habits that syphilis now spreads primarily 
via sex. Sex is the only infectious route that remains.
In sexual terms, too, we control ourselves better. The sexual stim-
uli surrounding us today, whether from advertising, styles of dress 
and deportment, or easy access to pornography, would have strained 
our ancestors’ self- control. In the 1840s, with the first trains, eti-
quette manuals advised young female travelers to hold pins between 
their lips as coaches entered tunnels and darkness descended, thus 
preventing stolen kisses from men in the carriages. It was custom-
ary for bedroom doors to be locked. A common trope of novels was 
the sexual signal of leaving them unfastened.14 Trying the door to 
find out was considered normal. Today, stolen kisses are actionable 
behavior, building codes frown on bedroom locks for safety reasons, 
and a houseguest rattling door handles might well not be invited 
back.
Modern society sees itself as sexually less tight- laced than the 
Victorians, but in fact we have adopted thresholds of male arousal 
higher than just a century ago. We are insouciant with respect to 
sex because we mutually agree not to act on stimuli that people 
earlier would have found difficult to resist. A sense of how things 
have changed can be had from observing the uncomfortable jux-
taposition of differing thresholds of sexual arousal in the multicul-
tural metropolis. While the local males in Scandinavian or German 
parks resist tumescence as efficiently as hard- baked nudists, tourists 
from abroad eagerly gawk at and photograph the seminude female 
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sunbathers there. The mixed saunas and nudist beaches, riverbanks, 
and parks of central and northern Europe mark an unusual degree 
of self- mastery.15
Or consider the automobile. We tolerate untold slaughter on the 
roads— as many deaths every year in the United States as during 
the entire Vietnam War. And yet, if anything, it is a miracle that 
the figure is not many times that. Our everyday assumption that 
we will arrive safely at our destination is based in part on the road 
infrastructure provided by government and on regulated automo-
tive safety— brakes, seatbelts, lights. It is the outcome, too, of policing 
errant transportation behavior such as speeding, tailgating, and road 
rage. But, above all, thanks is due to the average driver’s extraordinary 
self- control. We navigate pathways plied by what might otherwise be 
assumed to be inconsiderate, intemperate, distracted, and inattentive 
fellow voyagers who are maneuvering two tons of steel at high speeds 
within inches of our vital organs but who are also, in fact, almost as 
good as we are at reining in their animal spirits behind the wheel and 
remaining focused, attentive, and alert.
To govern self- mastering citizens is a different task than reigning 
over short- tempered, choleric, irritable, dyspeptic, impulsive early 
modern humans. Much of the behavioral control needed for dense 
urban life has in effect been shifted from the state to civil society. 
What remains in statutory hands requires less violence and force. 
Indeed, the modern state trains its powers largely on those citizens 
least likely to rein themselves in— the marginal, the poor, and other 
outsiders. The rest of us are policed only gently. Institutions have 
shaped our psyches and instincts to become model citizens.
Even so, the state has not stepped down. The behaviors consid-
ered offenses have changed dramatically over the past millennium. 
Many actions that once were illegal are now either private matters 
(such as most sexual behavior, what we wear, where we live, what we 
imbibe) or regulated by codes other than the penal (employment, 
public health, zoning, etc.). Yet many other acts have now become 
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illegal. New crimes respond to new technologies (securities fraud, 
insider trading), but we have also invented novel transgressions. 
Inchoate offenses, for example, make conspiring, planning, and 
intending to commit an offense in themselves crimes. The total sum 
of the prohibited has grown continuously. More laws now govern 
our behavior than ever before. And they encompass a broader vari-
ety of acts. Indeed, they go beyond acts to criminalize our inten-
tions, thoughts, and proclivities.
In other words, and this is the book’s final conclusion, at the same 
time as we have become more civilized, the state has extended its for-
mal reach, multiplying law and punishing us for transgressions. We 
have learned to delay gratification, moderate our impulses, resist our 
instincts, and act with a restraint, forbearance, and self- abnegation 
unknown in the early modern era. Yet the more we discipline our-
selves, the more law the state trains on us. One might have expected 
a trade- off between self- restraint and the law’s impositions. We now 
master ourselves. So why do we need more formal proscription? 
Should not the state’s legal apparatus be withering away?
On the contrary, seen over a long historical sweep, law and self- 
discipline have run in tandem: not only more discipline and social-
ization into correct conduct but also more law forbidding more 
behaviors and probing further into our minds and intentions. We 
undergo an increasingly insistent process of socialization to become 
functioning members of a specialized, sophisticated, dense, com-
plex, metropolitan civilization. Yet we also have an ever- growing 
law that governs our actions from above. We are caught more and 
more in an unforgiving forcefield between expanding formal prohi-
bitions and stricter requirements for personal mastery. The law plays 
a growing role in socializing us into the conduct required by modern 
society. Although most of us still keep up with this behavioral arms 
race, those who cannot fall further behind. Our jails are filled with 
the dispossessed and the marginal. The stark inequalities of modern 
society are becoming behavioral, not just economic.
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The state seems to have no intention of relinquishing its power 
to forbid and punish, relying instead on informal social control. We 
may now be socialized into proper behavior, but the realm of the 
illegal continues to grow. The state not only trains on us the institu-
tions of social discipline but also maintains and expands the law as a 
powerful tool of socialization. Our prisons are full of social outcasts. 
But for the rest of us, too, the law hovers ever present. As more acts 
are forbidden, as the state also delves into our thoughts, law con-
tinuously defines the parameters of allowable behavior. It restricts 
the scope of other arenas of socialization where we learn to rein our-
selves in. The state is the socializer of last resort for the dispossessed 
and defines the terrain on which the rest of us are schooled into 
acceptable behavior, narrowing evermore the turf on which we are 
expected to control ourselves.
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Who has prosecuted crime and what they were pursuing have 
changed dramatically over the course of human history. Gods and 
kin groups were the first enforcers; religious edict and customary 
precepts preceded statute and law. But the state eventually took up 
crime and its suppression as important tasks. The behaviors out-
lawed have also changed. Acts once forbidden are no longer, but oth-
ers that were once legally indifferent are now pursued. Whether the 
total number of offenses has increased is harder to discern. None-
theless, it seems that even though different acts are now illegal, 
there are more crimes on the books today than ever.
Crime and authority are joined at the hip. Without official stric-
ture, no crime. As dirt is matter out of place, weeds unwanted plants, 
and deviance behavior we disapprove of, so crime is action at odds 
with the law. Yet it took most of human development for this to 
become true. Of course, law is more than statute. Long before legal 
codes, custom and religious precept wove fabrics of regulation. Law, 
as Durkheim pointed out, was formulated only when custom began 
to lose its hold.1 Custom had no badges, truncheons, or penitentia-
ries, but it unleashed collective violence against those who snubbed 
its strictures. Norms were enforced communally long before laws 
formalized such obligations.2
At first, the supernatural policed this world, whether as mere sor-
cery or the divine itself. Gods punished offenses before kings did. 
Four thousand years ago, Egypt’s Middle Kingdom brought forth a 
Chapter 1
Crime’s Ever- Expanding Universe
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14  Chapter 1
concept of hell peopled by sinners. Individuals faced judgment, and 
punishment became a matter for both this and the next life.3 Jus-
tice in this world is rare. No wonder humanity’s longing for a fair 
shake demanded immortality of the soul and an afterlife. If death 
were but extinction, or if postmortem life were a morally neutral twi-
light zone, then evil would rarely be punished, or virtue rewarded.4 
As Socrates says in Plato’s Phaedo, if death were a separation from 
everything, it would be a godsend for the wicked.5 But postmortem 
punishment could be only retributive, at its worst an eternal suffer-
ing for a momentary lapse in the mortal world. If punishment after 
death were to be just, much less be able to reform or deter, it needed 
reincarnation or at least some sort of ascendable hierarchy of life 
after death.6
The ancient Chinese did not see law as connected to the divine, 
though this view may have been as due to polytheism’s inherent 
morcellization of divine power as to any lack of feeling for the super-
natural.7 Conversely, Egyptian pharaohs were powerful enough 
to feel no need for a source of law beyond themselves. Yet most 
other major ancient civilizations did connect law and the super-
natural: Mesopotamians, Jews, Indians, Greeks, Romans, Muslims, 
Incas, Aztecs, and, of course, Christians.8 Their earliest injunctions 
were religious, or at least supernatural, enforced by higher pow-
ers. Taboos were rules imposed by transcendent forces, sins their 
violation.9 When there were identifiable gods, sometimes they did 
the enforcing. In Greece and Rome, those struck by lightning were 
denied regular burials because they were assumed to have been 
punished directly by Zeus as perjurers. Since he handled matters, 
there was no need for human law on the subject.10
Yet it remained unclear why Greek gods bothered to punish mor-
tals. They did enforce order and balance, especially curbing our 
excesses of vengeance. But they acted for the same reason as their 
human subjects: anger at being wronged, not enforcement of code 
or principle. Why any specific offenders were punished, for what, 
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and even that they had been brought to heel— all that was unclear. 
In early societies, everything happened for a reason— spirits or 
gods offended, witchcraft invoked, magic gone wrong— nothing 
by chance.11 Offenders whom something ill befell therefore pre-
sumed they were being chastised.12 Gods’ favorite tool for punish-
ing humans was the weather, which could often be hard to divine.13 
Sin and crime were largely fused since both violated divine will. In 
the deep past, humans thus found themselves transgressing against 
norms nowhere spelled out, only vaguely apprehended, and often 
violated by the gods themselves. Punishments were meted out by (or 
on behalf of) higher forces. Before the state existed, sacrilege and her-
esy were the primal trespasses, the defying of transcendent powers. 
But all crimes, whether an attack on God, such as blasphemy, or on 
humans, such as murder, ultimately wronged the divinity by violat-
ing its commandments or wishes. All crimes were public wrongs, and 
all were sins.
Yahweh was a lawgiver and enforcer, laying waste to  followers 
who disobeyed him, threatening them with misery sevenfold their 
transgressions.14 Violating his covenant with his tribe was sin. 
Hebrew law was divine because it was God’s word. When Cain slew 
Abel, God, in the absence of any other humans than their parents, 
was judge, jury, and prosecutor, and the ground where blood had 
spilled was the only witness.15 Among the ancient Greeks, law was 
ultimately given by the gods, with codes submitted to the oracle at 
Delphi for approval.16 Yet divine law was also seen, as among the 
Romans too, as distinct from the gods, an abstract realm of ratio-
nality and natural order. Though formulated by the gods, it was 
also independent of them, not merely an expression of their will.17 
Christianity, in turn, was equally abstract and universal but more 
magnanimous. It regarded sin in terms of mortal weakness and 
divine forgiveness, Christ having died to save humans from their 
own evil. Penitence, not punishment, brought the sinner back into 
the fold.18
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Supernatural edicts did not govern all human action in antiquity. 
Worldly law regulated much everyday behavior even as the divini-
ties watched over what concerned them. But the overlap between 
edict and law was far greater than it later became. Secular and reli-
gious offenses were eventually distinguished, enforced respectively by 
state and church— though some cultures, notably Islam, continued to 
conflate the two.19 The state came to punish acts that violated secu-
lar law, which— as the gods were pushed aside— began to define the 
only enforceable public sanctions. Human law forbade many previ-
ously religious offenses: incest, slander, libel, usury, and perjury.20 Of 
119 offenses punished by execution in Sussex in the early seventeenth 
century, all but two were transgressions of the Ten Commandments.21 
Outside a few theocracies, purely religious offenses were eventually rel-
egated to the private sphere, punished not at all or only within volun-
tary communities of faith. Yet even the most secular modern societies 
keep blasphemy and sacrilege on the books as exceptions to this rule— 
though mainly to ensure public order, not to enforce theology.
The state thus came late to enforcing law and chastising offend-
ers. Even law formulated in statute was in place before the state 
did any punishing, whether among the ancient Jews or on ninth- 
century Iceland. Replacing the gods, the state eventually got to 
decide what crime was and what transgressions were punishable. 
Yet if the state is five thousand years old, assuming this power took 
it more than four millennia.
Except for the transgressions that affected it directly— treason, 
sacrilege— the state lacked until recently the will or ability to keep 
order and enforce norms. For most of history, disputes were resolved 
communally among the directly interested parties. Self- help was how 
conflict was dealt with, as it remains today among sovereign nations. 
When people harmed each other, kin groups righted the balance, 
shedding blood as vengeance or transferring value as compensa-
tion. Such private justice only gradually fell under the state’s remit. 
A judicial system, with the state punishing violations of collective 
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norms, was achieved incipiently by the ancient Greeks, Romans, and 
Chinese, but not again in the West until the Middle Ages. The state 
eventually defined crime by laying down the law, and it provided the 
means to deal with it: surveilling, policing, trying, sentencing, and 
punishing. As the state took on such tasks, broad changes followed. 
Punishing shifted from resolving conflicts between kin groups to 
publicly imposing generalized norms whose violation offended the 
whole collectivity. Rather than relying on civil society’s self- help, 
with families resolving disputes, the state enforced the communal 
interest by facing down transgression itself. Crimes became public 
concerns. Victims were no longer allowed to ignore an offense, much 
less settle it themselves. Since the state represented society as the ulti-
mate victim, whether and how to prosecute became its decision.
Even then, the road stretched out ahead. Echoes of private jus-
tice from the deep past could long be heard. In the 1790s, 80 per-
cent of criminal cases in England were still initiated by the victims, 
who also bore the costs. In the latter half of the eighteenth cen-
tury, courts finally began paying the expenses of bringing success-
ful felony prosecutions.22 Not until 1879 did the English establish a 
national system of public prosecutors, and it took another century 
for it to be made effective. Even today, prosecutions are sometimes 
handled privately in Britain. Shoplifters, for example, are often left 
to retailers to pursue.23 Authorities elsewhere enjoy a wide range of 
discretion whether to prosecute or not, ranging from extensive in 
Japan to almost nonexistent in Finland.24 In Japan and Germany, 
some crimes remain prosecutable only if the victim asks for it. Such 
Antragsdelikte in Germany include breach of the peace, domestic 
theft, exhibitionism, and poaching fish.25 Islamic law allows the 
families of murder victims to forgive killers— often for payment— 
and thus spare them death. And the role of the family, once the 
main enforcer, still shines through in contemporary disputes over 
how publicly to prosecute spousal violence, marital rape, and child 
abuse. But, on the whole, the state now leads in dealing with crime.
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As the state came to monopolize punishment, it resented pri-
vate parties poaching on its turf. Having once been the only means 
of redress, self- help was eventually forbidden, though vigilantism 
and other informal means of victims enforcing justice on their own 
have not vanished even today. Few developments in the history of 
the law and the state have been more important than the emerging 
concept of public offenses— the idea that crimes harm not just their 
immediate victims but also society as a whole. Torts (private dam-
ages) were gradually distinguished from crimes (public offenses). 
Criminal law, or punishable offenses against society, emerged as 
distinct from civil law, where private parties restituted harms. The 
oldest mention of this distinction dates perhaps from Roman law in 
194 CE, though the Greeks were familiar with it.26
As the state came to dominate law’s enforcement, punishments 
grew more moderate and subtle. Two major changes were at work. 
With emergence of representative government— initially republican-
ism and eventually democracy— laws no longer needed to be enforced 
by drastic means. Only despotic governments required severe pun-
ishments, Montesquieu observed. In republics (he included also 
monarchies), citizens were impelled to behave as much by honor, vir-
tue, and fear of disapproval as by punishment.27 Subjects had to be 
coerced, but citizens motivated themselves to obey. He might have 
added that the nature of law also changed, making it less burden-
some to follow. Laws emerged from decisions taken ultimately by 
citizens who, obeying them, conformed to what they had mandated 
their representatives to pass. Breaking the law now came closer to the 
self- inflicted harm that Immanuel Kant and G. W. F. Hegel discussed: 
thieves whose own right to property was undermined by their refusal 
to respect that of others.28 Described most generally, laws came to 
be self- imposed, and obedience was self- will. Legitimate law was vol-
untarily obeyed.29 Those regimes that most deviated from this par-
ticipatory ideal— autocracies and totalitarianisms— also imposed the 
harshest punishments.30
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Yet the lesser need for force when there is a political consensus 
was not the whole story. Yes, the state and society grew evermore 
symbiotic as political participation widened into democracy. But 
the state also grew increasingly able to enforce the measures result-
ing from this participatory process. The more powerful the state 
became, the less it had to flex its muscles.
In this process, the tools at the state’s disposal changed dra-
matically. The savage brutality of early punishments gave way to 
a subtler but also more regularized and broader enforcement. Spec-
tacular inflictions of pain in public were less needed to deter as the 
authorities developed new means of anticipating and preventing 
crime. Torture was no longer necessary to extract testimony once 
the burden of proof imposed by Roman law loosened in the late 
seventeenth century to allow conviction without two eyewitnesses 
or a confession. Subjects could now be punished on less evidence, 
as they were in those countries that did not insist on such a high 
standard in the first place, such as England. Banishment, mutila-
tion, death, and other cheap, cruel punishments were less urgently 
required once society marshaled the resources to afford the compar-
ative mildness of incarceration. Capital punishment was less press-
ing once the state successfully suppressed private vengeance. The 
state, in sum, no longer needed to show who was boss.
A state able to assert its might only intermittently had to hope for 
powerful deterrent effects from spectacular public demonstrations 
of it. At 1800, Britain’s criminal code was startlingly savage. Well 
more than two hundred capital offenses were enforced, mainly for 
forms of theft and often for trivial acts. Yet most violations were 
without consequence. Offenders went uncaught; if caught, unpros-
ecuted; if prosecuted, unconvicted; if convicted, unhanged. In 
sixteenth- century England, only 10 percent of those convicted of 
capital crimes were actually hanged. Even in the first half of the 
twentieth century, 45 percent of men and 90 percent of women 
condemned to die had their sentences reduced to life in prison.31 
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Harsh punishments could be imposed only sporadically on any-
thing other than abject subjects without provoking resistance.32 In 
any case, such severity absorbed resources otherwise available for 
other forms of enforcement.33 The harsher the punishment, the less 
it served an everyday function.
In contrast, the powerful omnipresent modern state hums away 
in the background, ensuring compliance less through manifest dis-
plays than by regular, predictable, moderate sanctions that it rein-
forces by a spectrum of behavioral encouragements— all rendered 
more effective by its subjects’ voluntary compliance. The stronger 
the state, the less draconian it needs to be. The law makes clear what 
transgressors can expect, and the judiciary metes it out.34 Moderate, 
foreseeable law enforcement was a core demand of the Enlighten-
ment philosophes, seeking to reform the early modern state’s grisly, 
sporadic flailing about. The English Reform Act of 1835 illustrates the 
point: it abolished the death penalty for many of the two hundred 
existing capital offenses and simultaneously extended to all munici-
pal boroughs the system of policing that London had introduced in 
1829.35 The law became both more lenient and better enforced. As 
the English state reduced the number of capital crimes in the nine-
teenth century, its conviction rates rose. Juries no longer resisted 
condemning defendants to their deserts when the balance between 
offense and sanction seemed just.36 Appearing merciful, the state in 
fact punished more citizens. It was nicer and yet more effective.
Yet more than rationality and humanitarianism were at stake 
here. Michel Foucault’s mantra was certainly true: the point was 
to punish better, not less.37 But better also meant less or at least less 
savagely. The contemporary state’s ability to relinquish much of 
the armamentarium of sanctions demonstrated its growing effec-
tiveness. It once brandished a panoply of pain: branding, flogging, 
mutilation, banishment, shame, death. Today it relies largely on 
prison and fines. That fines are the most common sanction shows 
how moderate punishments have become. In earlier eras, almost no 
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defendant pled guilty, most were acquitted, and the convicted some-
times were hanged. The law’s grasp was intermittent, localized, and 
sanguinary. Today it is constant, broad gauged, and comparatively 
low key. In early nineteenth- century England, a quarter of defen-
dants were acquitted.38 Today, many fewer are. Since prosecutors 
have done their homework, because offenders are no longer threat-
ened with disproportionately harsh punishments, and because 
plea bargains grease the rails of justice, most accused plead guilty.39 
Almost 80 percent of defendants before British magistrates’ courts 
enter guilty pleas, as do more than 90 percent of felony offenders 
in the United States.40 And of those tried, the vast majority are con-
victed. The 92 percent conviction rate achieved in the United States 
compares favorably with the 95 percent under Joseph Stalin’s trials 
in the late 1930s.41
Yet It Continues
And yet, for all the state’s subtlety, for all the cooperation between the 
penal code and other means the state uses to modify citizens’ con-
duct (school, market, workplace, family), the number and reach of its 
laws, the range of the formal and explicit codex of behavioral pre-
scription, continue to expand. The state has not withered away. Quite 
the contrary, it has grown. It is often noted that were every law punc-
tiliously enforced, all citizens would be criminals.42 The Kinsey report 
in 1948 argued that laws criminalizing sexual acts then considered 
deviant made 95 percent of the (male) population potential crimi-
nals.43 According to a police rule of thumb, a motorist followed for 
three blocks will end up committing a violation. Already in the 1930s, 
it was estimated that traffic laws— strictly observed— were violated 2.5 
million times daily in the United States.44 Assuming no recidivism, 
every single man, woman, and child thus crossed the law seven times 
annually. Few actions do not trespass one law or another.45
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Whether the range of criminalized behavior has narrowed or wid-
ened is hard to say, but it certainly has changed. As actions once 
outlawed have been removed from the penal code, new ones have 
been added. The number of laws in the penal code has massively 
increased. True, many statutes duplicate or add only nuance to pro-
hibitions already on the books. And many earlier laws accrete, rarely 
being removed. But even as some acts have been decriminalized, the 
range of offenses has also expanded. The US republic enforced half- 
a- dozen federal crimes at its birth, a couple hundred in the late nine-
teenth century, and more than four thousand today. The federal penal 
code has expanded massively, from eight pages in the 1875 version 
to almost nine hundred in the 2018 edition.46 Illinois has ten types 
of kidnapping offenses, thirty sex offenses, and forty- eight assault 
crimes. Virginia has twelve forms of arson and attempted arson, six-
teen kinds of larceny and receiving of stolen goods, and seventeen 
types of trespass crimes.47 Including regulations, not just penal stat-
ute, would add another ten thousand crimes. Perhaps some three 
hundred thousand US regulations are criminally enforceable.48
At first, all manner of actions were punished— crimes, torts, sins, 
and immorality, not to mention acts that today fall under health, 
labor, safety, zoning, economic, housing, and many other regula-
tions. Crimes punishable by death in early colonial America included 
idolatry, witchcraft, blasphemy, bestiality, sodomy, and adultery, 
most of which are no longer even offenses. Usury was once con-
sidered a sin, violating natural and religious law and punishable by 
death.49 Today it underpins banking— though only covertly in the 
Islamic world. Apostacy was once a capital crime in many religions, 
including Christianity, but is so today only in Islam, where it is not 
decreed in the Quran.50 Only gradually were things sorted out. Sin, 
as violation of God’s commands, was left to the church as religion 
separated from the state. It retains a sense of a collective, endur-
ing transgression rather than of an individual moral lapse, as when 
slavery is described as a stain that needs cleansing.51 Penal law once 
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governed ideological and theological beliefs as well as countless 
behaviors that we now consider personal choices but that once were 
the province of sartorial, sexual, sumptuary, or consumption codes. 
With the Enlightenment, however, authority’s role was understood 
as preserving order, not morality. Only acts that directly harmed 
others were to be banned. Matters of conscience and private belief 
ceased being the state’s concern. Moral wrongs fell to individuals 
and their conscience, only rarely did they remain the remit of the 
penal code. Disputes over individual harms were now sorted by the 
interested parties within the civil law.
The state also spawned other regulatory instruments to police 
many activities that were once covered by the penal code: work-
place and food safety, public health, labor relations, unemploy-
ment, zoning, competition and monopolies, construction, trade, 
 opening hours, and so forth. What we regard as social problems 
today were earlier handled by criminal law. Vagabonds, vagrants, 
beggars, Roma, prostitutes, demobilized soldiers, and other margin-
als, if away from the local community responsible for their upkeep, 
were shooed off elsewhere by penal sanctions.52 Credit markets 
were policed by debt slavery and debtor’s prison.53 The law allowed 
creditors to target debtors’ bodies, not their property. Debtors used 
to outnumber conventional criminals by far in prison, threefold 
in early nineteenth- century America. In Islamic jurisprudence, 
wherein corporal punishments were the primary coercive mecha-
nism, unpaid debt was the predominant basis for imprisonment.54 
The aim was coercive— forcing debtors to pay what they owed. Sen-
tences were indeterminate— until payment or creditors were oth-
erwise satisfied.55 Modern bankruptcy— with a proper discharge of 
debt— emerged from reform of this self- contradictory system in the 
early eighteenth century. Ultimately, it was back- stopped by jail, 
but— barring fraud— most cases came to be resolved without resort 
to prison.56 The problem was moved out of the penal code and into 
economic regulation.
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The actions left behind in the penal code are what we now think 
of as crimes— murder, theft, fraud, and the like. Offenses in this 
narrow modern sense have become the province of the state alone: 
they are acts that not only leave behind victims but also are seen to 
harm society as a whole. As crime’s focus narrowed, many public 
concerns were relegated to the private sphere. Sartorial rules once 
punished Romans who wore clothes in imperial purple, Aztec com-
moners in sandals, and Elizabethan Englishmen sporting felt hats 
on Sundays.57 Working on the Sabbath was forbidden, as was sac-
rilege and drunkenness. With a few exceptions, owning more than 
one loom was a penal offense in Tudor England.58 Medieval Iceland 
and England punished parents who failed to baptize their infants; 
Austria sanctioned mothers who took babies into their beds at 
night.59 Being out and about at night without pressing reason was 
once illegal, as was sleeping during the day.60
The ancient Greeks made stealing the clothes off a person in 
public (lōpodusia) a crime for which one could justly be killed on 
the spot.61 In early modern Holland, undressing a child was singled 
out as a crime— not for the reasons we might imagine, but because 
the cost of clothing made it worth stealing.62 Once a broad variety 
of sexual behaviors was forbidden, including homosexuality, sod-
omy, fornication, and adultery. Today, only necrophilia, bestial-
ity (with exceptions), and pedophilia are uniformly illegal. Incest 
was once defined expansively, criminalizing marriage with a broad 
range of family relations, including in- laws. Until 1907, British 
widowers could not marry their former wives’ sisters. For another 
fourteen years, deceased brothers’ widows remained forbidden 
fruit. Adultery was once a capital crime, one of the three inviola-
ble sins in the Bible, along with idolatry and murder. By the early 
nineteenth century, though, Bavaria punished it only if the harmed 
party insisted.63 Today adultery has largely vanished from the penal 
code— outside the remaining theocracies and eighteen US states.64 
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Once illegal and immoral, suicide is now considered a mental- 
health issue. Abortion, once punished as a variant of homicide, is 
increasingly treated as a regulatory problem. Euthanasia may be 
moving in this direction, too. Formerly a pressing public concern, 
blasphemy has been privatized. The initiative to prosecute it must 
come from a private party, claiming offense— if, indeed, the act can 
be pursued at all.65
Witchcraft these days is at most a public nuisance (Santería 
and other practices that include animal slaughter). As a crime, it 
has fallen victim not only to the general removal of religion from 
the state’s purview but also to a widespread skepticism of its effi-
cacy.66 Sorcerers are no longer charged with attempted murder 
however intensely they incant their spells and curses.67 Indeed, in 
India, where village witches are still persecuted in their commu-
nities, accusations of witchcraft have been criminalized.68 But the 
Catholic Church continues to fear the dark arts and trains priests in 
exorcism.69 The Bavarian police code had special provisions against 
occult activities. And in Canada, hucksters who prey on the psycho-
logically vulnerable can still be convicted for practicing dark arts.70 
Cursing, once an invocation of occult powers and thus a serious 
affront, is now just a harmless annoyance. Scolding, which used to 
be a major disturbance of the peace, no longer counts as a transgres-
sion.71 Public drunkenness has moved from being the reason for a 
majority of arrests in the United States in the 1940s and 1950s to 
causing a small fraction of that today.72 Public disorders that earlier 
led to arrest (begging, public sleeping, vagrancy) have been (partly) 
decriminalized.73 Slander, libel, and defamation became harder 
to commit as our ancient honor cultures, with their easily raised 
insults, faded.74 (Digital technologies, however, facilitate such 
offenses, and the rates of their commission appear to be rising, but 
at the same time they are making slander increasingly archaic.75)
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Crime Expands
Yet this narrowing of offenses has not freed us of the state’s imposi-
tions. Quite the contrary. Durkheim rightly pointed to how count-
less behaviors had been shifted from the penal law’s purview, but his 
anticipation that this move signaled the decline and obsolescence of 
the criminal code and repressive law in modern, complex societies 
was wide of the mark.76 In other respects, crimes defined in the law 
have massively expanded. They have enlarged in response to the 
growing complexity of human activity, giving us many more ways 
of harming each other, as well as in response to how the law itself 
has become increasingly sophisticated and elaborate. In the autoc-
racies and totalitarianisms, this relationship was painfully obvious. 
Not only did these systems multiply law in response to industrialized 
technologies, as in all political systems, but also many behaviors that 
in liberal democracies were transferred to the private realm here 
remained public and actionable. Fragile and paranoid, illegitimate 
regimes inherently expanded the opportunities to offend. But even 
liberal states, with their robust private spheres, have enlarged what 
is illegal and punishable. States have expanded illegality explicitly 
and consciously when faced with states of exception, feeling espe-
cially beleaguered. From Henry VIII’s massive inflation of treason-
able prosecutions to the English suspension of habeas corpus during 
the French Revolution to the Weimar Republic’s raft of emergency 
laws and on to current terrorism- inspired legislation extending the 
state’s surveillance and powers— regimes anticipating crisis have 
amplified the law’s reach.77
Liberal democracies, even in their everyday, peacetime function-
ing, have extended the law’s compass, criminalizing ever wider 
swaths of behavior. Assault and larceny made up 85 percent of all 
ordinary crimes reported in preindustrial Europe. In seventeenth- 
and eighteenth- century Massachusetts, fornication was the single 
most commonly punished offense.78 Since then, the number and 
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variety of crimes prosecuted, or the ways of contravening the law, 
have increased dramatically.
Start with the simplest. New technologies have created behav-
iors just waiting to be punished. Counterfeiting was not actionable 
before currency came into widespread use, or check bouncing before 
banks, not to mention money laundering. And of course the crimes 
associated with money have changed in tune with technologies of 
value transfer, from shaving the edges off coins to holding up cus-
tomers at ATMs and committing digital bank fraud. Public urination 
could not be actionable before indoor plumbing. Shoplifting became 
more common as the goods were no longer hidden behind the mer-
chant’s counter. Mail fraud attended on the post. Towns policed who 
could inhabit them in the Middle Ages, but violations of immigra-
tion law awaited the development of the nation- state. Before locks 
became widespread, everyone carried their valuables with them, 
and theft was largely petty larceny of consumables.79 Pickpocketing 
increased with urbanization.80 The invention of anesthesia brought 
great blessing, but it also created a class of drugs whose misuse was 
then made actionable. Traffic policing started as early as the seven-
teenth century. Furious driving of horse- drawn carriages and even 
driving without reins were infractions in the nineteenth century, but 
that today’s police would spend much of its time regulating cars was 
not foreseeable.81 A large section of the Virginia criminal code covers 
railroad crimes, which may not be much enforced any longer. But 
the offenses associated with automobiles (carjacking, joyriding, auto 
theft) have mushroomed. Driving back and forth in the same area 
(cruising or “repetitive unnecessary driving”) has gone from an inno-
cent pleasure to a crime.82 Indeed, traffic policing has become a gate-
way for authority’s continued ingress into everyday life. Exercising 
their regulatory powers over automobiles— stopping cars for moving 
violations, expired registration stickers, or broken running lights or 
at inebriation checkpoints— police have assumed expansive abili-
ties to detain and investigate any member of the motorized public.83
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New business models have led to new crimes: forgery, insider 
trading, mail- order peculation, breach of trust, wire fraud. The emer-
gence of corporations created new legal personae, which, at least in 
the Anglo- American realm, could be held liable for infractions of 
the law. More laws criminalize business behavior, with fewer due- 
process restrictions, than target the poor.84 The growth of bureau-
cracy spawned the vast field of white- collar crime. As a total of 
federal criminal prosecutions in the United States, such offenses 
rose from 8 percent in 1970 to 24 percent in 1983. Fraud has con-
tinued to evolve and expand, chasing the possibilities for deception 
permitted by ever new and more sophisticated business practices.85 
The administrative complexity of modern polities allowed oppor-
tunities for leverage, corruption, and blackmail that had to be 
recognized before they could be outlawed. Only in 1863 did the 
French forbid extorting hush money.86 Price fixing and other abuses 
of monopolies, tax and securities fraud, and foreign bribery all 
eventually were attended by possible prison sentences.87 Because 
the United States developed an equities market earlier than most 
nations, insider trading became a crime there by the 1930s, but not 
until later elsewhere. To regulate potentially dangerous consumer 
products, whether baby blankets, ski slopes, or airplanes, liability 
law mushroomed in the late twentieth century with an orgy of law-
suits forcing manufacturers to internalize the costs of safety.88
Formerly private relations have been made public and actionable. 
We smirk at the minute behavioral regulation of the early modern 
codes— forbidding sloth and adultery, for example. Yet though sex-
ual relations have been largely turned over to the private sphere, 
the modern state has again begun poaching on the same turf. The 
Mann Act, passed in the United States in 1910, allowed federal pros-
ecutors to track down extramarital sex throughout the nation.89 
Although that ability was reined in by the 1980s, sexual relation-
ships with and among the young have become increasingly policed. 
Raising the legal age of consent expanded the scope of statutory 
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rape.90 Sexual relations in the workplace have come to be regulated 
by law, not by custom. Even among equals— students at university, 
say— relations are a matter of statute. No longer regarded as a Kava-
liersdelikt, a petty offense, rape has been prosecuted more frequently 
and seriously.91 Its scope has expanded, too. What used to require 
force and was widely regarded as properly a crime only if a demon-
strably virtuous woman was hurt became an offense no matter who 
the victim. It also became premised on lack of consent, a much 
wider definition that did not necessarily involve violence. Acts that 
once would have been considered sexual coercion or assault, such 
as oral or anal penetration, came to be classified as rape proper.92 
Even wives— long regarded as their husband’s property— eventually 
could be considered to have been raped. Other acts of forced sex 
were specified in evermore painstaking detail. Oral copulation, 
for example, was finely parsed and considered a crime if achieved 
by immediate threats of violence, threats for the future, or threats 
against others than the victim; if perpetrated on an unconscious 
or intoxicated person; if presented fraudulently as serving a profes-
sional purpose; if initiated and achieved by someone pretending to 
be known to the victim or by other artifice; or if ordered by some-
one pretending to be a or invoking public authority.93
Behaviors once relegated to the private sphere as part of personal 
morality have remerged as public concerns. Rather than being out-
lawed as immoral, they are now punished as harmful. Once consid-
ered immoral, pornography is pursued because it objectifies women, 
encourages rape, and helps spread venereal disease.94 Where prosti-
tution has been outlawed, similar arguments apply to it. In the 1960s 
and 1970s, Sweden not only tolerated prostitution but also actively 
encouraged sex workers to organize, pay taxes, and service the hand-
icapped, old, and others who could not otherwise find erotic satis-
faction on their own. In recent years, however, it has clamped down 
once again on commercial sex as exploiting women and encour-
aging trafficking. Zero- tolerance policing has used neighborhood 
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blight as the motive to turn once barely actionable behaviors (loi-
tering, public urination, graffiti, panhandling) into offenses. Public 
drunkenness has been a long- standing problem, but not until 1873 
did it become a crime in France.95 The wave of drug legislation that 
swept the twentieth century rendered illegal behaviors that were 
otherwise widespread and popular. Homelessness may not precisely 
have been criminalized, but its effects have often been left to the 
police to deal with.96
The paterfamilias’s remit has narrowed, with the state extend-
ing its wing over many functions that were once the family’s pur-
view. Women and children were emancipated into full legal status 
directly subject to the state, not to the husband and father. Domes-
tic violence against children and spouses became a crime, no longer 
acceptable or considered somehow natural patriarchal conduct.97 
Tolerated by the Romans, infanticide became prosecuted by the 
Christian Church for moral reasons, then later by states as they 
expanded their claims to define who merited legal protection as 
subjects.98 Already in the sixteenth century, births in England were 
registered, signaling official interest in the infant citizen.99 School-
ing was eventually made compulsory, and parents were punished 
for their children’s truancy. Vaccinating children, too, was required 
in the mid- nineteenth century as more parental responsibilities 
became legal obligations. As the state narrowed the parameters of 
acceptable parenting, removal of children from families became an 
everyday occurrence. Victorian parents would have been surprised 
to discover that their great- great- grandchildren could lose custody 
of their offspring for emotional neglect. Today, leaving children 
unsupervised for almost any time, under any circumstances, is 
criminalized.100 Lowering the age at which minors can be tried as 
adults further limited the family’s remit.101
As the definition of property vastly expanded, so too did theft. 
Removing customary gleaning, pasturing, and other collective 
rights on common lands in the eighteenth century made those 
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rural poor who continued what had once been legitimate activities 
now guilty of larceny. Property rights were continuously created in 
new realms, especially the ethereal. Not until the early eighteenth 
century did it count as stealing to palm off someone else’s ideas or 
even exact words as your own. But after that, countless violations of 
intellectual property began to be enforced.102 The rights of persons 
to themselves expanded the harms others could do them. Unpro-
tected by free- speech rights, classical age satirists in Greece did not 
attack their contemporaries for fear of being prosecuted for defa-
mation.103 Starting in the sixteenth century, slanderous, libelous, 
and other kinds of attacks on reputation became actionable in com-
mon law. Developing rights of personality and publicity allowed 
prosecution of those who would harm (or use features of) others’ 
individuality.104 As globalization and multiculturalism increasingly 
juxtaposed different religions, blasphemy laws that once seemed to 
be fading with secularization and indifference have been revived.105
Legal personalities, those with actionable rights, have also multi-
plied. Whether unborn children could be plaintiffs and, if so, starting 
at which point in gestation varied with a given jurisdiction’s abortion 
laws. Singling out attacks on pregnant women that caused damage 
to their fetuses enlarged or at least deepened the pool of potential 
plaintiffs.106 Making femicide a crime in itself (fifteen countries and 
counting), with especially stringent penalties, increased the number 
of women victims. The expanding roster of licensed professions (now 
18 percent of the US labor force) gave more practitioners a stake in 
having their uncertified colleagues prosecuted.107 The status of who 
or what could be a plaintiff expanded beyond the human, too. 
Trusts, corporations, municipalities, ships, nation- states, and other 
inanimate entities have received enforceable rights. Animals used 
to be pursued for harms they may have committed, but those who 
hurt them are now held liable.108 Our relationship to animals more 
generally has become evermore the law’s business, whether for-
bidding the keeping of pigs in big cities in the nineteenth century 
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or determining which kinds of dogs are valid pets.109 And nature 
itself— rivers and forests, for example— has become a plaintiff.110
Technological, social, and economic developments may have 
driven the law to respond by expanding, but the legal system itself 
also unfolded luxuriously under its own steam. Long- forbidden 
actions grew like Jack’s beanstalk. As a specific form of theft, embez-
zlement emerged in English law in 1799, arising from a case where a 
bank clerk pocketed a customer’s cash while noting it as deposited to 
the account- holder’s credit. The customer was no worse off, but the 
bank had suffered a loss that existing law could not touch since the 
money had never actually been in its possession. From such humble 
beginnings, embezzlement expanded from a transgression that only 
those in certain specific relationships of trust could commit (a crime 
of betrayal) to a general offense applicable to anyone entrusted with 
property.111
From the sixteenth century on, perjury grew to mirror the increas-
ing use of oaths, now sworn by witnesses to deliver the certain testi-
mony that earlier had been ensured by ordeals and torture.112 Oaths 
ceased being reliant on adherence to a particular or, indeed, any reli-
gion. At least in the common law nations, they became more com-
monplace elements of bureaucratic practice, not just reserved for 
courtrooms. Tax declarations, for example, commonly require an 
oath to their accuracy. With no less than eighteen sections of the US 
Code now dealing with perjury, more citizens have become poten-
tially liable to it.113 In the 1970s and 1980s, fraud expanded to cover 
circumstances where nothing was foregone or any laws violated, but 
where victims had nonetheless lost an “intangible right,” such as the 
duty of public officials to provide honest and faithful services. From 
a narrowly defined action not applicable even when someone kept 
property entrusted to them, larceny has enlarged and can now be 
committed even by actions once seen as innocent, such as keeping 
money paid out to one by mistake. Bribery expanded in the 1990s to 
encompass also the lesser offense of receiving illegal gratuities.114
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Laws once intended for specific purposes have grown to include 
a smorgasbord of behaviors. Grober Unfug (disorderly conduct), 
defined in eighteenth- century Germany for use against noisome 
street urchins, was extended to include everything from carpet 
beating after- hours to press offenses to Social Democrats’ distribu-
tion of pamphlets.115 Treason broadened from collusion not just 
with enemy nations but also with nonstate actors, such as terror-
ists.116 The right to free speech is certainly more generous now 
than in the era when most criticism of the authorities was action-
able, not to mention the restrictions imposed by blasphemy. But 
in other ways its limits have stiffened with additional restrictions 
ranging from hate- speech prohibitions to the broader definition of 
libel.117 The right of public assembly has narrowed. The authorities 
tolerate less chaos than was allowed in eighteenth- century demon-
strations and protests. Our earlier right of spontaneous assembly 
today requires all manner of permits and permissions, applied for 
beforehand.118
Even within their narrowed remit, modern penal codes still pun-
ish a panoply of behaviors, ceding little ground to the broad police 
powers of the early modern period. US states criminalize many acts 
that few citizens contemplate in the first place: selling untested spar-
klers, exhibiting deformed animals, leaving animal carcasses on pub-
lic roads, cheating at cards, provoking dogs to fight, selling perfume 
as a beverage, training bears to wrestle, and frightening pigeons 
away from devices meant to capture them. Forbidding the removal 
of fire- safety tags from mattresses is often given as an example of 
allegedly excessive criminalization.119 The concept of police power 
expressed the early modern state’s expansive authority over its sub-
jects but is usually thought to have been superseded by the rule of 
law with the rise of the modern Rechtsstaat, a state based on law. In 
fact, far from being anachronistic, such police powers continue in 
parallel to the penal code, now sometimes in the guise of adminis-
trative or regulatory law.120
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Criminalizing proxy behaviors to get indirectly at underlying 
acts has bloated the penal code. Driving underage, driving while 
intoxicated, driving too fast, driving with defective equipment, and 
so forth are all separate crimes (implicit endangerment offenses) 
intended to punish dangerous locomotion without giving traffic 
police carte blanche to haul any motorist into court.121 It took years 
after automobiles became common for speed limits to be instituted at 
all since motorists insisted that police worry instead about unsafe— 
not necessarily fast— driving.122 That was but a blip on a broader 
development that has criminalized largely all automotive behavior. 
With driverless cars and the elimination of noisome human wetware 
from the transportation process, perhaps such laws will fade. Prohib-
iting proxy behaviors also motivates laws that forbid the possession 
of drug paraphernalia, tools useful in burglaries, or knives suitable for 
attacks.
Because penal codes are hemmed in by due process, authorities 
have also marshaled civil and other noncriminal codes to prosecute 
offenses. In California, almost as many acts have been criminalized 
outside the penal code as within it, including school principals fail-
ing to use required textbooks, teachers neglecting to bring first- aid 
kits on school outings, and citizens gambling on the results of elec-
tions. In Minnesota, 83 percent of recent crimes created by statute 
have been codified outside the penal code, 91 percent in Okla-
homa.123 The civil law requires only a lower standard of evidence, 
allowing greater flexibility and prosecutorial follow- through. Civil 
law is routinely used against offenses such as insider trading, ter-
rorism, and pedophilia. Store owners, for example, can prosecute 
via criminal law for the return of stolen items. Using civil recov-
ery laws, they can also collect up to five times their value.124 Civil 
asset forfeiture— the confiscation of property allegedly involved in 
crime— has long historical roots in English law, not to mention bib-
lical precedence. As of the 1980s, it was put to use again. In effect, 
it punishes while enforcing, inflicting drastic sanctions on those 
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not yet convicted of crimes, such as drug selling or money laun-
dering, while forcing them to prove their innocence, bereft of the 
penal code’s protections.125 More generally, authority has informally 
expanded the limits of its executory powers by punishing outside 
the law. Extrastatutory harassment, including death, is an unac-
knowledged weapon in the state’s arsenal. Thousands have been 
killed in pacifying the favelas of Rio de Janeiro or in fighting drug 
use in the Philippines. In El Salvador, ten times as many criminals 
as police die in gunfire with each other, a figure that suggests routin-
ized extralegal executions. In 2015, forty times as many US residents 
were killed by police than legally executed.126
Law has begun to punish formerly legal behaviors. Victimless- 
crime laws ban perceived moral failings even though arguably no 
one is harmed. Knowing of a possible crime without reporting it has 
become an offense in its own right. Misprision of treason, or failure 
to report plots or political crimes, was criminalized in late eighteenth- 
century Europe.127 That offense has now expanded. Crimes of omis-
sion or the absence of action would once have seemed a contradiction 
in terms. Today, not reporting a crime or failing to prevent children 
in your care from committing one is actionable.128 Good Samaritan 
laws punish those who do not help others in distress. Similarly, not 
protecting someone under our care has become actionable in Anglo- 
American common law. Such expansion of law’s remit is clear in the 
common law nations, where protecting against harm is the basis of 
the penal code. In the civil law tradition, the tendency is, if anything, 
stronger. In Germany, the criminal law protects legal goods (Rechts-
güter), which cover— however much the concept harm may have 
recently expanded— an even wider spectrum: everything from traffic 
safety to the environment and international peace.129
More generally, the law has also expanded its remit by moving 
from acts to thoughts. It once punished only deeds already commit-
ted, hoping for deterrence by inflicting public agonies on perpetra-
tors. It has since begun enforcing law preventively— anticipating and 
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punishing action not yet undertaken. Intent is thus penalized much 
like act. New thought crimes have emerged, even as formerly crimi-
nalized ideas such as blasphemy and sacrilege became legal. In the 
seventeenth century, courts began punishing defendants not for the 
crime itself but simply for being suspected of having committed it 
(Verdachtsstrafe). Since the offense was a lesser one, sentencing was 
adjusted accordingly to something short of death.130 Once endanger-
ing (posing a risk but not yet actualizing it) became a crime in its own 
right, the mere possibility of harm became actionable.131 Inchoate 
crimes, which target intent, in turn massively expanded the range of 
outlawed actions. Attempts, conspiracy, and solicitation were added 
to their underlying acts as new crimes, thus quadrupling the num-
ber of substantive offenses. Merely talking about committing a crime, 
even if nothing came of it, could be punishable. If a transgression did 
result, conspiracy was added as an additional offense to the act itself. 
More than a quarter of all federal criminal prosecutions in the US 
now involve conspiracy.132 In the United Kingdom, incitement (the 
British version of solicitation) blossomed into the new wide- ranging 
offenses of encouraging or assisting crime.133 People were sent to 
prison for second- order inchoate crimes, such as conspiracy to solicit. 
To gather tools usable in burglary could be prosecuted as an attempt 
to attempt to attempt to commit larceny— three levels of offense.134 
Hate- crime laws increased the penalties for offenses motivated by a 
dislike of protected categories of citizens. They thus added a punitive 
premium for the emotion that sparked what would otherwise have 
been a commonplace transgression.135
Along with actual perpetrators, accessories and accomplices to 
crimes have increasingly been held liable, too— those who par-
ticipated only vicariously or indirectly in the offense or knew of 
it without reporting it. Who counts as an accomplice has steadily 
broadened. Sometimes the intent of this expansion has been to 
spare perpetrators. In postwar Germany, various levels of accomplice 
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liability were carefully parsed to relieve Nazi criminals of harsh sen-
tences.136 But in general the intent has been to rope in a larger circle 
of offenders. A horrific court case from sixteenth- century England 
punished the husband who tried to kill his wife with a poisoned 
apple but saw his daughter die instead as the treat was passed along 
to her. But the friend who had counseled him on how to murder 
and supplied the poison went free since the child’s death had not 
been his intent.137 Such fine distinctions were quickly subsumed. 
Already during the French Revolution, accomplices were punished 
as severely as those whom they helped offend. Up to this point, Eng-
lish law had not allowed prosecution of accessories except where the 
main offender had also been convicted, but as of 1848 they could be 
charged independently and, indeed, as principals.138
Jurisprudence has formulated a spectrum of complicity: direct 
and indirect participants, solicitors and facilitators, as well as acces-
sories before and after the fact— those who obstructed justice, those 
who received stolen property, and the like.139 An ecosystem of crim-
inality developed around the offense. Accomplices could be pun-
ished even for trivial and tangential assistance: preparing food for 
the offender, holding his child, lending a smock.140 In the common 
law nations, many counted as accomplices because all killings com-
mitted during a felony were deemed murders. Thus, in 2007 a man 
was jailed for life because friends used his car to commit a murder- 
robbery while he was asleep somewhere else, dead drunk.141 Those 
who threatened but not did commit harm began to be punished. 
So were those who did nothing. When second offenses flowed nat-
urally from the first, an accomplice to the initial crime automati-
cally counted as participating in the latter.142 Outlawing conspiracy 
allowed the authorities to prosecute groups for doing something 
that if undertaken individually would have been legal. French civil 
servants were welcome to resign individually but not in groups. A 
solitary walk was unobjectionable; many simultaneous walks became 
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an illegal demonstration. Two people would be much more leni-
ently sentenced if each one sold marijuana individually than if they 
hawked the same amount together.143
Law has expanded over the past many centuries. America has 
begun debating overcriminalization, the bloating of the penal code, 
and the metastasization of criminal punishments throughout stat-
ute.144 If nothing else, multiplying and dispersing sanctions blur the 
moral message of right and wrong that law should convey. Indeed, 
they impede citizens from even knowing what rules they are expected 
to follow.145 The survey here shows that evermore law is a long and 
broad development, not a problem only in contemporary America. 
Already in the first century BCE, Cicero complained of more law, 
less justice. Nor has the march toward more laws and more behav-
iors punished been uniform and inexorable. Occasional reverses have 
been booked. Early in the new millennium, the US narrowed the defi-
nition of government corruption, making it harder to prosecute.146 
White- collar crime— insider trading, for example— may have been cir-
cumscribed and therefore prosecuted less tirelessly in recent years.147 
Nonetheless, the overall direction is unmistakable.
This trend poses a paradox. Levels of violence and disorder have 
dropped dramatically over the past several centuries. The state has 
monopolized violence, building an evermore efficient apparatus of 
enforcement and punishment. And citizens have ever better con-
trolled themselves, self- regulating their psyches as required by mod-
ern metropolitan life. Yet the number of crimes they are potentially 
liable for has increased. Even as the state has become a more subtle, 
regular, and ubiquitous sanctioner, even as citizens are evermore 
socialized into correct conduct, the number of laws and the range 
of behaviors they formally punish have also mushroomed. The 
need for law seemingly declined, yet its amount and sway increased. 
Why? Before we can answer that, we need an idea of what held true 
before the state began throwing its weight about.
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Transgressions were punished long before the state assumed that 
task as part of its monopoly on violence. Gods were arguably the 
first police, though they were often indifferent and distracted 
enforcers. Besides smiting sinners directly, divinities also worked in 
tandem with the customary regulation that kin groups enforced on 
their members. Once sin and crime began to be distinguished, the 
former fell to the church, the latter to the state. But this change 
took a long time, and only well into the early modern era did the 
state start performing its role unchallenged by either church or kin.
Before states began to issue statute as the rulebook for their sub-
jects, customary law and social norms formulated guidelines to live 
by. But above them were the edicts of the gods, binding on all believ-
ers. The earliest clan societies, uniting several kin groups, lived in fear 
of violating the precepts of supernatural entities, which were made 
known through the intermediation of shamans, witches, sorcerers, 
and other go- betweens. As societies enlarged, growing more complex, 
they united multifarious groups among whom less could be taken 
for granted. Accompanying this growing complexity— whether as 
cause or effect is hotly debated— religions emerged to enforce codes 
of conduct, from which morality eventually evolved. This mold-
ing of human behavior occurred either at the behest of moralizing 
high gods, such as the Abrahamic divinity or Allah, or by creeds that 
dispensed broad supernatural punishment through means such as 
karma in Buddhism. Policed by omniscient, omnipotent big gods, 
Chapter 2
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these complex societies developed cooperative habits that gave them 
advantages over less- sociable ones.1
God’s role in law enforcement raised issues. Technically speak-
ing, divinities had only limited sanctions at their disposal. If the 
consequences of transgression were overly specified, gods risked 
being unmasked as shooting blanks. Bad weather, illness, death, and 
other— in any case— likely events were the most plausible indica-
tors of divine wrath, but their import was often hard to fathom. 
Nor is it clear why omniscient and omnipotent gods needed mortal 
justice. Often they did not, instead intervening directly to punish 
offenders. So annoying did the gods of Mesopotamia find human-
ity’s constant din that they struck back.2 Roman gods punished 
oath breaking directly. In sixth- century Gaul, perjurers were para-
lyzed, their right hand raised in oath, or they contracted gangrene 
in the offending limb or were struck dumb as God brought justice 
to earth.3
When the gods intervened directly, they also undermined human 
justice, and temporal authorities risked being cut out of the loop. A 
sincere confession, which in the early medieval Latin Church could 
be given to anyone, not just to priests, might set things right with 
God, eliminating mortal sanction. Twelfth- century Europeans pon-
dered whether if sinners contritely confessed to gain absolution, a 
subsequent ordeal would exonerate them. A fornicating fisherman 
from Utrecht, for example, fearing he would be accused at the next 
synod, confessed to his priest. Having resolved to sin no more, he 
carried the hot iron without being burned. Repentant offenders, 
who had settled their affairs with God, were often miraculously 
saved from the gallows.4
The nature of their divinity influenced gods’ relation to the law. 
Though the earliest gods demanded and appreciated tribute, they 
were often uninterested in making humans toe some moral line.5 
Polytheistic religions’ confused command structure muddled who 
issued laws on what. Chinese gods could work against human purpose. 
Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/books/book-pdf/1963888/book_9780262361507.pdf by guest on 27 December 2021
Crime before the State  41
Greek gods countermanded each other, making unclear or contra-
dictory demands. Gods often paid humankind no mind. Sometimes 
human prayer could compel them to react.6 Other times secondary 
divinities (such as Prometheus) sided with humans and were pun-
ished for it. Pantheists worshipped gods whose influence was local 
and circumscribed. How did humans then know what divinities 
expected of them? The hierarchy of gods meant a ranking of edicts, 
too— some more pressing than others. Multiple near- omnipotent 
beings— such as the Greek gods— acting on no discernable basis of 
justice or morality unsettled their subjects.7 Monotheism helped 
clarify matters. A single power issued commands binding on all 
members of the faith everywhere. But even such pronouncements 
required interpretation and could be mutually incompatible. Mat-
thew contradicted and revised Moses’s commandments.8 And the 
Christian God could also be petty, or so humans thought. Renais-
sance Italians assumed that God, just like everyone else, pursued 
vendettas.9
Hoping to assert their exclusive connection to the supernatural, 
religions branded their rivals as mere sorcery. Secular authorities, 
too, mercilessly persecuted witches and sorcerers, competing claim-
ants to power who had failed to assume the aura and trappings of 
true divinity. In Hammurabi’s code (Babylonia, ca. 1750 BCE), the 
worst crimes were witchcraft and offenses against the administra-
tion of justice and religion. The Chinese penal codes hounded sor-
cerers.10 Monotheism accentuated this tendency. Though enlisting 
miracles to persuade converts, Judaism and Christianity distanced 
themselves from the welter of competing doctrines that used what 
they dismissed as mere magic. Two forces reigned supreme, God 
and Satan, with only secondary room for demons, saints, wonder 
rabbis, and holy objects. The medieval church persecuted witch-
craft and sorcery as pagan delusions, even as it considered that its 
own miracles proved God’s existence.11 Eventually it handed off 
punishing witchcraft to secular courts— in England, Scotland, and 
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Germany as of the sixteenth century. Heretics, too, were turned 
over to the secular powers for execution.12
The Jews’ covenant with God promised them prosperity so long 
as they followed it or disaster if they did not.13 In Leviticus, God 
detailed what he would inflict on disobedient Israelites: plague, 
famine, savage beasts, cannibalism.14 The Old Testament forbade 
immorality, blasphemy, murder, usury, witchcraft, theft, seduction, 
bestiality, assassination, manslaughter, assault, kidnap, slander, 
bribery, perjury, treason, and riot. It treated all largely as offenses 
against God. Death was the punishment for many offenses, though 
it was often unclear whether God or human authority was to do 
the enforcing.15 Those who afflicted widows and orphans, however, 
could be sure that God himself would kill them with a sword as 
punishment.16 In the ninth century, Charlemagne invoked divine 
law to warn murderers that both God and he would punish them. 
As late as the sixteenth century, Martin Luther insisted that authori-
ties enforcing the law acted on God’s behalf.17
The gods punished directly but also at human behest, as when 
magistrates at Teos and Sparta invoked curses at offenders.18 Oedi-
pus pronounced a curse against the unknown killer of Laius, but, 
as it turned out, Oedipus himself was that killer. Roman law distin-
guished between ius (profane criminal law) and fas (sacral crimi-
nal law), the latter dealt with by the pontifex, the chief high priest. 
Early Germanic law codes may have distinguished between sacral 
offenses (violating the peace of gods and people alike by arson, 
homicide, fornication, and so forth) and profane, less- serious 
breaches of the peace of the people.19 In the first century CE, Taci-
tus wrote that German priests, standing in for the gods, punished 
warriors.20 Sacrifices— including of humans, as among the Egyp-
tians, Nordics, Germans, and Incas— revealed how eagerly believers 
aimed to please their gods.21 For Aztec gods, human blood was their 
nourishment.22 Hopes of propitiating angry gods long remained a 
motivating force. The country- wide fast ordered in England in 1832 
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to atone for whatever sins had caused that year’s cholera epidemic 
was only one such national self- flagellation that the British Parlia-
ment hoped would catch the Almighty’s eye.23
Besides intervening in this world, gods could threaten punish-
ment in the next. Only some religions imagined the afterlife as atone-
ment. The Aztec and related Mesoamerican religions foresaw nothing 
but total extinction for all, good and bad.24 For non- Axial religions— 
immanentist, not transcendent— which often saw postmortem life 
as but an extension of this one, no great shift was required. But 
Hinduism and Buddhism, where the law of karma punished this 
life’s wrongs in the next incarnation, may have enjoyed a deter-
rent bounce.25 Though the ancient Chinese did not link law to the 
divine, the Confucian ruler represented the gods, and good and evil 
were expected to be treated accordingly in heaven.26 The Christian 
doctrine of purgatory, completed in the thirteenth century, added 
a wrinkle by blurring the gulf between the now and the thereaf-
ter. Sinners gained a second chance at postmortem redemption 
through penance. Others could intervene on their behalf through 
indulgences, the shaving of time off purgatory through monetary 
payments rather than through good works.27 Excommunication— 
exclusion from the religious community— also blurred now and 
later. Hell loomed eventually, but in life, too, the excommunicant 
became a nonperson, the living dead. For believers, eternal damna-
tion was an incomparably worse sanction than anything meted out 
on earth— not to mention the certainty of being found out. To the 
medieval mind, God’s omniscience penetrated far deeper than Jer-
emy Bentham’s panopticon, and straying led to consequences more 
severe than any possible secular punishment.28
Secular lawgivers piggybacked on transcendent sanctions, trad-
ing off between this- and other- worldly punishment. The church’s 
power over the next life added muscle to its punishments in the 
here and now. Wihtred, the eighth- century king of Kent, threatened 
foreigners who refused Christian marriage with banishment, the 
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English with excommunication.29 Physical punishment was costly, 
so invoking supernatural policing relieved hard- pressed secular 
authorities. Sanction after death may have lessened the state’s need 
for immediate intervention, while its subjects’ belief in strictures in 
the afterlife encouraged obedience in this one. Assuming that past 
attitudes can be extrapolated from the reactions of today’s under-
graduates in psychology lab experiments, humans who believed 
that gods would eventually punish transgressions felt less impelled 
to ensure that offenders received their just deserts now. And stern 
gods were better regulators of behavior than kind ones. A belief in 
hell’s transcendent accounting, punishing sinners who had side-
stepped this- worldly retribution, may thus have helped the state.30
At first, most offenses were sins, contraventions of divine will. 
Gods were therefore the ones to mete out sanctions. Vengeance is 
mine, the Lord warns in the Old Testament. Secular crimes scarcely 
existed independent of divine offense, oversight, and intervention. 
Sin and crime were separated from each other only gradually, and 
even today the distinction between law and morality throws up 
similar problems. Offenses could therefore have both legal and rit-
ual consequences. Among the ancient Greeks, accidental killings 
required purification but no penalties. Involuntary manslaughter 
meant exile as a means of purification. Deliberate killings, in con-
trast, brought down both law and religion on the offender’s head.
With the state’s emergence as caretaker of secular order, crime 
was distinguished from sin. Churches pursued sin, states prosecuted 
crimes. Much sin became defined as crime. The Greeks punished 
arrogance and extravagance as criminal offenses. In 1650, England 
changed adultery from a church court offense to a felony without 
benefit of clergy.31 In our own day, adultery has reverted to— at 
most— mere sinfulness, though technically it remains illegal in many 
US states. Usury went from sin to crime to big business, with only a 
faint echo of its disreputable past still audible in laws that set puta-
tive upper limits to allowable interest charges.32 In medieval England, 
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infanticide was treated as a sin, and church courts imposed penance.33 
The state later took even the youngest under its wing, though the 
dire straits faced by mothers who resorted to killing their offspring 
was often taken into account. A third of women indicted for infan-
ticide in seventeenth- century Scotland were banished instead and 
never brought to full trial.34 But in seventeenth- century Denmark 
and Norway, giving birth in secret (thus facilitating infanticide) was a 
capital offense. In Germany, sixteenth- century law reform increased 
the likelihood that infanticides would die, too. And in France at the 
same time, infanticides made up a fifth of all those executed by the 
Parlement of Paris.35 Sin and crime still blended. The concern was 
not just with the killing as such but also with how it endangered the 
child’s soul by depriving it of baptism.36
As crimes and sins separated out, so too did the respective modes 
of proof it took to be convicted in the West. Religious and secu-
lar parted ways during debates over trial by ordeal in the twelfth 
and thirteenth centuries. Ordeals called on God to indicate guilt or 
innocence and thus to intervene directly in human affairs. Com-
pared to feuds and other private dispute resolutions, trials by ordeal 
had two great advantages: they were public decisions taken once 
and for all, and, in theory, they tapped into a supernatural source of 
certainty, allowing a definitive outcome.37
Though foreign to Roman law, ordeals existed globally, from 
Europe to Japan. Archaic Greece knew them, as did Palestine of the 
Bible.38 The accused swore oaths invoking gods and their own repu-
tations as reason to believe their claims to innocence, and they were 
backed up by compurgators— allies who staked their own reputa-
tions on the defendants’ behalf.39 Whereas oaths involved God indi-
rectly as the ultimate character witness, ordeals (by battle, water, or 
fire) roped him in directly. Humans obliged God to testify through 
the ordeal’s outcome as to the guilt or innocence of his wretched 
creations. Ordeals promised certainty, but practical problems still 
remained. If God determined the outcome of judicial combats, why 
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seek out the best fighter? Why were women more often subject to 
trial by fire rather than by immersion, where the buoyancy of their 
adipose tissues compounded the likelihood of a guilty verdict?40 
How to explain miscarriages of justice, when ordeals gave patently 
false verdicts?41
Ordeals were eventually abandoned as people were persuaded to 
reason on the evidence of their senses to determine guilt, but first 
they were attacked for religious reasons. Medieval theologians wor-
ried over the tension between worldly proof and divine gravitas. Of 
course, an omnipotent divinity could intervene in human affairs. 
But why would he want to upend the laws of nature and perform 
miracles to settle petty disputes— and at human demand?42 Ordeals 
were God intervening into nature, thus miracles, but they were not 
his free choice. His act had to correspond to an outcome dictated 
by human will— guilt or innocence. God should not be tempted or 
tested— that was the theological objection to ordeals.43
Ordeals eventually gave way to physical evidence and the jury. 
But even as the secular state’s concern for religious transgressions 
ended and the supernatural’s role in the judicial process was mar-
ginalized, God’s calling card remained on the tray in the hall. The 
intertwining of divine and secular continues even today in the 
oath.44 By swearing, we invoke a higher power while promising cer-
tain actions or attesting to the truth of our assertions. That humans 
thought they could oblige God to help keep them honest is what 
made oaths suspect to the apostles.45 But the judicial system in the 
Latin West took a more robust Old Testament view of God’s willing-
ness to backstop mortal truthfulness. In taking an oath, we curse 
ourselves, calling down supernatural wrath if we lie. In seventeenth- 
century England, anyone violating the oath taken in a binding- over 
action risked God’s anger.46 Today a jail sentence for perjury is at 
stake, not our immortal souls. But the logic of trembling before a 
higher power remains.
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The State Emerges
As divine and secular law gradually separated, crime fell to the state, 
leaving sin to church and conscience. Since the state came to handle 
punishment alone, hell— as a place of deterrent torment— played 
a less necessary role in mainstream theology.47 Yet, seen in histo-
ry’s long scope, the state only recently awoke to what we regard as 
among its primary duties: laying down the law, punishing transgres-
sion, maintaining order. Law— natural, divine, customary— was, of 
course, older than statute. Outside the ancient empires, enforcing it 
was long left to religion and civil society. China, Greece, and Rome 
policed their citizens, but not until the early modern era was the 
state again able to do so in Europe. Recognizably modern polic-
ing arrived only in the late eighteenth century. Even today, small 
isolated societies such as the Inuits, or close- knit religious com-
munities manage without overt policing, resolving matters— even 
homicide— informally between victim and offender’s kin.48
Only gradually did the state command a role in resolving conflict. 
Disputes had been sorted by the interested parties, coming to agree-
ment or feuding in its absence. Feuds eventually gave way to a pub-
lic resolution of conflict in trial- like circumstances. Court procedure 
was well elaborated already in ancient Babylon, almost two millen-
nia before Christ.49 From the seventh century BCE, even before law 
had been written down, men acting as judges set up informal courts 
in Greece to adjudicate disputes between parties who would jointly 
choose a venue and agree to adhere to the judges’ decision.50 In the 
Iliad’s trial scene, the disputing sides find judges, a framework of 
adjudication, and two talents of gold for the best judgment. Such 
quasi- courts slowly managed to ground their decisions not just, as 
earlier, on the claims of the powerful to rule but also on laws that 
were accepted as applying to all citizens.51
As the decisions of these early Greek informal courts accumulated 
and were abstracted, they gave rise to a judicial framework.52 Rules 
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were imposed: parties to agree on arbitrators, decisions handed 
down under oath and binding, a settled issue not to be raised again, 
and so forth. Meeting regularly, arbitration tribunals developed into 
an early form of courts. Their decisions could be appealed to the 
Council of the Areopagus, which may deserve to be considered the 
first proper court. During the poet Hesiod’s time, eighth century 
BCE, arbitration became public and compulsory. Each male citizen 
served as a judge in the year after turning fifty- nine.53 Trials run 
wholly by the judiciary made a public duty out of formerly private 
matters. As of the seventh century BCE, the early Greek codes of 
Drako, Solon, and Zaleukos specified penalties rather than leaving 
them to the judges’ decision. Forbidding victims’ kin from seizing 
the accused and taking matters into their own hands, the Great 
Code of Gortyn (fifth century BCE) instead offered regularized pro-
cedures of public adjudication.54 Communal negotiations were now 
subordinated to the authorities. Whether from self- interest or com-
pulsion, the parties agreed to abide by rules imposed from above. 
The law gradually emerged as a body of strictures, independent of 
kin, with the state as enforcer.55 Under the Romans, improvised pub-
lic tribunals grew permanent in the second century BCE, authorized 
to punish serious crimes affecting the whole community. During 
the later empire, judges presided as state representatives, able to act 
independently of any charge brought by private parties.56
But even as the authorities promulgated laws, much remained 
left to self- help. Awarded a settlement in ancient Greece, defendants 
themselves still had to enforce it. Cases were heard before courts, but 
Roman plaintiffs acted as their own prosecutors.57 In medieval com-
mon law, victims’ widows and children personally dragged killers to 
the gallows, and a violated woman herself castrated and blinded the 
rapist.58 Justifiable homicide is the polite fiction whereby a weak 
state agrees that certain killings are legitimate. Ancient Greek and 
Roman law defined justified homicide expansively, as did most West-
ern legal codes for the next two millennia. A highwayman in the 
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act, a robber using force, anyone stealing at night, someone robbing 
clothes at the public baths, a man having sex with another’s wife, 
mother, sister, daughter, or concubine, a rapist of free- born women 
or boys: according to various codes, all could be justifiably killed on 
the spot.59 The killer of a manifest felon would likely not be prose-
cuted in medieval England, or he would be protected against retali-
ation from the criminal’s kin. Someone burning down a house in 
medieval Iceland could be instantly killed in the act, as could tres-
passers.60 Absent reliable intervention by the authorities, self- help 
remained the victim’s most likely source of satisfaction.61
Only gradually did the state grow able to define, police, and pun-
ish homicide. Early Chinese emperors might pardon murderers, 
but, recognizing that victims’ families would still seek to avenge 
their kin’s death, in the fifth century they began compelling the 
pardoned to move far away.62 In medieval England, a husband could 
no longer kill an adulterer having sex with his wife, but as a tres-
passer the cad was still a sitting duck. In the late seventeenth cen-
tury, catching a wife in adultery remained sufficient provocation to 
reduce a charge of murder to manslaughter.63 Yet by the thirteenth 
century killing outlaws and obvious felons on the spot was consid-
ered frontier law in England, no longer allowed in most localities. 
Justified killings were eventually permitted only in self- defense. In 
the thirteenth century, a thief caught in the act could be killed with 
impunity only if he also posed a danger. And self- defense grew 
limited in turn. In England by the mid- thirteenth century, even if in 
danger, those able to flee committed a crime if they instead struck 
and killed in self- defense.64 The duel, which we return to later, was 
also part of this story of restricting justifiable homicide. It allowed 
certain sorts of people to kill each other by following particular 
rules. But by the nineteenth century, it too was largely stamped 
out.65
Yet, as so often, the law here bears continuing traces of its past even 
in contemporary statute. Violent self- help remains tolerated today. 
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Several US states allow mere manslaughter charges for killing spouses 
caught in flagrante.66 Until 1975, a French husband catching his wife 
in the act at home could justifiably kill both her and the lover. So 
could a Texan husband.67 In Italy, sentences were reduced under sim-
ilar circumstances until 1981.68 Even severe assaults today are still less 
likely to lead to arrest, prosecution, and conviction if between related 
people— practically speaking, husbands against wives.69 Temporary- 
insanity pleas are used as technical work- arounds to treat violence 
against women leniently.70 Stand- your- ground laws permit citizens 
to take the law into their own hands to defend themselves. In many 
nations, such as Britain, such laws have been whittled back. The state 
jealously guards its monopoly on violence, forbidding citizens to act 
as their own avenging angels. But in the United States, the citizen’s 
duty to retreat rather than to fight is defined narrowly, sometimes 
allowing lethal self- defense.71 A similar logic is used when abused 
women invoke battered- wife syndrome to expand the parameters of 
the imminent threat they need to plead self- defense.72
Before the nineteenth century, the fundamental reality of 
enforcement and punishment was the state’s absence. Some crimes, 
as we will see, did concern the state from the start— especially trea-
son, where it was the target. But most violations were left for the 
interested parties to handle. Until the state imposed its judicial 
monopoly, offenses were dealt with largely in two ways: vengeance 
and compensation.73 Compensation was the overarching concept 
because in effect restitution was provided by both methods, mea-
sured either in blood or in material value.74 Restitution and ven-
geance alike righted the moral imbalance created by harm, either in 
the eye- for- an- eye logic of the lex talionis or by means of fungible 
values— money, oxen, slaves— that were considered equivalent.75
If all parties agreed, compensation resolved the issue once and 
for all. But feuding kin groups often fought on for generations, the 
original offense ever amplifying and expanding. In the seventeenth 
century, the Scottish authorities hastened to intervene immediately 
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after the first killing, before feuds could snowball, each subsequent 
round of slaughter harming anew, stoking further revenge.76 Since 
the offender’s entire kin was accountable, feuds ratcheted upward. 
The stronger the kin, the longer the feud.77 A single spared opponent 
threatened yet further revenge. Pushed to its logical extreme, a feud 
was truly resolved only once the opposing clan’s last male had been 
killed. The family of Milovan Djilas, the Yugoslav Communist parti-
san and politician, for example, was almost wiped out in feuds with 
agents of the Montenegrin prince Nicholas I in the early twentieth 
century.78
Vengeance was a major obstacle to the state’s hopes of pacifying 
its territory internally. During the Warring States period in China 
(ca. 400 BCE– 200 CE) unbridled vengeance challenged the state’s 
grip, with officials forced tacitly to condone it.79 Feuds, in effect, 
negated the state— with kin groups treating each other as the pri-
mary political units and refusing to recognize any higher authority 
than honor. Hopes of taming vengeance’s savagery encouraged the 
state to expand its role in administering justice.80 Once embarked on 
the business of adjudicating disputes, the state therefore sought to 
curb vengeance while promoting and institutionalizing compensa-
tion instead. In the Hittite edict of Telepinus (ca. 1620– 1600 BCE), 
a victim’s family chose between retaliation and restitution. But later 
laws ruled out retaliation.81 By the time described by Homer, half 
a millennium later, the Greeks had largely managed to stamp out 
blood feuds. In the Iliad, blood is never exacted for blood.82 The 
Romans, too, suppressed vengeance early. And Sharia law restricted 
blood feud in part by permitting retaliation only after judicial 
authority had determined the culprit’s guilt.83 In the Old Testament, 
David rejected the vengeance taken by two of his followers on the 
son of his enemy Saul. He killed the killers who, mistakenly expect-
ing to be rewarded, had brought him Ish- Bosheth’s head.84
Slowly, wherever it could, the state wrested control away from kin. 
Compensation and vengeance ran parallel for many centuries.85 By 
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the seventh century CE, the Visigoths had followed the Greeks and 
Romans by taking disputes into the courts. In hopes of keeping the 
peace, the early Germans allowed restitution even for homicide.86 
Medieval kings offered restitution as an alternative to vengeance, in 
the Swedish Helsinge law in the early fourteenth century, for exam-
ple. Merovingian laws ordered compensation for assault and robbery, 
set out procedures to clear those accused of homicide, and stipulated 
restitution so as to prevent feud. Charlemagne admonished the kin 
of killers and their victims to seek quick settlements, thus squelch-
ing dispute.87 Over a thousand years, from the late Roman Empire 
to the imposition of a semblance of regularized policing in the early 
modern era, European states sought to suppress feuding.
England, with its centralized state and developed court system, 
was among the earliest to match the ancient empires’ achievement. 
By the thirteenth century, feuds among the nobility had been brought 
under control.88 On the continent, that took another two centuries. 
The medieval peaces— a church initiative— sought to multiply the 
holy days on which killings were forbidden, thus pacifying more of 
the year. A Saxon edict from around 1221 ruled that revenge could 
be exacted only on Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday, but the rest 
of the week was to remain free of conflict.89 Renaissance Italian fami-
lies’ savage vendettas were controlled only slowly by emerging abso-
lutist states. In sixteenth- century Florence, peace treaties among 
warring families, enforced by posted bonds, sought to end feuds. 
In the fifteenth century, the Spanish monarchs Ferdinand and Isa-
bella imposed the Santa Hermandad to enforce royal justice against 
their warring aristocrats.90 The Imperial Peace Statute of 1495 in the 
Habsburg lands similarly outlawed feud and private warfare. And 
honor crimes were brought under court control in Russia.91
By the 1500s, feuding had largely been replaced by the official 
judiciary, at least in the European core, where the state was stron-
gest. Even in a largely pastoral country such as sixteenth- century 
Castile, where only a quarter of males could read, lawyers litigated 
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on behalf of a menagerie of plaintiffs over quotidian disputes.92 
Conflict resolution had shifted from bare knuckles to the courts. But 
in the peripheral worlds, where the state’s sway was weaker, feuds 
continued: the Scottish Highlands, Friuli, Liguria, Valencia, not to 
mention islands such as Sicily, Corsica, and Sardinia. For more than 
five hundred years after its ninth- century founding, Iceland refined 
its elaborate system of law, but it never found a way of enforcing it 
other than by feud. When the Icelanders finally wearied of cycles 
of bloodshed in the thirteenth century, they invited the Norwegian 
king to establish order. Highland Scottish clans grew tired of fight-
ing in the late sixteenth century. They asked the royal authorities to 
arbitrate disputes and threatened to arrest their own members who 
refused or reneged.93 By the time of the revolution, French deputies 
still worried that if the penal code legitimized killing in defense of 
others, not just oneself, it would give carte blanche to what were 
by then considered Mediterranean habits of vendetta, known from 
Italy and Corsica.94
In Giuseppe Verdi’s opera La forza del destino (1861), the brother 
of a seemingly wronged woman is delighted (“What great joy!”) 
when her lover is healed of a mortal wound— but only because this 
affords the brother the chance to kill the lover once and for all, 
avenging the lover’s killing of the siblings’ father. Feud was hard 
to brake, the logic of its momentum unrelenting. Even deep into 
the nineteenth century, the Japanese government still authorized 
and rewarded private parties seeking vengeance.95 Feuds continued 
unabated across the Mediterranean and Balkans. In eighteenth- 
century Corsica, with feuding men holed up in fortified houses, only 
women could till the fields. A century later, feuds endured, half of 
them lasting at least fifty years. Deep into the twentieth century, 
such disputes claimed hundreds of victims annually in the Balkans.96 
In Albania, dozens of families remain sequestered in their homes 
today, too fearful of vengeance to venture out. Clan feuds in Gaza 
claimed at least ninety deaths in 2006.97
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Feud, however, was not anarchy. Where centralized authority 
had yet to impose rules, feud was a means of settling disputes. All— 
strong, weak, or equals— had to resolve differences knowing that an 
unacceptable solution would prolong the conflict and that fortune 
or recrystallizing coalitions might reverse today’s outcome. Feuds 
were stylized rituals whose procedures limited the worst excesses. 
The talionic principle of an eye for an eye in Jewish, Greek, Roman, 
and Sharia law was meant to set an outer limit to vengeance. Sharia 
exempted singular organs— noses and penises— from amputation.98 
Where feud was most institutionalized, as in medieval Iceland, the 
rules on vengeance killing were incorporated into the law of the 
land. In early modern Germany, feuding was rule bound, includ-
ing negotiations before hostilities and a challenge delivered prior to 
violence.99 If followed, the feud’s fundamental logic was self- limiting: 
reaction only in proportion to provocation. The feud might continue 
interminably, but without necessarily escalating. Only men and only 
adults usually could be killed. Icelandic law spelled out the allow-
able: immediate killing for sexual assault, say, but acts of vengeance 
over the subsequent year for less- serious blows. Those who violated 
truces became social pariahs. Feuds here were a stabilizing ritual 
that channeled conflict into formalized arenas for arbitration.100 In 
Catalonia, prospective avengers registered their claim by letter to 
their victim, waited ten days, and targeted only the offender him-
self. Having withstood an all- out assault on its house for three days, 
a clan in modern Montenegro was considered vindicated. Thereaf-
ter, the feud unfolded more moderately as small- group attack and 
individual ambush. However awful, feuds moderated even worse 
horrors— the apparent paradox dubbed the “peace in the feud.”101
Vengeance competed directly with the state’s claim to be the only 
enforcer of order. In comparison, compensation had the advantage 
of quick and bloodless resolution— so long as all agreed. No wonder 
authorities preferred it to vengeance. A bull killed someone: the Old 
Testament recognized the owner’s theoretical liability to pay with 
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his own life but suggested ransom instead.102 From the beginning, 
the law eagerly sought to regularize restitution. The earliest extant 
code (Sumerian from ca. 2050 BCE) tallied the precise cost of infrac-
tions: ten silver shekels, say, for cutting (off?) a foot. So did the 
Twelve Tables of Roman law. The sixth- century laws of the Salian 
Franks stipulated costs for stealing pigs, depending on their condi-
tion and age, and other animals, down to bees.103
Wergeld, the restitution paid in Germanic law for injuries or kill-
ings, precisely tabulated the cost of mutilation and dismemberment 
as well as the worth of different lives. Modern actuarial tables are 
less detailed than these medieval codes. Æthelberht’s laws from 
seventh- century Kent finely calibrated prices, both by damaged 
body part and by whether the victim was slave, freeman, or priest. 
Front teeth were worth more than back teeth. Damage to incisors 
was legally weightier (counting as mayhem) than damage to molars 
or grinders, not only since it was more disfiguring but also because 
the loss of incisors disadvantaged victims in a fight. Different fin-
gers and their nails had different prices. Whether ears were ren-
dered deaf, cut off, pierced, or lacerated mattered, as did whether 
bones were laid bare, damaged, or broken and whether the penis 
was destroyed or pierced partially or fully. Such detail pertained not 
only to bodily injuries but also to every conceivable violation of 
women and other forms of property.104
These finely calibrated costings revealed how the law still was 
only the intermediary between kin groups negotiating what they 
owed each other.105 Though less bloody, compensatory law— like 
vengeance— was ultimately incompatible with the state’s ambitions 
to be the only actor to settle conflict. Restitution was therefore even-
tually suppressed, too. In ancient Greek and Jewish law, compensa-
tion was eliminated altogether.106 Christianity, however, accepted 
restitution and thus obliged Christian states to spend the following 
centuries attempting to eliminate it. The state took its own revenge 
for being eclipsed by beginning to claim part and ultimately all of 
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the compensatory payments for itself.107 Early Anglo- Saxon law 
already distinguished wite, or fines that belonged to the king, from 
wergeld.108 In early English law, communities unable to identify a 
killer paid murdrum to the king. Because a homicide breached the 
collective good of the peace, feudal lords claimed part of the wergeld 
paid to kin. By the twelfth century, compensation in England was 
paid to the church, king, or community, not to the victim’s fam-
ily.109 In sixteenth- century Seville, mothers and widows could still 
accept compensation from the murderers of their sons and hus-
bands. But highway robbery and treason were not thus atoned. By 
the seventeenth century, restitution had largely been eliminated, 
at least in northern Europe.110 Rather than allowing injured parties 
to be compensated, the state itself now collected what had in effect 
become fines.
Restitution was thus largely eliminated from the penal code, its 
logic now confined to civil law and insurance. And yet reintroduc-
ing compensation to the criminal law remains today a widely dis-
cussed proposal, sometimes called “restorative justice.” Reformers 
note that the victims receive nothing besides the satisfaction of see-
ing offenders punished.111 If criminals restitute victims, it is argued, 
rather than making amends to and through a neutral state, they 
will better grasp the evil they have wrought.112 Allowing offend-
ers to buy themselves out of prosecution by compensating victims, 
however, is still considered beyond the pale, although it remains 
possible in Islamic law.113
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That crimes were ultimately offenses against the community, not 
just against individual plaintiffs, was perhaps the most important 
conceptual breakthrough in law’s development. Individual harm 
was self- evident but only tangentially the state’s business. For mil-
lennia, such torts were therefore left to the parties involved to han-
dle. The idea of a public crime, however, required both a sense of 
social damage— a tear in the communal fabric going beyond any 
individual’s stake in the matter— and recognition that the state, as 
society’s most plausible representative, was the proper actor to pun-
ish it. That insight took centuries to emerge.
With the state seeking to stamp out vengeance and restitution, 
a broader issue arose. If crimes merely pitted kin groups against 
each other, then private resolutions sufficed. But what about vic-
tims without family or others to speak for them?1 More interest-
ingly, what about actions that damaged not just the victim but 
also society? Many crimes targeted individual victims: theft, rape, 
murder. For them, private solutions were obvious and for centuries 
the only ones available. Yet other offenses, sometimes with no spe-
cific individual victims, were inherently attacks on society. Offenses 
against authority and religion were obvious examples of such pub-
lic crimes.2 But more mundane violations could also harm some-
thing beyond the individual victim. Embezzlement, tax fraud and 
evasion, espionage, perjury, perversion of justice, coining and coun-
terfeiting, food adulteration, sedition, pollution, failure to school or 
Chapter 3
Crime as a Social Problem
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vaccinate children: all such acts inflicted collective harm where res-
titution did not suffice. Even individual crimes had social conse-
quences. Philo of Alexandria, a contemporary of Paul, considered 
adultery worse than murder because it harmed the soul, not just 
the body, and left behind victims among families, children, and 
the state.3 Though suicide was seemingly the ultimate individual 
act, Durkheim argued, in fact it gnawed at the social principle of 
each person’s inviolability.4 Anything that undercut public trust in 
the currency long remained a capital crime— even in Quaker Penn-
sylvania of the eighteenth century. Clippers of coins, John Locke 
thundered in 1696, not only removed some silver but also under-
mined the public faith in government, turning robbery into treason 
and meriting death.5
Dante Alighieri regarded fraud and betrayal— betraying public 
trust— as socially more harmful than mere violence.6 In a collectivist 
system ruled by religious caste (theocracy) or dictator (autocracy), 
an individual action might violate the communal order— privately 
worshipping false idols, say, or stealing property that by definition 
belonged to the collective. But the idea of purely individual trans-
gressions wilts under scrutiny also in secular and politically liberal 
societies. They, too, enforce a common code of ethics. Citizens may 
be left to make decisions privately that earlier were publicly defined 
and enforced. Mores may have changed and relaxed. Yet inviolable 
moral precepts ground every society, even ours today.
Both Roman and then Germanic law focused on individual 
 retribution and retaliation.7 Yet the insight gradually spread that if 
society suffered damage, then it could take revenge. If society had 
been harmed in ways unrepairable by individual action, the state 
would stand in for its claim to restitution. Christianity’s emphasis 
on forgiveness and on redeeming sinners shifted attention away 
from making criminals pay: not taking an eye for an eye but turning 
the other cheek.8 Nonetheless, sins remained understood as actions 
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against God, offensive not just to him but to all faithful. Sin had col-
lective consequences. Crime went beyond individual malfeasance.
Religious law first broached the idea of an offense that trespassed 
against something higher, not just the immediate victim.9 In early 
times, crimes foremost violated God’s order. Sin and crime over-
lapped, and everyone— not just the miscreant— might end up suf-
fering. The offended gods might punish or forgive. Hebrew law was 
divine, emanating directly from God. Cuneiform laws (of Babylo-
nia, Egypt, etc.) were mediated by the ruler, who was their author. 
Adultery illustrates the difference. In cuneiform law, a husband 
could decide whether to punish his wife and her lover. But in bibli-
cal law the offense was against God, not the spouse. Death was the 
unavoidable sanction, with the religious authorities vouchsafing 
God’s role as the offended party.10 Genesis demanded that wild ani-
mals who killed humans be put to death— not because of the harm 
done but because they had violated the higher law that human life, 
made in God’s image, is sacred.11
The state’s stake in punishing crime thus went beyond individual 
justice to protect the common interest by enforcing the law. “All suf-
fer injury when someone wrongs the state,” Plato insisted. Demos-
thenes regarded deeds of violence as public crimes committed also 
against those who were not directly involved.12 The Greeks saw some 
crimes as polluting all society, with individual actions taking on col-
lective consequences. Like traitors and committers of sacrilege, mur-
derers offended the community as a whole, not just victim and kin.13 
Crimes involving matters of public concern, such as charges against 
government officials, were processed in special jury courts (dikaste-
ria).14 In the Old Testament, rituals were prescribed to cleanse a com-
munity of the collective guilt arising from an unsolved murder.15
Most apparently, desertion or loss on the battlefield endangered 
the entire community and was collectively punished from early on. 
By the Roman fustuarium, a disgraced military force divided itself 
Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/books/book-pdf/1963888/book_9780262361507.pdf by guest on 27 December 2021
60  Chapter 3
into tens, picking by lot one man from each group to club to death. 
The Germanic tribes hanged deserters in trees.16 Other offenses 
that violated the community in early law included treason, incest, 
bestiality, and witchcraft leading to death.17 In ancient Greece and 
Rome, aborting a healthy fetus was a crime against state and soci-
ety for eliminating an economic and military resource.18 In com-
mon law, maiming someone was illegal not so much because of 
the harm done the individual as for depriving the king of an able- 
bodied subject to defend the realm. Self- maiming was felonious for 
much the same reason.19 As was homicide.20 Murder had its obvious 
victims, but the social order also suffered when homicide prolifer-
ated. Fraud undermined the security of all financial transactions, 
not just the one in question. Thieves, as Kant explained this logic, 
hurt themselves as much as their victims. Undermining everyone’s 
ownership, they hollowed out their own, too.21 Individual crime 
inherently affected all of society.
Crimes with public consequences could thus not be left to indi-
viduals to handle. Private prosecution of public crimes misaligned 
the incentives. Why should victims pursue offenders if they would 
receive no restitution? Or, conversely, they might undermine pub-
lic trials by defaulting to informal plea bargains or even by drop-
ping (or only half- heartedly pursuing) a prosecution if paid off by 
the defendants.22 Outlawing such side payments, known as “com-
pounding” (in effect a circuitous form of restitution), the state sought 
to force dispute resolution into public forums. In sixth- century 
France, Merovingian kings forbade private settlements for theft.23 
In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, robbery victims who 
got their goods back from thieves and agreed to keep quiet could 
be prosecuted for theftbote.24 Private deals to settle misdemeanors 
remained legal, but for felonies they were forbidden in eighteenth- 
century Britain. Courts fined those who sought to sidestep the judi-
cial machinery by offering rewards for the return of stolen property 
rather than prosecuting theft officially.25 Even today, police and 
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retailers are at odds over whether shoplifters should be prosecuted 
or merely arm- twisted into making restitution.26 In the US, offering 
to accept restitution for a felony itself became a felony. The state 
could prosecute on victims’ behalf even without their consent.27 
Public crimes demanded public punishments.
Vengeance and restitution would no longer do since both took 
an individual approach to crime. Restitution grew incompatible 
with public punishment once the state began taking at first a cut 
and then soon all of compensatory payments, directly competing 
with the victims. From the vantage of vengeance, restitution’s basic 
assumption— that money resolves every conflict— was profoundly 
amoral. Higher principles had been violated that money could not 
assuage. Do not accept restitution for a murder, the Old Testament 
commanded, but kill the killer.28 Even where compensation was 
customary, vengeance lurked offstage. Medieval Icelanders happily 
restituted most offenses, but not the killing of family. “Kin should 
not be carried in one’s purse,” they cautioned.29 How could money 
make good murder, rape, or assault— or adultery, defamation, and 
other loss of honor? How could restitution pay the price of living in 
fear of crime or for seeing other public goods violated?30 For crimes 
that could not be compensated, early Germanic law demanded 
whipping or enslavement. Later, life itself became the tribute paid.31 
In the long run, excepting a few vestiges, as in Sharia law, the inabil-
ity to compensate for certain offenses and the need therefore for 
public punishments became deeply embedded in our moral sense.
Vengeance in turn threw up a different dilemma. It refused any 
compensation other than an equivalence of pain and suffering. Like 
compensation, vengeance was pursued by kin groups, yet it gave 
voice to a collective system of value alternative to and competing 
with the state’s pretensions to speak alone for society. Wounded 
honor was an inherently collective affront, an injury that both 
was created and had to be restituted socially. Dishonor injured its 
victims’ social personae, affecting how they were seen by others. 
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All of society, not only the immediate victim, was involved. Ven-
geance was so pressing a motive and was so hard for the state to 
quell precisely because— tapping into the burning insistence on 
retribution— mere restitution could not assuage profound injury.
In the long run, neither restitution nor vengeance could master 
crime’s social consequences. Public offenses demanded public pun-
ishments, and only the state could mete out such sanctions. Even 
those hoping to reintroduce restitution to modern penal codes 
admit its limits. Allowing restitution for rape, for example, would 
legalize sexual inequality, nor could crimes against humanity be 
restituted.32 Some crimes are ultimately irreducibly public. As the 
state gradually assumed the adjudication earlier left to the impli-
cated parties, it emphasized crime’s collective nature. The shared 
moral codex underlying any society presupposed that violating its 
norms endangered everyone, not just immediate victims. Shoulder-
ing responsibility for punishing public wrongs, the state thus took 
over the role first played by God.
Most religions have penalized sins as offenses against the gods.33 
That collective offenses endanger all has been a leitmotiv across cul-
tures and ages. In the Old Testament, crimes against God threat-
ened all of Jewish society, requiring death for the offender.34 After 
the Homeric period, the Greeks grew convinced that criminals’ 
presence polluted society, endangering everyone and requiring 
the state to punish on behalf of the gods.35 In Oedipus Rex, a plague 
looms because a killer remains at large. Once the Roman Empire con-
verted to Christianity, heresy became an offense against the state, 
an aggression against everyone. Pagan sacrifice was made a capi-
tal crime as of the fourth century. Justinian’s code of 529 CE held 
blasphemy responsible for famine, earthquake, and pestilence.36 
The Aztecs feared drunkenness as a violation that opened a por-
tal for sacred wrath to enter mortal society. Peruvians were certain 
that violating Inca commandments hurt everyone, not just them-
selves.37 Sodomy was thought to have provoked God to unleash 
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the plague on fifteenth- century Venice.38 In early modern Europe, 
swearing and blasphemy were considered dangers to all, not just 
to the individual sinners, as was bankruptcy by Dutch Calvinists.39 
English Puritans feared God punishing all for the presence of sin. 
Austrians of the same era were convinced that vice, frivolity, and 
wrongdoing had angered God, bringing on the Turks and inflation. 
Cotton Mather, the New England Puritan divine, told a convicted 
murderer he had to die lest the nation be polluted.40 In our own 
day, the AIDS epidemic and other catastrophes have been blamed 
on sin.41 The logic of collective affront is familiar and persistent.
In Hebrew law, public offenses demanded collective punishment. 
For idol worship or the serving of other gods, the entire community 
had to expiate. Stoning— definitionally carried out by the group— 
was often used for crimes considered a collective threat. Moses was 
commanded to bring out a blasphemer to be stoned by the congre-
gation.42 Banishment, found in Dracon’s code in the seventh cen-
tury BCE, was also common in early German and Nordic societies. 
It was collectively enforced: anyone was at liberty to kill a returning 
exile. Tacitus noted that the tribes of Germany still settled murder 
privately, but those who offended against the collective (by retreat-
ing in battle or deserting to the enemy) merited public punishment. 
Six centuries later, the Carolingians imposed public punishments, 
not just private restitution, for inherently collective offenses such as 
counterfeiting, false witness, and perjury. In Anglo- Saxon England, 
incest, witchcraft, and bestiality were treated as crimes punishable 
by the community, not just by the victims.43 In eighteenth- century 
England, two- thirds of those convicted of forgery were executed. 
Other than murder, no crime was more severely punished.44 For the 
Incas in the Andes, removing a bridge was a public offense on par 
with adultery, murder, or blasphemy, much as stealing bee hives 
was a capital offense among the Germanic tribes, whose only source 
of sweetness they were.45 At the end of the Roman republic (ca. first 
century BCE) offenses earlier considered private (delicta) came to 
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be seen as public. The concept of iniuria (a wrong or outrage) was 
expanded to include violating private homes or corrupting minors 
and women. Laws now outlawed adultery, electoral corruption, the 
bearing of arms, public violence, criminal gangs, and interference 
with the administration of justice.46
This logic of collective offense was also extended to crimes that 
on the face of it did not affect the entire community, homicide 
above all. Among the ancient Jews, a murderer’s blood was needed 
to expiate this crime against both God and humans.47 In Homer, 
however, homicide concerned only the victim’s family, who pur-
sued the matter. If the dying man forgave him, the killer could 
not be charged, and the victim’s relatives were released from the 
obligation to prosecute. Despite his other reforms, the Athenian 
statesman Solon left homicide a private offense. But in the sixth 
and seventh centuries BCE, murder began to be considered a crime 
not just against the victim but also against the gods, who might be 
angered if it went unpunished.48 The Roman state in turn made pur-
suing murderers its duty, no longer left to the victim’s kin. Murder 
gradually became seen as an offense as much against king as against 
kin.49 Even before the Conquest of 1066, the English monarch 
directly prosecuted weighty crimes, such as homicide by stealth. By 
the early twelfth century, the Crown had assumed jurisdiction over 
homicide and other serious crimes generally, forbidding private set-
tlements. Killings and other felonies that had earlier been atoned 
for by restitution were now punishable by death.50
As caretaker of common interests, the state also began to decide 
whether to prosecute at all. In the early accusatory systems, victims 
challenged offenders and might themselves be punished in the 
same manner if they failed to prove the case. Later, third parties not 
directly implicated in the offense were allowed to file charges, too. 
As Solon reformed Dracon’s code permitting any citizen to avenge 
the wronged, he institutionalized the sense that certain transgres-
sions harmed the whole community.51 The graphe allowed any male 
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citizen, victim or not, to prosecute public offenses, such as military 
desertion, political bribery, temple robbery, idleness, theft, perjury, 
hubristic conduct, and sycophancy. One notable reform was to for-
bid parents to sell their children into slavery. Such rights had to be 
enforced by third parties since minors could not act against their 
parents?52
Roman public law increasingly upheld common standards that 
could not be set aside by an understanding between the parties. Under 
Augustus, whether to pursue adultery ceased being the decision only 
of the woman’s husband or father. He could take the initiative, but so 
could third parties. A husband who took no action against his wife 
caught in flagrante could be punished as a procurer (lenocinium).53 In 
seventh- century Visigothic law, the king could prosecute adultery if 
the husband, children, or other relatives refused to, and they, in turn, 
could be penalized for negligence. Charlemagne’s capitulary of 802 
punished adultery as a crime against the Christian community.54 In 
the same spirit of forbidding offenses even in the absence of a direct 
victim, a woman who voluntarily aborted could be punished. Acces-
sories to suicide could also be found guilty.55
Public crimes developed apace during the Middle Ages.  Public 
utility, Pope Innocent III argued in the early thirteenth century, 
demanded that crimes be interdicted.56 Charlemagne’s tribunals had 
already ordered and enforced a peace rather than just mediating 
between warring parties, who might comply or not. Besides excom-
municating the disputants, the medieval peaces mooted the idea of 
crime and disorder harming the “common utility.”57 Even restitu-
tion was harnessed to atone for collective damages. The proximate 
victims received their bit. But church and state increasingly also 
got a part— since the larger community too had been harmed. Sin 
offended God’s honor, Anselm of Canterbury insisted in the elev-
enth century, and a miscreant’s payment must reflect that additional 
damage.58 An offense did not vanish just because the victim died 
or refrained from prosecuting. Judges had an obligation to persist, 
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the fourteenth- century Italian jurist Bartolus argued, so as to defend 
the community.59 From the thirteenth century on, witnesses could 
be compelled to testify. Otherwise, the canonist Hostiensis argued, 
the innocent would be damned, the guilty absolved, and crimes go 
unpunished.60 As of the Sachsenspiegel (1221– 1224), the most impor-
tant compilation of law in the Holy Roman Empire, a general public 
proscription of offenses was absorbed into customary law.61 Half a 
millennium later, when the French revolutionaries proclaimed that 
all offenses were attacks on the public, the idea of crimes as inher-
ently social events had been long in the making.62
The Judiciary as Voice of the Public Interest
Out of the state’s growing responsibility for punishment grew the 
now common distinction between torts and crimes— torts as harms 
that individuals restitute among each other and crimes as acts of col-
lective concern. The Greeks only incipiently distinguished crimes 
from torts but did allow any citizen to bring charges on matters 
of public interest, such as treason, desertion, and embezzlement. 
This rule also applied where the victims were unlikely to speak up 
or where larger issues were at stake: maltreating orphans or seduc-
ing free women.63 In the fifth century BCE, Solon allowed anyone 
to take legal action on behalf of a victim. Everyone helped enforce 
the law, especially where society was the injured party. Acting with 
hubris (obnoxiously and self- indulgently) was considered so offen-
sive to the state that it was actionable even by a slave.64 Among 
the fourth- century CE Goths, serious offenders were compared to 
wolves: outsiders to society and enemies of king, people, and God, 
to be killed on sight.65 Crimes where the culprit was not immediately 
known or where the offenders— once identified— belonged to no 
group able or willing to punish them as one of their own could also 
not be left to private resolution. They required state intervention. 
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Theft, for example, early on became the state’s business.66 In Eng-
land, with its accusatory judicial system, any citizen could pursue 
any offense, acting as a public prosecutor. The prosecutor, when 
that position eventually developed, had no powers beyond those of 
every male citizen.67
As crime became regarded as an offense against the public, the 
courtroom emerged as the arena where law prevailed. Three snap-
shots from larceny’s evolution illustrate the development. In Roman 
law, the nocturnal thief (whose evil intent was presumed manifest) 
could be killed on the spot. In early medieval England, victims were 
obliged to sound the hue and cry, thereby enlisting the public’s aid 
and alerting it that the criminal would be executed so that the accus-
ers would not be mistaken for killers as they carried out the sentence. 
But by the thirteenth century, the right of private execution had 
given way to the duty of public trial.68 Courts evolved from arenas of 
mediation in the ancient world to independently prosecuting insti-
tutions. Their task was now adjudication, no longer arbitration. Trials 
eventually emerged as the primary forum for administering justice.
After collapse of the ancient world, courts slowly developed once 
again in the Middle Ages, extending the state’s investigatory and 
adjudicatory powers. Feudal lords dispensed justice over their subor-
dinates. Emerging as the primus among lords, the king did the same 
to them— in England after the Conquest of 1066 and in France two 
centuries later. Settling disputes in his court, the monarch became 
the first quasi- professional judge, the place lending its name to the 
institution.69 Eighth- century English statute warned subjects against 
taking the law into their own hands instead of going through courts. 
By the thirteenth century, French courts had changed from locals 
mediating among themselves to royal power imposing verdicts 
increasingly based on abstract concepts of justice and legality.70
Extrajudicial, indeed extraterrestrial, mechanisms of judgment 
such as oaths, ordeals, and combat were eliminated across Europe 
by the thirteenth century.71 The jury system that then developed 
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in England allowed what— from Roman law’s perspective— must 
have seemed wildly capricious: letting bystanders decide weighty 
issues of guilt and innocence in private deliberations. Max Weber 
compared juries to oracles, neither of them required to give rational 
grounds for their decisions.72 With the twelfth- century revival of 
Roman law on the continent, combined with canon law, the old 
accusatorial process pitting plaintiff against defendant gave way 
to the reintroduction of an inquisitorial approach. Inquisitional 
techniques had biblical backing. When word of Sodom and Gomor-
rah’s sins reached heaven, God himself investigated.73 The state, 
including at first also the church, now took over this role, acting 
through judges and prosecutors to pursue transgression. Germanic 
law had earlier been based on accusation, with the victim’s kin ini-
tiating matters. In the inquisitorial procedure, in contrast, the state 
took the lead. Individuals might still start the process, but judicial 
officials then took over.74 The state assumed the role of society’s 
plaintiff.
Crimes had earlier been prosecuted only when someone had 
been harmed. Twelfth- century legal reforms now identified a pub-
lic interest. An individual might not have a specific concern in a 
given crime, Hostiensis argued in the thirteenth century, but all had 
a general interest in every crime.75 English criminal law shifted from 
largely private agreements on monetary compensation to royal 
courts and justice, with death as the usual punishment.76 By the 
early fourteenth century, France had institutionalized the prosecu-
torial function in the person of the procureur du roi, who could act 
even without a private complainant. Two centuries later, he alone 
could seek serious criminal sanction, even given a plaintiff. By this 
time, the German lands were following suit. In the Carolina, the 
first German penal code from 1532, private parties could still initi-
ate prosecution, but then an official public investigation took over.77 
Queen Mary’s mid- sixteenth- century reforms in England decreed 
that plaintiffs could no longer terminate actions at will. Once a case 
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was initiated, the authorities prosecuted it to its conclusion. Rus-
sia, too, shifted from private to public law, with harsh punishments 
instituted from the sixteenth century.78 As late as the sixteenth cen-
tury, extrajudicial settlements were still common in Poland and 
Hungary, and they remained so in Bourbon France and colonial 
North America in the eighteenth century. But the number of “boot-
less” crimes, those that private parties could not settle, gradually 
expanded, and the courts ruled supreme.79
The accusatorial system in England and parts of northern Europe 
relied on juries. Like the inquisitorial method, juries provided an 
alternative to oaths, ordeals, and other appeals to divine interven-
tion. The defendant’s peers instead decided the outcome.80 Though 
less dramatically than in inquisitorial courts, where judges ruled, 
juries, too, extended the state’s reach. Prominent local men, they 
served as the central authorities’ proxies. Under Charlemagne, they 
had to answer the judge’s questions about local crimes.81 In tenth- 
century England, the leading local nobles were obliged to accuse and 
arrest those suspected of crimes. Two centuries later, under Henry II, 
this responsibility was given to a presenting jury, a forerunner of the 
grand jury, which reported crimes committed locally. By the thir-
teenth century, two- thirds of murder trials in England were initiated 
by the authorities, not by appeal from the victims’ families.82
In other respects, too, England’s accusatorial system concen-
trated initiative in the state’s hands, following the continental lead. 
From the mid- fifteenth century, juries ceased being self- informing, 
and Crown officials instead collected the evidence presented to 
them.83 Reforms in the mid- sixteenth century made the process 
more public. Plaintiffs continued to prosecute cases, but they were 
now obliged to testify. If there was no accuser, the justice of the 
peace became more like a public prosecutor. He actively investigated 
the crime, organized the case, and rounded up the accused and wit-
nesses.84 In the eighteenth century, the plaintiff still had to press 
the authorities to indict, prepare the trial, assemble witnesses, and 
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present the evidence in court.85 But by the nineteenth century, the 
English authorities finally took full responsibility for apprehending 
and prosecuting criminals.
As a further arrow in the authorities’ quiver, the legal revolution 
of the twelfth century revived the Roman doctrine of infamia, now 
called mala fama. Ecclesiastical courts could prosecute notorious 
suspects in the absence of an offense, accusation, or accuser. Even 
without a harmed party, the community’s sense of violation was 
actionable.86 To avoid baseless accusations, plaintiffs had earlier 
“subscribed” to the potential punishment by undertaking to suf-
fer the same if they failed to prove the accused’s guilt. With vic-
tims understandably reluctant to become plaintiffs, a fully- fledged 
accusatorial system was hobbled. But from the twelfth century, a 
new system of denunciation before ecclesiastical courts allowed 
plaintiffs to accuse without having to prove they were right or to 
risk being punished if they could not. Judges could now proceed 
on the basis of denunciation or other evidence of notorious offend-
ing, gathering testimony and prosecuting on their own.87 By the fif-
teenth century in Italy, prosecution on the basis of bad reputation, 
malum famum, was commonplace.
As the state became the primary punisher, sanctions were no lon-
ger carried out by victorious plaintiffs but by professionals acting 
for the court. In fifth- century Athens, the victims’ families executed 
murderers. In Visigothic law, accusers sometimes tortured the plain-
tiffs but were liable should they die.88 Stoning, as in Jewish law, 
meted out punishment by the community as a whole or at least by 
a representative sample.89 But Plato already described a parricide’s 
execution by public magistrates, who then stoned the dead body 
for good measure.90 And in classical Athens, executions were car-
ried out by a professional known as the “public man.”91 With the 
Romans, the public executioner became a fixture— arguably the sec-
ond bureaucrat, after the tax collector, though of course even more 
socially ostracized. The Middle Ages, too, saw official executioners, 
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sometimes moonlighters from other despised professions but full- 
time employees in larger towns. To judge the significance of this 
institution, consider that in China’s Warring States era, kin were 
expected to take vengeance on official executioners who had ful-
filled their duties against the family’s relatives.92 However strong 
our sense of filial piety, the idea that we should kill the executioner 
has long bowed before the state’s authority.
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Most crimes eventually became understood as collective problems to 
be solved by the state acting on society’s behalf. But one offense— 
treason— definitionally concerned the state from the very start. 
Early on, even murder was left to the implicated parties to sort. Yet 
from the very onset, the state penalized treachery against itself in 
the severest manner. Other than sacrilege and blasphemy, treason 
was the first example of a truly public crime and set the scene for 
the broader development outlined in the previous chapter. Yet as 
a crime it became ever less important. Democratically legitimated 
regimes feared it far less than their autocratic forebearers did. Why 
revolt against yourself? And as their powers grew, states found more 
effective ways of protecting themselves short of the ponderous legal 
machinery used to deal with treason.
Treason has always stood apart from other crimes. It is founded 
in scripture, where humans are warned against cursing their rulers.1 
Romulus himself, Romans believed, had protected their city against 
subversion, presiding over the trials in person.2 It is the only crime 
explicitly defined in the US Constitution. Traitors have often been 
punished by special tribunals, outside normal courts.3 Dante con-
signed them to the lowest circle of hell, two notches below mur-
derers. In ancient China, treason was the only crime exempt from 
the stricture that relatives not turn each other in. For all other 
crimes, family ties trumped obligations to the state: you were pun-
ished even for accurately reporting an errant family member to the 
Chapter 4
The State as Victim: Treason
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authorities. For treason, in contrast, the state wreaked its vengeance 
not only on offenders but also on all their family.4 Where faiths 
backed rulers, attacks on them threatened the divine, too. In medi-
eval England, killing the king was compared to blasphemy against 
the Holy Ghost.5
Until recently, traitors died gruesome deaths. In ancient Egypt, 
treason was the only crime punishable by death. Traitors were 
thrown into pits in ancient Greece, banished or painfully killed 
in Rome, and even eaten in China.6 In sixteenth- century England, 
they were dragged along the ground to the gallows, hanged until 
close to death, cut down and castrated, disemboweled alive, had 
their heart cut out and burned along with the entrails, and finally 
were beheaded, then quartered, each part hung on towers and the 
head set upon London Bridge.7 As of 1814, traitors were allowed 
to die by hanging but were then still dismembered. If the king was 
in a good mood, they might merely suffer decapitation.8 Death 
remained the punishment for treason long after it had been ban-
ished for other crimes, up to 1998 in the United Kingdom.9 The 
traitor’s family, too, was often punished. In fifth- century Athens, 
treason was a hereditary sentence, with descendants banished and 
despoiled. Roman law spared the children of traitors but confiscated 
their property and made their lives miserable.10 An Aztec traitor’s 
household was enslaved for four generations.11 The Prussian Code 
of 1794 also held a traitor’s children liable in case the state decided 
to banish or lock them up. In nineteenth- century Bavaria, a traitor’s 
family had to change its now infamous name.12 Deep into the twen-
tieth century, the Soviets punished traitors’ families.13
For treason to be a crime, a state was needed to offend against. 
As its primary victim, the state defined treason and did so accord-
ing to its own nature. It classified certain acts as treasonous— ones 
that others might see differently, even as virtuous. A vicious spiral 
of self- referential criminality ensued. Almost any action, however 
innocent it seemed, has at some time been deemed treasonous. But 
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one person’s regicide was another’s tyrannicide. Treason has always 
been an unstable concept. As the state consolidated its position, it 
abandoned its once- heavy reliance on the concept of treason for 
protection. Modern states invoke it rarely— not because they are 
weak, but because they are secure.
As long as the state and its ruler melded, treason was an offense 
against the person more than against the institution. Whatever the 
attendant pleasures of being a ruler, it was also very dangerous. In the 
first millennium CE, European monarchs were ten times as likely to 
be violently killed as the most endangered citizens of the developed 
world, young Black American men in blighted neighborhoods of the 
1990s.14 In the early Middle Ages, with the sixth- century Salic code, 
for example, attacks on kings were punished especially severely. 
Ming regulations singled out acts that endangered the emperor: 
incorrectly mixing his medicines, violating dietary prescriptions, 
poorly training his carriage horses, building his ships shoddily, and 
so on.15 By the sixteenth century, regicide— the most obvious form 
of treason— had declined to largely modern levels.16
In sixteenth- century England, Henry VIII used treason shame-
lessly to hound his enemies— whether to attack his theologi-
cal opponents as he broke with the papacy or against those who 
rejected his six marriages. Between 1532 and 1540, Henry’s courts 
charged 883 people with treason. Of this total, 308 (38 percent) were 
executed, 287 of whom had openly rebelled, raising war against the 
king; 34 were victims of court politics, caught up in the destruction 
of the Boleyn, Pole, and Courtenay dynasties; and 394 were tried 
for treason in relation to the Reformation— Catholic martyrs and 
others denying the king’s preeminence.17 With each new wife from 
Anne Boleyn forward, Henry made it treasonable to question the 
validity of his latest wedding or to accept his earlier marriages.18 In 
1541, as he planned to divorce Katherine Howard, his fifth wife, 
he made it treasonous for a woman he intended to marry to con-
ceal an unchaste sexual past, for his queen to cuckold him, and for 
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anyone who knew of such transgressions to not warn him.19 He also 
expanded treason beyond his person to include attacks on his poli-
cies as well. Opposition to Crown policy was criminalized; calling 
the king a heretic, schismatic, or tyrant was now treason.20
In stark contrast, modern America has made little use of treason. 
Had the Founding Fathers’ rebellion failed, they would have been 
hanged as traitors themselves.21 Unsurprisingly, they were as alert 
to tyrants’ abuse of treason charges as to treason itself.22 They knew 
how rival aspirant families had misused treason to settle scores in 
England and were aghast at the hideous punishments inflicted there, 
so they defined treason as a limited and abstract offense on par with 
other felonies.23 Even with the specter before them of Shays’ Rebel-
lion (a tax revolt in western Massachusetts in 1786) and other insur-
rections, even with England in Canada, with Spain in Florida and 
claiming the Mississippi Valley, with France only recently relieved of 
the Ohio Valley— despite enemies seemingly all around— the Con-
stitution’s drafters formulated treason precisely and narrowly. They 
dealt with it in the Constitution to prevent the legislature or judi-
ciary from expanding it at will.24 Though they followed the model of 
the English treason act of 1351, in their definition they eliminated 
compassing (or imagining) the king’s death not only to acknowledge 
the absence of a monarch but also to ensure that constructive defini-
tions of treachery, extending from actions to mere thoughts, could 
not be used to settle scores between political factions. Simply holding 
beliefs or harboring intent, as was actionable in England, was ruled 
out. Overt acts were required as evidence of guilt.25
The fledgling nation did not define treason as harm to a non-
existent monarch but restricted it to “consist only” of levying war 
against the United States or adhering to its enemies.26 As in English 
law, a confession or two eyewitnesses was required as proof.27 Trea-
son was not to be used to punish political opponents or in domestic 
infighting, and the sovereign ruler’s person no longer played a role. 
Only acts intended to harm the nation were treasonous.28 With a 
Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/books/book-pdf/1963888/book_9780262361507.pdf by guest on 27 December 2021
The State as Victim  77
few exceptions, mere riots, without a demonstrable ambition to 
overthrow the government, were not actionable as treason.29 Over 
the course of two and a half centuries of US history, only some two 
score traitors have ever been prosecuted.30 No convictions were 
returned during World War I, and not a single person has ever been 
executed for this crime (admittedly with the intervention of a few 
presidential pardons).31 Even after the Civil War, the North did not 
pursue the Confederates for treason.32 Such insouciance in the face 
of what was once regarded as the worst possible crime spoke to the 
Americans’ desire to leave behind the Europeans’ frequent mis-
use of treason. It also showed Americans’ confidence in their new 
republic. Its foundation was secure, and it faced few enemies. They 
were a people “singularly confident of external security and inter-
nal stability,” in the words of the Supreme Court in 1945.33
Between these extremes on treason’s historical trajectory— 
sixteenth- century England and modern America— two points emerge. 
First, treason reflects the nature of the state it offends. Second, except 
in the totalitarian dictatorships, treason has faded in importance, 
not just in the United States but also in all democratic countries. 
Because democracies are not one person’s rule, they are inherently 
less prone to treason in its classic form— political assassination. The 
primary parties in modern democracies are broadly similar, and the 
rules of succession clear, so killing a leader merely means that some-
one quite like him or her carries on. In autocracies, by contrast, 
whether absolutist monarchies or dictatorships, killing the ruler 
pays off. Protected by a private army of thousands, Adolf Hitler sur-
vived some forty attempts, Fidel Castro several hundred.34 Oppres-
sive, unrepresentative, and weak leaders have been most likely to 
die violently in office. Their rule generated opposition, and they 
tolerated no dissent, but they were insufficiently ruthless or effec-
tive to suppress their enemies fully.35
The state eventually no longer needed treason laws to protect 
itself, instead amassing an arsenal of other weapons against attack. 
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Treason fell victim to the state’s own success. More important, as 
the modern state became an element of an increasingly represen-
tative and eventually democratized political system, it served its 
citizens, not their rulers. Political change no longer came primar-
ily through revolt, rebellion, or insurrection— acts threatening the 
entire system— but as piecemeal reform, broadly agreed. Seen in a 
Kantian or Hegelian perspective, treason thus became just another 
crime. It was self- rebellion, acting against oneself. Attacking a demo-
cratically legitimated system differed from transferring power among 
competing dynasties. Change in democracies came increasingly 
from within, as everyday “treason” or reform. The domestic aspects 
of treason— sedition— faded in importance. Treason in democracies 
instead focused increasingly on collaboration with enemies, or exter-
nal treason.36
Over millennia, treason reflected the nature of the government 
authority it attacked. It spanned a broad array of actions against 
the people and their community in the Greek city- state, where state 
and society largely overlapped (as they did again in the totalitar-
ian regimes of the twentieth century). It focused on affronts to the 
person and later the office of the sovereign in imperial Rome and 
even more so in feudal Europe. In the early modern era, treason was 
abstracted to cover attacks on the nation, not on its ruler. And mod-
ern representative democracies pared treason back largely to aid-
ing and abetting enemies. Most recently, as sovereignty has in part 
transferred to supranational institutions— the United Nations, the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Hague, and the European 
Union— treason’s boundaries have grown even hazier.37
Treason was once a much broader concept. A young and weak 
state was threatened by many acts.38 When treason was the charge 
invoked between dynastic factions vying for preeminence, little 
hemmed it in. The ruler of the moment defined all enemies as trai-
tors. Since traitors’ lands escheated to them, medieval monarchs 
eagerly expanded the crime’s remit.39 In the fifteenth century, French 
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kings used treason charges to redistribute subordinate lords’ lands to 
allies.40 The greater the sovereigns’ leeway to define treason, the more 
enemies quavered. Pointing to the Chinese emperor, Montesquieu 
put it aphoristically: the less precisely high treason was defined, the 
more despotic government could be.41 Few actions have not been 
thought treasonous: consulting soothsayers about the king’s death, 
questioning the royal household expenditures, committing buggery, 
being a Jesuit priest, manufacturing bad shoes, and clipping coins— 
alongside, of course, aiding and abetting enemies and assassinating 
leaders.42 In contemporary Thailand, insulting the king— via inter-
net postings or bathroom graffiti, say— or even just speaking ill of 
his dog merits prison. In Myanmar, so does tattooing an image of the 
president on your penis— or even just claiming to have done so.43 
Since treason was definitionally a threat to the state, whatever the 
state thus defined became ipso facto thus. Traitors have come in all 
shapes and sizes: Christians under Rome, peasants in the fourteenth 
century, Jesuits in the fifteenth, both republicans and aristocrats in 
the eighteenth, Chartists in the nineteenth, Nazis and Communists 
in the twentieth, Islamists in the twenty- first.44
Before religious and secular power began separating in the early 
modern period, treason and sacrilege or heresy were much the same 
offense, attacking the highest authority.45 The Greeks closely associ-
ated impiety (asebeia) with treason (prodosia), and temple robbers 
were targeted by the same law as traitors. The Romans regarded seri-
ous violations of divine law (fas) as a kind of treason against the 
gods. Criticism of the emperors, regarded as quasi- divine, was con-
sidered both impiety and treason.46 In the Old Testament, the rebel-
lions of Adam, Cain, and Saul were disobedience against God. The 
Bible instructed Christians to obey the authorities, who held their 
power from God.47 In 1199, Pope Innocent III turned imperial laws 
on treason against heretics, now seen as traitors to God.48 Henry 
VIII, both king and head of the English Church, distinguished only 
vaguely between treason and heresy. French kings in the sixteenth 
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century equated heretics and traitors, confiscating the property 
of both.49 In the seventeenth century, James I of England consid-
ered resistance to kings blasphemous. The Prussian legal codes of 
the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries still defined trea-
son as an attack on divine as well as worldly powers.50 And French 
old- regime law recognized lèse- majesté divine, thought and speech 
crimes against God. It was from this that lèse- majesté humaine was 
derived by analogy once the prince and the state were conceived of 
as being separate.51
As long as rule by one lineage remained the norm, state and gov-
erning family overlapped, and treason was committed against the 
person of the ruler, not against the state in any abstract sense. Killing 
the leader was the essence of treason. Today, assassination is legally 
seen as but another murder. Because fathers, like hereditary leaders, 
were once invested with a quasi- supernatural authority, parricide 
too was once a worse crime than the simple homicide it is today. 
The Romans drowned parricides in a leather sack together with a 
dog, a cock, a viper, and an ape. So did eighteenth- century  Germans, 
who added infanticide to the list of such crimes.52 In ancient China, 
a broad array of kin elders were protected against parricide, and 
offenders were punished by the severest affliction, death by slic-
ing.53 Neither English nor US law singled out parricide54 But in France 
parent killing was still a separate crime in the Napoleonic penal code 
of 1810. The convicted were executed with special humiliations: 
barefoot, wearing only a shirt, head covered with black cloth, the 
right hand amputated.55 In Japan, parricide did not become a murder 
like any other until 1973.56
Similarly, seducing a leader’s wife or adult daughter is today at 
most a private moral transgression with no legal implications. In 
the past, however, subverting the royal lineage’s purity and claim 
to power by adultery, seduction, or rape was treasonous.57 Philippe IV 
of France executed two minor nobles in 1314 for adultery with his 
daughters- in- law.58 In 1536, Henry VIII prosecuted Lord Thomas 
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Howard for marrying the daughter of the queen of Scots, Henry’s 
eldest sister. Had Henry died heirless, he feared Howard could bid 
for the crown. The new act made it treason to defile or deflower the 
king’s sister, niece, or aunt or to marry them without royal permis-
sion.59 This still holds. Adultery with the monarch’s consort, eldest 
unmarried daughter, or the wife of the heir to the throne remains 
treasonous. Princess Diana’s affair with James Hewitt, her riding 
instructor, posed the issue most recently. With treason still a capital 
crime at the time, both could theoretically have been executed.60
When state and society broadly overlapped, as in the Greek polis, 
more actions were potentially treasonable than later when the 
state crystallized into more specialized functions and was threat-
ened only by specific acts.61 Among the Romans, too, almost any 
offense seemingly of peril to the state was treasonous, although the 
emperor eventually became the focus of concern.62 The Romans dis-
tinguished two concepts. Perduellio (wicked warfare) covered any 
action harmful to the people, as though from an armed enemy.63 As 
Rome enlarged, former external enemies became internal subjects, 
and so the concept of treachery expanded as well.64 About 100 BCE, 
it included also the crimen maiestatis (combined by Sulla into a sin-
gle law in 81 BCE)— behaviors tarnishing the sovereignty or dignity 
of the Roman state or the emperor. Maiestatis encompassed perduel-
lio, and together they included even negligent or merely reckless 
behavior. Under Augustus, the definition expanded to cover personal 
damages to the leader, such as slander of the princeps, his family, 
and other prominent citizens, alive or dead.65 Counterfeiting, too, 
was treason because it desecrated the emperor’s image on coins.66 
Wearing clothing in the imperial purple was a treasonous offense.67 
Already under the Romans, the concept of majesty thus shifted 
focus from the community to the person of the ruler, which was to 
dominate the Middle Ages and absolutism. The Lex Quisquis (397 
CE) expanded treason to include almost any political utterance the 
ruler, his ministers, and favorites objected to.68
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Treason in Roman law was action against ruler and people. Ger-
manic ideas, as they merged with the Roman inheritance in the bar-
barian legal codes of the seventh century, instead emphasized the 
contractual relationship between ruler and follower. Loyalty was 
pledged, and breaking that pledge (Treubruch) was treason.69 Verrat 
was equally evocative: bad counsel. The vassal owed his lord good 
advice and aid.70 As feudalism spread, kings, solidifying their power 
as the primary lord, distinguished betrayals against themselves from 
those against lesser lords. English common law thus separated high 
from petty treason, reserving special sanctions for crimes against 
the king.71 The German term for treason in general, Hochverrat, still 
retains a memory of high treason.72
As royal power solidified, treason focused on the monarch’s 
person. In the late thirteenth century, the English king Edward II 
sought to define opposition from his barons, who wished to hold 
him to his feudal obligations, as treason. The kings slowly suc-
ceeded. If the monarch was society’s linchpin, his demise was neces-
sarily worse than others. A royal death involved the “whole nation 
in blood and confusion,” in the words of an eighteenth- century 
English jurist. Every stroke against him is “levelled at the publick 
tranquility.”73 In the seventh century, Visigoths defined treason as 
actions against the people and the land as well as against the king. 
But at the close of the ninth century, King Alfred declared a man’s 
treachery to his lord the one crime that compensation could not 
expiate.74 The English treason act of 1351 (still in effect today and 
the model for the US Constitution’s treatment of the subject) tar-
geted violations of the king’s person. It began with instructions to 
punish physical attacks against or plans (i.e., compassing) to kill 
the king, queen, and eldest son as well as rape of the king’s wife, 
daughter, or daughter- in- law, thus compromising the lineage. Only 
then did it proceed to war against the king and his realm, adherence 
to the enemy, and the killing of high ministers.75 The feudal king 
pushed aside lesser lords, concentrating treason law’s protection 
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on himself. His absolutist successors took this approach to its apo-
gee. Even the subjects of a king who had become a tyrant, James 
I lectured them, had no right to resist him. No rebellion was ever 
justified.76
From Ruler to Nation
Yet this fixation on the sovereign’s person could not last.77 Whom 
or what did the concept of treason seek to protect? Was treason an 
attack on the person of the sovereign or on sovereignty itself, inde-
pendent of its current holder? If treason law protected the sovereign 
person, then if he were deposed, allegiance remained with him. 
His usurper was a pretender. Tell that to the triumphant successor! 
But if allegiance was to the ruler on the throne— in other words, to 
the system not to the person— then the expelled sovereign was a 
has- been, and the current occupant the true king. Any attempt to 
reverse a once- treasonous shift in power would now itself be trea-
son. Success cleansed treason. Being enthroned justified all earlier 
treason. Politics became a succession of treacheries. Each successful 
treason immediately flipped from crime to status quo. Treason was 
thus an inherently unstable concept. If allegiance was to the per-
son, it could not survive his or her departure; if to the system, then 
the new regime automatically trumped it. Impotence or irrelevance 
were the possible outcomes.
As long as treason focused on the ruler, regime change became 
a parade of treacheries. When the current leader lost, he was defi-
nitionally succeeded by traitors turned kings, whose own rule was 
equally illegitimate and faced the same predicament with the next 
challenger. In ancient China, a ruler who had driven out his prede-
cessor was considered to have polluted himself. To be cleansed, he 
had to sacrifice a victim— that person was dismembered, his limbs 
thrown out the city’s four gates.78 As long as competing would- be 
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rulers battled, as in the European Middle Ages and early modern 
period, accusations of treason rarely rose above being tit for tat. 
“Treason does never succeed; and what’s the reason?” the famous 
epigram asks. “When it succeeds, no man dare call it treason.”79
Put another way, all political action short of slavish support of 
the powers in charge could be treason. As a judge, Richard Tresilian, 
a member of the court party during Richard II’s reign, had advanced 
the king’s cause in 1386. With the peers ascendant again the fol-
lowing year, he was impeached and executed. Having pronounced 
treason on others, the judge was now himself killed as a traitor. In 
Tudor England, treason charges flew fast and furious as lordly lin-
eages sought to prevail. Competing accusations of treason inevita-
bly arose, with the last word going to the victor of the moment. 
Most so- called traitors of this period merely had the misfortune of 
ending on the losing side of a civil war.80 Much the same held true 
during the French religious wars of the sixteenth century, when 
lèse- majesté could be turned at times against the Huguenots and at 
others against the Catholics, depending on what prince appeared to 
be next in line for the throne.81
Besides the inherent anarchy of a personified definition of the 
offense, in time other forces also helped move treason’s focus away 
from the individual ruler. Whom did the king serve? Himself, the 
people, something higher? Germanic and feudal law approached 
relations between ruler and subject contractually and recipro-
cally. “Thou shalt be king if thou dost right,” as the Visigoths put 
it, “but if thou dost not right, then shalt thou not be king.”82 In 
post- Conquest England and France, the feudal relationship was recip-
rocal. If the king violated his end of the bargain, vassals could for-
mally withdraw fealty (diffidatio) and then wage war against him, 
all without committing treason.83 A king who became a tyrant lost 
legitimacy. To rebel against him was not treason. This was clearly 
spelled out in the various thirteenth- century compacts regulating 
relations between kings and their barons, most notably the Magna 
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Carta (1215).84 That tradition had been overshadowed in late feu-
dalism as one lord gained preeminence and enlisted the crime of 
treason for his own protection, but its fundamental logic reemerged 
in the contractarian political theories of the eighteenth century.
Even the absolutist monarchs’ pretensions, spurning any criti-
cism, were undermined in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries 
as the religious persecution sparked by the Reformation prompted 
contractualist theories of government, and the natural- law tradi-
tion reemerged. Natural law insisted that transgression was not just 
what authority said it was but that the state itself could be consid-
ered a criminal if it violated those higher laws by which it should 
abide. Only those kings who governed according to higher prin-
ciple could justify their authority. Tyrants could justly be deposed. 
John Ponet’s A Shorte Treatise of Politike Power (1556) openly advo-
cated tyrannicide against Mary Tudor because her rule contravened 
divine and natural law. Obedience was not to a personal monarch 
but to a constitutional sovereignty compliant with divine and nat-
ural law. In 1579, Phillipe du Plessis- Mornay, the likely Huguenot 
author of Vindiciae contra tyrannos, argued that it was treasonous 
for a king to commit crimes against his subjects.85 Regicide might 
be reprehensible, but tyrannicide was justified. Oliver Cromwell’s 
republic in mid- seventeenth- century England rested on similar 
constitutional assumptions. Kings derived power from the people. 
If they did not pursue their subjects’ good, resistance was justified.86 
Even Thomas Hobbes allowed subjects to resist kings who harmed 
them directly.87
Whether the standard by which rulers were judged was a supra-
political principle or an implicit contract with their subjects, they 
were held accountable to something other than their own wishes. 
This principle was institutionalized further with representative rule 
in the seventeenth century and then with democracy beginning 
with the eighteenth- century revolutions. Not every criticism or 
action against leaders was treason. Indeed, they themselves could 
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be guilty of treason. Once rule was justified by a higher standard 
by which it could fail, traitors were distinguished from common 
criminals not just because they violated laws— both did that— but 
because they did not recognize the legitimacy of the law in the first 
place. Modern traitors rejected the entire system, claiming it had no 
purchase over them. Unlike common criminals, traitors also often 
claimed to be spurred on by a higher purpose, not by mere lucre.88
In Europe after the late Middle Ages, the object protected by trea-
son laws thus shifted from the person of the sovereign to some-
thing more abstract, whether the Crown, the office of the monarch, 
the existing governmental system, or eventually the nation. As 
political systems increasingly justified themselves as pursuing the 
good of the ruled, the crime of treason declined. Why undermine a 
system that ostensibly helped you? Treason necessarily faded when 
political change could be effected by means other than resistance, 
rebellion, and overthrow of authority in that regular change was 
incorporated into the very functioning of government. As subjects 
became citizens and thus the ultimate sovereign, treason meant 
revolting against themselves.
Treason’s focus continued to move from sovereign to sovereignty, 
from ruler to state. In the early thirteenth century, the Magna Carta 
codified how the English king shared power with his barons and 
was not a divine ruler, which helped bring forth the idea of the 
Crown as the bond between the kingdom (the barons who had to be 
consulted) and the king. The Crown, not the king, was sovereign.89 
Treason now meant action against the realm more than against the 
king. By the mid- thirteenth century, treason was seen in France as a 
crime not just against the ruler’s person but also against the province 
as a larger entity independent of him. The ruler now represented 
the state; he no longer was the state.90 By the early sixteenth cen-
tury in England, kingship was no longer understood as a network 
of personal allegiance but, rather, as an office or a public capacity. 
The king assumed it, but it existed independently of him.91 Under 
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Edward II in 1320, forging of coin was declared to be an affront 
not just— as the Romans had it— to the ruler but also to the people 
of his realm. Similarly, counterfeiting in sixteenth- century Florence 
was no longer a crime because, as with the Romans, it desecrated 
the emperor’s image on the coin but because it impugned the cred-
ibility of the state’s finances.92
A century later in Elizabethan England, the state grew fully rec-
ognized as a permanent and public entity, existing independently 
of the monarch. Only thus did the trial of Charles I in 1649 for 
treason make sense. He had warred against something independent 
of the monarch, namely “Parliament and Kingdom.” The English 
civil wars of the 1640s crystallized out an impersonal concept of the 
state, where the kings’ sovereignty was derogated to them by the 
people.93 By the time of England’s strife with its North American 
colonies in the 1770s, this idea was firmly in place. Colonist reb-
els levied war against the king, “though they have no direct design 
against his person.”94
Protecting the Person of the Ruler
Despite this shift in the definition of treason, attacks on the sov-
ereign’s person long remained the primary concern. In 1813, the 
Bavarian penal code’s first and worst example of treason was attacks 
on the “sacred person” of the king.95 The Napoleonic penal code pun-
ished attempts on the emperor as parricide.96 England took longer 
than most to shift attention from ruler to state.97 In 1695, an English 
statute, passed in reaction to the bloody excesses of recent treason 
prosecutions, sought to hem in their scope by imposing due- process 
requirements. Even it, however, exempted attempts on the king’s 
life.98 A century later, after stones were thrown at George III, treason 
was specifically defined to include harming, maiming, or wound-
ing the monarch.99 Five years on, after another attack, attempts to 
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assassinate the king were now to count as and be tried in the same 
less- restrictive manner as murder.100 Two witnesses were no longer 
needed, making it easier to prosecute. In 1840 and 1842, several 
would- be assassins attacked Queen Victoria.101 The treason act of 
1842 therefore allowed prosecution of violence against the monarch 
without wheeling out treason’s heavy legal machinery, treating such 
crimes by the laxer standards of conventional murder. The mon-
arch’s person could be better protected by making it a crime short of 
treason merely to bring into her presence firearms or other weapons 
or even just to alarm her. Easier to prosecute, these offenses also trig-
gered more moderate punishments (transportation, hard labor, flog-
ging, imprisonment) than the death prescribed for treason.102 The 
1998 treason act retained compassing the monarch’s death (inher-
ited from the statute of 1351) as the only treasonable action directed 
against his or her person. Attacking the queen would thus be treason 
only if it was evidence of wanting to kill her.103
Although special protection was sometimes still reserved for 
the head of state, treason’s focus was clearly shifting from ruler to 
state. Nowhere did this transition occur more abruptly than Israel. 
Importing the English treason act of 1351 largely verbatim in 1943, 
Palestine under the British Mandate defined treason as “levying war 
against His Majesty.” When it became a nation in its own right, the 
Supreme Court redefined the object of solicitude in 1959 to be the 
State of Israel.104 Elsewhere the change was more gradual. The exam-
ple of the French revolutionaries’ shift from king to state as the 
protected object shows that ruler and system were being clearly dis-
tinguished. In the penal code of 1791, lèse- majesté, offense against 
the monarch, shifted to the newly minted category of crime against 
the nation, lèse- nation. In July 1790, the king— like all his subjects— 
was made to swear an oath to the nation. His flight to Varennes on 
20 June 1791, as he sought to leave his subjects behind, revealed the 
king as no longer treason’s victim but its primary culprit.105 Like 
Charles I, Louis XVI died on the scaffold, a convicted traitor.
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Napoleon backtracked slightly. The penal code of 1810 espe-
cially protected the emperor (his murder punished with the extra 
measures reserved for parricide) and his family (their killing pun-
ished as a capital crime), much like the Roman and medieval sover-
eigns.106 In the late nineteenth century, the Japanese penal code cast 
its net even wider. It protected not only the divine emperor and his 
heirs but also his mother and grandmother, whose role in assur-
ing the regime’s continuity had, after all, been fulfilled long ago.107 
In Germany, as in Italy and Sweden, insulting the sovereign was 
still considered an affront to the nation, thus graver than disparag-
ing private citizens.108 Attempts on his life was the penal code’s first 
example of treason.109 The Belgian penal code of 1867 distinguished 
internal from external security. Recognizing that the king was not 
the state itself, though one of its officers, it added another category 
on crimes against the king and his family.110 In the French Third 
Republic of the 1870s and then in Germany’s Weimar Republic from 
1918 to 1933, such feudal echoes dissipated altogether. In matters of 
personal safety, the president was treated like any other private citi-
zen. Killing him, after all, did not lead to a change in government, 
merely a new election.111 Fearing unrest, the Social Democratic 
leaders of the Weimar Republic bucked their party’s commitment 
to abolish capital punishment, mandating it for conspirators who 
plotted to kill government members.112 By the postwar era, how-
ever, the transition was complete. In the German Basic Law (1949), 
treason laws protected not the ruler and not even the nation but 
the fundamental political system, the constitutional order.113 The 
current French penal code makes it treasonous to attack— among 
other aspects of the very broadly defined “fundamental interests of 
the nation”— the “republican form of its institutions.”114
Born a republic, the United States was reluctant to offer its head 
of state special protections. Assassinating the president was defined 
as nothing more than murder unless the killing was part of a plot 
to aid and abet the nation’s enemies.115 A wartime statute in 1917 
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sought to change direction by outlawing threats against the presi-
dent.116 After John F. Kennedy’s assassination in 1963, it was discov-
ered that although federal law penalized threats against the president 
and the murder of other national officials, it had overlooked the kill-
ing of the president.117 That omission was rectified in 1965, when 
investigating and prosecuting assassination were centralized in fed-
eral hands, though with punishments for it remaining the same as 
for conventional murder or manslaughter.118
Protecting the System
With political change, treason also changed. Battling barons, fight-
ing for the crown, used treason to solidify power once they attained 
it. Endless bloodletting resulted. Hence, the 1495 treason act, passed 
after ten years of Tudor rule under Henry VII, in effect recognized 
de facto (not just de jure) governments. To avoid the killing of court 
officials as regimes devoured their predecessors, the act assured gov-
ernment personnel that they would not be prosecuted for treason 
as new monarchs ascended the throne or for past adherence to the 
king’s enemies.119
At issue here was not the nature of the system but the identity 
of the ruling clan. When political change was threatened between 
different systems, not just by substituting royal lineages, however, 
the stakes increased. Treason was gradually whittled down from 
a welter of actions to focus on the primordial sin of fundamental 
regime change. Treason had once been vaguely defined as almost 
any conceivable action that hurt the body politic and community, 
especially its ruler. Gradually it came to focus on overthrowing gov-
ernment, aiming to change the system fundamentally, whether in 
collusion with foreign enemies or not.
Such fundamental change had earlier been almost inconceivable. 
Dynasties, not regimes, came and went. Early modern governments 
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sought to protect themselves by passing inherently self- contradictory 
laws outlawing their own end. Anyone in a position to violate these 
laws could not, of course, care less. In the late fourteenth century, 
Richard II promulgated a statute making it treasonous to attempt to 
repeal his new law on treason. His successor, Henry IV, having won 
the throne in war, repealed it shortly thereafter.120 Treason laws’ 
inherent contradictions were accentuated once they were deployed 
to protect not just the ruler but also the system. The German peas-
ants revolting in the sixteenth century fought not for a new king 
but for a new political system altogether. The same had been true 
of the English peasants rebelling in 1381 and then charged with 
treason against the realm.121 The Holy Roman emperor thought the 
same as he expanded treason in the sixteenth century to include 
rebellion— threatening revolting peasants with decapitation or flog-
ging.122 He rightly worried that peasants wanted to end imperial 
rule tout court. After the peasant rebellion of 1525, the Landesord-
nung (territorial law) of South Tirol threatened all insurrectionaries 
with death.123 The treason trial of Charles I in England in 1649, part 
of the establishment of Cromwell’s republic, brought fundamen-
tal regime change. No longer did rival claimants to the throne suc-
ceed one another; hereditary monarchy ended altogether.124 Treason 
was already cruelly punished, but under Charles II Cromwell’s now 
defeated followers were subjected to even more spectacular suffering, 
probably in response to how they had overturned the entire order. 
The corpses of the mercifully already dead Cromwellians were disin-
terred, hanged, and beheaded.
Representative government and then democracy exacerbated the 
problem of treason’s logical self- contradiction. How could treason 
be squared with the right of citizens to hold their leaders account-
able? In democracies, allegedly based on natural law, actions that 
“would earlier have kept the hangman busy” were now under-
stood as citizens’ right to determine the regime that ruled them.125 
Far from being treason, criticism and change were baked into 
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representative government. With freedom of speech a fundamental 
right, seditious opinions and even libel against the ruler could not 
be treason. And yet even democracies faced treason’s fundamental 
incoherence: you cannot legislate across basic ruptures in legitima-
tion. Only unsuccessful treason can be prosecuted. Successful trea-
sons by their nature are not pursued.
Regimes with representative and especially democratic legitimacy 
allowed, indeed welcomed, criticism and reform. Yet they, too, drew 
the line at fundamental system change. Just as sovereign individuals 
cannot sell themselves into slavery without violating their freedom, 
so democratic regimes could not allow the undermining of popu-
lar sovereignty. That principle, in turn, rested on the assumption 
that popular sovereignty would never willingly surrender itself into 
the hands of some other system. Deciding whether one dynasty or 
another was to sit on the throne involved no basic principles, but 
to tamper with a regime constituted by its subjects’ free choice was 
serious. Insofar as democratic regimes represented the general will, 
to question them was to thwart that will. A traitor to democracy was 
an enemy of the people. Starting already with the French Revolu-
tion, such reasoning was taken to its extremes in the populist pseu-
dodemocracies of totalitarianism. Any criticism, however mild, was 
taken as tantamount to treason. Any transgression, however incon-
sequential or technical, was heresy.126 Some liberal democracies, 
having surveyed the ravages of authoritarianism, therefore drew 
robust conclusions on protecting democracy against its own worst 
instincts. Militant democracy was the outcome— the doctrine that 
lesser civil rights, such as free speech or assembly, must occasionally 
be sacrificed since a democracy cannot tolerate political parties that 
aim to overthrow popular rule. In the postwar era, more than half 
of Europe’s nations have banned a political party for such inten-
tions, mainly but not only parties on the far Right.127
This logic existed already with the first quasi- democratic repub-
lic in ancient Rome. When the monarchy was overthrown and 
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the republic installed, each citizen had to swear never to support 
a king or similar leader, making it treasonous not to back the exist-
ing system.128 Similarly, in 1671 the New England colonists of New 
Plymouth defined treason as any attempt to alter or subvert the 
“Fundamental Frame and Constitutions of this Government.”129 The 
US Constitution of 1787 followed suit, guaranteeing the individual 
states a republican form of government and promising to protect 
them against invasion.130 The French revolutionaries repeated this 
reasoning. They messianically regarded their regime as history’s cul-
mination. To question this conclusion was self- evidently treason. The 
French penal code of 1791 listed seventy- nine different crimes against 
the state.131 In 1792, the revolutionaries decreed death for anyone 
proposing a return to monarchy or any other regime hostile to the 
people’s sovereignty.132 In the Napoleonic penal code, treason was 
defined as any “attempt to change the form of the government.”133
But, of course, events overtake even the most ambitious intentions. 
The Roman emperors were not deterred by the republic’s oaths. Revo-
lutionary France was only the first of— so far— eight French regimes: 
five republics, two empires, and whatever Vichy should be called. 
Overturning a popularly legitimated system may be a primal political 
sin, but no regime is stronger than its ability to defend itself. Treason 
laws are only as robust as the regime that enforces them.
Treason Narrows
Once democratic governance became the norm, treason changed 
profoundly. Democracies had weaker reason to fear treason than 
less- legitimated regimes, except as outside attack or a wholescale 
upheaval from within. Democratically legitimated regimes’ author-
ity rested on doing their citizens’ biddings. Why would anyone over-
throw themselves? The short answer was that almost no one did. 
Treason moved from being a crime of the elite— nobles battling each 
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other for power— to one of outsiders, cranks, and fabulists— the 
Lord Haw Haws and Tokyo Roses of the world. The longer answer 
must also take account of the circumstances of World War II and 
the Cold War. As nations became carriers of competing ideologies 
(as during the earlier wars of religion), working for a foreign power 
meant more than helping enemies fight one’s homeland for pay. 
Traitors took sides in an ideological battle. The fifth columnists in 
the West— Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, Guy Burgess, Harold Philby, 
and others from that quaint era when art historians had access to 
state secrets— were anticapitalist true believers. The dissidents of 
the totalitarian regimes were their mirror image.
But in the longer durée of modern history, treason fell into dis-
use. By the eighteenth century, interest in it was so slight that stan-
dard legal texts ceased discussing it in any detail. No other major 
crime, German observers calculated early in the twentieth century, 
was committed so infrequently.134 Prosecutions occurred mainly 
in wartime and other crises. The world wars and interwar era saw 
clashing ideologies demanding ever firmer allegiance and a precari-
ous geopolitical balance, with nations fearing attack and invasion. 
Legislation protecting nation and state unsurprisingly tightened.135 
In the United States, sedition laws suppressed radical unions during 
the 1920s. An uptick in treason prosecutions followed the Kennedy 
assassination in 1963. The Cold War rekindled treason charges, as 
did the Algerian conflict for France.136 But even then treason law 
remained little used, compared to the early modern era, although 
Islamic terrorism in the West from the late twentieth century on 
has put it back in the limelight.
Once a blunderbuss in the early modern period, modern trea-
son narrowed to a few crimes, mostly involving enemy powers and 
local collaborators. Modern law commonly distinguished between 
foreign and domestic treason, or what Germans call Landesverrat 
(treason) and Hochverrat (sedition).137 In liberal democracies, trea-
son was restricted to a few actions: attacks on public authorities, 
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insubordination in the military, sabotage, and more generally the 
aiding and abetting of the enemy. The external aspects of treason 
included obvious instances of assisting foreign enemies: committing 
espionage, serving in their military, admitting them illegally into the 
national territory. The presumption was that in democracies both 
government and citizens opposed the enemy.
In contrast, modern democracies deal with sedition, the domes-
tic aspects of treason, in two ways. Much of what would earlier have 
counted as seditious is now accepted criticism and dissent and thus 
something the modern state must tolerate. But not all. Democratic 
systems that otherwise regard freedom of speech as foundational 
have also been quick to punish when matters stray onto treason’s 
turf. Regarding words as treasonable acts in their own right stands 
in a long tradition. Following Roman law, with its emphasis on 
sedition and disloyal thoughts, the English treason act of 1351 
expanded treason to include compassing or imagining the death of 
the king— a purely internal event perceptible only to traitors them-
selves and perhaps to God. How then to know whether someone 
was guilty? Two centuries later, under Henry VIII in the treason act 
of 1534 the offense was broadened to include attempts to imperil 
the king’s person, accomplished by writing or a similar manifest 
act. Calling the king a heretic, schismatic, tyrant, or the like was 
now treasonable.138
Courts came to accept spoken or written words alone as overt 
acts proving treason. In one extreme example from 1460, a tav-
ern owner was convicted for promising to make his son, should he 
behave, heir to the throne.139 During the French Revolution, about 
a third of the many thousands executed died merely because of 
what they had said or written.140 The American Founding Fathers 
avoided making mere expression treasonable, but state statutes 
considered allegiance uttered to the English king treasonous.141 
A US statute of 1917 protecting the president from threats crimi-
nalized verbal attacks on his person, thereby sanctioning speech, 
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and criticism of conscription was punished during World War I. In 
cases during World War II, propaganda was accepted as action and 
thus potentially treasonous.142 To prevent overreach, courts sought 
to distinguish between true threats and mere hyperbole. Yet even 
those who made conditional threats in private were indicted.143 On 
the whole, however, free- speech protections encouraged the state to 
accept that criticisms, even ones like those once considered treason-
ous, were the price of democracy. The authorities worried less about 
the content of utterances and more about whether they sought to 
undermine public order. Criticism was fine, riot not.144
Prosecutions of overt treason were reined in. But the modern dem-
ocratic state also redirected its powers into other channels, retaining 
its defensive capacities in new guises. Treason laws were no longer 
the only or even the main bulwark against the state’s enemies. It now 
deployed new potential charges. Since these charges were not sub-
ject to treason’s procedural restrictions, through them the authori-
ties in fact had greater leeway. Following the US Civil War, no one 
was prosecuted for treason, but laws regarding other, newly defined 
crimes now punished much the same acts. Rebellion and insurrec-
tion were criminalized in 1862, seditious conspiracy in 1861.145 Such 
attempts to make an end run around treason proper survived chal-
lenges in court, which portrayed them as treason in all but name.146 
In the 1940s, similar treason substitutes were passed that outlawed 
advocating the government’s overthrow.147 In the United States, trea-
son was seldom prosecuted during the Cold War, in part because the 
Supreme Court tightened up requirements in 1954. The authorities 
instead pursued threats via other means: rebellion, insurrection, trad-
ing with the enemy, seditious conspiracy, advocating overthrow of 
the government, piracy, and espionage were among the crimes now 
rolled out against treasonlike activities.148 Alger Hiss was convicted of 
perjury in 1950, the Rosenbergs of conspiring to spy in 1951.149
Britain invented the crime of treason- felony in 1848 to prose-
cute those whose actions earlier would have required accusations of 
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sedition.150 During World War II, the new felony offense of treachery 
allowed pursuit of espionage and disloyalty without treason’s cum-
bersome rules of evidence and procedure.151 The French penal code 
of 1994 devoted an entire book to the grandiosely named crimes and 
misdemeanors against the nation, the state, and the public peace. 
The book defines treason in 10 articles and then proceeds to another 
227 distinct articles, many covering several different acts.152
Modern states also turned to practical techniques to protect 
themselves. No- go zones from which civilians were excluded or for-
bidden to photograph became common.153 Although modern lead-
ers may no longer be protected by as many laws, they have become 
far more insulated from their constituents, making them physically 
harder to harm. They are assassinated most often at stopping points 
during travel, including parades.154 Modern weaponry has in effect 
banished leaders from the open air. Their workplaces and homes 
have been sealed off like fortresses, and they travel in armor- plated 
vehicles. Such protective technologies would have been the envy of 
the Borgias and, until recently, would have been used only by the 
most despised dictators, such as Hitler and Stalin.155
The rough and tumble that leaders were once expected to endure 
astonishes the modern mind. The same day in 1800 that James 
Hadfield tried to assassinate George III in the Drury Lane Theater, 
the king had earlier been the object of a near- miss shooting dur-
ing a Grenadier Battalion field exercise in Hyde Park. That same 
evening, on the way back from the theater, George was pursued 
by an angry mob, which dispersed only when the Bow Street offi-
cers made arrests.156 Security precautions were laughable by mod-
ern standards. In 1840, a drunk wandered into the White House 
to spend the night unnoticed. John Wilkes Booth shot President 
Abraham Lincoln while the police officer assigned to his theater 
box was drinking in a nearby bar.157 After an unsuccessful attempt 
on President Andrew Jackson’s life in 1835, the would- be assassin 
was released on (an increased amount of) bail since there had been 
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no actual battery.158 The French king Louis- Philippe was the object 
of seven assassination attempts between the autumn of 1834 and 
the following summer.159 When Queen Victoria was shot at in her 
carriage in 1842 and the assailant escaped, she and Albert were sent 
down the same route the next day (at a slightly faster pace) to flush 
out the would- be assassin.160 Though he was indeed arrested on 
the second attempt, it seems highly unlikely that modern leaders 
would thus be treated like tethered goats— nor does a body dou-
ble seem to have occurred to the Victorian imagination. Victoria’s 
reign was long, but the eight attempts on her life put to shame what 
modern leaders are expected to endure. In the spring of 1878, Kaiser 
Wilhelm I survived two assassination attempts within three weeks, 
both on the same boulevard, Unter den Linden. Napoleon III, how-
ever, was widely suspected of having fabricated assassination plots 
to suppress his enemies.161 And Felice Orsini’s attempt on Napo-
leon’s life in 1858 certainly prompted a widespread crackdown and 
massive deportations.
A logically unstable concept, treason has undergone two divergent 
developments. As the state increasingly came to serve the people 
as the ultimate sovereign, treason largely dissipated. Regime change 
no longer involved switches among ruling dynasties, who sought 
to bolster their own legitimacy by wielding treason laws against 
their enemies, only to have the same eventually done to them. In a 
popularly legitimated system, treason was almost self- contradictory. 
As an offense, it continued as a pale vestige of its former self, largely 
reduced to collaboration with external enemies. What had once been 
the worst possible crime, one the state expended its main efforts 
suppressing, had largely vanished by the nineteenth century. But 
the state’s repressive machinery against those who would threaten 
its stability or harm its leaders took new forms. The modern state 
relinquished treason law as an arrow in its quiver not because it was 
weak but because it was too strong and all- controlling to need it any 
longer.
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In history’s long sweep, the state eventually asserted its prerogative 
to maintain order on its own. It imposed its monopoly on violence 
by banning parallel means of resolving disputes that had long coex-
isted with the official machinery, both predating it and often per-
sisting even today. Civil society adjudicated its own disputes long 
before the state was in a position to intervene and continued to do 
so long after it became a competitor. The state’s claims to monopoly 
were not as absolute as it often pretended. Sometimes it enlisted 
private efforts on its own behalf, as we will see later with policing. 
Other times it tolerated a continuing role for civil society.
In the state’s judicial role, its primary rival was the family. The 
family’s head, the paterfamilias, ruled supreme within it, largely 
autonomous of statutory interference. Over wives and children, 
treated as property, his was the final word. In the earliest eras, he 
could sell his offspring or adopt them away, treating them— and his 
spouse(s)— largely as he pleased. Only gradually, under the Romans, 
was killing children or slaves forbidden.1 Roman fathers built prison 
cells in their homes for disciplining. In the eighteenth century, the 
Bastille was filled with errant offspring locked up at their families’ 
request— the Marquis de Sade among the most notorious. Physical 
abuse of children was likely the most frequent form of assault in this 
era.2 The father also chose both his sons’ and his daughters’ spouses.
Only gradually did the state make inroads on this patriarchal pre-
serve. With Solon, children could no longer be sold into slavery; 
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with Christianity they were no longer exposed. By the eighteenth 
century, women began to be allowed to own property and con-
duct themselves as legally independent of their families, and they 
were eventually allowed to vote. In the modern era, children were 
emancipated from absolute paternal power, too. The state required 
fathers to let them be registered at birth, drafted, educated, vacci-
nated, and inspected. It began meddling in inheritance, forbidding 
primogeniture, enforcing equality of offspring. It took over divorce 
from the church. It sought to determine how many children fami-
lies bore— more or fewer depending on its needs. The young were 
emancipated from their fathers at an ever earlier age, becoming 
full subjects and then citizens in their own right. In Roman law, a 
father’s power lapsed only with his death. Today, the children’s late 
teen years are usually the cut- off. Such changes came late and often 
remain incomplete. Marital rape was outlawed only recently and 
not everywhere. Spousal abuse remains widespread— officially for-
bidden but tolerated nonetheless. Parents can still waive statutory- 
rape protections for minors in some US states and elsewhere by 
consenting to child marriages. Even today, parents determine more 
than half of all marriages globally.3
Beyond the family as a judicial institution, however, more spe-
cific mechanisms of adjudication have also vied with the state’s 
pretension to sole power. Vigilantism is a general aspect of this 
self- administration of justice, duels a more specific instance. Both 
sought to implement justice, as locally defined, by sidestepping the 
state’s claims to omnipotence. Both therefore had to go, and both 
eventually went. Of course, all justice began as vigilantism, civil 
society administering itself. The spontaneous stoning of criminals 
in ancient Greece and Rome is an example.4 The logic of ostracism 
was much the same, though not lethal— a vote taken against those 
who had aroused enough ill feeling among their fellow citizens 
that they were voted out of society for a decade. Only as the state 
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successfully established its monopoly was vigilante justice dispar-
aged as unworthy.5
The duel was founded on consent— that both parties thus agreed 
to resolve their differences. Why should something consensual be 
forbidden them? Consent removes some actions from the law’s 
purview, making them a matter of private negotiation. At a certain 
age, sex consented to is making love. Without permission, it is rape. 
With the proper forms signed, someone who violates your body 
with sharp instruments is not committing assault but performing 
heart surgery, inscribing a tattoo, or piercing your ears. Consent 
does not always sidestep the law’s prohibition, though. Even agreed 
to, certain sexual acts— involving physical damage, for example— 
remain assaults, not just sadomasochistic foreplay.6 Female genital 
mutilation cannot be agreed to; male circumcision is contested. A 
surgeon who cuts off your fingers could probably be charged with 
mayhem or assault even if you had agreed.7 Neither murder nor 
assault can be mitigated by the victim consenting to be harmed.8 
You cannot sell yourself even willingly into slavery, though becom-
ing an indentured servant was once interpreted as expressing indi-
viduals’ right to control their own affairs.9 Whether you can hawk 
your sexual services depends on the jurisdiction, as it does for sell-
ing or renting your organs or gametes.
Invoking consent, the duel also sought to exempt its particu-
lar violence and death from illegality. Duelists sought to be spared 
sanctions, as other legal killings such as justifiable homicide and 
self- defense were exempted. But the state would have none of it. 
True, the duel helped tame aristocratic brutality, refining and replac-
ing the vendetta in the Renaissance.10 In that sense, it helped lessen 
violence. Yet because duelers aimed to fashion their own sphere of 
private law, the state ultimately could not tolerate their combat, 
any more than it could vengeance or feud. Duelers were, as one 
seventeenth- century critic put it, lawless condemners of authority.11
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Duels were ancient. David and Goliath fought one, and in the 
medieval trial by battle God himself intervened to indicate guilt or 
innocence in cases where the evidence was ambiguous and truth 
difficult to discern.12 Yet Augustine inveighed against gladiatorial 
combats, and the medieval church rejected the shedding of Chris-
tian blood in duels.13 Eric Haakonsson, governor of Norway in the 
eleventh century, outlawed duels.14 The Council of Trent in the 
mid- sixteenth century excommunicated dueling Catholics, and 
Protestants followed suit. Though the duel was found in the Ger-
manic codes, Roman law knew it not. Judicial battle, with its appeal 
to God’s intervention, was undermined with the rise of Roman law 
in the twelfth century and rare by the fifteenth.15 Duels instead shed 
their supernatural aura to become yet another means of feuding 
and a test merely of skill, bravery, and luck. In Njál’s saga of the 
thirteenth century, when Mord is challenged to a duel, his friends 
point out that he is likely to lose since Hrut is strong and brave.16 By 
the sixteenth century, the modern secular duel had arrived: a vin-
dication of honor, not an evidentiary technique, and no longer an 
element of the judicial system but deliberately outside it.
From the state’s vantage, the modern duel actually had much to 
recommend it. Unlike feuds or vendettas, duels were first limited 
to aristocrats and restricted in scope. Duels were fought between 
equals over points of honor, which were slippery to legislate, prose-
cute, and punish. Challenges could not be issued up the social scale 
and were wasted if aimed down.17 Compared to full- scale feuds, 
duels were orderly and conducted with discretion. Only two men 
fought, their interaction ritualized, with few chances of drawing 
others in and thus expanding the conflict. Duels also ended, once 
and for all, disputes that might escalate. Even if both parties sur-
vived, the duel settled their conflict.18 Yet its aristocratic pedigree 
made it appealing to other social groups. With the middle classes 
emulating their betters, dueling democratized to become all the 
rage in eighteenth- century Germany.19 Dueling scars became male 
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adornment. The dueling associations of the Central European uni-
versities issued leather masks with strategically placed slits so that 
facial scars could be decoratively inflicted as fashion dictated. In 
eighteenth- century England, workers, too, settled conflicts with rit-
ualized fistfights.20 Even the democratic New World enjoyed such 
aristocratic vestiges. The American South was naturally fertile soil, 
but the habit also spread farther north. In 1804, Aaron Burr killed 
Alexander Hamilton in New Jersey shortly after Hamilton’s son had 
died in a duel.21
The duel’s popularity threatened the state’s pretensions to monop-
olize adjudication. The absolutist state pacified unruly nobles in 
part by suppressing duels. Louis XIV managed to eradicate the duel 
among his courtiers, drawing them into the gilded panopticon of 
Versailles and undermining their raucously independent lives in Paris 
or the provinces.22 The English upper classes abandoned duels early 
on. James I forbade challenges in the early seventeenth century. In 
the 1840s, officers who encouraged duels were court- martialed, and 
widows of duelists were stripped of their pensions. The last known 
duel with a lethal outcome in England was fought by two French-
men in 1852.23 In eighteenth- century Massachusetts, judges were 
required to sentence duelers to death and then dissection. Peter the 
Great ordered the bodies of both the slain duelist and the winner 
hanged alongside each other.24 In the 1830s, Alabama made aspir-
ing lawyers affirm they had never dueled. To this day, would- be 
Kentucky state legislators must swear that they have never partaken 
in a duel.25
Statutes against dueling were but one facet of the state’s attempt to 
suppress vigilante justice more generally. Vigilantism can be thought 
of in at least two ways. Before the state was able to administer jus-
tice, vigilantism improvised it. But once the state staked its claim, 
vigilantism competed with it. The benign view of vigilantism, as the 
provision of what the state eventually would do, sees it as deliver-
ing services the authorities failed at and relying on volunteer labor 
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drafted only as required.26 The English hundreds were one form of 
such self- administered justice, as were the twelfth- century Sicilian 
Vendicatori, the Vehm in early modern Germany, and today’s many 
mafias. Samosud in Russia was the popular justice administered by 
peasant communities in the absence of much official policing. With 
maling in eighteenth- century Holland, crowds manhandled thieves 
caught red- handed, who were often spared only by being arrested.27 
The Regulators in eighteenth- century back- country South Carolina 
provided law enforcement where the state failed. “Jeddart justice” 
refers to Jedburgh, a Scotch border town where raiders were hanged 
without trial.28 To this day, even well- policed states such as France 
and Germany allow private citizens to bring flagrant offenders to 
justice.29
Vigilantism not only enforced neglected laws but also often pre-
scribed behavior dictated by sentiments of justice and morality that 
were popular though not on the books— and, indeed, often illegal. 
Because vigilantism competed with the state, it was inherently a 
relapse as citizens briefly took back the sovereignty they had other-
wise yielded to the authorities. Long- standing vigilante movements 
were a contradiction in terms.30 Vigilantes broke the law to achieve 
what they deemed just. Rough music, charivaris, and shivarees were 
of this ilk: humiliating those who had violated custom and tradi-
tion, such as old men who took young brides or henpecked or cuck-
olded husbands or wife beaters.
Vigilantism sometimes served broadly sympathetic causes: pros-
ecution associations bringing felons to heel in eighteenth- century 
England; citizens uniting to bring order to lawless territory in the 
nineteenth- century American West; Guardian Angels patrolling 
inner- city neighborhoods ignored by the police; communities band-
ing together to drive out drug dealers or flush out hoarded food dur-
ing shortages; Queer Nation helping curb discrimination against 
sexual minorities; and the so- called Regulars in eighteenth- century 
New York State who— dressed in women’s clothing— flogged abusive 
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husbands.31 Fictional accounts stand in this line: Robin Hood, the 
Three Musketeers, the Virginian, Zorro, the superheroes of comic 
strip, screen, and digital game.32 In this spirit, vigilantism was often 
romanticized as expressing popular sovereignty, a form of tempo-
rary self- rule, like other social movements. If law were ultimately 
made by the people, so this logic went, why should they not also 
enforce it?33 Vigilantism was democracy or self- rule in its rawest, 
least- mediated form.
Yet lynch justice often ruled instead. Hate- filled mobs bayed for 
blood while the state stood aside: when Protestants were massa-
cred in the sixteenth century, Jews were slaughtered in pogroms, 
Native Americans were killed like wild animals, Blacks were hanged 
to teach them their place.34 Orgies of violence, overpowering what-
ever the authorities may have done to quell them, vented savage 
hatreds.35 Mob justice occasionally accompanied widespread social 
breakdown, as in St. Petersburg following the revolution of Feb-
ruary 1917.36 But it has equally been part of otherwise stable and 
functioning systems and often even a means to achieve goals the 
authorities tacitly accepted. The mob’s motives could at times argu-
ably be unobjectionable: when child molesters were publicly ostra-
cized and driven out of communities; when a woman who refused 
to clean up after her dog on the subway in Korea was hounded by a 
massive harassment campaign.37
Named after Charles Lynch, a justice of the peace who supervised 
extralegal executions of Tory sympathizers during the revolution, 
lynch justice in nineteenth- century America marked the limits of 
the state’s pretensions to enforce law on its own terms.38 Lynching 
expressed a rough popular justice, with white crowds meting out 
vastly more severe punishments than the law foresaw on despised, 
often innocent, and almost invariably Black victims. Black men 
showing a sexual interest in white women unleashed the white vox 
populi’s extraordinary savagery.39 In the American South, lynching 
was a de facto parallel system of “justice” for much of the 1900s. In 
Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/books/book-pdf/1963888/book_9780262361507.pdf by guest on 27 December 2021
106  Chapter 5
part, lynching filled a gap in the state’s enforcement, but it equally 
gave voice to a different conception of law altogether, one that— 
neither legalistic nor universal but brutally retributive— upheld the 
property, racial, and sexual hierarchies defended by rural whites. 
More justice and less law, was how one Wyoming lyncher put it in 
1902.40 In the late nineteenth century, even the recorded number 
of such killings— and many lynchings likely went unrecorded— far 
surpassed official executions.41 At a snail’s pace, the state eventu-
ally suppressed this regime of terror. Lynchings declined from more 
than 150 annually in the 1890s to half that at the turn of the cen-
tury and into single digits by the 1940s.42
But rather than being stamped out, southern whites’ baying for 
blood was then arguably institutionalized within the state’s judicial 
machinery. State executions increased as extralegal killings were 
eliminated, the authorities themselves thus satisfying the popu-
lar demand for retribution. The American South and Southwest, 
lynching’s heartland, today have the highest execution rates in the 
country. The death penalty’s popularity here gives voice to a form 
of community justice, now inflicted not directly by lynching but 
indirectly as the authorities respond to popular demand.43 The con-
tinued popularity of capital punishment in China similarly sustains 
the Maoist doctrine of whipping up popular hatreds against ene-
mies, slaking a widespread demand for revenge.44
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Many motives, sometimes contradictory, have prompted crime’s 
punishment, and they have historically shifted in emphasis and 
focus. The fundamental philosophical dispute has pitted retribu-
tion and a hope of delivering justice for the wronged against a 
more utilitarian concern with diminishing crime that was willing 
to employ techniques that did not necessarily treat the harmed as 
they deserved. An innocent good- faith buyer of stolen property, for 
example, was usually considered its legal owner. The need to keep 
markets unencumbered by endless disputes over title took prece-
dence over the original owner’s absolute title: efficiency trumped 
fairness.1 These opposing positions have been argued in largely all 
eras. Though the two are theoretically exclusive, in fact some com-
bination of justice and usefulness has motivated almost all state 
actions.
The kin groups who once settled disputes among themselves 
typically sought revenge and retribution. Harm needed to be set 
right, an out- of- kilter moral balance reequilibrated. Compensation 
was demanded for damage to life and limb, to intangible property 
(the monetary value of men’s sexual monopoly over women), or 
to reputation. Ancient and early medieval law listed precise values: 
for each particular mutilation or for the rape of other men’s wives, 
daughters, or female slaves. But how to deal with losses that were 
hard or impossible to compensate? Taking revenge at least gave the 
satisfaction of equal damage, a negative compensation for a loss 
Chapter 6
Why Punish?
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that could never otherwise be made good. The talionic one- to- one 
logic of retribution sought to cap the otherwise potentially unbri-
dled frenzy of revenge: an eye for an eye, death for death, amputa-
tions of the offending limb or member.2 Even hell was imagined 
talionically: blasphemers hanging by their tongues, adulteresses by 
their hair.3
Beyond this logic, who sought to punish? That victims and their 
kin were keen on revenge is obvious. Less clear is why the state— 
concerned to maintain order and take a broader view— should also 
pursue retribution. When authority was the offended party, as with 
treason, then its motives were akin to kin’s. For threats against the 
group as a whole— public harms— the group responded as a unit, 
as in the ancient Greek pollution theory of crime. But as the state 
assumed responsibility for regulating a group that was more varie-
gated than kin, with multiple and contradictory interests, it neces-
sarily became more concerned with order than with retribution. At 
that point, authorities were likely to have stepped back from aveng-
ing harm to considering instead their broader aims in prosecuting 
crime. Although vengeance might satisfy the individual or the kin, 
it also created disorder through ongoing feud that undermined 
social harmony. The state needed to be seen ensuring justice, but 
justice was more than retribution.
From a practical vantage, the state was as concerned to maintain 
order as to dispense individual justice. Ensuring justice was part of 
underwriting stability, but too narrow and individual a concept of 
justice, with no concern for social utility, undermined that order. 
Vengeance delivered a narrow form of justice for the harmed party, 
but the rest of society gained little and indeed suffered from con-
tinued mayhem in vengeance’s wake. So was the answer a more 
utilitarian approach, which took the aggregate well- being of most 
citizens as its primary goal? That approach threw up problems, 
too. Social utility could be maximized only by violating primal 
notions of fairness and equity. Some offenders would be let off, some 
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innocents punished— if that promoted order. From a utilitarian van-
tage, what mattered was the damage caused by criminals, not why 
they had offended. Not criminals’ motives or intent but the harm 
they inflicted should determine their punishment, the Enlighten-
ment philosophe Cesare Beccaria argued in 1764.4 From this van-
tage, punishing a successful assassin made sense, but punishing one 
who had overslept or missed the mark, killing no one, perhaps did 
not.5 It could be socially efficient to punish only mildly or even 
not at all if it did not deter future crime. Why bother prosecuting 
the aged death- camp guard?6 If punishment prevented no offenses, 
what was the point? Bentham asked. It would just be “adding one 
evil to another.” But if it did deter others, then the otherwise “base 
and repugnant” sanction was justified as “an indispensable sacrifice 
to the common safety.”7
If preventing crime could be achieved by other means, then a 
utilitarian approach considered punishment unnecessary. If hang-
ing someone in effigy deterred, Bentham argued, then actually 
stringing up offenders would be cruel.8 But the same logic might 
equally dictate punishing even the innocent in pursuit of useful 
outcomes. What if hanging every ten- thousandth passer- by reduced 
crime? Either way, in this view punishment was set not in relation 
to the crime already committed (what was just and deserved) but in 
terms of what would prevent future offenses (what was useful). The 
two extremes of these divergent approaches— retribution and social 
usefulness— can be nicely juxtaposed thus: Why punish a prisoner 
who was certain not to offend again? the utilitarians asked.9 In con-
trast, Kant famously argued that even in a society that had agreed 
to dissolve itself, the last capital offender should nonetheless be 
executed in order to square the moral accounts, however little con-
sequence or effect this killing might have.10
Retributionists were concerned with desert, utilitarians with dan-
ger. But desert and dangerousness unfortunately often pointed in 
different directions. Some deserved punishment, though they no 
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longer posed a threat. Others were real dangers, though they had 
yet to commit a crime. Did that mean sentencing on the basis of 
predicted offending— leniency for the now toothless monster but 
lengthy terms for those with vividly sadistic imaginations? Or, more 
mundanely, did it mean longer sentences for the recently unem-
ployed, who were revealed by statistical analysis to be more likely 
to offend?11 Once the tie between offense and its punishment was 
cut, seeking instead some socially beneficial outcome, all bets were 
off. Why punish attempted murder less than completed homicide 
when the would- be killer was as morally culpable and dangerous as 
the one who succeeded?12 However, a desert- based approach strug-
gled to explain why a particular crime merited precisely this or that 
punishment. Did an eye balance the moral books for an eye? Why 
death for theft? For that matter, why death for any of the other two 
hundred capital crimes in eighteenth- century England?
Treating criminals as they supposedly deserved also produced dys-
functional outcomes. Branding criminals on the cheek in eighteenth- 
century England prevented them from resuming normal life.13 
Torturing to extract confessions crippled suspects who later proved 
to be innocent. The law requiring that forgers be executed, London 
bankers complained in 1830, encouraged juries to let them off, thus 
endangering the property rights the law sought to protect. When 
arrests for domestic violence were mandated, reporting the crime 
dropped off.14 Overly harsh punishments could spur more crime, 
not deter it. In Russia, Montesquieu observed, where both robbery 
and murder were punished by death, thieves killed their victims. 
Why spare a witness?15 In Qin era China (third century BCE), rain 
delayed a group of convicts en route to a military camp. Since the 
punishment for arriving late was death, there was no downside to 
the revolt they decided to stage instead.16 The recent intense scru-
tiny of pedophilia, it has been argued, has ironically helped sexu-
alize childhood, thus perhaps exacerbating the crimes it seeks to 
avoid.17
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The dispute between justice and utility has been ongoing, tip-
ping one way or the other. The polarities have been presented here 
abstractly and ahistorically. But the themes are discernable in almost 
every epoch. Just deserts or socially useful goals? Justinian’s sixth- 
century Digest focused on desert, defining justice as “a steady and 
enduring will to render everyone his right.”18 Kant amplified this 
central principle of Roman law, insisting that punishment should 
pursue no goal other than meting out what is deserved.19 Contem-
porary retributionists resist the utilitarian neglect of desert, insisting 
that punishment instead articulate society’s moral outrage.20 Utili-
tarians in turn not only have promised beneficial outcomes from 
punishment but have also sought to conquer their own moral high 
ground. The state has no more right to inflict pain and death, they 
have insisted, than do its citizens. Only the pursuit of a broader 
social goal— less crime— could justify sanctions. Mere retribution, 
without seeking to reduce crime, Hobbes argued, is but an act of 
hostility by the sovereign.21 Locke considered punishment justified 
only insofar as it makes repairs or seeks to avoid future crime.22 All 
punishment is evil, Bentham agreed, and allowable only if it pre-
vents some larger harm.23
Merely imposing just deserts could lead to pointless retribution, 
unconcerned with actual effect— Did crime increase afterward, did 
offenders transgress again? Sheer utilitarianism, at the other extreme, 
could tinker amorally, punishing without fairness or justice so long 
as the outcomes were desirable. In practice, most punishments have 
evaluated both the damage done as well as the intent behind the 
act. We do not punish for just the harm caused (otherwise acciden-
tal damages would be penalized as harshly as intentional ones) and 
only rarely for the intent alone (otherwise the would- be killer or 
even the sadistic fantasist would be jailed for as long as the actual 
murderer). Evil intent has generally prompted harsher punishments 
for the actions it motivated and sometimes, as we will see, has 
been penalized by itself. Conversely, harms caused accidentally or 
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inadvertently have been punished less severely or not at all (except 
under strict liability in the common law world, where intent and 
negligence are irrelevant).
The motives prompting punishment have often been classified 
as to whether they look backward, to atoning for crimes already 
committed, or forward, to avoiding future offenses.24 Thus, revenge, 
restitution, and other measures to reestablish moral balance sought 
to rectify past injustice. They were concerned primarily with the 
individual criminal and with society only insofar as they aimed to 
restore its overall ethical equilibrium. Incapacitation, deterrence, 
rehabilitation, and prevention, in turn, aimed to improve the future. 
They were concerned more with bettering society than with making 
offenders pay. Individual criminals were reformed or incapacitated. 
Those incapable of reform had to be incapacitated, at the extreme 
by death. If they were used as examples, others’ behavior might be 
affected. Incapacitation aimed less to punish than to render offend-
ers harmless, halting any further predations.
Deterrence looked forward, but it affected the future only insofar 
as making criminals’ present circumstances publicly miserable did 
in fact discourage others from emulation. Its logic was that even if 
offenders were not capable of rehabilitation and only suffered by 
being punished, others contemplating their fates might be reformed 
and avoid crime— a second- order rehabilitation.25 Rehabilitation, in 
turn, acted on present criminals, expecting to improve their future 
conduct. Finally, prevention most actively shaped the future by 
intervening, not just to reform today’s transgressors or merely to 
make the environment less prone to crime but to anticipate future 
acts and discourage potential criminals or punish them beforehand 
by laws on inchoate offenses.
The dividing line between backward- and forward- oriented pun-
ishments has been imprecise both conceptually and historically. 
Already Plato discussed punishment in terms of learning virtue and 
deterring future acts rather than just in terms of taking vengeance 
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for the past, which he dismissed as a primitive, animalistic motive.26 
Yet retribution has remained a motive in the modern world. Indeed, 
it enjoyed a renaissance in the twentieth century, with desert weigh-
ing heavily in determining punishment.27 Conversely, even when 
administering just deserts retributively, punishment can deter if 
potential offenders understand that they are likely to be caught and 
sanctioned. All human punishments, “in a large and extended view,” 
the English jurist William Blackstone wrote in the eighteenth cen-
tury, are more intended to prevent future crimes than to expiate past 
ones.28 Whatever its immediate motives, a well- functioning system 
of justice deters.
Any given punishment could be motivated in different ways. 
Largely all punishments could be retributive, except in cases where 
offenders actively welcomed the outcome— as with murders intended 
to prompt capital punishment, thus disguising a suicide. In religions 
where killing could be forgiven but self- killing could not, suicide by 
murder followed logically— at least if God were thought too obtuse 
to see through the ruse. Swedes, especially women, killed others to 
achieve suicide without eternal damnation. Theirs was the predom-
inant form of homicide in Stockholm in the late seventeenth cen-
tury. The victims often were children, innocents who did not have 
to repent their sins before death. Muslims in the Philippines have 
masked their desire for death in jihadist attacks that lead to their kill-
ing. Suicide by cop is a short- cut variant.29
If suffering were required, then retributive punishment of mas-
ochists was definitionally impossible. Indeed, exoneration would 
be the only feasible sanction. That logic cropped up as the author-
ities sought to deal with suicidal murderers of the sort just men-
tioned. Paul Johann von Feuerbach’s draft of the Bavarian penal 
code in 1810 commuted execution to lifelong labor in chains if the 
offender was aiming to commit suicide.30 In Denmark, torture was 
first added to the death penalty in hopes of deterring would- be sui-
cides. When that did not work, capital punishment for those who 
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sought death through murder was abolished altogether in 1767— a 
penal enactment of the old joke where when the masochist says, 
“Hurt me, hurt me,” the sadist says, “No.”
If rehabilitation were painful or unpleasant, even it could be 
retributive— as is often true of prisons.31 Carried out in secret, many 
punishments merely incapacitated, while when carried out in public 
they also deterred— both the offender (except when executed) and 
others. Shaming punishments definitionally had to be public and 
were both retributive and deterrent. Besides being retributive, death 
and banishment could also be both incapacitating and deterrent. So 
could certain kinds of mutilation, especially the so- called sympa-
thetic talionic punishments: amputating thieves’ hands, pederasts’ 
testicles, rapists’ penises, or blasphemers’ and slanderers’ tongues.32
Death could be retributive and deterrent but never rehabilita-
tive. Nor could a true life sentence in prison— or at least it did not 
matter even if it were.33 Fines, depending on their level, could be 
retributive, deterrent, or compensatory or all three, but unlikely 
rehabilitative.34 Prison could be retributive, deterrent, incapacitat-
ing, preventive, and perhaps even rehabilitative. Forced labor could 
be compensatory, deterrent (and even better than execution since 
it lasted longer), and possibly rehabilitative.35 Banishment has been 
understood both as incapacitating and— by the ancient Greeks— as 
rehabilitative because part of a purification ritual. In the British 
penal colony of New South Wales, banishment also rehabilitated 
the many convicts, who subsequently became useful citizens.36 And 
retributive punishments implemented fairly and firmly could have 
deterrent and thus utilitarian effects by demonstrating that the jus-
tice system worked and would punish miscreants.37 Looking just at 
the punishment did not always reveal the motives behind it.
Nevertheless, the broad historical trend has been from retro-
spective to prospective approaches, from retribution to rehabilita-
tion. Blips mar the smooth curve of any long- term evolution. It is 
always difficult to date developments precisely, nor do they occur 
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everywhere simultaneously. But we can discern a rough outline. 
Starting in the sixteenth century, the newly powerful and effec-
tive core European states enforced the law more harshly than ever 
before as they refined their own powers of imposing justice. But 
having rattled its sabers, the state needed less to demonstrate its 
ferocity as its prowess improved. That trend toward greater modera-
tion has continued largely into the present. A detailed study of any 
subperiod will naturally unveil many variations in this large- scale 
development. Physical mutilation, rare in the late Middle Ages in 
England, revived under the Tudors.38 Having faded with the Enlight-
enment philosophes, a retributive justice was revived by Kant and 
then Hegel in the nineteenth century. From the early nineteenth 
century, US prisons pursued rehabilitation. Overcrowding in the 
post– Civil War period ended such efforts. Rehabilitation returned 
in the twentieth century but again was abandoned by penal theo-
rists and practitioners in the mid- 1960s.39
Starting in the 1970s, retribution made a comeback, both among 
reformers who thought that punishment’s social utility had been 
overemphasized at the expense of basic notions of justice as well 
as in penal practice. Now came mandatory minimum sentences, 
enhanced sanctions for habitual offenders, reduction of parole, 
and, above all, the late twentieth century’s massive expansion of 
incarceration.40 In the Islamic world, punishments have become 
notably harsher in recent decades, with executions, stonings, and 
merciless lashings. Criminals are still executed in public in China, 
Pakistan, and the Middle East.41 Compensation and restitution have 
also enjoyed second lives in the form of “restorative” justice, focus-
ing more attention on victims than did retribution or social utility. 
Community- service requirements, too, have offered a mild form of 
restitution to society as a whole.42
Nonetheless, in a long historical trajectory it is hard to overlook 
two fundamental developments. Most obviously, though punish-
ment had long been civil society’s task, it finally became the state’s 
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largely exclusive province. Less undeniably but nonetheless true, 
the state has been more concerned with society’s overall function-
ing than with individual justice— except insofar as a fair judiciary 
is necessary for a well- run system. The state’s attention has turned 
evermore to punishment’s social utility. Preventing future offenses 
has become more pressing than atoning for past acts. That has 
meant a shift from retributive justice to the prevention of crime. A 
moderation of the ferocious inflictions of the past has, in turn, been 
one welcome outcome.
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Punishments have varied along with the motives prompting them. 
Exchanges of value— whether in specie or goods— made atonement 
a transactional arrangement. Offenders paid the costs they had 
imposed. With vengeance, death was the currency of justice. Feuds 
were often long and sanguinary. Nonetheless, the logic of restitu-
tion limited overly bloody revenges. A dead goose laid no golden 
eggs. Most of the punishments of the past are no longer used: muti-
lation (though male sex offenders are sometimes chemically or 
physically castrated), branding, shame, and humiliation (though 
public registries of sex offenders and chain gangs still exist), torture 
(in many nations), banishment (in most nations), and death (in 
many nations). The punishments that remain, at least in the West, 
are imprisonment and an endless array of fines.
Banishment
Most simply, criminals have been rendered harmless by getting rid 
of them, either by death or by banishment, outlawing, deporta-
tion, or exile. The Incas made many crimes capital for this reason. 
They never fined or confiscated goods since what was the point of 
allowing a poorer but still dangerous criminal to remain?1 The ety-
mology of the term exterminate suggests a combination of execu-
tion and banishment— death as the ultimate bringing beyond the 
Chapter 7
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boundary: ex terminus. Execution separated the criminal once and for 
all from society; exile served the same purpose less absolutely. Plato 
envisioned a form of imprisonment far from human habitation. 
The Greeks practiced ostracism, a popular vote to banish dangerous 
citizens for a decade.2 Both Greek and Roman law allowed a choice 
between death and banishment.3 Exile could be temporary, as among 
the Greeks, who regarded it as a form of purification. Or it could 
be perpetual, as in ancient Egypt, where an ultimate punishment, 
debaptism, also eradicated criminals’ names, obliterating offenders 
in both this world and the next.4 For serious crimes, such as parricide, 
the Greeks cast the offender’s body out of the city, denying it burial 
and any postmortem home.5 The Chinese both banished— physical 
removal— and excluded, a kind of internal isolation in shame. With 
excommunication— a form of spiritual banishment in the Middle 
Ages (“God’s outlaw”)— exile acquired a new dimension.6
Banishment followed a certain topological logic that made it 
suitable in some times and places but largely useless elsewhere. It 
worked well in a sparsely populated world with abundant destina-
tions for exiles— ungoverned spaces.7 But as the nation- state, with 
its territorially defined sense of sovereignty, arose in the early mod-
ern era, most spaces belonged to someone. Frontiers became bor-
ders, and formerly liminal territories were now apportioned.8 In 
such denser and more clearly delineated circumstances, your neigh-
bors implicitly had to cooperate in any banishment meted out as 
punishment and might indeed display their hostility precisely by 
giving your internal enemies refuge. In small tribal societies, ban-
ishment could mean physical as well as social death. Among the 
Jews, karet was to be cut off from the people, and so flogging was 
considered preferable.9 Bereft of their property, exiles from ancient 
Athens lived hard- scrabble lives.10 At first, exile made a virtue of 
necessity— to escape vengeance a killer had to flee. In ancient 
Greece, atimia was a form of outlawry. Anyone might kill or plunder 
those so sentenced, thus encouraging distance. In largely unpoliced 
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societies, outlawing offenders was the best that could be done with 
those who escaped apprehension.11
Nonetheless, in antiquity exile was a well- regulated condition. 
Rules governed, for example, how shipwrecks cast up on forbid-
den shores should conduct themselves. If they kept one foot in the 
water, they were spared until they could depart again. Recidivists, 
tried in territories they were banished from, mounted their defense 
from a boat, with the judges sitting on the beach.12 In the Old Testa-
ment, exiles went to one of six designated and signposted cities of 
refuge, where they were protected from avengers and lived rent free 
until their case had been resolved.13 Cain, though threatened with 
wandering the earth, was in fact taken under God’s protection, as 
indicated by a mark put upon him (but protected from whom given 
that the only other humans alive were his parents, Adam and Eve?). 
He settled in neighboring Nod, east of Eden, where he founded the 
city of Enoch and a dynasty, including a great- great- great- great- 
great grandchild Jubal, father of all who play stringed instruments 
and pipes— not a bad outcome for the first fratricide.14
Before modern nations patrolled their borders and transported 
offenders, outlawing, banishing, or exiling criminals helped keep 
them from one particular place, without necessarily specifying 
where they should be. Outlawing was less precise and possibly less 
effective than banishment or exile. The ancient Chinese spelled out 
in sentencing how far defendants had to remove themselves. In 
medieval Iceland, a small island nation, outlawry in practice meant 
banishment. Along with fines, it was the most common sanction.15 
Medieval exile could mean having to go live in a certain place, such 
as a monastery, or being forbidden to linger anywhere for more than 
a few days and thus sentenced to perpetual wandering.16 The early 
modern Spaniards often removed those sentenced to hard labor 
to Africa. The eighteenth- century Parisian police gave first- time 
petty offenders the option of returning to their native provinces— 
banishment lite.17 Other than killers, exile was often used to remove 
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political enemies for whom normal penalties seemed inappropri-
ate. Ovid was banished from Rome, and this function remained 
well into the Middle Ages.18 The Bourbon monarchs sent nobles 
who had fallen out of favor at court abroad or, for lesser offenses, 
to their provincial estates. The French revolutionaries made clear 
that old- regime refugees were never welcome back. The Napoleonic 
penal code banished political criminals, but until midcentury the 
lack of suitable French territories left this exile a largely theoreti-
cal option.19 The English began transporting ordinary criminals to 
the colonies in the early seventeenth century. In an era when pris-
ons were porous and inefficient, banishment was a more reliable 
incapacitation— excarceration instead of incarceration. A century 
later, having tallied up the exorbitant costs of domestic prisons, they 
started deporting convicts to Australia.20
In medieval England, vastly more convicts were outlawed than 
hanged. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, almost all (97 
percent) noncapital criminals in Amsterdam were banished. Banish-
ment from Paris was also far more common than imprisonment.21 
With the revolution, the French began exiling political prisoners to 
Guiana in South America, and then after 1848 and the Commune of 
1870 they set in motion waves of expulsion to other places as well, 
such as New Caledonia. After 1885, they transported hardened crimi-
nals to colonial penal settlements— the bloodless guillotines, so called 
because of their high mortality. Having once begun, the French 
continued this practice long after others had ceased, well into the 
1930s.22 Before the American Revolution, three- fifths of all English 
male convicts were transported. Even in the 1830s, about one- third 
of convicts went to other colonies.23 The English convict transports 
arguably fell victim to their own success. New South Wales became 
a prosperous colony with a largely free population. As of the 1840s, 
the residents grew reluctant to admit more transportees.24
On a larger scale, groups defined as enemies, whether religious, 
ethnic, or political, were banished. Jews were expelled from England 
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in 1290 and from Spain in 1492, followed by Moriscos (descendants 
of Muslim converts) in 1609. French Protestants, the Huguenots, 
were forced out of the country after 1685. Native Americans were 
expelled from their ancestral lands across the nineteenth century, as 
were other first peoples in the English settler colonies. The Turkish 
genocide of Armenians in 1915 occurred in the guise of forced pop-
ulation transfers. Greeks and Turks expelled each other in mutual 
population transfers in 1923. The Madagascar Plan, proposed in 
June 1940 by the Nazis as a means of ridding Europe of Jews, was a 
last delusional fantasy of large- scale banishment. The mass killing 
of Jews in death camps began in mid- 1942 when it became clear, as 
the German advance into the Soviet Union bogged down after Stal-
ingrad, that merely pushing them eastward out of Europe was no 
longer an option.25 Such “excisionary violence,” with banishment 
and extermination the endpoints on a continuum, has arguably 
characterized not only totalitarian regimes but also the colonial 
policies of otherwise modern liberal states. In the relatively moder-
ate guise of ethnic cleansing, where deportation but not death was 
the aim, excisionary violence has been practiced over the past two 
centuries in most European nations, in the partition of India, and 
in British- ruled Palestine.26
Internal exile was used instead of prison. In the sixteenth cen-
tury, the Florentines sent convicts to malarial areas around Pisa and 
Livorno. Corfu— now the playground of yacht owners— was a Vene-
tian penal colony. More generally, confino was a form of internal 
exile to remote locales.27 Carlo Levi wrote memorably of his time in 
exile to a small village in Lucania under Mussolini in Christ Stopped 
at Eboli (1945). The Russians put Siberia to use. Because the tsars 
exiled political prisoners, a stint in Siberia became a Communist 
badge of honor, Vladimir Lenin taking his nom de plume from the 
Lena River. The Soviets, in turn, adopted both internal and exter-
nal exile, using domestic passports to eliminate freedom of move-
ment. Large swaths of the country were turned into de facto penal 
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colonies, with harsh terrain hampering escape as surely as barbed 
wire.28 In imperial China, exiles from one province were always sent 
to a particular twinned province. Only in the early twentieth cen-
tury did internal exile begin to be dismantled here.29
However common in the past, banishment has largely ended 
today. Pursued too vigorously, it created its own problems, as when 
the Chinese discovered in the nineteenth century that they had ban-
ished so many prisoners to Ili in Xinjiang that the local governor wor-
ried they would ally with “outside barbarians” to foment rebellion.30 
Prison and camps took over the incapacitation that banishment 
had once achieved. Exile today is a polite fiction, allowing peace-
ful regime change in autocracies. Former dictators flee prosecution, 
taking themselves off on last- minute flights to friendly neighbors, 
trailing mistresses, wardrobes, and suitcases of cash. The Ugandan dic-
tator Idi Amin was emblematic of modern exile— a well- upholstered 
pariah, holed up as guest of the Saudis on the top floors of the Jeddah 
Novotel.31 Exiles today tend to be ideological refugees, given shelter 
in sympathetic nations— such as the Allende Chileans, the Tanzanian 
socialists, and the Kurdish independence fighters in Sweden during 
the 1970s. Today’s sanctuary cities in America protect undocumented 
immigrants, who are viewed sympathetically as victims of circum-
stance and harsh federal immigration legislation. Embassies, too, at 
times give sanctuary to prominent dissidents abroad, and churches 
continue their role as places beyond secular law.
But in other respects exile has become morally impossible. Ban-
ishment assumes that transgression in one place is inconsequential 
elsewhere, that no common legal and moral standards hold every-
where. Though having committed serious offenses, criminal exiles 
were tolerated abroad. That is no longer possible. Though Socrates 
drew the opposite conclusion, he put his finger on the problem 
when he refused an offer of exile, preferring compulsory suicide: 
Why would foreigners put up with his ideas if his fellow Athe-
nians did not?32 Real criminals can no longer be banished. Far from 
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accepting exported miscreants, a vigilant abroad requires they be 
kept at home. Australia has recently drawn the logical consequence, 
preventing pedophiles from traveling abroad by refusing them pass-
ports.33 A universal moral codex by and large holds globally, and 
a violator of it in one place would only exceptionally be tolerated 
elsewhere. The banished have vanished.
That shift in turn has led to a revival of domestic exile. The resi-
dence of sex offenders in the US, for example, is regulated much 
like the Soviet system of internal banishment. They are required to 
register, and their neighbors are notified, free to draw their own con-
clusions. The restrictions on their housing (proximity to schools, 
parks, and the like) are often so expansive that nowhere suitable 
remains.34 In New York City, only 14 of 270 homeless shelters 
can receive released sex offenders. Those who cannot find a bed 
in these overcrowded facilities often remain in prison.35 Thanks 
to GPS monitoring, not just residence but movement too can be 
restricted.36 Domestic banishment also continues in another sense, 
at least in the United States and Britain. With the increased use of 
true life sentences, either multiple or without parole, prison has 
become a means to remove offenders permanently from society, 
with no expectation of rehabilitation. In 2012, a third of all Ameri-
cans serving life sentences had no prospect of parole.37 Sentences 
in the United States also sometimes explicitly remove defendants 
from their local communities, as in the aptly named Project Exile.38 
In addition, European countries are increasingly deporting foreign 
criminals after they serve their sentences, back to homelands they 
often never or only long ago lived in.39
Fines
For millennia, imposing payments as compensation for offenses 
was the most common sanction. But it wasn’t until the state began 
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collecting such payments that they became fines. With the rise 
of the prison in the eighteenth century, compensation was partly 
eclipsed, for serious offenses at least. Nor has it received anything 
like the scholarly attention lavished on incarceration. But in the 
modern era, monetary restitution, now in the form of fines, has 
again become a widespread sanction.40 Precisely how common is 
hard to measure. In absolute terms, the sheer volume of levies, such 
as parking tickets, probably makes fines seem more important than 
they are. Some nations, such as the US, or the East Bloc in its time, 
used fines less than others.41 For indictable offenses in Britain, fines 
peaked at almost half of all punishments in the 1980s, falling sub-
sequently to half that. But they almost definitionally make up the 
bulk of punishments imposed on organizations.42
With vengeance and restitution, the disputing parties agreed on 
an exchange of value or death to resolve matters. Two millennia 
before Christ, Eshunna’s code in Sumeria threatened fines and death 
as its only sanctions.43 At first, monetary compensation was paid 
directly by the offender to the victim. Only later did the state insist 
on its cut, eventually imposing pecuniary sanctions as an alternative 
to more direct bodily chastisement.44 The word fine itself comes from 
the final settlement (finalis concordia) negotiated by the offender 
with a medieval king so that he could be released from prison. Prison 
was not the punishment as such but merely the means by which the 
criminal was encouraged to pay the fine.45 In medieval England, fel-
ons’ property reverted to the king. If accused felons refused to plead 
one way or the other, they were subjected to peine forte et dure, being 
pressed to death with weights. But if they endured this torture, thus 
dying without being convicted, their estates were saved for their 
heirs.46 In Norman England, amercements were penalties payable to 
the Crown for misdeeds.47 Among the early Germans, part of the 
mulct went to the king. Scandinavian rulers started collecting their 
part of wergeld in the Middle Ages.48 In eighteenth- century Amer-
ica, fines imposed for biting, gouging, or maiming were paid half to 
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the victim, half to the state.49 The authorities ultimately took every-
thing, transforming compensation into fines in the modern sense. 
Restitution was now due the community, no longer to the individ-
ual victim. Today, only civil fines and judgments for damages recall 
the original sense of victims being compensated.50
Once fines in the modern sense had emerged, the state faced a 
choice. It could levy them to make offenders pay for externalities, 
pricing their behavior through what in effect was a tax baked into 
the cost of doing business. Fines on polluting industries or for work-
place accidents have been of this ilk— forcing offenders to pay some 
part of the costs of their actions without necessarily halting those 
acts altogether.51 The Factory Act of 1844 in Britain required employ-
ers to fence in dangerous machinery and enforced this by impos-
ing fines. In effect, it remained the employers’ decision whether 
to fence or to pay the fines.52 Fines on the nineteenth- century sex 
trade raised revenue, presupposing that prostitutes would continue 
business in order to pay.53 Fines on those who shirked civic duties 
similarly taxed the negligent. Eighteenth- century Londoners could 
buy their way out of their required participation in the watch by 
hiring a substitute. In the American colonies, citizens who refused 
or failed their tasks as constables or sheriffs were fined. Traffic and 
other everyday fines, too, are much like post hoc licenses.54
But fines have also been used to compel. If raised to exceed the 
value of the offense, fines can be an indirect means of coercion, 
compelling offenders to change behavior. Were acts the state wished 
to discourage to be priced or penalized?55 Sometimes pricing could 
be used to punish. Though not obliterating the person, fines could 
extinguish someone economically. The Romans exorbitantly val-
ued damaged goods when they wanted to compel restitution of the 
actual objects rather than just have damages paid.56 Henry VII used 
bonds and recognizances to coerce his nobility, four- fifths of whom 
were at some time indebted to him. When Lord Abergavenny was 
fined £70,000 for unlawful retaining, it was not with the expectation 
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that he would pay but as leverage to relieve him of £500 annually. 
Convicted of blasphemy in 1676 and fined 1,000 Marks he could 
not pay, John Taylor was effectively jailed for life.57 Up through the 
1940s, prisoners in the southern US, fined several times their pos-
sible annual earnings, were in effect enserfed by being leased to 
mines, railroads, quarries, and farms.58 Under China’s one- child pol-
icy (recently relaxed), fines for a second baby, set at thrice parents’ 
annual earnings, rendered their offspring de facto stateless, bereft 
of rights to housing, school, and work.59 In the early 1990s, the US 
government began to impose corporate fines that were actual pun-
ishments, not just retrospective licensing fees. Once merely slapped 
on the wrist, polluters were now often compelled by unaffordable 
fines to obey environmental legislation.60 Punitive damages follow a 
similar logic, intended not just as compensation but as sanction for 
wrongdoing.
Unpayable fines as a means of coercion contradicted the state’s 
interest in revenue. Steep fines to compel obedience were less lucra-
tive than small fines routinely imposed for minor offenses. In the 
third century BCE, Romans built a temple to Venus from the fines 
paid by adulteresses.61 The medieval state derived much of its income 
from minor fines. In the thirteenth century, judicial fines generated 
one- eighth of the English monarch’s revenue. Wessex law doubled 
fines for stealing on Sundays or religious holidays. In sixteenth- 
century Shetland, feudal lords imposed fines for meticulously speci-
fied actions and varied them by time and place, so that bloodying a 
shopkeeper’s nose on a Sunday night rather than a Monday morn-
ing could be an expensive proposition.62 Today, financially strapped 
US and UK municipalities treat speeding tickets in a similar spirit, as 
profit centers.63 So did the East Germans when they fleeced Western 
drivers passing along the transit routes to Berlin, and so do Chinese 
localities when they fine prostitutes.64
Since large coercive fines were but an indirect means of compul-
sion, as the state grew better able to twist arms directly, the need for 
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them faded. Fines could be diminished without weakening the state’s 
overall ability to compel. Already the Romans limited how much mag-
istrates could fine. In the seventeenth century, the French Parlement 
restricted fines to a quarter of the defendant’s estate.65 English courts 
of the same era hewed to a rule deriving from Magna Carta of fines 
not being so high that defendants had to sell the tools of their trade. 
Rather than impose a heavier fine, which in effect meant lifetime 
prison, Blackstone advised, the courts should physically imprison or 
whip the defendants.66 When in 1687 for political reasons the duke 
of Devonshire was fined £30,000 for striking someone near the king’s 
palace (a median fine for assault was two shillings, six pence), the 
Lords judged this fine oppressive and illegal. In 1689, England prohib-
ited excessive fines, followed a century later by the US Constitution’s 
Eighth Amendment on cruel and unusual punishments.67
Whether treated as tax or a means of indirect compulsion, fines 
relied on the already existing machinery of sanction without which 
they lacked bite. In fact, fines were only a quasi- sanction. Even as 
restitution to society, not merely to the individual victim, fines were 
often not seen as punishments in the fundamental sense of pain 
equitably inflicted for retribution or deterrence. For offenses that are 
gravely immoral— such as rape and murder— payment strikes the 
modern mind as a wholly inappropriate punishment. Restitution 
between individuals undercut the state’s ambition to enforce laws 
applicable to all. In a similar way, fines ran in parallel and some-
times at cross purposes to the regular system of retributive sanction. 
Above all, they were hampered by their social inequity.
Bodily pain was the state’s primary leverage over the poor, either 
directly by inflicting distress or alternatively by prison’s slow con-
fiscation of their mortality. The rich also had property on the line, 
but they could more easily shrug off a loss of property than the poor 
could forfeit years. Inequalities of money dwarf those of chronol-
ogy. The starkest disparity between the time- wealthy teenager who 
stands to lose a life in jail and the ninety- year- old would rarely be 
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more than six to one. As property themselves, slaves owned none. 
Unable therefore to be fined, they were instead whipped, castrated, 
or otherwise mutilated according to early medieval codes. Freemen 
unable to afford a fine were flogged.68 In the thirteenth century, rich 
offenders able to pay compensation were more likely to be pros-
ecuted for tort violations, but the poor, who could offer nothing but 
their pain, more likely for crimes. A New Hampshire statute in 1682 
had those below a certain poverty line whipped rather than fined.69 
Deep into the nineteenth century, workers— with little to offer the 
fine collector— were jailed for violating labor contracts.70 Since a rich 
person could effectively buy the right to slander others if fines were 
the only punishment, Kant suggested that they be obliged to kiss 
the hand of the poor whom they had insulted.71
Judiciaries through the ages have wrestled with the inherent 
unfairness of punishments premised on property. The Romans hap-
pily fined the gentry and beat the poor. The Greeks, in contrast, substi-
tuted prison in place of fines for those who could not pay.72 Talionic 
sanctions have at times been considered an egalitarian alternative, 
preventing the wealthy from buying their way out. However harshly, 
they treated rich and poor alike.73 Sixteenth- century Florence trum-
peted the egalitarian virtues of direct corporeal punishments for all cit-
izens, rich or poor. The absolutist monarchies, asserting their power 
through spectacular public punishments, could scarcely be bothered 
to impose the merely indirect suffering of fines.74 Only if they could 
not afford the five- shilling fine were drunks in colonial Massachu-
setts locked into the stocks for three hours. Russian peasants feared 
fines and (if they could not afford them) prison more than they did 
bodily pain, which could be endured. Whipping remained a com-
mon punishment in Russia far longer than it did in the West.75 In the 
1930s, fines were rarely used in nations such as Italy, Bulgaria, and 
Poland, where most people lived outside a cash economy.76 Reform-
ers imposing smallpox vaccination in the nineteenth century pon-
dered the unfairness of allowing wealthy resistors to pay fines instead 
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and appreciated the equality of directly compelling all to contribute 
to herd immunity.77 Because fines favored the affluent, they were 
regarded warily in socialist nations, though they were happy to seize 
assets.
Like bail, fines raised problems of fairness. If others paid on the 
offenders’ behalf, they allowed them to avoid atoning. Early on, fines 
permitted the well-off to escape. A wealthy Roman, slapping the 
faces of passers- by as he perambulated, was followed by a servant, 
who paid on the spot the requisite fine for his indulgence.78 But in 
a money- based economy, if fines were correctly calibrated and per-
haps paid in installments, most people could afford them, and they 
were not strikingly unfair. In ancient Rome, women, children, and 
slaves could not be fined since they owned nothing.79 Yet medieval 
English law assumed that even slaves could pay fines, and by the 
eighteenth century fines were a ubiquitous punishment.80 Today 
fines have become the commonest sanction. Even allegedly social-
ist China punishes half of all criminal offenses by fines.81 Sanctions 
have become more moderate, and most citizens are sufficiently well- 
off to be punishable in their property, no longer just in their person.
Yet the inequality problem has not vanished. In the early twen-
tieth century, the first motorists, who had to be wealthy to enjoy 
this new sport, happily paid a succession of £10 speeding fines. Rich 
motorists were occasionally sentenced to jail to make sure they did 
not just pay their way out of trouble.82 To account for this funda-
mental inequity, fines have sometimes been reengineered as a fairer 
and tougher coercive device.83 They have increasingly been tai-
lored to the offender’s circumstances. Plato suggested fines graded 
by wealth for his ideal community.84 Following the Scandinavians 
in the 1920s, income- staggered fines were adopted also by others, 
such as the Swiss and the Cubans. In northern Europe, fines are 
often set in relation to daily wages.85 Finnish millionaires have been 
slapped with five- figure speeding tickets. Estonia has trialed giving 
speeders a choice between cash fines and forfeiting their time by 
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the roadside under police supervision— both more equal and pos-
sibly more deterrent for drivers in a hurry.86 Maximum penalties for 
insider trading— a rich man’s offense— leapfrogged in the US from 
$100,000 in the 1960s to $1 million in the 1980s to $5 million in 
the new millennium.87 Corporations have faced the same logic. The 
European Union has threatened to fine information- technology 
and social media businesses in relation to annual revenue. For 
a company such as Google, a 10 percent fine of annual revenue 
would be $9 billion.
Finally, fines pose the issue of fungibility. As restitution, fines 
have priced almost every action, even those that the modern mind 
resists considering compensable— such as Sharia law’s acceptance 
of payment for murder. If nothing else, this pricing of everything 
undermines the facile idea that only the modern market economy 
alienates humans by attaching a monetary value to all things. 
Wergelds, due for killing someone, expressed the social hierarchy 
of the early Middle Ages in precise monetary terms. In seventh- 
century Kent, Æthelberht required only that a man who had sto-
len someone else’s wife pay her wergeld and supply a new woman, 
much as if he had run over his neighbor’s dog while backing out 
of the driveway.88 Medieval law was the equal of today’s actuarial 
tables in its subtle distinctions among harms and their cost. Marxist 
legal theorists, such as Evgeny Pashukanis, in effect agreed, arguing 
that punishment in bourgeois society and more generally law and 
morality are founded on the idea of exchange, whose logic reaches 
historically much further back than the origins of capitalism.89 
With the introduction of specific performance, it is modern law 
that arguably has sought to retain a sense that some actions cannot 
merely be compensated. Instead of just paying damages, offenders 
are forced to restore matters to their preharm state. Already early 
Roman law set aside victims’ claims that stolen items be restored to 
them and offered only restitution in money.90 The Anglo- Saxon sys-
tems limited specific performance to equity law, especially for land 
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and other singular goods. Specific performance achieved its high-
point in the nineteenth- century civil law codes, which took as their 
default making damages whole again, not just paying for them.91
Death
Forward- looking motives prompted even more different sanctions 
than backward- looking ones did. Before mass media, deterrent 
punishments had to be brutal and public. Carried out in secret, an 
execution only incapacitated. But a hanging in the town square 
was thought to concentrate the subjects’ minds, not just amuse the 
rabble. Early states could caution their subjects against transgressing 
mainly through theatrical cruelty, amplified by word of mouth. The 
mass public trials held by the totalitarian regimes in the Soviet Union 
and China served similar purposes.92
As crimes were recognized to have broad implications for society 
as a whole, punishment both retributed for wrong and aimed to 
prevent its reoccurrence. Death has historically been the most con-
sistently used penalty, still on the books in one- third of all nations 
today. Vengeance commonly demanded it, and the state, with its 
first forays into adjudication, in fact curtailed capital penalties as it 
sought to reduce mayhem and bloodshed. But as the state itself took 
over punishing, it wanted to demonstrate that it, too, could admin-
ister justly harsh penalties. Death quickly became among the truest 
arrows in its quiver. By the standards of its day, the Old Testament 
decreed death comparatively sparingly, for perhaps some thirty 
types of crimes. Islamic law knew only three capital crimes: rob-
bery, adultery, and apostasy.93 But of the 359 articles in the Chinese 
emperor Wu’s code, 409 statutes related to the death penalty.94 And 
Dracon’s code (seventh century BCE) used scarcely any other punish-
ment. Dracon thought small offenses deserved it, and he knew of 
no worse punishment for the serious ones. The Greeks considered 
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capital punishment insufficient for deliberate parricide, the worst 
form of murder, so they stoned such killers’ corpses at a crossroads 
at the city’s edge, then hurled the body beyond its boundaries.95
Death, in fact, came as a welcome relief from the preliminary tor-
tures inflicted on many criminals. William the Conqueror abolished 
the death penalty, judging it overly lenient. He preferred to treat his 
enemies as slaves, blinding and castrating them.96 Even today, the 
logic of retribution suggests that some crimes— such as genocide— 
perhaps deserve more than simple death.97 Beccaria put his finger 
on the problem: since the human body could suffer only so much, 
the most enormous crimes were not adequately punished by pain 
alone.98
As we have seen, when defending against a common danger, the 
state readily assumed the authority to punish drastically on society’s 
behalf. Having once regarded death as merely an efficient method 
of incapacitation, Roman law began to aim higher, hoping to set a 
deterrent example. Under Tiberius (d. 37 CE), it sought to prevent 
those sentenced to death from committing suicide before the state 
exacted its due.99 In the fifteenth century, the Russian state spoke 
for the communal interest, even at the expense of crime’s victims, 
by forbidding compensation (by money or enslavement) for espe-
cially heinous offenses, insisting instead on death. In 1537, Chris-
tian III of Denmark demanded capital punishment for all homicides 
(other than accidents or acts of self- defense) because kin’s ability to 
pay restitution was undermining deterrence.100 This spirit of capi-
tal punishment serving the common cause infused the commission 
reforming German penal law in 1906 when it described capital pun-
ishment as an act “in which the majesty of the state achieves its 
most powerful expression.”101
But death has been more than just another sanction, and its use 
contentious. Its origins were theological— a sacrifice to appease 
the gods.102 Its finality lent it gravity and moral import. The state 
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illegitimately assumed God’s role in deciding life and death, said the 
death penalty’s opponents. But the authorities were just using their 
most potent weapon to protect the community, came the riposte. 
After all, the state sacrificed soldiers in extremis for the common 
good.103 Why did it not have analogous moral authority to battle 
and kill internal enemies? Did capital punishment undermine the 
broader goal of reducing crime? Did the state contradict itself by 
killing to punish killing? Such have been the debates.
However much we pride ourselves on our humanity and com-
passion, capital punishment has faded as much because the state 
no longer needed it as thanks to any groundswell of popular revul-
sion. Quite the contrary: in most countries, the death penalty was 
and remains popular. In ancient Rome, capital punishment asserted 
republican freedom: a citizen could be executed only after trial by 
his assembled peers.104 When death sentences were first restricted 
starting in the nineteenth century, reformers were acutely aware 
of bucking public opinion. The French revolutionaries, who oth-
erwise changed so much, kept the death penalty. Massive public 
campaigns resisted its abolition when that was proposed in France 
in 1906. The death penalty was finally ended in 1981 despite con-
tinued support from two- thirds of the public.105 Capital punish-
ment remains in effect in many nations— in some as an instrument 
of state terror, in others thanks to its popularity. Having been all 
but abolished in America during the early 1970s, the death penalty 
made a comeback, especially in the South and the West. Unlike for 
other punishments, juries rather than judges pronounce sentences 
in capital cases, and officials who advocate capital punishment are 
often elected by a public eager for retribution.106
In Western nations, capital punishment has been abolished 
largely at the instigation of the professionals involved and allied 
elite opinion. In recent times, social elites have only rarely favored 
capital punishment— in twentieth- century Germany up through 
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the 1950s and in contemporary China.107 Iran may be on the verge 
of flipping, though elsewhere among the Middle Eastern autocra-
cies capital punishment remains widely used. The death penalty 
became a human rights issue in Europe only long after it had been 
abolished, sometimes for self- serving reasons, such as sparing for-
mer Nazis, but also in revulsion at the Third Reich’s mass murders.108 
Niklas Frank opposed the death penalty for everyone except his 
father, Hans Frank, chief jurist of the Nazi Generalgouvernement in 
Poland, who was hanged at Nuremberg.109 And, indeed, the Allied 
imposition of death at Nuremberg complicated efforts to abolish it 
subsequently at home— in Britain, for example.110
Even so, which higher principle took precedence? The state not 
killing or the state justly punishing evil? Whose lives mattered 
most— victims’ or criminals’? By the 1840s, British proponents of 
retaining capital punishment had turned the sanctity- of- life argu-
ment in their own favor, arguing that by not executing murder-
ers, the state was not taking victims’ deaths seriously.111 “Treating 
criminals humanely is in effect tolerating the inhumanity that they 
have shown their victims,” was how a Chinese pro- death activist 
recently put it.112 That is the standard argument, fighting fire with 
fire. Yet even those who oppose everyday death sentences ponder the 
extremes. Urged on by strong popular and press demand for retri-
bution, the Norwegian Parliament overwhelmingly reinstituted the 
death penalty after World War II for traitors and collaborators with 
the Nazis. “Humanism and mercy for traitors betrays the people” 
read the banners in massive demonstrations in Oslo in 1945. After 
the genocide in 1994, Rwandan authorities were dismayed to dis-
cover that only the Hutu killers tried at home could be sentenced to 
death, whereas those tried before the International Criminal Tribunal 
were spared. Saddam Hussein was never brought to an international 
tribunal because the Iraqis and Americans insisted on the possibility 
of capital punishment, and, indeed, he was eventually executed.113
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Prison
In China, prison became a primary form of punishment already 
during the Han period, two centuries before Christ, though at other 
times it was not.114 In Europe, however, before the seventeenth cen-
tury prisons were generally places to warehouse those awaiting 
trial.115 Exceptions included the Greeks, who used prison in some 
instances as a punishment, and in Rome an indefinitely postponed 
execution might leave a prisoner languishing in jail for life. In 
medieval England, oath breakers and thieves could be locked up for 
forty days. In thirteenth- century Languedoc, the Catholic Inqui-
sition imprisoned heretics, hoping for confessions.116 Monastic 
orders often shut in rogue monks.117 Debtors were imprisoned in 
ancient Rome and medieval Europe to persuade them to pay up. In 
early modern England, they made up easily half of all inmates. But 
since they were held as part of a civil process, they were not felons 
or punished as such.118
Prison gradually became a sanction in itself, not just the help-
mate of real punishments. From the late thirteenth century, both 
the number of prisons and the crimes that landed offenders there 
increased. In the early sixteenth century, the English common law 
listed 180 imprisonable offenses.119 As of the eighteenth century, 
prisons were finally a punishment in themselves. The first to abol-
ish death entirely, Tuscany’s criminal code of 1786 left imprison-
ment as serious crime’s main sanction. Largely financed and often 
run by the inmates themselves, early prisons were porous holding 
pens that barely separated miscreants from society. Prisoners were 
expected to pay for their own upkeep, entitled to better conditions 
for extra fees, and reliant on charity if unable to pay.120 As late as the 
early twentieth century, when the suffragettes were jailed, Britain’s 
prisons had three classes, like its trains. The bottom two are easy to 
envision. First- class inmates enjoyed books, newspapers, visits, and 
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mail as well as better food, drink, and cells, permission to wear their 
own clothes, and the right to hire other prisoners as servants.121
Prisons were expensive to build and to run. Revolutionary France 
cut corners by converting nationalized church properties.122 Mutila-
tion, torture, death, exile, and flogging had been cheaper, but inflict-
ing pain and even death eventually lost favor. Banishment worked 
only if penal colonies or expansive territories were at hand. Using 
male prisoners for military ends, as galley slaves, for example, raised 
questions of motivation and reliability— much like for mercenary 
troops. The Chinese practice of enlisting criminals in military exile 
to defend the country’s borders suffered from obvious inherent con-
tradictions.123 The nineteenth century reshaped the armed forces on 
a universalistic nationalist basis— the male citizen’s self- interested 
duty. With exceptions, such as the French Foreign Legion, it was 
now thought nonsensical to entrust the nation’s defense to soci-
ety’s outcasts. The refinement of sail in the eighteenth century and 
the end of the need for oarsmen turned galleys into hulks that now 
housed prisoners whose muscle power was put to use elsewhere.124
Already in the 1700s houses of correction aimed to reform the recal-
citrant poor— vagrants, the idle and disorderly, obstreperous servants, 
unmarried mothers, and the like. As of the mid- seventeenth century, 
convicts who earlier would have been killed were now imprisoned.125 
The English were ahead on the prison curve. After 1853, as transpor-
tation to Australia ended, prison became the main punishment for 
serious offenders.126 By the early 1800s, 60 percent of those sentenced 
were imprisoned; by the 1860s that portion was 90 percent. In late 
eighteenth- century Paris, only 10 percent of sentences were for jail. 
But in the revolutionary penal code of 1791, prison became the most 
common punishment. By the early nineteenth century, imprison-
ment had become the standard punishment for noncapital crimes in 
Germany, too.127
To cut costs, inmates were put to work. Prisoners built the pyra-
mids, and the Romans used them on public works or in the mines.128 
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Workhouses were an early iteration of what was to become the prison. 
Galleys made criminals part of the nation’s defense. Labor was cen-
tral also to nineteenth- century prisons, both for what it brought in 
and for its disciplinary effects. The Chinese and Soviet camps often 
worked prisoners to death. Inmates in the American South, Blacks 
a majority among them, were worked ruthlessly.129 To this day, the 
American prison- industrial complex remains a large corporate pres-
ence.130 But inmates were rarely a first- class labor force: work shy, 
asocial, unmotivated, uncooperative, and hence uncompetitive. Like 
eighteenth- century workhouses for the poor, prison labor rarely paid 
for itself.131 At the same time, prisons’ subsidized labor competed with 
the free market.132 Already with the first workhouses, nonincarcerated 
workers and private employers complained of publicly subsidized 
goods sold on the open market.133 US law specifically forbade prison 
labor from competing with the free market. That labor has therefore 
been tolerated largely to make products consumed by the state itself— 
license plates, uniforms, and the like— or for public works.134
Prison was in effect a fine levied in terms of time. By itself, it could 
not guarantee a change of behavior. Just as someone might regard a 
fine as the price of offending, so too an inmate might consider a stint 
behind bars the cost of doing business, especially if he could pay a fall 
guy to take the hit. In early modern Europe, debtors often preferred 
prison to settling their accounts: sometimes they had no choice; at 
other times they did. When debtors were no longer imprisoned in 
Britain as of 1869, those who refused to pay up, though they had 
the means, could be jailed.135 Conversely, in Sharia law, debtors could 
be imprisoned to determine whether they had the funds to meet 
their obligations; if not, they were released since what was the point 
of coercing them to do something they could not? More recently, 
plaintiffs hoping to conceal substantial assets in divorce cases have 
been willing to suffer jail.136 A similar trade- off between time and 
money held for fines. In the 1950s, more than half of US jail inmates 
were atoning for unpaid fines, as remained true in Scotland in the 
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1980s.137 Further complexities lurked. The state had long inflicted 
pain on offenders. Inmates’ lives could of course be made a living 
hell, too, but if torture were the goal, prison was an inefficient and 
costly way to go about it. Jail incapacitated offenders in an era when 
banishment was no longer possible. Why not then rehabilitate them, 
so that prison did not become a breeding ground for further criminal-
ity? Prisons, in other words, were inefficient means of inflicting pain 
and an expensive and possibly dysfunctional form of incapacitation. 
Why bother locking up criminals if prisons did not improve them?
From such considerations sprang the rehabilitative turn incarcer-
ation took in the eighteenth century. Since prison without rehabili-
tation was basically torture, and since inmates were the state’s for 
a long time, why not attempt to redeem them?138 By itself, prison 
promised to discourage certain bad habits: drinking, gambling, con-
cubinage, whoring. A regular schedule of meals, sleep, and work— 
even if just the treadwheel’s make- work— inculcated industrious 
discipline. Enforced solitude at least isolated inmates from bad 
influences and might encourage them to ponder their crimes.139 
Prison was to be a spiritual ordeal from which inmates emerged 
purified. The Philadelphia system of extreme isolation therefore 
became popular. Prisoners lived and worked wholly alone, hooded 
when they left their cells, receiving only a single visitor and letter 
annually. England’s Petworth prison had stalls built to keep them 
apart even in chapel. In Pentonville, the guards wore padded shoes 
so as not to break the silence.140 Yet total isolation was costly and 
took a heavy psychic toll on inmates, who often committed suicide 
or went insane. From such failures emerged a moderated approach, 
pioneered at Auburn prison in upstate New York, where inmates 
were isolated in their cells only at night, working communally dur-
ing the day.141 Yet all such ambitions for rehabilitation have failed. 
Today’s prisons— overcrowded, understaffed, replete with soci-
ety’s least favored— perform what is at best incapacitation and at 
worst— in maximum- security institutions— a form of torture.
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Seen in a long historical view, punishments have— with some 
fluctuation— become more moderate. Durkheim argued that as soci-
eties became more complex and interdependent, they would natu-
rally scale back punishments.1 Like all general explanations, this one 
is unable to account for why harshness has fluctuated historically 
or why it has varied among cultures that were otherwise seemingly 
similar. In China, castration, the last remaining mutilating pun-
ishment, was ended around 220 CE.2 The Western state’s embrace 
of moderation began only after an initial turn first to greater vio-
lence under absolutism. When punishing was a communal activ-
ity, vengeance often ran amok. Here, the state exerted a calming 
influence, suppressing feuds and eventually outlawing them. As the 
state began to take over punishment, however, it needed to prove its 
mettle and show that it could administer justice. The punitive feroc-
ity of the early modern period was unleashed as the state asserted 
its authority and ability to enforce. Capital punishment expanded in 
the eighteenth century to even trivial transgressions— thefts of trifles 
and the like. In 1688, some fifty crimes were capital in England, and 
by 1820 more than two hundred were.3
Public punishments reached their violent extreme in Europe 
sometime in the 1700s.4 Moderation had begun earlier, perhaps 
already in the fifteenth century, but with the absolutist regimes 
of the early modern era they at first grew more severe again.5 The 
Enlightenment philosophes were eager reformers. In 1762, Voltaire 
Chapter 8
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exposed the gross injustice done to the Protestant Jean Calas, falsely 
accused, tortured, and executed for having killed his son, a convert 
to Catholicism. Cesare Beccaria’s book on punishment became a 
runaway global bestseller, advocating moderate, regular, and pre-
dictable punishment as more effective deterrence than occasional 
public dismemberment. The state now had more and more effec-
tive tools, so why rely on horrendous public sanctions?6 Mercy 
sprang less from a change of heart than from the state’s developing 
prowess.
In the Middle Ages, mens rea, the doctrine that an intent to offend 
was a prerequisite for punishing the act, created new offenses of 
planning and conspiracy. Yet it also moderated sanctions that had 
earlier been levied on the act alone, even if it had been accidental or 
unintentional. Equity law, with its roots in Roman and canon law, 
softened the often harsh consequences of applying the common 
law literally. Confessions were no longer required for conviction or 
torture for their extraction. Offenders could be tried on evidence 
that would earlier not have passed muster and sentenced to lesser 
punishments.7 Spectacular public deaths were gradually considered 
more deleterious than deterrent. The US Constitution specifically 
forbade cruel and unusual punishments in 1787. Torture was even-
tually outlawed in all nations, at least on paper. Disgusted with the 
Inquisition’s excesses and the Reformation’s pursuit of its own here-
tics, the Enlightenment philosophes saw torture as barbaric. Prussia 
led the way, abolishing it in 1754. By the late eighteenth century, it 
had been forbidden in most European nations— at least if we ignore 
the torture of serfs in eastern Europe and of slaves in the colonies.
The right granted clergy to be punished only in ecclesiastical 
courts, which could not impose death, was extended in fourteenth- 
century England to all men who could read (using generous and 
often ritualized literacy tests) and thus claim, even if implausibly, to 
be of the cloth.8 In 1487, this right— benefit of clergy— was extended 
to all men, and in 1623 to women. Nonclergy could invoke it once, 
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and to prevent repeat claims they were branded on the thumb with 
an M for “murder” or a T for “theft.” In the sixteenth century, about 
20 percent of all felons sidestepped execution through benefit of 
clergy. In the early eighteenth century, capital punishment was 
extended by removing benefit for various crimes (petty thefts and 
shoplifting, attacking deer, cutting down trees, etc.). Yet at the same 
time the literacy requirement for benefit was removed, thus extend-
ing it to everyone, literate or not.9 Though on paper the law may 
have been harsh, the number of executions declined after the mid- 
seventeenth century.10 Awash in in capital crimes, England under-
cut their effect through benefit of clergy and other mitigations. In 
seventeenth- century Sussex, 80 percent of those found guilty could 
have been hanged, but at least two- thirds were thus spared.11
During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, death was less 
invoked for property and other minor offenses and reserved instead 
for homicide and other serious crimes.12 In the American colonies, 
William Penn’s Great Act in 1682 limited death to murder alone at a 
time when the British homeland had more than 200 capital crimes. 
Those 200 were then reduced to 8 by 1841.13 The Prussian penal 
code restricted capital punishments in 1743 and executed only 
murderers after 1794.14 Most northern US states confined the death 
penalty to murder starting in the 1780s.15 With the new French 
penal code of 1791, the panoply of capital crimes (from sodomy and 
murder to minor theft and the cutting down of trees) was pruned, 
leaving just various forms of murder and theft.16 In China, from 800 
in the Qing dynasty (1644– 1911), the number of capital crimes fell 
to 130 in the penal code of 1908 and to 10 in the 1950s— part of the 
twentieth- century reforms intended to follow Western models of 
moderation.17 Today, some 70 are on the books. The US has 46 capi-
tal crimes, mostly variations on homicide.18 Nations that retained 
death sentences cut back dramatically on executions— from 72 per 
million in colonial America to 1.8 in the 1990s. The Chinese remain 
enthusiastic executioners, killing thousands annually. But even 
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they have recently narrowed the range of capital offenses under the 
slogan “Kill Fewer, Kill Cautiously.”19 Even for major transgressions, 
such as treason, death became less common throughout the world. 
Most nations eventually no longer applied it at all.20
The technology of death was also refined.21 Capital punishments 
came in a wide variety over the centuries: poisoning, strangling, 
drowning, stoning, asphyxiating, boiling, precipitating, impaling, 
hanging, crucifying, and burying. Beheading was among the earliest 
techniques, reserved in Roman law for nobles and the reason why 
such punishments are called “capital.”22 The Chinese, in contrast, 
regarded strangulation, leaving the body intact, as superior.23 With 
its semiautomated decapitation, the guillotine brought the nobility’s 
privilege to the masses. Commoners, too, escaped the vagaries and 
humiliation of the noose or the mishaps of unskilled or inattentive 
ax- wielding executioners.24 In the twentieth century, Americans 
accepted gas, the electric chair, and then lethal injections as nei-
ther cruel nor unusual.25 Earlier, as the use of execution declined, 
intermediary punishments developed, more severe than fines and 
less than death. The Byzantine Empire mutilated instead of killing. 
Emperor Wen in ancient China whipped rather than mutilated. 
The Reichslandfriede of 1103 prescribed the loss of hand or eye for 
large thefts.26 After 1600, thieves in France were sometimes branded 
rather than mutilated. Less visible parts of the body than the face 
were gradually chosen for scarring or mutilation.27 To preserve 
their economic value, slaves in nineteenth- century America were 
whipped rather than imprisoned or executed. Galleys, workhouses, 
and transportation joined death and mutilation. Transportation 
was introduced on a large scale in late seventeenth- century England 
thanks to dissatisfaction with death.28
Banishment and transportation were in turn eventually judged 
excessive, too, their use declining by the mid- nineteenth century. 
Indeed, transportation at times hardly deterred. The actual passage, 
though not easy, became less harrowing by the mid- 1700s. The 
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prospect of jobs and a future was often better than the offender’s 
situation at home. By the 1870s, deportation to the South Pacific 
island of New Caledonia was considered so desirable that French 
inmates assaulted and murdered guards or fellow prisoners in 
hopes of being banished to paradise.29 Flogging, balls and chains, 
solitary confinement, and other physical chastisements were grad-
ually abandoned, too.30 Punitive excesses were tempered early in 
England, though well into the eighteenth century more convicts 
were executed there than in other European nations. The breaking, 
drawing, quartering, and mutilation still common in France ended, 
leaving only hanging. Pressing with weights was abolished in 1772, 
branding in 1779. In Prussia, strangling and burning were not abol-
ished until forty years later, and in the 1830s most executed bod-
ies were still also broken on the wheel or decapitated.31 Yet where 
punishments remained public, sentiment was turning. Reformers 
feared that the spectacle of death fed the crowd’s bloodlust more 
than it edified.32 In Germany, physically chastising the convict 
before execution was thought to arouse the crowd’s sympathy, and 
so it was eliminated in the late 1700s.33 By the nineteenth century, 
executions had been moved from the public square to the compara-
tive seclusion of the prison.
Instead of death and other savageries, prison became the favored 
sanction. In late eighteenth- century England, public whippings 
declined as prison sentences became routine for theft.34 Yet prison 
could nevertheless be retributive, even barbarous. Perhaps the Vic-
torian era’s (and our own) overcrowded, undermanned, chaotic, 
and violent prisons were shortcomings of the original intent. Even 
so, certain aspects of incarceration squarely aimed to inflict pain. 
Some prisons were deliberately more unpleasant than others. Into 
the nineteenth century, German prisons flogged inmates on entry 
and exit (Willkomm und Abschied) as well as on the anniversary of 
their offense. The practice of schwerer Kerker in Austria put inmates 
in chains, permitting almost no communication.35 British Victorian 
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jail diets were so meager as to constitute scientific starvation. Point-
less treadwheel labor made sentences even nastier experiences.36 The 
Philadelphia system’s solitary confinement would now be consid-
ered psychologically so harsh as to be retributive. Today’s US super-
max institutions take this tradition to its extreme, but now with no 
ambition beyond controlling prisoners and inflicting psychological 
pain.37
Prison itself eventually came to be considered harsh and inef-
fectual. By the end of the nineteenth century, more than half of 
British offenders, especially first timers and the young, were fined 
rather than incarcerated.38 As prison was thought to breed further 
criminality, the number of those jailed was reduced. Parole, proba-
tion, and other halfway solutions instead kept the convicted within 
the carceral loop without actual lockup.39 The prison’s foundational 
idea, that isolating the inmate from society would serve to rehabili-
tate, was here reversed. The responsibility for social molding and 
control was instead returned to society.40 Already in the late nine-
teenth century, Belgium and France began suspending first tim-
ers’ sentences, releasing them on good behavior. In France, inmate 
numbers were thus halved between 1887 and 1956. Alternatives to 
prison were developed in the late twentieth century using house 
arrest, conditions of residence, halfway houses, periodic impris-
onment, treatment programs for addiction, electronic controls on 
movement, community service, and boot camp. Prisons themselves 
were differentiated by adding more loosely structured and policed 
arrangements for inmates unlikely to abscond as well as specialized 
institutions for juveniles.41
Punishments were moderated for several reasons. As authority was 
exerted on its subjects’ behalf, law became less of an outside imposi-
tion on civil society and more the expression of its own will, thus 
giving less cause to contravene it. Such moderation began already 
in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, long before democracy, 
so we cannot see an immediate cause in a specific political system.42 
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Yet it did coincide broadly with the rise of more representative 
government. It seems also to have been part of the civilizing effect 
that historians have identified as a general ameliorating influence 
on violence starting in the early modern period. As measured in 
homicide rates but also in many other respects, levels of violence 
in European society began declining in the sixteenth century. The 
absolutist state’s monopolizing of the tools of violence, the repres-
sion of vengeance and private adjudication and their replacement 
by courts, the decline of honor culture with its insistence on a per-
sonal righting of the moral balance upended by an offense, which in 
turn was connected to a growing liberation of individuals from the 
demands of their immediate kin groups— all such factors led to the 
broad and dramatic decline of homicide rates over the past five hun-
dred years.43
Nor could the penal code diverge too far from common senti-
ments of right and wrong without provoking resistance and becom-
ing hard to enforce. To preserve order, the state had reason to keep 
those it was policing on its side. On the whole, maintaining order 
was a popular cause. Laws have often favored the powerful: harsh 
measures against poaching or against lost rights over commons or 
against smuggling, for example. But ensuring that criminals who 
preyed on fellow subjects got their due was a welcomed state func-
tion. Popular sentiment was therefore likely to have influenced 
punishment even before politics were formally democratized. Law 
enforcement is invariably a pas de deux between state and civil 
society, each relying on the other. The more a legal system appears 
to its subjects as legitimate and justified, the more they follow its 
precepts voluntarily rather than out of fear of the consequences of 
disobeying.44
Conversely, as the state became more powerful and confident, it 
needed less to exert its force overtly. Durkheim advanced an axiom 
that punishments were harshest where society was primitive and 
government absolute.45 The interplay between society and state 
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in determining punishment is, of course, one of the leitmotivs of 
this book. But Durkheim’s idea that absolute government was also 
omnipotent misses the mark. The thrust of modern governance has 
been precisely the increase in its effective power over society, even 
as it has discarded the trappings of absolute dominance. The mod-
ern state’s ability to persuade, jostle, inculcate, and arm- twist its 
subjects— who grew more literate, rational, and self- aware as edu-
cation spread— into obedience proved more effective than drawing 
and quartering in the town square. At its most savage, the state’s 
law enforcement in fact undermined its own ambitions to effective 
control. Violence begat resistance. We have noted how harsh pun-
ishments spawned further crime as offenders sought to avoid execu-
tion by eliminating witnesses. The henchmen of Truman Capote’s 
true- crime novel In Cold Blood (1966) became killers so as to leave 
no witnesses. Even those who committed mere property offenses 
in China during the 1980s often murdered their victims to avoid 
the testimony that might subject them to the ever- harsher punish-
ments threatened for such offenses.46
Harsh punishments also made it hard to convict. The law of 
accomplices was first developed to spare secondary participants 
from what seemed like an unjust death.47 When lay moral intu-
itions rejected disproportionate sanctions, the prosecution’s ambi-
tions were hindered. In nations with jury systems, where decisions 
fell to the accused’s peers, drastic punishments at odds with pop-
ular sentiments of justice were often not enforced.48 In medieval 
England, the great majority of defendants tried for homicide were 
acquitted.49 For crimes where conviction meant death, few defen-
dants pled guilty. In eighteenth- century England, they were actively 
discouraged from doing so in capital cases. With so many capi-
tal crimes, many offenders were tried but few convicted— in part 
thanks to inevitable difficulties of evidence and proof but also in 
part because juries deliberately nullified outcomes they considered 
needlessly bloody.50 Although members of early juries were jailed for 
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not returning the verdicts demanded by judges, jury nullification 
eventually became an accepted mechanism to rein in overly harsh 
prosecutions. Juries either found defendants guilty of lesser crimes 
or innocent altogether.51 When punishment for defendants plead-
ing benefit of clergy was changed in 1699 from branding on the 
thumb to branding on the cheek near the nose, courts often balked. 
So long as rape was a capital crime, no one pled guilty, and few 
were convicted. When the punishment for grand larceny increased 
to transportation to America in 1718, defendants were less willing 
to plead guilty.52 Forgers and counterfeiters were hard to prosecute 
in the early nineteenth century when death was their reward. The 
Bank of England therefore proposed lesser sentences to maintain its 
conviction rates and thus plausible deterrence.53 Early nineteenth- 
century French laws punished quarantine avoiders so harshly that 
they were rarely applied (whereas the moderate English system of 
fines for the same offense was consistently enforced).54 Even under 
the Nazi regime, Germans were reluctant to report looting to the 
authorities once it became punishable by death.55 An overly vindic-
tive state, bereft of sympathy, undercut its own purpose.
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Punishments were moderated as the state expanded its power. 
Enforcement’s brunt bore down ever less on its citizens’ bodies, both 
in outright physical pain and in the psychic anguish of time lost in 
prison. Yet the state did not step back from probing and controlling 
its subjects’ lives. Quite the contrary. It moved beyond mere trans-
gressions by act to delve into citizens’ inner lives, their thoughts, 
inclinations, proclivities, and— most intrusively— the likelihood that 
they might offend in the future. So far we have looked at crimes as 
tangible acts committed: killing, stealing, burning, cheating. But 
thoughts, ideas, beliefs could also offend— if they were prohibited. 
And so eventually could intentions, plans, and conspiracies, even 
inclinations and proclivities to do what the state forbade.
The state had little ability to plumb its subjects’ true state of mind. 
By torturing, it could elicit confession or repentance but never know 
how sincere. How far into the individual psyche could the state pen-
etrate, and why should it bother? The state could hope for outward 
conformity, and it often rested content with that. But even in secu-
lar modernity, the state has shown an interest in what goes on in 
citizens’ minds, seeking to penetrate and influence that.
With overt, tangible offenses, human law could and  eventually did 
handle matters. But thought crimes— not easily known— tested secu-
lar law’s limits. Speech and writing expressed underlying thoughts 
and beliefs and, by being public, could influence others in unwanted 
ways. But because subvocal, thoughts were definitionally without 
Chapter 9
Crimes of Thought
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effect on others, their very presence unknown. Why pursue such 
an offense? And how? The Fourth Lateran Council in 1215 speci-
fied that unknown crimes should not be subject to inquisition. Only 
those publicly charged with heresy were to be pursued, not offenders 
accused in secret, much less those who kept their thoughts private. 
In 1484, the Spanish inquisitor Tomás de Torquemada decreed that 
those whose heresy was unknown to others be allowed to abjure and 
do penance in secret, too, thus never being exposed as heretics.1 “The 
thought of man shall not be tried, for the devil himself knoweth not 
the thought of man,” said Chief Justice Brian at the end of the Mid-
dle Ages.2 Given the impossibility of penetrating the black box of any 
human mind, were such pronouncements just the state making a vir-
tue of necessity?
How could the state or church police an interior state of mind 
when it knew only outward signs— acts or words? Even if it knew 
of an interior transgression, what could it aspire to? Punish the 
thought or conviction retroactively? Ensure that whatever hetero-
dox believers really thought, they at least mouthed the right opin-
ions? Or seek to change the offender’s actual beliefs and thus future 
acts as well as thoughts? With conventional transgressions by act, 
no one expected offenders to become good and never offend again. 
Retribution cared only that they suffered. Deterrent punishments 
naturally sought to prevent future crimes, but more by terrifying 
potential offenders into obedience than by necessarily chang-
ing their dispositions. From society’s utilitarian vantage, whether 
citizens behaved out of fear or goodness mattered less than that 
they toed the line. In modern parlance, society was a behaviorist— 
concerned with outward acts more than with inward beliefs. Yet 
rehabilitation at its starkest, as in totalitarian brainwashing, did 
in fact seek to change past offenders into a future law- abiding and 
right- thinking citizens.3 Citizens’ inner and outer states were to cor-
respond, both acting and being good or at least in conformity to 
the law. Such attempts to penetrate deeply into citizens’ psyches 
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therefore provoked opposition as violating human autonomy, or— 
overreaching— they simply tended to fail.
Retributive punishment for thought offenses made little sense, 
given that no one had been harmed by purely private ideas. Punish-
ing to deter or incapacitate heterodox thinkers might warn others off 
entertaining similar deviations, but it also publicized the presence 
and possibly even the popularity of precisely the ideas to be stamped 
out. To punish thoughts meant to seek to convert or persuade the 
offender. If successful, the influence would lead to a genuine and 
lasting change of mind. Or it might mean merely outward assent to 
a position still rejected at heart. How would persuaders know?
In Islamic law, male apostates were jailed for three days in hopes 
of reviving their faith. If they did not then reaffirm it, they were to be 
executed. In the Middle Ages, Dominicans tortured suspected her-
etics less to find out what they thought than to make them recant.4 
At the end of their travails, the monks remained equally ignorant of 
the heretics’ true convictions. In seventeenth- century Virginia, the 
authorities’ inability to do much beyond eliciting outward signs of 
conformity was laid painfully bare. Those who absented themselves 
from twice- daily prayer were first punished by loss of wages, whip-
ping, and the galley, and those who spoke against the Christian faith 
were executed. These measures, however, judged only on external 
indications. Ministers therefore also interrogated suspected heretics 
on their faith and knowledge of it. Those who refused to submit 
were whipped and made to confess to the congregation. For a third 
infraction, they were flogged daily until they confessed, asked for 
forgiveness, and sought instruction from the minister.5 Despite this 
escalation, the religious authorities still remained uncertain what 
their victims actually believed.
Authorities have always found it hard to know who entertained 
heretical ideas, how firmly they held them, and if they could be dis-
suaded. Crimes of thought were inherently harder to detect, much 
less eradicate, than conventional offenses by act. Much normal 
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crime is opportunistic, succumbing to a momentary weakness. 
Offenders of thought have rarely been motivated by what would 
be the equivalent— a whim or passing fancy. Unlike conventional 
criminals, they have usually been moved by conviction. The het-
erodox have often been educated, conscientious, well- meaning peo-
ple, idealistic and unbribable, too. Of course, some have sought to 
reform a religion or bring down a political system. But they have 
equally seen themselves as the only ones truly understanding the 
thought system in question, seeking to return it to its roots, core, 
or true mission.6 Attacked as heretics or traitors, they claimed to be 
true believers or patriots. Many statesmen started as traitors; many 
religious leaders as heretics. Christ was accused of blasphemy for 
insisting before the Sanhedrin that he was the Messiah.7 George 
Washington would have hanged for treason had England won the 
Revolutionary War.
Since their religions made no exclusive truth claims, polytheistic 
regimes of the pre- Axial age could most easily accommodate variant 
beliefs. The Romans folded deities from conquered cultures into their 
pantheon of cults and gods. Not every belief was taken equally seri-
ously, but they all could be accommodated so long as they tolerated 
one another. A single god, demanding unwavering adherence, how-
ever, undermined polytheism’s workaday toleration. The Abrahamic 
monotheisms made exclusive and mutually incompatible claims to 
absolute truth, all while refusing to consider polymorphous beliefs 
worthy competitors. For the Jews, Jupiter was not just a foreign 
god, but no god at all.8 Christianity was even more universalizing 
than Judaism, less attached to any particular nation. Universalizing 
ideologies— whether religious or, later, political— saw ideological dis-
sent in binary terms. They were ecumenical in the sense that any-
one willing to believe was welcome as an adherent but intolerant in 
insisting on the sole truth of their way, the falsity of any other.
Many more people would ultimately be killed for political princi-
ples than for theological beliefs. But outside the totalitarian regimes, 
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the secular powers would never match the intensity with which 
religious heresy was pursued. The stakes were higher for heretics 
than for political dissidents— eternal damnation, not just death. Nor 
could political persecutors assuage their consciences with the belief 
that the pain they inflicted was for the sufferer’s own good in the 
next life. Augustine insisted the church must compel the true faith. 
Heretics had been led astray. Christians should force them to see 
the light, not indulge their errors with a misplaced sense of mercy, 
thus losing them forever.9
Heretics also had the advantage over many political dissidents in 
appealing to ultimate authority. A common claim of religious trans-
gression was that it understood the truth, which— as orthodoxy— 
had become encrusted by institution and ritual. Only the heretic 
tapped straight into the godhead.10 The heresies that eventually 
became Protestantism shared a belief in their direct access to God’s 
truth. Hence, they rejected many sacraments, the cult of saints, pil-
grimages, salvation by good works, and above all the clergy as inter-
mediaries between the laity and God.11 The most extreme sects lost 
even a sense that sin was possible, allowing them to believe that 
unbridled sex, including incest, would restore their lost purity.12
Religious Unorthodoxy
The first thought crimes were theological. Disobeying God was the 
original sin. When crime and sin were largely the same, worship-
ping deities other than your own people’s god was among the first 
offenses. At first, such transgressions had little to do with the state 
as such, nor did gods need the state’s laws and powers to punish 
them. The ancient Greek gods sometimes administered justice, 
though these spiteful and all- too- human deities mostly quarreled 
among themselves, wreaking occasional havoc on human soci-
ety.13 In Euripides’s play Bellerophontes, Zeus dispatched the main 
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character with a thunderbolt for his atheism.14 When Gideon pulled 
down the altar of Baal and desecrated the other local gods whom 
the Jews had begun worshipping while in Canaan, his father saved 
him from his people’s wrath by insisting that were Baal a god, he 
could defend himself.15 Why the God of the Jews needed mere mor-
tals to take up his cause when blasphemed was left unexplained.16
Sin, irreligion, immorality, and crime were at first largely indistin-
guishable. Crimen could mean both “sin” and “crime.”17 Both sins 
(in the broad sense of being irreligious and immoral) and crimes 
violated laws given by god(s) and enforced either directly by them 
supernaturally or indirectly through authorities, whether religious 
or worldly. Attacking the leader, who was also god’s earthly repre-
sentative, transgressed both religious and secular authority. Heresy 
and treason were thus much the same offense— attacks on leaders. In 
ancient Greece, sacrilege and treason were closely related, the tem-
ple being the home of the state’s protector.18 Sins such as blasphemy 
were treated like secular transgressions such as murder or theft, as 
violations of the divine order, and enforced by the authorities. Blas-
phemy in Greece was a portmanteau offense, including speaking ill 
of the gods, disturbing the peace, and dishonoring principles of gov-
ernment. Sacrilege was punished with death in the Lex Julia, along 
with embezzling public monies. Adultery was considered a sacrilege 
in Roman law, a defiance of marriage’s inviolability.19
Sin and crime were eventually separated out. The transcendent 
religions of the Axial Age— Buddhism, Confucianism, Jainism, then 
Judaism, Christianity, and Islam— desacralized this world. God and 
the divine were elevated to a higher plane, no longer interacting 
much with the mortal and certainly not on a daily basis.20 By the 
nineteenth century, the legal reformer Anselm von Feuerbach was 
able to argue that God could not be insulted and that he certainly 
would never stoop to exacting revenge for injured honor.21 The 
Greek and Roman gods had constantly meddled in human affairs. 
The Western Christian world was eventually, after kings and popes 
Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/books/book-pdf/1963888/book_9780262361507.pdf by guest on 27 December 2021
Crimes of Thought  155
had sorted their relations, ruled by secular law, with religious pre-
cept only at a remove.
If the divinity did not intervene, religions themselves could 
only persuade. They could censure and influence believers. Excom-
munication had an effect only insofar as the spiritually banished 
remained sufficiently adherent to agree that it imposed a cost on 
them. If used too often, as among seventeenth- century Jewish com-
munities against Sabbatian heresies, its effects were shrugged off.22 
Only those who still accepted the orthodoxy could be punished by 
it. For similar reasons, religion’s most effective leverage, hell, failed 
to work for those whose faith had changed or faded. Besides such 
voluntarist measures, religion could enforce its precepts only when 
it allied with the state, turning sin into crime.
Religious orthodoxy and the state therefore intertwined. A lan-
guage, as the old joke goes, is a dialect backed by an army. So, too, a 
sect becomes religion only once it can enforce itself. Once a persecuted 
faction, the Christian Church eventually promulgated its doctrine 
by law. With the Roman Empire converted under Constantine, the 
church could determine the content of faith in this world with more 
than just threats for the next. Christianity came in variants, so in 325 
the Roman emperor chose among them, calling the Council of Nicea 
to formulate the first creed.23 The Theodosian legislation of the fourth 
century made Catholic Christianity the religion of the empire. Other 
Christian faiths were now branded as heresy. Heretics and pagans 
were stripped of the right to worship or hold civil office and fined for 
their beliefs. Trinitarianism was Christianity’s central theological dis-
pute, an attempt to reconcile monotheism with Christ’s peculiar sta-
tus as partly human, partly divine. It did not become orthodoxy until 
the Council of Chalcedon in 451.24 In 453, the constitution of the 
emperors Valentinian III and Marcian subjected pagans and heretics 
to confiscation and death. After 376, imperial constitutions forbade 
secret meetings of heretics. From the sixth century on, those who 
failed to denounce heretics were also condemned.25
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Long persecuted, Christians now went after each other. After 
Nicea, Constantine issued an edict against heretics aimed at Nova-
tian schismatics and Gnostics.26 A millennium later, that cycle 
repeated itself with the Reformation. Just as treason wipes the slate 
clean by its own success, so victorious heresy becomes orthodoxy. 
Though hounded to near extinction, Waldensians, Hutterites, and 
other sects sowed their seed in those areas where Protestantism later 
flourished.27 Severely persecuted by Catholics, mainstream Protes-
tantism in turn went after many of its own bewildering array of 
sects. Luther had at first rejected coercion in matters of faith. As he 
gained power, however, worried by the excesses of Anabaptists and 
other schismatics, he changed his position. John Calvin’s vicious 
hounding of Michael Servetus to a gruesome death in 1553, who 
had already been persecuted by Catholics for his views on the Trin-
ity, was among the worst examples.
So long as religion was considered society’s cement, belief was 
a public issue. Incorrect thoughts threatened order and stability. 
If God insisted on human society’s purity, individual deviations 
became a collective problem. Heresy could spread like disease and 
had to be stamped out. The threat of divine wrath at sin obligated 
human authorities to police themselves. Chinese rulers anxiously 
scanned the heavens for omens and signs of supernatural displea-
sure that required a recalibration of their policies.28 Romans were 
largely indifferent to theology so long as order was maintained, but 
Christians feared that wrong thinking affected the entire commu-
nity. Heresy threatened God’s wrath through famine, earthquake, 
and pestilence. Theologians of the eleventh and twelfth centuries 
insisted that a universal, uniform faith alone won God’s favor for 
the Christian world. Emperor Maximilian issued the first imperial 
law against blasphemy in 1497 because he feared epidemics, fam-
ine, and natural disasters.29
As we have seen, both treason and heresy were first regarded as 
defiance of collective religious and political authority. In 1199, Pope 
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Innocent III treated heresy analogously to treason. Both were crimes 
against the ultimate authority, whether secular or religious.30 Her-
esy was not just an individual crime but, like treason, also offended 
against the community of faithful. Only subjects or citizens could be 
traitors since foreigners were definitionally unable to betray a ruler 
to whom they owed no allegiance. Foreigners could be enemies, 
of course, but not traitors. Believers may quibble whether Søren 
Kierkegaard was right that pagans could not sin. But atheists proba-
bly cannot sin— unless it turns out they are wrong, and God exists.31 
Similarly, only believers could become apostates and heretics.
But non- and other-believers could blaspheme or verbally assault 
sacred values. Early Christianity drew such distinctions imprecisely. 
Pagans were routinely lumped with heretics in the Roman Empire. 
Religion, sorcery, magic, superstition, and witchcraft were interlaced. 
Christians took witchcraft very seriously as a competing faith, neces-
sary to root out. “For rebellion is as the sin of witchcraft,” says the 
Bible.32 As of the fourteenth century, black magic and pagan rituals 
were considered heresy, which thus elevated superstition to a theo-
logical challenge.33 In medieval France and England, necromancy 
aimed at the royal line was treason. In the early seventeenth century, 
James I of England drastically punished witches.34 The Ming Chinese 
outlawed private ownership of celestial instruments to predict the 
future. In sixteenth- century Muscovy, both witchcraft and religious 
dissent were serious crimes, along with treason and revolt. The Mas-
sachusetts Bay Puritans made witchcraft a capital crime.35
Resonances of such hierarchies persist. Few today see sorcery as 
a valid competitor to religion. When in the Republican presidential 
primaries of 1980 George H. W. Bush called Ronald Reagan’s supply- 
side policies “voodoo economics,” the description was regarded 
as an uncontroversial commonplace, even as Vodun’s practitio-
ners accused him of slander.36 Nations with official state religions 
decide which variants they recognize as legitimate competitors. In 
Germany, both the Society of Friends (Quakers) and Scientology 
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are classified as sects, not religions. European authorities question 
whether such would- be religions qualify for state subsidies (or can 
collect religious taxes). In the US, tax exemptions have been the 
main issue: whether to grant Scientology standing as a religion has 
been the remit of the fiscal authorities.37
Transgressions against the faith eventually became crimes against 
the state. In the fifth century BCE, the Greeks began punishing the 
impious and those who refused to recognize the gods.38 Plato argued 
that even well- meaning citizens who committed impieties should 
be put to death if after being instructed and admonished for five 
years in a house of correction, they had still not repented.39 Socrates 
was only the best remembered of such victims. The Romans cared 
little for religious orthodoxy. Good citizens engaged in the cults, 
but Roman law knew few theological or sacral crimes. Transgres-
sions were punished largely if they were also a public offense, such 
as theft from the temple. Unauthorized revelation from the Sib-
ylline book of oracles was a capital crime, and neglecting private 
shrines was actionable. As the Romans began persecuting Christi-
anity, they sometimes made sacrifices to their gods obligatory. But 
they regarded religion mostly as a matter of public order. Citizens 
were expected to go through the motions of adherence, but their 
actual beliefs were of less concern. Roman syncretism, assimilating 
the foreign cults swept up by imperial expansion, hampered any 
narrow orthodoxy.40
Christianity’s challenge to the state cults threatened public order 
even as the Romans took little interest in its theological claims. 
They viewed Christians as another annoying, standoffish sect that 
shunned public festivals, sacrifices to local deities, and homages to 
the emperors’ statutes. Neither the Christians’ portentous prophe-
cies of unbelievers’ fates nor rumors of secret bloody and sensual 
rituals helped their image. Rome firmly regulated and occasion-
ally suppressed Christians along with the Bacchantes, the Druids, 
and followers of the cults of Isis and Serapis.41 Christians, however, 
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proselytized effectively, universalizing Judaism’s monotheism and 
its unwavering claim to the truth. They ignored the Roman state, 
which, besides persecution, had few tools to deal with a belief that 
despised worldly power. Once the emperors converted to Christian-
ity in the fourth century, religious and political power aligned. The 
state now policed orthodoxy, and heresy and blasphemy became 
among the most commonly prosecuted crimes.42
Church and state together battled heterodoxy through the Mid-
dle Ages. Pope Gregory IX decreed that blasphemers undertake pub-
lic penance in church, while secular authorities fined them. Secular 
laws against blasphemy followed in the early thirteenth century.43 
Forbidden to shed blood, clerics farmed out heresy’s punishment to 
the state. In England, Henry VIII combined political and religious 
power in the same hands, and the two forms of dissent became 
indistinguishable. Objecting to his variant of the Reformation was 
both heresy and treason.44
Religion began to be exempted from the state’s concern in the 
Elizabethan era. Francis Bacon promised that the authorities did not 
seek to “make windows into men’s souls.” And in 1570, the queen 
agreed that all subjects who were obedient to her laws would be free 
from “any molestation to them by any person by way of examina-
tion or inquisition of their secret opinions in their consciences for 
matters of faith, remitting that to the supreme and singular author-
ity of almighty God, who is only the searcher of hearts.”45 The 
right to remain silent was invoked in this era to protect religious 
dissidents from persecution, indirectly allowing them freedom of 
conviction by not having to testify to their variant beliefs. That 
innermost thoughts need not be divulged to secular authorities was 
invoked by Thomas More in his trial in 1535.46 Extremists such as 
the Arians and Anabaptists were persecuted, but Catholics and Puri-
tans only if also their activities threatened political dissent. Though 
adopting the Thirty- Nine Articles as official doctrine in 1571, the 
Elizabethan church did not rigorously enforce them. Catholics 
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attended established churches or paid fines for recusancy and went 
to mass in private. The state demanded only outward conformity 
and pro forma obedience.47
Insofar as the state wanted heretics to repent or convert, it could 
not just execute them. With thought crimes, capital punishment 
indicated failure, so heretics were often imprisoned and tortured in 
hopes of conversion. Used to extract the truth, torture also served 
to persuade. Dead heretics, Thomas Aquinas pointed out, could not 
do penance.48 The Spanish inquisitors repeatedly urged the accused 
to examine their consciences, identify the charge against them, and 
confess. Only then were formal charges brought.49 Because particu-
lar thoughts were not an ineradicable part of humans— as ethnic-
ity would later be considered— they could be changed and did not 
seal their thinker’s fate.50 Only those who valued their convictions 
above all else faced death. Luther came to consider Anabaptists, who 
rejected the state and its coercions, blasphemers and seditionists, 
calling for them to be killed. Not everyone was cut out for martyr-
dom, however, and many convicted heretics lived after recanting.51
From Theology to Politics
Over time, faith grew private, no longer a threat to the state. Dissi-
dence moved to politics instead. We have followed this development 
with treason. Threats originally posed to the person of the ruler were 
later aimed at the system as politics ceased being a dynastic mat-
ter. With the spread of representative government and later democ-
racy, some degree of political dissidence was baked into the system 
as reform, with only outright attempts to destroy it outlawed. Only 
in the totalitarian regimes did political dissent retain a theological 
aura, with even trivial acts regarded as mortal threats. Nonethe-
less, liberal democracies, too, took an interest in citizens’ political 
thoughts. Nationalism sometimes presupposed an adherence to the 
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community that prompted the state’s concern with its members’ 
beliefs, not just their conduct. The faithful congregation found its 
counterpart in the patriotic nation.
Political dissidents could be traitors or revolutionaries, more dan-
gerous than ordinary criminals. Just as assassination was not merely 
another murder, so politically motivated crimes were “less repre-
hensible morally but more dangerous to society than the same act 
would be if due to revenge or some other personal motive,” as the 
British police said of the suffragettes in the early twentieth cen-
tury.52 The French revolutionary penal code of 1791 made political 
crime an offense against the state, not the ruler: lèse- nation, no lon-
ger lèse- majesté. Seeking to change the system was treason. Those 
undermining the state attacked their own people and so ultimately 
themselves. Opposing the people’s will, they stood outside the com-
munity.53 Democracy’s opponents were enemies of the people. This 
was the logic taken to its extreme in the totalitarian populisms.
But dissidents could also seek to improve, not overthrow. In this 
guise, they were considered political criminals. In recognition of 
their social status and benevolent intentions, nineteenth- century 
Europe punished them more leniently than ordinary offenders. 
Starting in the 1830s, France softened its treatment of opponents. 
Both Left and Right despised Louis- Philippe, the bourgeois mon-
arch. Legitimists hated him for overthrowing the last Bourbon 
king, republicans for his narrowly upper- middle- class backing. The 
Orleanist regime responded with comparatively moderate laws, 
though robust by modern standards. It curbed free speech and writ-
ing, required authorization for associations, and controlled weap-
ons. The July Monarchy’s reforms marked the growing lenience of 
laws on political crime. Political opponents were now regarded as 
honorable, sincere citizens, not as criminals.54 Madame Germaine 
de Staël, the salonnière and writer, was allowed to remain in France, 
though not in Paris, and visitors to her home near Auxerre were 
monitored but not prohibited. Napoleon III, though authoritarian, 
Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/books/book-pdf/1963888/book_9780262361507.pdf by guest on 27 December 2021
162  Chapter 9
treated opponents of his coup moderately, exiling some, allowing 
others to remain in France under surveillance.55
The suffragettes of the late nineteenth century were emblemati-
cally political criminals. They advocated violence yet often hailed 
from prominent families. Unlike the Chartists and Fenians, earlier 
working- class political prisoners in Britain, suffragettes were radi-
calized insiders. They exploited that position, daring the authorities 
to treat them like drunks and other low- level offenders.56 Using cat- 
and- mouse tactics, they pushed the authorities to respond force-
fully, hoping to win public sympathy. They heckled, demonstrated, 
threw stones at meetings, broke windows, disrupted religious ser-
vices, burned mailboxes, slashed paintings, rushed the House of 
Commons, picketed politicians’ homes, held hunger strikes, and 
committed public suicide. Even assassination may have been dis-
cussed.57 Fined, they did not pay. Ordered to provide sureties, they 
refused, requiring the government to keep them in jail.58 On hun-
ger strikes, they obliged the police either to undermine their own 
authority by releasing them or to force- feed them, with the atten-
dant bad publicity.59 Hunger strikes had long been one of the tru-
est arrows in the political criminal’s quiver. Strikers in effect took 
themselves hostage, leaving the authorities with bloody hands by 
requiring them either to let the strikers die or to torture them 
by force- feeding. Even God had been the object of a hunger strike by 
Saint Patrick.60
Yet lenient treatment of political offenders had its limits. The more 
authoritarian, the more twentieth- century regimes have treated polit-
ical prisoners akin to ordinary criminals, refusing them the courtesy 
of a special status.61 And even liberal democracies have shown their 
harsh side. Unlike on the continent, the Anglo- Saxons generally did 
not recognize political crime as a special instance or grant leniency 
for such offenses, however well intentioned.62 Nor did they regard 
ordinary crimes as in any sense justified through being provoked 
by political oppression. Historians may regard crimes committed by 
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Blacks in the United States, whether slaves or their descendants, 
as protests against a deeply unfair system, thus political. But at the 
time they were met with lynching and oppression, certainly not 
treated with any understanding.63 The rise of nationalism and the 
ideological conflicts of the interwar and Cold War decades posed 
quasi- theological political conflicts once again, undermining the 
nineteenth century’s lenience toward political offenders.64
British prime minister Margaret Thatcher held out against Irish 
Republican Army hunger strikers in 1980. She refused to recognize 
their political status or to force- feed them. Almost a dozen starved 
to death.65 Contemporary terrorists, who have been willing to com-
mit mass murder by suicide, have failed to win status as political 
criminals or its attendant sympathy. If anything, they have pro-
voked the state to treat them worse than ordinary offenders— held, 
interrogated, tortured, and sometimes sentenced without benefit of 
due process, as at Guantanamo. Ransoms for release can be paid 
for victims of criminal kidnap, but under United Nations regula-
tions and in some countries, such as Colombia, under threat from 
the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, it is a crime to do so 
for politically motivated abductions. “If it’s criminal, it’s legal,” was 
one British bureaucrat’s laconic summation.66 In such respects, ter-
rorists have been treated much like anarchists in the late nineteenth 
century and fascist collaborators after 1945, as enemies beyond the 
pale.67 The lenience with which the nineteenth century treated 
political prisoners evaporated in the following era.
Ever Inward
Ideological systems, whether religious or political, punished thought, 
not just deed. Why? So long as subjects acted lawfully, did it mat-
ter what went on in their minds? Did orthodox behavior require 
orthodox belief? Were not laws enforcing church attendance or party 
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membership enough? And why were the authorities so curious about 
their subjects’ thoughts? To ensure that everyone was truly virtuous, 
both thinking and acting correctly? Or were the authorities utilitar-
ians, worried that wrong thoughts undermined society’s cohesion? 
Knowing what was in people’s heads, let alone changing it, was an 
intractable problem. Identifying, reforming, or at least incapacitating 
heretical thinkers, in contrast, was a practical proposition.
Acting lawfully merely means obeying rules. Being good, however— 
whether in a religious or a secular moral sense— requires a correspon-
dence between interior and exterior states. Sin and morality look to 
the motivations behind the act, the law to the act itself and to the 
attitudes impelling it only if they indicate its character.68 To avoid 
sin, according to Locke, inner conviction must correspond to outer 
behavior; lawfulness only means acting correctly.69 In Kant’s dis-
tinction, morality rests on human autonomy, the law on external 
compulsion. The law can make people behave correctly, but only 
morality or belief can make them good.70 States reached the outer 
limits of their powers at this distinction. Perhaps they could compel 
subjects to act lawfully, but making them good was doable, if at all, 
mainly through institutions that were only partly under the states’ 
sway: churches, families, schools.
Authorities have always been keen to know the inside of their 
subjects’ heads. In a fragment of an ancient Greek play, possibly 
by Critias, King Sisyphus speculated that divine omniscience had 
been hatched as a concept because mortals could not know each 
other’s minds. People who feared that gods knew their innermost 
thoughts would be good, prompted by a kind of universal panop-
ticon principle.71 This logic underlies recent theories of how large, 
complex societies, uniting unrelated strangers, emerged under the 
auspices of omniscient “big gods.”72 Gods were often all- knowing. 
Janus could look two ways at once, Buddha four; the Egyptian god 
Horus appeared as a sharp- eyed falcon; and Greek gods’ bodies were 
often covered with eyes.73 The monotheistic gods were even better 
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enforcers: omniscient, omnipotent, and morally infallible. Accord-
ing to the medieval theologian Peter Abelard, God, able to pierce 
humans’ inner minds, punished the sin with no need to await the 
act.74 In comparison, even the mightiest mortal rulers were weak. 
Political and religious heretics could be known only if they revealed 
their thoughts by word or deed. Otherwise, unorthodoxy remained 
their secret, its punishment a matter for God— if anyone. Such were 
the Marranos, forcibly converted Spanish Jews; Moriscos, their 
Muslim analogues; and the Nicodemites, Protestants who attended 
Catholic mass.75 Confession was the best and— other than indirect 
revelation by act— usually the only way of knowing the black box 
of the mind.
But even confession, especially if produced by torture, could mis-
lead. The Greeks allowed evidence from slaves only if extracted by 
torture— even preferring this testimony to the uncompelled offer-
ings of freemen.76 But was confession under duress authentic? Or a 
desperate ploy to end the agony? The tortured body was not a reli-
able conduit to the soul. Medieval torturers solved the problem as 
best they could by requiring that a forced confession be repeated in 
the courtroom. Those who recanted off the rack started over again— 
though, for what it was worth, no more than thrice.77 In sixteenth- 
century Seville, one observer thought that women who still did not 
confess after being stripped naked were probably innocent since 
why else would they accept such humiliation? But this was a logic 
that could be applied at any stage. At which level of agony did the 
tortured finally reveal the truth? Michael Servetus, the antitrinitar-
ian Protestant whom Calvin hounded to a horrendous death, asked 
to be beheaded before being burned lest the flames persuade him to 
recant.78
The most fervent heretics, convinced of their own righteous-
ness, were especially willing to play fast and loose with the observ-
able truth. Protestants in sixteenth- century England, for example, 
perjured themselves. Ninety- eight percent of Lollards, an early 
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Protestant sect, who were tried as heretics abjured. Many of them 
then relapsed, so their initial recantations were likely insincere. 
Even Joan of Arc recanted at first. Hearing saints’ voices rebuking 
her, she rescinded her recantation and was burned alive.79 Giovanni 
Valentio Gentile, an Italian Protestant in Calvin’s Geneva, was 
arrested for heresy in 1558. Concluding that he had recanted out 
of fear rather than conviction, the judges voted for his execution.80 
The sentence was commuted, but the point remained. Ultimately 
no one could know the authenticity of a forced confession, and 
those doing the confessing or recanting might well still retain their 
heretical core beyond reach of their suffering.
Torture was of course often used as punishment in its own right. 
Ancient Persians tortured not to extract confession but to intensify 
suffering.81 But its main role in Western law was evidentiary, to reveal 
truth in the absence of better sources. Greek and Roman authori-
ties tortured only outsiders, including slaves, but not citizens, over 
whom they had other leverage. Slaves, beholden to their masters, 
would tell the truth to others only under duress.82 Citizens, however, 
were valid witnesses in court. If they lied on the stand, they risked 
being charged with perjury, pronounced legally infamous (atimos), 
and fined.83 That perjury eventually became a serious crime is the 
price we have paid for avoiding torture. During the Middle Ages, 
ordeals and other divine interventions brought resolution to trials.84 
When in 1215 the Fourth Lateran Council forbade ordeals for ecclesi-
astical trials, it left a yawning evidentiary gap. Through ordeals, God 
had revealed the guilty: their hands blistered, their bodies buoyant. 
Without the ordeal, the Roman- canon law’s standard of evidence 
was hard to meet: two eyewitnesses or a confession. With death as 
the likely punishment, few confessed voluntarily. To force a confes-
sion, torture therefore became crucial for conviction.85
Medieval courts tortured to unveil innermost thoughts but 
also to solve crimes without witnesses. In Europe’s inquisitional 
systems, confession became the queen of proofs. Not only did 
Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/books/book-pdf/1963888/book_9780262361507.pdf by guest on 27 December 2021
Crimes of Thought  167
the defendant’s admission seal the case, but for crimes that were 
unknowable in any other way confession was the only access to 
them. With offenses such as simony and concubinage, the only 
witnesses were themselves implicated and unlikely to sing.86 Other 
offenses, such as heresy, might be unknown to anyone other than 
the offender, though blasphemy, like slander, required an audience 
of at least one. How then to make suspects confess? Torture was 
required because the inquisitional system demanded firm proof. 
Abolishing ordeals had moved God out of the judicial process. Tor-
ture was meant to reassure that the standard of proof remained 
exacting. With mere mortals now sitting in judgment, confession— 
even if elicited by torture— became the capstone of evidence.87 
Where judicial torture remained uncommon, as in England, it was 
largely because the standard of proof was lower. English authori-
ties tortured, too, but unenthusiastically. Persecuting the Templars 
in 1310 and unable to find competent Englishmen for the task, 
Edward II imported continental torturers.88 Not English humanity 
but the legal system explains the difference. By Roman law stan-
dards, the jury system applied lax standards of evidence— whatever 
would convince a dozen compatriots. It did not need torture.
New crimes were formulated that were not capital and there-
fore required less- definite proof for conviction. When seventeenth- 
century Germany began to punish those who were merely suspected 
of offending (Verdachtsstrafe), the standard of proof was adjusted 
accordingly, and torture to confession (inherently unlikely with a 
crime of suspicion) was no longer required.89 Circumstantial evidence 
was taken evermore seriously, displacing confession. As the quality of 
the evidence required to convict was lowered and the range of both 
offenses and sanctions expanded, torture was less fit for purpose. An 
increasingly powerful state, punishing subjects for more acts in more 
ways, could afford to abandon such blunt instruments. Fundamental 
to torture’s eventual demise was also that certain interior crimes— 
religious and many political heresies— fell out of the state’s remit. 
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The authorities no longer had to plumb souls, though that still left 
broad scope, as we will see, for other occult crimes.
Torture in the West today is used largely on outsiders but now 
mainly in a forward- looking interrogational mode, aiming to extract 
information about anticipated events rather than confessions about 
past transgressions.90 Having supposedly banned torture, our own 
era (ignoring totalitarianism) has seen it revived. Some democracies 
have developed techniques of “clean” torture that tacitly acknowl-
edge their illegality by inflicting pain without leaving physical 
traces.91 The state has repeatedly confronted supposedly existential 
threats from actors it regards as outsiders, beyond the protection of 
due process: outcasts and organized criminals subjected to “third- 
degree” interrogations by American police (legal until 1936); Alge-
rian nationalists taking the independence struggle to French soil in 
the 1950s; Islamic extremists waterboarded— or worse— at covert 
rendition sites, beyond the law’s protection.92 Ticking- bomb scenar-
ios have been invoked to convince skeptics that torture was neces-
sary, despite the damage to institutions and morality.93
Torture to elicit confession was among the first, crudest, and 
commonest techniques the state used to penetrate its subjects’ inte-
riors. It was the flip side of the voluntary laying bare of souls that 
the church also began demanding of the faithful. Confession and 
inquisition arose simultaneously as mirror aspects of the church’s 
attempt to illuminate and mold the soul. When the Fourth Lateran 
Council abolished ordeals in 1215, paving the way for torture’s rein-
troduction, it also made sacramental confession a routine element 
of lay religiosity, an annual obligation of all Christians.94
At first, confession was a public event, Christians seeking forgive-
ness collectively through the church’s intermediation.95 Sinners who 
made peace with the church contritely endured its penitential pun-
ishments: praying, fasting, undertaking pilgrimages, paying fines, 
chastising themselves, wearing clothes that indicated their faults, 
and the like. In return, they expected the church to intercede for 
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them with God.96 As of the mid- sixth century, beginning in Ireland, 
confession was also held privately, penitent to priest. In this form, it 
was required as of 1215.97 Public confession had channeled the sin-
ner’s redemption through the church, which intervened with God. 
Private confession put the sinner in more direct relation to the divin-
ity, though still through a priest. Canon lawyers called confession the 
forum internum, the “internal court,” to distinguish it from their own 
external court of law.98 Absolution resolved sin, while crime was left 
to the secular authorities. Protestants eventually denounced Catholic 
confession as a wheeze, promising redemption through mere ritual. 
They emphasized true confession and contrition’s ability to bypass 
established authority as sinners pleaded directly with God.99
Confession’s privacy was reinforced with the sixteenth- century 
invention of a place for it to occur, the confessional. Confessions 
were now both private and at least nominally anonymous, encour-
aging penitents to reveal all. If confession had earlier dealt with 
the frictions of rural life, the tensions and violence of local com-
munities, it now concentrated on interior sins, often sexual, with 
masturbation a particular church preoccupation.100 Sinners were 
reconciled to God, no longer to the community. Even before the 
Reformation attacked penances as mere empty ritual, confession 
focused on interiority. Early medieval confessions involved two 
meetings with the priest, the sinner first confessing and then after 
penance returning for absolution. But as absolution was extended 
to the laity starting in the late tenth century, confession was com-
pressed to a single meeting where penance and absolution were dis-
pensed together. Attention thus shifted to the sinner’s attitude at 
the time of confession, the contrition expressed even before having 
undertaken penance.
A presumably apocryphal story illustrates the change. Having 
raped his daughter, a man asked for severe penance in confession. 
Given seven years, he demanded more. The priest instead reduced 
his penance, and this downward haggle continued until it arrived 
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at but a single Paternoster. By this point, the man was so mortified 
by shame that he died on the spot, going straight to heaven.101 The 
Reformation turned confession even more inward.102 Luther distin-
guished between acts that harmed the community (adultery, murder, 
theft, usury, slander, wrath, enmity), which were to be handled by 
public or sacramental confession, and “the secret sins of the heart,” 
or sexual fantasies. The latter could be dealt with between individual 
sinners and God. Insofar as they wanted the comfort of confession, 
they could also confess to any Christian, ordained or not.103
Neither forced nor voluntary confession provided certain knowl-
edge of interior states, however. Only a truthful confessant aligned 
interior conviction with outward profession. Others were con-
flicted. Neither priest nor torturer knew whether conversion or 
confession or repentance was meant wholeheartedly. The problem 
with torture lay epistemologically not with those who had in fact 
offended. They resisted the pain— or not. The innocents, in con-
trast, saw no reason to suffer for deeds they had not committed, and 
so they served up whatever they thought the interrogators wanted 
to hear, and often much more. Soviet police, for example, became 
alarmed during the late 1930s as torture stimulated detainees’ imag-
inations, and the evidence suddenly suggested that subversion was 
even more widespread than the authorities feared.104 On the scaf-
fold, the executioner never really knew whether he was killing a 
stubborn heretic or a genuine innocent.
Imposing orthodoxy, religious or political, some regimes wel-
comed public confession or recantation as a ritual of allegiance by 
which dissenters acknowledged their reentry into the fold, affirmed 
the official creed, warned potential transgressors, and reinforced the 
official message of ideological unity— all regardless of what the her-
etic actually thought. The authorities often settled for the mere 
appearance of a change of heart. The Inquisition threatened to tor-
ture Galileo unless he recanted his heliocentric beliefs. They for-
bade him to write more about them and kept him under house 
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arrest for the rest of his days, which suggested they were under no 
illusion as to his true thoughts.105 More cynically, the forced self- 
criticism of the Soviet mass trials turned confession into an empty 
exercise in abject humiliation that could scarcely have convinced 
even the most credulous true believer. When interrogating suspects, 
Chekist secret- police officers were advised not to seek evidence but 
to ask first what class the suspect belonged to. From that all else 
followed.106 Chinese Communists, in contrast, seem to have con-
tinued the Confucian tradition of self- criticism, seeking to change 
their enemies’ convictions.107 Either way, totalitarianism’s insistence 
on alignment of inner and outer states, belief and act, meant that 
confession again took on a role akin to that in the post- Lateran 
world. Objective proof of guilt or innocence based on third- party 
evidence paled in comparison to extracting an admission from the 
sinners themselves as part of their forcible rehabilitation. Bereft of 
any real proof of guilt, the mass show trials of the 1930s were often 
based on confession alone. In the post- Stalinist 1960s, confession 
was downplayed, and proof reinstated in importance.108
Short of confession, the authorities had only external signs of 
thought offenses to go on. Specific acts, indicating forbidden atti-
tudes, were treated as offenses: following certain ritual practices 
(or refusing them), owning particular writings, or tuning in to spe-
cific media.109 Refusing to swear an oath or pledge betrayed internal 
attitudes. When the church began requiring annual confession, it 
gained insight into parishioners’ ideas, such as those of heretics too 
guileless to lie, and also flushed out dissenters, such as Cathars, who 
shunned such sacraments.110 Even moderate Protestants rejected 
many of Catholicism’s rituals, sacraments, and liturgy. Eating 
meat on Fridays or refusing to fast during Lent, they gave them-
selves away.111 In ideological systems, otherwise commonplace 
transgressions became fraught with new significance. Once Stalin 
had declared socialism achieved in 1933, petty offenses such as beg-
ging threatened to undermine the new system and were considered 
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political crimes.112 A bribe is the price of doing business in a con-
ventionally corrupt system. In an ideologically saturated one, brib-
ery often became a crime against the state. Economic crimes were 
counterrevolutionary in Maoist China. In the 1980s, they were de- 
politicized as normal offenses. Nonetheless, even today smuggling, 
foreign- currency speculation, public- property theft, and bribery 
remain political offenses in China. As actions against socialism and 
thus the state, they are punished by death.113 And assassination, as 
we have seen, is not just murder. Even in secular, allegedly unideo-
logical Western nations, it is difficult to shake the residue of such 
sentiments and to treat the killing of a leader as mere homicide.
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As the state turned its sights to human interiority, probing thoughts 
to punish the offending kind, new vistas opened up. Being good 
presupposed a congruence between inner inclination and outer 
act. So long as the state punished only acts, it could hope for law- 
abiding but not necessarily virtuous citizens. Crimes of thought and 
their policing raised the possibility— last seen when the authorities 
had been concerned with sin as well as crime— that goodness, not 
just propriety, might be the outcome of their interventions.
Apart from habit, custom, and informal sanction, at least three 
kinds of rules have enforced behavior: religious precepts, moral exhor-
tations, and laws. Each was transgressed in its own way. Sin scoffed 
at divine edicts or the church’s will. Immorality transgressed ethical 
or moral codes. Crimes violated laws— rules that, neither divinely 
enjoined nor necessarily ethically informed, had been issued by rec-
ognized authority. Religion, morality, and law have often reinforced 
each other. Once the gods stopped enforcing and the church gave 
up its temporal power, the law commanded the largest battalions. 
Nonetheless, religion and morality still undergird the law. Religion, 
morality, and law today steer in different directions on only a few 
issues: abortion, euthanasia, homosexuality, and polygamy. Despite 
increasing secularization, the law continues to enforce morality. 
“Besides interfering with people who wish to have abortions, com-
mit homosexual acts, visit prostitutes, take drugs, get drunk,” as 
Chapter 10
Obliged to Be Good
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one scholar listed the still controversial instances in 1976, “it also 
interferes with people who wish to steal, rob, evade income taxes, 
assault, and murder.”1
Ideological regimes, religious or political, have punished wrong 
thoughts for at least two reasons. First, the thinkers needed to be 
saved from themselves. That was Augustine’s logic. Since eternal 
damnation awaited heretics, compelling their conversion did them 
a great favor. Second, wrong thoughts might harm society collec-
tively either by angering higher powers (or— in the secular, political 
version— by defying ineluctable laws of history or biology) or by 
undermining its sense of community. As we have seen, the concept 
of crime as a collective affront has deep historical roots— back to the 
Greek pollution theory at least. Medieval heretics were persecuted 
not just to save themselves but also to protect other Christians.2
Western societies no longer consider thought crimes a commu-
nal danger. As the distinction between sin and crime was elabo-
rated, and as religious and eventually political beliefs were moved 
from the state’s auspices into the private sphere, what individuals 
thought or believed became a matter largely for them alone. The 
same held, but to a lesser extent, for the collective danger posed 
by wrong thinking. If some thoughts motivated wrong action, they 
undermined society. The individual adulterer might not harm any-
one, but widespread philandering threatened to hollow out the 
family as an institution. Perjury, contempt of court, and tax evasion 
did not necessarily cause immediate widespread harm but under-
mined the penal code’s deterrent effect.3 The state might no longer 
enforce religion, but it did police morality. In much the same way, 
though the authorities did not suppress political criticism, they did 
insist on maintaining order. Treason, as we have seen, has been nar-
rowed to the point where only actual attempts to destroy the state 
are punished. Most opinions may be freely expressed. The concern 
with speech has shifted from its content— now only rarely action-
able— to the circumstances and form of its expression: whether it 
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threatens unrest or disorder. Around the time of the Peterloo massa-
cre in 1819, the English authorities began paying less attention to 
whether public statements were libelous and treasonous and more 
to whether the assemblies where they were uttered were riotous.4 
Contemporary debates over hate speech focus less on the precise— 
usually risible— claims advanced in that speech and more on the 
circumstances of their utterance and their consequences in acts.
Does the modern state legislate morality? Founded contractu-
ally for its citizens’ common good, the state, many think, pursues 
order, not virtue. Society has therefore banned only those actions 
that harm it, undermining public tranquility. Sacrilege, even unbe-
lief, are no longer its concern, though blasphemy may disturb the 
public peace and can be prosecuted on that basis, not as an offense 
to God or religion.5 Nor are many behaviors pursued that harm no 
one, or even those that affect only the person doing them: adultery, 
sloth, fornication, gluttony, inebriation, masturbation, and other 
acts that once called down the law’s wrath. The private realm of 
permissible behavior and cogitation has undeniably expanded. Yet 
what that realm includes and what remains regulated depend on 
how order and harm are defined. As some behaviors became pri-
vate, others were recognized as of public concern.
By themselves, religion and later morality lacked strong means 
of secular enforcement. Big gods enforced sanctions and encour-
aged prosocial behavior.6 But on earth law played little role in vol-
untary communities of the likeminded, bound together by belief but 
with no official ability to coerce. Among the early Christians, mor-
als and faith guided believers without legal sanctions. As a gather-
ing of the likeminded with no tools of compulsion, the early church 
could enforce its precepts only through private punishments (pen-
ance, fasting, pilgrimages, sartorial markings) that believers agreed 
to submit to, along with whatever psychic toll was imposed by the 
conviction that they had fallen from God’s favor. Mennonites, the 
Amish, Mormons, Orthodox Jews, and other religious communities 
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that enforce behavioral norms not enshrined in statute continue like 
this today.
Convinced of their own virtue and ability to guide behavior by 
example rather than by precept, political ideologies, too, have suc-
cumbed to the illusion that they could do without the law. Punishing 
them treated humans as animals, Marx thought. Under socialism, 
people would recognize their own wrong- doing and reform them-
selves. Somewhat unexpectedly, Marx’s view of what abolishing 
the state would actually look like was akin to the United States 
of the early nineteenth century.7 Later Marxists believed that law 
was needed only in bourgeois systems, to defend property against 
the dispossessed. Law, along with morality and the state, would be 
superseded under socialism’s wholly novel arrangements.8 Early 
in the Soviet Union, the police were considered a bourgeois and 
capitalist institution and thus nothing for socialists.9 That was the 
myth of the state withering away in the coming Communist nir-
vana. Castro thought that socialist Cuba could do without lawyers 
since revolutionary justice was based on moral convictions, not 
legal precepts.10 Yet these political ideologues, just like the religious 
ones, soon discovered how handy the law could be. Unhampered 
by due process, the so- called actually existing socialisms attacked 
their class and ideological enemies mercilessly. The state must be 
democratic for the proletariat and dictatorial against the bourgeoi-
sie, Lenin decreed.11 In the theocracies, morality and religion were 
enforced by law, often backed by terror.
Early on, religion regulated even behaviors that would later be 
treated as ethical or legal concerns. Thus, theocracies policed a wider 
range of conduct than we now recognize as pertaining to either moral-
ity or the law. The Old Testament decreed death for encroachment on 
the tabernacle, idolatry, blasphemy, Sabbath breaking, assault on par-
ents, contumacy, murder, manslaughter, negligent killing, adultery, 
concealed unchastity, rape, homosexual acts, bestiality, prostitution, 
incest, stealing from God, kidnapping, and serious perjury.12 Religion 
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sought to control personal conduct (diet, hygiene, dress, groom-
ing, and other ways of combatting uncleanliness) as well as beliefs 
(apostasy, sacrilege, heresy, blasphemy), economic and legal relations 
(usury, perjury, breach of contract, forgery of documents), supernat-
ural and semireligious behaviors (sorcery, witchcraft, magic), moral-
ity (adultery, incest), quasi- emotions (greed, pride, envy), and family 
relations, including women’s rights.13 As if that were not enough, reli-
gion also claimed to govern belief, sin, grace, and other inner states. 
Today’s theocracies punish a similarly expansive range of actions, 
many of which are elsewhere considered private issues or matters of 
indifference.
Polytheistic religions were not very good at setting consistent 
ethical precepts. Gods disported themselves with little coherence 
and even less willingness to set a good example. Among the Aztecs, 
as the four sons of Ometeotl fought each other for control of the 
universe, Huitzilopochtli beheaded his sister when she tried to mur-
der their mother, who had become pregnant out of wedlock. The 
Egyptian god Seth killed his older brother, Osiris, to become king 
of Egypt and then had to fight his nephew, Horns, to retain power. 
Deities raped, seduced, and cheated. Osiris sired the god Anubis by 
the wife of his brother, Seth, and Seth in revenge raped his young 
nephew, Horns.14 The monotheistic religions were practically prim 
in comparison, issuing universalist law codes and punishing a wide 
variety of behaviors— drinking and gambling in Islam, for example.
Whether mono- or polytheistic, divine precepts were often ethi-
cally indifferent, even immoral. Gods were spiteful, vengeful, petty, 
peevish, and cruel. They were often envious of humans— when 
mortals were too happy, for example.15 What they commanded was 
not always ethical, and far from all sins were immoral.16 Why gods 
were not more moral has long been a puzzle. The concept of an “act 
of God,” describing the unpredictable, overpowering forces insur-
ance companies refuse to reimburse for, hints at the dilemma. Job 
tries our understanding as he endures God’s injustice. Accustomed 
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to mercurial divinities, even the Greeks were often stumped by how 
unjust the gods could be. In the Theognidean sylloge, Zeus is asked 
the question we pose of Job: Faced with a just person suffering 
undeservedly, can we still worship the immortals?17
It may be sinful not to pray or worship, but it is hardly immoral. 
Nor was Jonah being immoral when he disobeyed God by tak-
ing a ship in the opposite direction instead of going to Nineveh 
to preach.18 Dietary injunctions and other rituals were morally 
indifferent. Whether we believe in the unity or the trinity of the 
godhead may be theologically significant, but not ethically. Some 
taboos still in force today are likely rooted in a deep premoral past: 
laws against suicide, incest, bestiality, necrophilia, and parricide, 
against improper burial or disposal of corpses, and perhaps against 
cannibalism. Nor should we read much morality into the first three 
or four of the Commandments: that only the God who issued them 
may be worshipped, that he must not be figuratively represented, 
that his name must not be invoked except to worship him, and that 
he must be worshipped on a particular weekday.19 These orders were 
the trade- unionist aspects of divinity, with religious but no ethical 
import. Adultery and coveting others’ possessions we today regard 
as mere moral transgressions. In contrast, not stealing, killing, or 
bearing false witness remain core legal and moral prohibitions.
Religion at times contradicted morality outright. The elect saw 
their behavior as inherently virtuous, regardless of how immoral. 
Subjects who claim direct access to the divine are the state’s worst 
nightmare: unruly, supremely self- assured antinomian anarchists, 
irrepressible in their mischief. In the twelfth and thirteenth centu-
ries, the Free Spirits of northern France and the Rhine Valley were 
convinced that, thanks to their immediate relation to a pantheistic god, 
they had no need of the church and its sacraments. Sinless and thus 
unbound by conventional morality, they allegedly indulged in spectac-
ular feats of sexual promiscuity, even incest. Intercourse with the illu-
minated, they cunningly claimed, restored a woman’s virginity.20 The 
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Ranters of seventeenth- century England believed they were incapa-
ble of sin and so welcome to indulge in fornication, incest, adultery, 
orgies, cursing, whoring, drunkenness, and blasphemy.21 The Jewish 
messianic rabbi Sabbatai Zevi made similar claims to direct connec-
tion with the divine. Claiming to be the messiah, he married a former 
prostitute and radically reformed rituals. In 1666, he ordered follow-
ers to celebrate his birthday rather than fast on the Ninth of Ab, com-
memorating the Temple’s destruction. Sexual extravagances were also 
reported among later Sabbatian heretics.22
But as religious and secular administration grew separate, so did 
law and religion and later morality as well. Morality increasingly 
crystallized out the ethical components of religion, leaving behind 
the sectarian and ritualistic aspects. Eventually it too was statutorily 
enforced. Compared to what would have been the Jews’ theocratic 
commandment of religious injunctions if they had had a state, the 
Romans scarcely enforced religious matters. They did forbid violat-
ing the chastity of the Vestal Virgins, who stood in constant con-
tact with the gods if they remained pure.23 But it was still long before 
religion and morality were clearly distinguished. The scholastics of 
the twelfth and thirteenth centuries recognized natural law, but not 
morality, as something separate from religion.24 In the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries, natural law, in all its variations, supplemented 
or replaced the divine as the ultimate authority. By the Enlighten-
ment and especially with Kant, a secular morality had developed 
with little connection to organized religion, indeed often opposed 
to it. Voltaire’s philosopher Zadig claimed that all religions aimed at 
a lowest common denominator of ethics. At the same time, sin also 
came to approximate immorality as religious teachings became more 
generally ethical and less concerned with theological doctrines.
For Hobbes in 1651, crime was still a subspecies of sin, “consist-
ing in the Committing (by Deed, or Word) of that which the law 
forbiddeth, or the Omission of what it hath commanded.” Every 
crime was a sin, but not every sin a crime.25 In the early seventeenth 
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century, Hugo Grotius, too, hardly distinguished between law and 
morality. Sin and crime remained conflated. Laws in the eighteenth 
century still prohibited what were regarded as sins or moral failings: 
committing adultery, having sex outside of wedlock, working on 
the Sabbath or not working at all, begging, bear baiting, and cock 
fighting.26 But in 1689 Locke separated the two. The magistrate’s 
mandate was the public good. Being covetous, uncharitable, or idle: 
though possibly sins, these were not crimes. No harm ensued, nor 
was society’s peace disturbed.27 Law’s concern was only with actions 
that hurt others. The Enlightenment philosophes, such as Beccaria, 
distinguished between secular punishment in this world and divine 
justice in the afterlife.28 The French Constituent Assembly’s Law of 
8– 9 October 1789 declared that the law should prohibit only actions 
harmful to society.29 The Bavarian penal code of 1813 distinguished 
rigorously between law and morality. Law should not deal with acts 
that violated people’s moral obligations to themselves. Masturba-
tion, sodomy, bestiality, and fornication were immoral, but laws 
punished such sins only if they violated others’ rights.30 Adultery 
was treated as a breach of contract and dealt with in the code’s arti-
cle following that on attorneys who failed to pursue their clients’ 
interests. It was punished with a maximum of three months’ jail.31 
In France half a century after Locke, however, Montesquieu still 
counted offenses against religion and morality as two out of four 
forms that crime took, alongside actions against public tranquility 
and individual security.32
Enforcing religion long remained the law’s task. The church 
developed its own courts whose remit included blasphemy and her-
esy. By 1500, such courts were found throughout Western Christen-
dom.33 Technically a royal institution, the Inquisition pursued the 
church’s enemies until 1834.34 Secular authorities eventually entered 
the field, too. Early in the thirteenth century, several European 
states instituted death against heresy, which they treated as a secular 
crime.35 In seventeenth- century England, blasphemy was a common 
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law offense and in 1697 also began violating statute. Christians who 
denied the Trinity, claimed there was more than one God, or rejected 
the Bible as divine authority could not hold office and suffered other 
legal disabilities and jail if they repeated any of these offenses.36 Yet 
the state cared for public order more than for theological purity. 
Cromwell’s mid- seventeenth- century Puritan republic faced even 
more extreme nonconformists. Reformers themselves, the Puritans 
could have enforced orthodoxy only hypocritically. But dissenters 
such as the Ranters, who believed that God was everywhere and that 
no authority deserved obedience, gnawed at society’s moorings.
In 1650, the House of Commons took aim at Ranters with an act 
punishing those who believed that, thanks to their immediate rela-
tionship to God, moral distinctions no longer applied to them, sal-
vation and damnation were irrelevant, and they were incapable of 
sin. A month later, another act ended all requirements of uniform 
religious belief and practice. A variety of Christian practices was 
now tolerated, but extreme dissenters were still beyond the pale— 
Ranters and Socinians (who rejected Christ’s divinity and original 
sin). In effect, forms of Christianity that were both religious and 
moral were accepted, but those sects that refused to toe the line of 
morality and social order were not. This distinction held even after 
the monarchy was restored in 1660. Christians sects that did not 
threaten the social order were tolerated. Only those who refused 
to swear oaths (Quakers) or considered themselves the sinless elect 
were not. They were punished not for theological deviations but 
for threatening stability. When John Taylor was convicted of blas-
phemy in 1676 for calling Christ a bastard, a cheat, and an impos-
ter, he was put in the pillory with a sign saying “for blasphemous 
words, tending to the subversion of all government.”37 Blasphemy 
was now punishable in common law because Christianity was part 
of the social order. But it became enforced by law less as a religious 
doctrine than as a set of behavioral precepts— more morality than 
theology.
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Morality and religion were conflated. Resting on both, the social 
order would be undermined if either were violated. In 1675, Chief 
Justice Hale warned that to deny religion was “to dissolve all those 
obligations whereby civil society is preserved.” A century later, in 
1797, Justice William Henry Ashurst said of blasphemy that it was not 
just an offense against God but against “all law and government from 
its tendency to dissolve all the bonds and obligations of civil soci-
ety.” Another century on, in 1908, Justice Walter Phillimore allowed 
that humans were free to think, speak, and teach as they pleased in 
religious terms but not in moral ones.38 Purely theological issues had 
now been left to God, but beliefs with this- worldly consequences— 
morality— remained the law’s concern. That is broadly where the 
issue has remained ever since. Some still think that morality cannot 
be taught without religion.39 But in the main, doctrinal matters have 
been shifted to the private sphere, out of the state’s purview. Out-
side the world’s remaining theocracies, religious practices concern 
the law only if nonreligious norms have also been violated: bigamy 
among Mormons, animal cruelty in Santería sacrifices, child neglect 
by Christian Scientists shunning medicine, truancy among home- 
schooling Seventh- Day Adventists, infibulation of Muslim women.
Blasphemy, however, has remained on the books in many coun-
tries. Thirty- two nations (eight in Europe) still retain antiblasphemy 
laws. Another twenty punish apostasy.40 France abolished blasphemy 
in 1791, and the US never instituted it as a federal crime.41 Yet it 
remained in place as a state- level offense. Even colonial Pennsyl-
vania, otherwise religiously ecumenical, outlawed blasphemy. Mas-
sachusetts prosecuted it as a capital crime until 1692.42 By 1951, 
federal law and First Amendment rights together made prosecutions 
for blasphemy unconstitutional. And yet as of 2009 it remained law 
in Massachusetts, Michigan, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Caro-
lina, and Wyoming. On this basis, in 2007 Pennsylvania rejected a 
bid to name a company “I Choose Hell Productions.”43 Until 2008, 
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blasphemy remained a crime in Britain, but only against Christian-
ity. This helped the authorities in 1989 when they were pressured to 
join the fatwa issued by Iran’s Ayatollah Khomeini against Salman 
Rushdie for his treatment of Muhammad in his novel The Satanic 
Verses.44
Blasphemy obviously remained a religious issue in theocracies. 
But to secular societies, blasphemy marked the boundary between 
free speech and civility, a matter of order and propriety, not theo-
logical doctrine.45 Modern blasphemy laws no longer protect specific 
doctrines but prohibit the insulting of religious feelings or the incit-
ing of hatred against religious groups.46 They have become a form 
of collective libel legislation, protecting minority communities from 
attack.47 In 1922, an Australian judge found that while respectful 
denial of God’s existence was not blasphemous, scurrilous and offen-
sive attacks intended to outrage Christians were. In 1978, a British 
court convicted of blasphemy the publisher of James Kirkup’s poem 
about homosexual sex between Christ and a centurion.48
Muslims, whose religion— like some variants of Protestantism— 
forbids depictions of God as idolatrous, have especially policed blas-
phemy. Cartoons depicting Muhammad in Jyllands Posten in 2005 
cast the complacently tolerant Danes as the new Satans of interna-
tional politics.49 With the slaughter in 2015 of twelve journalists 
by Islamist gunmen at the offices of the Parisian satirical magazine 
Charlie Hebdo, free- speech fundamentalism found itself unexpect-
edly on the defensive against a more cautious consideration of reli-
gious sensibilities. Muslims in Europe— however quick to anger and 
kill— were also downtrodden minorities. Did that give them claim 
to deference for their cultural singularities? Mormons endured a 
whirlwind of blasphemy in the wildly popular musical the Book 
of Mormon in 2011.50 Their official response was commendably 
restrained. “You’ve seen the play,” the billboards proclaimed, “now 
read the book.”
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From Theology to Morality
Yet even as religion was reduced to a public- order issue, ethics were 
still enforced by law. Individual habits with no immediate social 
consequences were privatized as citizens’ choices: gluttony, sloth, 
cupidity, and most sexual behavior other than rape and pedophilia. 
But new immoralities came to be restricted by law, as we will see. 
Morality was informal social sanction that broadly reinforced what 
statute also dictated. Did the law need morality as a backup? Or 
were formalized, democratically decided rules alone legitimate, 
with morality therefore archaic and redundant?
The Enlightenment’s debates over atheism posed such issues first. 
Could society function without a commonly accepted sense of sin? 
Could atheists be moral? Even the philosophes found it hard to 
shake off the basic assumptions of a fundamentally religious era.51 
Hobbes endowed the Leviathan with a strong state church— not 
for religion’s intrinsic value but to secure order. Though religiously 
tolerant, Locke banished atheists because— considering that they 
accepted no higher power— their oaths and promises meant noth-
ing.52 If people did not believe in a punitive God, Voltaire feared, 
society would crumble. That was the gist of his often misunder-
stood assertion that bereft of God, we would have to invent him.53 
Though a generation younger, Pierre Bayle had already cast off reli-
gion’s social role. Morality was not necessarily based on religion. 
An atheistic society would function civilly and morally so long as 
it punished crimes and honored laudable acts. We have no right, 
he insisted, to assume that an atheist is less moral than a believer.54
That the irreligious could also be moral was discovered only 
slowly. In the developing world, vast majorities still refuse to accept 
that one can be both moral and yet not a believer.55 Even today, we 
continue to insist on religiously observant leaders. Outside China, 
few public figures dare to openly acknowledge their atheism.56 Simi-
lar issues were raised when James Fitzjames Stephen and John Stuart 
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Mill crossed pens in the nineteenth century. Punishments voiced 
society’s moral revulsion, Stephen thought, whereas Mill allowed 
sanction only if citizens directly harmed each other.57 These issues 
arose again in the 1960s in debates fought as Britain reviewed the 
criminalization of (male) homosexuality. Did society need the glue 
of a common moral codex to undergird formal statute and avoid 
ethical anomie? Patrick Devlin famously argued that it mattered less 
what moral values society held so long as they were widely shared 
and enforced.58 Both sides back then broadly assumed that gay sex 
was immoral; at issue was whether it should also be illegal.
Should the law enforce morality? Did purely individual transgres-
sions even exist— ones with no consequence for others? Conserva-
tives insisted that individual acts— divorce, sexual unorthodoxy, 
blasphemy— weakened society’s bonds.59 But what level of harm 
should be punished? Most expansively, not just tangible harm but 
offense, too, was actionable. Acts that merely offended others, even 
without damaging them, could be condemned. That risked leav-
ing the penal code responsive to society’s most delicate souls. They 
might feel impaired just by the possibility that somewhere some-
one was doing something disturbing.60 Without a semiobjective cri-
terion of harm, the definition of offense would endlessly expand. 
In 1957, the Wolfenden Committee (Parliamentary Committee on 
Homosexual Offences and Prostitution) in Britain solved the prob-
lem by deft distinction. It simultaneously demarcated a private 
sphere where actions— in this case male homosexuality— were per-
mitted even if offensive to some but advocated more stringent pen-
alties for street prostitution, regarded as a public harm.61
Nevertheless, society still rested on moral and behavioral 
norms. The law dealt originally with crime, sin, and immorality, 
all together. As the three were gradually separated out, it focused 
on violations of statute, not of theology or morality. Depending 
on how “to bear false witness” is defined, twentieth- century Brit-
ish law embodies either three and a half or four and a half of the 
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Bible’s Ten Commandments.62 Today, the law is much larger than 
morality, prohibiting many more actions. Yet it has also narrowed. 
Large swaths of once illegal conduct are now solely a matter for 
ethicists or theologians. Purely theological transgressions are rarely 
legal issues any longer. Many acts once considered immoral are 
now often legal: adultery, homosexuality, prostitution, abortion, 
suicide, euthanasia. And not all immorality is illegal: lying, cheat-
ing on your spouse, bullying, standing by while someone drowns. 
Conversely, most crimes are not immoral: jaywalking, driving with 
a broken tail light, failing to withhold employee Social Security 
deductions. The distinction between illegality and immorality has 
become a commonplace.63
As philosophers explored the various moral codes in effect across 
the globe, their relativity caused lawyers to fear hitching statute too 
closely to ethics. Montesquieu emphasized the multiplicity of legal 
and political systems. Locke and Kant sought to separate law from 
morality, John Austin and Bentham (who considered the idea of 
natural rights “nonsense on stilts”) to free their utilitarian codex 
from it entirely. The French Revolution, invoking what the revolu-
tionaries insisted were natural laws, scared many, prompting con-
servatives such as Edmund Burke and Friedrich Karl von Savigny 
to draw sharp distinctions between law and morals.64 Starting in 
the late nineteenth century, legal realists, for whom the law was 
only what the authorities decided, unlinked to anything transcen-
dent, made the separation watertight.65 The law sought to wall itself 
off from religion and morality and to remain untainted by what it 
regarded as outmoded behavioral prescriptions. The Austrian legal 
philosopher Hans Kelsen insisted in the early twentieth century 
that morality was culture specific, without a common core. The law 
could not be founded on such relativistic quicksand.66
Nonetheless, despite the most astringent legal theorists’ distaste, 
the legal and the moral still overlapped. True, the law expanded to 
include more actions only tangentially related to religion or ethics, 
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but its core remained the fundamental tenets of morality.67 Do not 
kill, lie, assault, cheat, or steal. Blurring the line between law and 
morality became a problem mainly when statute enforced those 
aspects of morality that did not involve protecting others from 
direct harm. Should the law require us to perform acts that benefit 
others? To avoid acts that cause indirect harm to others or harm to 
ourselves? To shun acts that offend others or that are regarded by 
them as immoral?68 These were gray areas where law and morality 
overlapped, where cultures differed in which ethical precepts they 
enforced legally, and where changing social mores, striving to be 
recognized in legal reform, first had an effect.
Morality has obviously varied— sometimes dramatically— among 
and within cultures. Such differences have tended to concern sex 
and women: homosexuality, pedophilia, adultery, bigamy, divorce, 
contraception, abortion. The law often limped along, barely keeping 
abreast of evolving mores.69 In the US outmoded detritus still litters 
state penal codes, technically outlawing a wide range of behaviors: 
adultery, fornication, sodomy, and (in some state or municipal code 
somewhere) just about any form of sexual behavior short of the 
missionary position within marriage and solitary masturbation. In 
1948, Boston police arrested 248 adulterers. Massachusetts success-
fully prosecuted an adultery case in 1983, and as of 2012 the offense 
remained on the state’s books as a felony.70 Nevertheless, a common 
core arguably united most behaviors considered morally signifi-
cant: promise keeping, truth telling, protecting innocents from vio-
lent attack.71 That punishments should be proportionate to offenses 
approximates a human constant.72 The endless debates over natural 
law at least served to distill plausibly quasi- universal rules. And law 
helped reinforce morality when it was used expressively to under-
gird society’s ethical precepts.73
Even today the law is based more on morality than is often rec-
ognized. Hospitality law, how to treat aliens, what the Germans call 
Gastrecht, has evolved from a moral obligation to a legal duty in 
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international law.74 The obviously unethical is usually illegal as well, 
but morality also informs everyday economic transactions. The law 
of contract depends on the concept of good faith. The US Uniform 
Commercial Code defines good faith as “honesty in fact in the con-
duct or transaction concerned.”75 All commercial systems rest on 
the (moral) assumption that those engaged in exchange can rely 
on each other’s promises. Such promises may be reinforced in law. 
The blossoming of contract law in the nineteenth century put some 
steel in the velvet glove of promises made in the free market by its 
interacting parties.76 But without good faith, systems of exchange 
would collapse.77 More generally, good faith transactions— keeping 
promises, performing what was agreed upon, and the like— were 
behaviors enforced at first by custom and religion in self- governing 
communities. When the law began regulating these actions, they 
long kept religious forms. The standards of due care in the law of 
negligence, of fair competition, and of fair conduct of a fiduciary: 
all involved a concept of fairness and reasonableness that— though 
applied by courts— ultimately rested on moral intuitions.78 In the 
continental civil codes, contracts were explicitly premised on 
morality. Those that were immoral could be declared invalid.79
Relations of law to morality had long been given voice in two 
sets of distinctions. Where both morality and law forbade the same 
actions, they targeted inherent evil, malum in se. Where the law 
alone prohibited conduct that might not be immoral, it created 
the malum prohibitum.80 Mala in se were fundamentally unethical 
actions, directed against life, health and bodily security, personal 
liberty and dignity, property rights, as well as the constitutional 
order and safety of the state. Sins they were not, but the term moral 
turpitude was often used to describe them.81 Mala prohibita were 
forbidden acts or regulatory or civil offenses. Plato distinguished 
between curable and incurable offenses, Aristotle between natu-
ral political justice (having the same force everywhere) and legal 
political justice (important only once laid down in the law).82 The 
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distinction had become formalized by the late fifteenth century 
and then rendered orthodoxy by Blackstone in the 1760s.83 Despite 
being ridiculed by Bentham, the distinction remains in good stand-
ing, cited by the US Supreme Court as recently as the 1950s.84
Related, though not identical, was the distinction between torts 
and crimes, emerging after the thirteenth century in common law. 
Before this point, crimes could be pursued both by private parties 
and by the king, and the law could impose either compensation or 
corporeal punishments.85 Torts were harms that could be assuaged 
through compensation alone. Before the state assumed responsibil-
ity for justice, most transgressions had been treated as torts— even 
ones, such as homicide, that later became crimes. They were settled 
between the disputant parties through an exchange of value. Torts 
were actions society preferred to regulate, whereas crimes were for-
bidden outright. One priced acts; the other prohibited them. Torts 
were not worth the bother of criminal sanctions. Or, because certain 
offenses might enrich the offender more than they harmed soci-
ety, they were more efficiently dealt with by recouping their social 
cost through fines. Crimes, in contrast, were acts whose cost society 
was unwilling to monetize and collect, therefore to be forbidden 
altogether. Punishing crime aimed not to reimburse victims but to 
deter others. Sanctions inflicted real suffering. Crimes were actions 
society sought to eliminate wholly (rape and murder), whereas torts 
might have some social utility (the economic efficiencies of turning 
a blind eye to polluting or workplace accidents) and should be dis-
couraged and reduced but not wholly forbidden. It sufficed if their 
cost was internalized, borne by the offender.86
The boundary between morality and law has constantly shifted 
across history. Many behaviors have boiled off the core of immo-
rality to become legal: sex between racial groups, drinking, adul-
tery, homosexuality, to some extent abortion and prostitution, to 
some extent the use of inebriants other than alcohol. Incest may 
be moving toward a crossing of the ethical Rubicon.87 Polygamy is 
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ambiguous. Monogamy has historically been the exception. China 
and India, together composing well more than a third of human-
ity, did not forbid polygamy until the mid- 1950s.88 Outlawed in the 
West, it remains present throughout the Muslim world, in parts of non- 
Muslim Africa, surreptitiously among Mormons, as well as in more 
recent demands by urban hipsters for civil unions of threesomes.89 
Bestiality has been decriminalized in some nations (although animal 
rights may end up trumping claims to human erotic self- expression). 
Euthanasia, once considered murder, is legal in several jurisdictions. 
Attempted suicide is less commonly punished than earlier and has 
been decriminalized in some sixty nations, mostly Western.90
Tax avoidance may be morally suspect, but tax evasion is illegal, 
too. Working on the Sabbath was once irreligious, immoral, and 
illegal, but, overall, Sabbatarian regulation has declined.91 Yet sur-
prising numbers of laws still shape economic activity according to 
religious fiat. In allegedly secular Sweden, taxis charge even more 
on Lutheran high holy days than on weekends or nights.92 Signs on 
playgrounds in the Calvinist parts of the Outer Hebrides discour-
age children from using them on Sundays.93 Blue laws still regulate 
liquor sales on Sundays in the US. A popular movement in Cath-
olic Bavaria seeks to reverse their few exceptions to Sunday clos-
ing laws. Communism sought to upend inherited moral instincts 
about property (or theft, according to the anarchist Pierre- Joseph 
Proudhon). The Soviet Union punished theft of state property more 
harshly than theft of private possessions, often with death and with 
no chance of amnesty, but the penal codes of most Communist 
states still prohibited conventional larceny.94
The law does not just reflect social value judgments; it helps 
shape them. Durkheim wrote that the collective consciousness is 
not offended by an act because it is criminal, but that it is criminal 
because society abhors it.95 This oft- quoted bon mot did not, how-
ever, spare him the paradox he thought he was sidestepping. Yes, 
as he rightly pointed out, the quality of the criminality that society 
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shuns is hard to define, but cleverly turning the tables does nothing 
to solve the causal problem. Why does the collective consciousness 
decide that something is abhorrent and therefore criminal? And, 
having done so for its own inscrutable reasons, how can things ever 
change? In fact, seen historically, not only has the law changed 
continuously, but changes in statute have also driven views of what 
offends. The law has taught us right and wrong, not just mirrored 
our views thereof.
The realm of the illegal and immoral has not just shrunken but 
also expanded. Many once legally indifferent behaviors are now out-
lawed. Two centuries ago, a man who refused a duel would become 
a social outcast. Today, one who accepts the challenge risks a charge 
of attempted homicide.96 Honor killings— once an imperative— are 
no longer permitted or acceptable. Conventional industrial waste 
disposal— that is, polluting— has become broadly illegal. Tobacco 
use is increasingly forbidden, almost like other drugs, even as other 
inebriants have become tolerated. Primogeniture once kept the 
family intact and men on top. Today, anyone who insists on leav-
ing all assets to an eldest son would be regarded as peculiar and in 
most developed nations denied his or her wish.97 Theft of intellec-
tual property became a crime starting in the late eighteenth century 
and expanded massively through the twentieth, though in the digi-
tal age it has become something of a misdemeanor and even mor-
ally valorized as justified use.98
White- collar crime, once treated more leniently than physical 
offenses, is taken more seriously.99 Whereas being tough on crime is 
often a conservative cause, economic offenses have riled the Left— 
just as the women’s and environmental movements brought their 
own rosters of new offenses to be prosecuted. In the 1960s, corpo-
rate executives from major American businesses, conspiring to fix 
prices, went to jail for the first time. In the 1970s, the US began 
prosecuting bribes paid to foreign authorities— once regarded as a 
cost of doing business. Insider trading has been criminalized, even 
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though it was earlier considered a normal— if a bit sharp— business 
practice or at worst a violation of tort or regulatory law.100 In 1934, 
insider traders could be required to disgorge only illicitly procured 
funds. By the 1960s, they could be fined as well; as of the 1980s, 
they were slapped with treble damage sanctions and jail. Prison 
sentences have become a regular occurrence in the US business 
world.101 Wall Street executives, pillars of their Connecticut com-
munities, are perp- walked for the news cameras as they are taken to 
be booked. And as sentencing reform diminished judicial discretion 
and pegged punishments to the dollar value of the harm, prison 
stays for crimes such as securities fraud have lengthened to rival 
those for murder.102
Many now illegal acts have also become immoral: slavery, wife 
beating, marital rape, child labor, child marriage, child abuse, cru-
elty to animals. Pedophilia, considered normal (within limits) in 
ancient Greece, is today regarded as the single most immoral and 
illegal act, potently stigmatized. Once prized as manly  behavior, 
hunting endangered megafauna has become both illegal and 
immoral.103 Now illegal and on the cusp of also being immoral are 
actions such as insider trading, price fixing, bribing, and antitrust 
violations. Driving drunk is illegal and increasingly regarded also as 
immoral. Some jurisdictions have harnessed popular sentiment to 
state enforcement by prosecuting hosts who allow guests to depart 
inebriated. Endangering consumers by knowingly selling deficient 
products is considered immoral. The days of caveat emptor (buyer 
beware), when consumers bore most risk in a purchase, are long 
gone. Sexual harassment is criminal and has recently also become 
regarded as immoral, not just a lark that women ought to tolerate. 
Abortion remains morally fraught but also illegal in many places 
and circumstances. Polluting is not just illegal but has become 
immoral, too. In surveys, it often ranks as more serious than tra-
ditional offenses, even murder.104 This new view is arguably col-
ored by older theological concepts of pollution as a transcendent 
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violation. Ancient ideas of despoiling the sacred order were broader 
in their understanding of taint than modern biological and chemi-
cal concepts, though today deep ecologists come close to this older 
view.105
Law has sometimes directly enforced moral obligations. Certain 
duties became required of citizens: providing testimony in court, 
paying taxes, serving on juries and in the military. Perjury became a 
crime in England in the mid- sixteenth century. The act did not just 
undermine the court system but was also morally tainted since it 
violated an oath.106 The medieval English law of hue and cry obliged 
all within earshot to join in pursuing a felon.107 Hit- and- run laws 
today impose a duty not to leave an accident. Owners have obliga-
tions to those they invite onto their property. But, otherwise, there 
has been little legal requirement to help those in need.108 Drawing 
up the Indian penal code in the 1830s, Thomas Babington Macau-
ley argued that the law could not specify what bystanders had to 
endure to help strangers. Should they be required to go one hun-
dred yards to caution someone against fording a swollen river, or a 
mile? The law should only keep people from doing harm, Macauley 
concluded, leaving morality and religion to encourage the good.109
But Good Samaritan paragraphs in civil law codes have demanded 
more.110 The moral obligation to provide aid where there is no risk 
to the bystander is a legal duty in several European nations.111 Israeli 
law requires aid in traffic accidents.112 Already the German penal 
code of 1870 required citizens to help the police on request, and 
the Nazi regime broadened this obligation into a citizen’s duty to 
aid others. In 1954, the German Great Criminal Senate declared the 
duty a moral obligation and “an imperative command of Christian 
doctrine.”113 The equivalent French legislation was initiated in 1941 
by the collaborationist Vichy regime to encourage Frenchmen to 
aid German occupiers wounded by resistance fighters.114 Since then, 
such statutes have been regularly invoked in Europe. The estate 
of David Sharp, who perished on Mount Everest in 2006 as forty 
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other climbers passed him by, could have sued in France but not 
in Britain.115 The English- speaking world became aware of Europe’s 
Good Samaritan laws after Lady Diana’s death in Paris in 1997, 
when the French authorities considered prosecuting the paparazzi 
who chased her car and then stood by photographing her as she lay 
dying.116 The law of the sea has also long recognized a duty to help 
those in distress.117
Is moral evolution eventually reflected in the law? Or do changes 
in statute help shape ethics? Those remain open questions.118 Author-
ities have often struggled to punish what most people do not regard as 
immoral offenses. Early modern popular opinion commonly refused 
to consider smuggling, poaching, or gleaning (once it had been 
revoked as a right) as crimes. They were “social crimes,” more illegal 
than immoral.119 Smuggling was once widespread across Europe, and 
the state’s concern to prosecute it was too obviously self- serving in 
the early modern era, when tariffs were a major source of revenue.120 
It was thus more akin to tax evasion today than to the peccadillo we 
now— in an era of much freer trade— consider it. Nonetheless, as late 
as 1964, when Goldfinger became the third hit James Bond movie, 
its villain still transported gold across borders by smuggling it as the 
bodywork of his car.
Sometimes the law has been a teacher. Making something illegal 
has less reflected a moral shift than helped to create it. The authori-
ties’ vigorous suppression of dueling likely helped change opinion 
on something once held in favor. In the United States, tax evasion 
began to move into the realm of immorality when it was made a 
felony in 1924 and then in 1952 when its prosecution changed 
from merely a means for the state to recoup the income foregone 
to a tool of general deterrence.121 Other fairly technical offenses, 
such as insider trading, antitrust violations, and bribery, which 
were scarcely known to the public beforehand, became morally 
condemnable in the wake of outlawing them.122 Conversely, when 
law did not reflect popular morality, enforcement bogged down. 
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Juries nullified verdicts, refusing to convict those whose actions, 
although illegal, did not seem immoral. In so doing, they expressed 
society’s broader sentiments. The growing acceptance of euthana-
sia was revealed when it took the US authorities four attempts to 
convict Jack Kevorkian in 1997 for assisting the terminally ill to 
die.123 In the 1920s, prohibitionists thought they were bringing law 
and morality into alignment by forbidding the sale of alcohol, but, 
in fact, their moral intuitions turned out not to have been widely 
shared.
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Punishing was one thing, preventing another. If the state could 
head crime off at the pass, it would save itself enormous bother. But 
how to do that? Deterrence was the oldest of the state’s preventive 
tools. Although it remains in steady use, it is blunt, unwieldy, and 
unpredictable. More promising were the authorities’ hopes of fore-
casting the criminal character, thus anticipating who might offend, 
where, and when and acting to prevent this. But that raised its own 
issues. Despite hopes for more, it turned out that the authorities 
were almost entirely unable to get inside offenders’ heads to make 
useful predictions about crime— except based on their past behav-
ior, on the assumption that what had already happened would con-
tinue in the future.
Heretics and political dissidents were often rational, well- 
meaning, stubborn people at odds with the official ideology. The 
dissident mindset was indicated by a verbalized thought, an act, or 
a ritual. The authorities sought to punish and thus to change not 
any one act or idea but the person who could think and behave 
in a certain way. They aimed at the underlying personality and its 
core of belief. Over time, beliefs were increasingly relegated to the 
private sphere. Religious divergence mattered only if it disturbed 
public order. Political dissent was channeled into the appropriate 
machinery of controversy in systems growing evermore democratic. 
So long as it steered clear of sedition and treason, it was not a crime.
Chapter 11
From Retribution to Prevention
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That left certain offenders as the primary concern. The easiest to 
deal with were opportunists, weak- willed but not evil people who 
fell for temptation. Deterrence might hope to persuade them to 
stick to the straight and narrow. But habitual offenders, inherently 
likely to transgress, were tougher nuts. With ideological crimes, the 
state had aimed at belief systems that underpinned acts. With more 
conventional offenses, its focus remained on an underlying behav-
ioral stratum, the character of the criminal, the personality that 
prompted such offenders habitually to offend.
Only the state could prevent crime. Private parties seeking ven-
geance or compensation for particular offenses had no concern to 
anticipate others. True, the bodies of the dead were often displayed 
to publicize the resolution of feuds, to halt further vengeance, and 
possibly to discourage potential transgressors.1 But, by and large, 
kin groups had little concern to head off crimes more generally. 
Prevention was a public good that only the state could deliver.2 As 
with disease, prevention beat cure. For crimes feared as endangering 
the entire community, prevention was an urgent necessity. Char-
lemagne’s ninth- century capitulary defined adultery not simply 
as sin but also as a crime against the Christian community, to be 
punished so that “others may have fear of doing the same: so that 
uncleanness may be altogether removed from the Christian peo-
ple.”3 And for crimes that were inherently hard to discern, prosecute, 
and convict— such as simony and clerical concubinage— prevention 
was the best tack.4
“Have you ever been punished before?” the Danish comedian 
Storm P. is asked. “No, always afterward.” That was historically the 
nub of the matter. Preventing crimes, not just punishing them post 
facto, was complicated. Making an example of offenders by sanc-
tioning them severely and publicly might deter others. Hardening 
the environment to make it more resistant to crime (locks, lights, 
cameras) impeded all forms of offending, whatever their motives, 
but beyond such rudimentary tactics, preventive action by the 
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state meant identifying potential offenders and stopping them in 
their tracks. The authorities had to penetrate more deeply into sub-
jects’ lives and thoughts, anticipating wrongdoing, and interven-
ing before it was realized. Law enforcement had begun as a private 
matter, the authorities only gradually assuming the task. With the 
ambition to prevent crime, an interventionist state actively plunged 
into civil society, aiming to manage it.
The preventive enterprise focused on communal harms, seeking 
to provide a public good. It therefore raised once again the classic 
utilitarian dilemma: Are individuals mere ends to a larger goal? A 
man should be hanged, as the dictum had it, not because he had 
stolen a horse but that horses might not be stolen.5 Even as rudi-
mentary a preventive strategy as deterrence was not necessarily just. 
It often made a harsh example of offenders who happened to be 
unlucky. “Altho’ one suffereth, numbers are protected and relieved,” 
an eighteenth- century Philadelphia judge explained the logic; “the 
punishment of a few is the preservation of multitudes.” In the eigh-
teenth century, capital punishment was intended less to sanction the 
immediate culprits than to warn off others. The proper end of pun-
ishment, William Paley wrote in 1785, is “not the satisfaction of 
justice, but the prevention of crimes.” Asked how to treat the Gor-
don rioters in 1780, Edmund Burke recommended hanging only six 
of them, but with maximum publicity.6
Initially, when the state had little power or capacity, deterrence 
was its best preventive tool. The few offenders it got its hands on 
were publicly and savagely punished to warn others. In China, 
the Legalist school elevated this logic to a maxim: strict and brutal 
laws might sound abhorrent, but precisely their stringency meant 
that once having had their initial deterrent effect, they would not 
require enforcement any longer.7 Life for most people was nasty 
and brutish; punishments had to be worse. The scaffold deliv-
ered a theater of horror, and prisons were made even more ghastly 
than offenders’ everyday lives. Civil society still only imperfectly 
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socialized subjects to moderate their impulses, curb their appetites, 
and discipline their most unruly instincts. Life was horrid; the state 
had to be even more so. To deter, punishments also had to be public 
to broadcast the message. Savagery in the town square caught every-
one’s attention. Medieval Germanic law punished crime after the 
fact, imposing compensation. This deterred only indirectly insofar 
as potential offenders preferred avoiding having to restitute. Roman 
law, however, had used exemplary public punishments deterrently, 
and this practice was revived in the Middle Ages. In his capitulary, 
Charlemagne aimed for deterrence in punishing murder and adul-
tery with death.8 Medieval canonists advised hanging bandits in the 
neighborhoods they had haunted to dissuade their peers. Hostiensis, 
the thirteenth- century bishop of Ostia, noted that “the infliction of 
punishment creates terror and deters others from sinning.”9
For lesser crimes, shame helped prevent, too. In 1001 Nights, 
being paraded disparagingly (sitting backward on a donkey, for 
example) was the commonest sanction. During the Western Middle 
Ages, offenders were publicly humiliated by marks that proclaimed 
their offense: branding on the thumb or cheek for those spared the 
gallows via benefit of clergy, red tongues sewed on false witnesses’ 
clothing, yellow crosses for Cathars. Those condemned to penitence 
attended church carrying rods, which the priest used to beat them 
in front of the congregation.10 In seventeenth- century Scotland, 
fornicators were seated on tall repentance stools. After such offenses 
were decapitalized in late seventeenth- century Massachusetts, adul-
terers and the incestuous were mock executed, forced to stand in 
the gallows for an hour, then branded with the letter of their crime. 
Women who had consorted with the Nazis had their heads shaved 
in postwar Europe.11 In our own era, public sex- offender registries 
are officially intended to allow neighbors to protect themselves, but 
shaming perpetrators is a motive for their existence, too.12 Chinese 
sentencing rallies, sometimes attended by huge crowds, inflict mass 
humiliation.13
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Yet shame worked only insofar as the targeted actually suffered 
the emotion. Only offenders who were tied into social networks 
whose values they shared and whose censure they felt acutely were 
likely to be affected. In effect, shame punishments presupposed 
what they hoped to achieve. Those who felt shame were already 
motivated to behave. The brazen— or anomic— were less likely to be 
pained by publicity. The shame of receiving public alms, for exam-
ple, did not necessarily spur the poor to industriousness. In 1697, 
England made poor- law pensioners wear badges. When this failed 
to discourage all but the neediest, paupers had to enter unpleas-
ant and demeaning workhouses.14 Harshness was required, the Poor 
Law Commission agreed in 1834, because the effect of shame was 
“quickly obliterated by habit.”15 Punishment and shame in effect 
worked at cross- purposes. As Durkheim pointed out, being sanc-
tioned desensitized recipients and weakened their moral backbone, 
making them more likely to reoffend.16 Relying too much on prison 
thus undercut hopes of having a reformative effect, leaving its func-
tion as primarily to incapacitate. That, in turn, opened the question 
of what to do when sentences expired and inmates rejoined society.
Death was the most useful deterrent— for others. Other harsh 
punishments could also prevent. John Stuart Mill favored the death 
penalty precisely because it delivered the same deterrence as life 
imprisonment but less cruelly.17 Enlightenment philosophes who 
opposed capital punishment proposed a lifetime of hard labor as an 
alternative. In 1907, French prime minister Aristide Briand consid-
ered lifelong solitary confinement equally deterrent.18 The Tuscan 
penal code of 1786 replaced death with ergastolo, a life of solitary 
confinement in chains, which many considered worse.19 But these 
expensive solutions were beyond the administrative ken of early 
modern states. Public shows of force were among states’ few means 
of rattling cages. “Killing a chicken to scare the monkey,” was the 
Chinese slogan.20 Death was made agonizingly spectacular to trum-
pet the message that crime did not pay.
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Imperial Rome asserted the state’s might through grotesque 
public death. Offenders were condemned to gladiatorial combat or 
thrown to the beasts in public games. They were burned alive or cru-
cified to prolong the agony.21 For offenders, death was often the least 
of their woes, a welcome relief from horrific tortures: burning alive 
as in Rome or boiling alive as in eleventh- century Spain or being 
sliced to bits as in China.22 If lucky, the condemned were dispatched 
early in the process. Breaking on the wheel could proceed from the 
head down if the authorities wanted to be merciful, but it could also 
go from the feet up to prolong the agony. Arsonists in early modern 
France were rewarded for naming accomplices by being strangled 
before burning, as were women torched in eighteenth- century Eng-
land. Even then, such mercies were performed surreptitiously so as 
not to dilute the deterrent effect of the public spectacle. In 1749, 
Frederick the Great of Prussia instructed executioners to strangle 
criminals secretly before breaking them on the wheel, thus preserv-
ing the deterrent effect while minimizing pain.23
Punishments became increasingly public and spectacular. The 
pillory was an early public sanction. Criminals were exposed while 
the crowd hurled insults and worse. In England, Ann Marrow lost 
both eyes when pilloried in 1777 for having impersonated a man 
in marriage to three different women.24 Recidivists were punished 
ever worse— an ear sliced off in the first instance, a foot in the sec-
ond, hanging for a third offense. Public whippings were added. 
The wheel was mentioned first in France in 1385.25 Following the 
Roman example, the absolutist monarchies of the eighteenth cen-
tury again staged spectacular deaths to demonstrate their might and 
glory. Gruesome public punishments reached their apogee perhaps 
in 1757 when the would- be regicide Robert Damiens was broken, 
eviscerated, and drawn and quartered in Paris— the scene immortal-
ized for a modern audience by Foucault’s prurient pen portrait.26
In the course of execution, such unfortunates were of course 
killed many times over, and death was often specifically added to 
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death. For good measure, Peter the Great had the corpses of viricides 
(women who killed their husbands) hanged after their execution. In 
many European nations, executions were made even more painful by 
breaking offenders on the wheel first.27 Criminals’ corpses were often 
also desecrated. Plato argued for parricides to be stoned after execu-
tion.28 In 1751, the English decided not only to execute murderers 
but also to dissect them afterward.29 Not until 1949 did Scotland for-
mally abolish drawing and quartering traitors posthumously.30 Into 
the nineteenth century, executed bodies were publicly displayed for 
weeks and months as they rotted.31 Though less adept at spectacu-
lar punishment than the continental regimes, the English stood out 
for sheer numbers. They applied the death penalty to a dismayingly 
large range of offenses. Homicides, arson, rape, and major larceny 
were givens, but they also executed for felling trees, attacking deer, 
stealing hares, hunting at night, buggering men or beasts, practicing 
witchcraft, and committing all manner of petty thievery. Defraud-
ing the mail remained a capital crime until 1835.32 In the early nine-
teenth century, England had 223 capital crimes in its statutes, France 
6. The English sentenced to death proportionately five hundred 
times as many as the Prussians, executing sixty times more.33
At some point, however, this rudimentary deterrent lost its luster. 
Eighteenth- century reformers were appalled at its barbarity, whether 
it achieved its goal or not. The rowdy, unruly crowds at executions 
seemed to be enjoying themselves immoderately, their worst instincts 
stoked by raw violence.34 Intended to demonstrate the state’s awful 
majesty, public executions had instead turned into carnivals— both 
literally as mortification of the flesh and metaphorically as baccha-
nalia. Even worse, the mobs were often feeling sympathy with the 
condemned, undermining brutality’s deterrence.35
By the eighteenth century, then, sheer brutality was no lon-
ger thought to deter. That change in attitude shifted— without 
undermining— the logic of deterrence. Beccaria and the Enlight-
enment philosophes argued that deterrence could be achieved 
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without immorally making an example of some criminals for the 
public good. Certainty of punishment was more preventive than 
its cruelty.36 Knowing that most offenders were likely to be caught, 
convicted, and punished would do more to dissuade than random 
savage affliction of a few misfortunates. In fact, as we have seen, the 
utilitarian reformers advanced an ethical argument for their own 
position. Whereas retributive punishments were just the state tak-
ing vengeance, thus wreaking more havoc, only punishments that 
deterred future offenses could be justified.37 Medieval canonists had 
already argued that efficient prosecution and sanction were good 
deterrence— without the need for bloodshed. In the 1760s, Adam 
Smith agreed that preventing crime was done best by enforcing just 
laws rigorously.38 More recent reformers have concurred. Knowing 
that a well- functioning system delivers equitable justice impartially 
in itself deters without the immorality of making some offenders 
serve the public purpose of scaring others off from crime.39
Enlightenment reformers did not object to public punishment so 
long as it was not too brutal. Putting criminals to hard work in public 
in special uniforms or in mines where the public could visit was con-
sidered deterrent. Beccaria thought lifelong slavery deterred more 
than death.40 In the long run, however, publicity went the same 
way as brutality. Punishment moved out of the limelight. In 1783, 
London magistrates abolished the procession to Tyburn, though not 
the actual hanging, which still drew large crowds. Public hangings 
in England ended in 1868, six years after public whippings.41 The 
French revolutionaries were at pains to avoid the spectacles of the 
old regime. The guillotine’s semiclinical efficiency was intended 
not only to democratize death but also tone down the circus atmo-
sphere, marrying deterrence to decency. Torture was ended as part of 
executions, and decapitation was permitted as the only technique, 
though beheadings were still performed in public.42
But after the excesses of the revolutionary Terror, any publicity 
proved too much. Executions were shifted from the town square 
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to the prison courtyard and were now attended by only a few offi-
cials, not the rabble. In 1851, the new Prussian penal code brought 
executions within the prison walls. By the 1830s, most northern 
US states executed only inside prisons, England three decades later. 
The last public execution in the United States occurred in 1936 in 
Kentucky, in France on the eve of war in 1939.43 And already by 
the late eighteenth century, public punishments were falling out of 
favor more generally. In England, the pillory was abolished in 1837. 
In the 1830s, the last old- style public punishment ended in France 
when convicts sent to the prison ships at Toulon or Brest began 
being conveyed in closed carriages, no longer paraded through the 
streets.44 Spectacular deterrence persists in some nations. Prisoners 
are still killed publicly in the Middle East and in China, where mass 
executions are scheduled on public holidays and festivals.45
Administered away from the public eye, how could punish-
ments still deter? In the absence of brutal spectacle, would potential 
offenders understand crime’s consequences? Legislators in Wash-
ington State forbade published accounts of executions in 1909, 
thus eliminating even the vicarious experience.46 Foucault echoed 
Beccaria by claiming that concealing sanctions shifted them from 
everyday experience to the realm of abstract consciousness. Punish-
ment’s effectiveness now resulted from its inevitability, not its visi-
ble intensity. The certainty of punishment, he thought, discouraged 
crime.47 But that glossed over the inherent contradiction that hid-
den penalties could not deter crime. Punishment did not become 
more certain by virtue of being carried out in private. Punishments 
that were both certain and public were equally thinkable. And if the 
public did not know that sanctions were administered, how could 
its ignorance influence its behavior? The Norwegian government 
in London exile during World War II reinstituted the death penalty 
to discourage Norwegians from collaborating with the occupying 
Nazis. But how would those who were meant to be deterred from 
treason hear of this threat in a legally effectful manner when the 
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only means it was conveyed were clandestine BBC broadcasts that 
few were likely to hear?48
More likely to be deterrent was the severity of sanctions. But that 
could also brutalize society, implicating the authorities in the same 
kinds of actions they were punishing and promoting further vio-
lence as offenders realized they had little to lose. Speedy justice 
swiftly administering punishment might also deter, but it threat-
ened the rule of law, whose gravitas could not be hurried. In their 
periodic “strike hard” (yanda) campaigns starting in the 1980s, the 
Chinese— much like Europe’s absolutist rulers— assumed that harsh 
public punishments swiftly carried out especially deter.49 But on the 
whole, deterrence was never more than a crude first approximation 
of what the state really sought— the ability to discover and punish 
but even more so to predict, anticipate, and thus head off crime.
Intent and Mens Rea
Using the law to prevent crime, even with rudimentary means such 
as deterrence, presupposed first of all that potential offenders knew 
what was forbidden so that they could choose to avoid it or not. 
Next, it assumed their free will, the conscious choice whether to 
transgress. More precisely, it rested on the presence of an interval 
separating the intent and planning of an offense from its execu-
tion, during which an intervention might work. If crime were an 
automatic reflex produced by social conditions (the Marxist view 
of it as inherent in capitalism) or biological impulse (Cesare Lom-
broso’s theory of the innate offender and its countless variations), 
it could be prevented best by social engineering: reforming society 
to improve criminogenic conditions or eugenically tinkering with 
human nature to breed out antisocial impulses. Socially or bio-
logically determined crime could be prevented only by wide- scale 
reform of society or its members.
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At the other end of the spectrum, if crime were spontaneous— 
committed by weak characters succumbing to temptation— then 
social reform promised little relief. Wholly opportunistic offenses 
were hard to anticipate and deter. At best, you could target-harden the 
environment against offenses— whether impromptu or planned.50 
Between such extremes of total determinism and utter fortuity, deter-
rence and prevention relied on potential offenders pondering their 
options before executing them and, it was hoped, concluding that— 
all in all— the anticipated crime did not pay.
Intent, liability, responsibility, and prevention were intertwined. 
Crimes heavily determined by strong natural urges (incest, sod-
omy, debauchery, baby snatching, sometimes bestiality) were often 
considered less blameworthy than those committed with intent.51 
Blaming social, biological, or other deterministic forces for crime 
lessened individual responsibility. Nor could such crimes be pre-
vented except by modifying the underlying causal mechanisms. 
Conversely, one- off, spontaneous events were unpredictable and 
unpreventable. But in between these two extremes, individuals could 
be held liable— evermore so as their motives were deliberate and 
intentional. Peter Abelard, the medieval theologian, thought that 
all actions, without a consideration of their motives, were mor-
ally indifferent (adiaphora)— even violations of the Ten Command-
ments.52 Their intent thus determined their nature. A focus on the 
intent, the mens rea, behind offenses made them more like sins. To 
be meaningful and thus worth punishing, sins had to be voluntary 
and deliberate acts. No will, no sin, said Bartolomeo Fumi, the scho-
lastic philosopher, in 1547.53
Many, possibly most, debates over crime have concerned whom 
or what to hold responsible. At one extreme, at least in the common 
law world, strict liability punished all harm caused regardless of why 
or how it came about. That was social utility speaking. At the other, 
only harm that was both intended and actually carried out was 
penalized. That was justice making itself heard. But many actions 
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lay in between: the accident befalling in a moment of inattention, 
the killing that resulted even though just a beating was meant.54 
Intent, strengthening responsibility for acts at one extreme, and the 
insanity defense, removing responsibility altogether at the other, 
were opposing pendants, stretching the continuum of behavior— 
willed and involuntary— in opposite directions. A focus on mens 
rea sought to mediate the two extremes, punishing transgressions, 
but only when the requisite intent revealed moral culpability.55 Was 
society liable for crime, as the Enlightenment philosophes argued, 
because it created the poverty that sparked delinquency? Or were 
vagrants the authors of their own misery, spongers on society, and 
therefore to be treated harshly by the law?56 Most agreed that no one 
was liable for actions they had been forced to perform under duress, 
therefore not their volition. Yet what counted as compulsion? Being 
physically compelled was clear. But what was the psychological 
equivalent? Legal codes have long tolerated men killing spouses or 
lovers caught in flagrante. Only recently and not everywhere have 
the supposedly irresistible imperatives of the honor code no longer 
trumped the law.
The insanity defense amplified such considerations: In what frame 
of mind were offenders not culpable? Incapable of intent, neither 
the young nor the mad nor eventually animals were guilty. Roman 
law assumed that insanity exculpated crime.57 In the thirteenth cen-
tury, the English jurist Henry of Bracton exempted infants and the 
mad from culpability, and insanity became grounds for granting 
felons royal pardons. By the mid- 1700s, acquittal by plea of insan-
ity was becoming common in England.58 In 1800, after George III 
was attacked by an obvious lunatic, the law was changed to ensure 
that defendants who successfully pled insanity were committed to 
an asylum, not released, as they formerly were.59 Having been a get- 
out- of- jail card, the insanity defense now led to life- long lockup. 
Over the following years, the burden of proof shifted back and forth 
between prosecution and defense. The M’Naghten rule in the 1840s 
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was the result of Queen Victoria’s displeasure when the assassin of 
her prime minister’s private secretary pled insanity. It required the 
jury to assume the defendant was sane unless proven otherwise. The 
US Model Penal Code of 1962 shifted the burden to the prosecution, 
which had to prove a defendant not insane if the issue were raised. 
That decision was reversed in 1984 after public outrage when John 
Hinckley, President Reagan’s would- be assassin, was judged not guilty 
because insane.60 Today the insanity plea is used only sparingly, and 
those who succeed rarely see freedom again.
Intoxication ran a similar course. The Greeks increased fines for 
drunken assaults, but the Romans considered intoxication reason 
to punish less harshly.61 Yet overinebriation could also be a double- 
edged sword: both a crime on its own and an exacerbating factor in 
other offenses. In the Penitential of Theodore, written by the arch-
bishop of Canterbury in the late seventh century, someone who 
killed while drunk was twice guilty: of the self- indulgence of intoxi-
cation and of homicide. Yet half a century later in the Penitential 
of Ecgberht, the archbishop of York gave drunken murderers the 
same moderated punishment as those who killed in anger. Early in 
the nineteenth century, the enhancing effect of intoxication had 
vanished from English jurisprudence, replaced with the mitigating 
influence it retains today.62
As intent was increasingly taken into consideration, the range of 
offenses broadened from acts to inclinations. A crime intended ren-
dered the offender clearly blameworthy. Even a dog, as Oliver Wen-
dell Holmes put it, can tell the difference between being stumbled 
over and kicked.63 Intent distinguished such actions from accidents 
and from acts that— though not fortuitous— were not premeditated 
or planned. The offender’s mens rea, the intent, determined the 
nature of the act. Without a culpable mens rea, an act could not be 
a malum in se.64 At the other extreme, intent alone— even without 
much of an overt act— could be a crime in itself, as with treason, 
conspiracy, and inchoate offenses. Someone who had no motive for 
Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/books/book-pdf/1963888/book_9780262361507.pdf by guest on 27 December 2021
210  Chapter 11
a crime or refused to admit one became an enigma.65 A concern for 
the mens rea behind the act thus deepened the problem raised by 
Locke and Kant on how inner and outer states corresponded. Being 
good meant more than acting lawfully. It required also wanting to 
do so. Taking mens rea into account, offenses arose when an inner 
bad intention correlated with an outer transgression. Without bad 
intent, the act— though harmful— might be legally irrelevant or even 
innocent. Conversely, with evil intent an otherwise legal act could 
be actionable.
Absent an intent to commit a crime, often none had occurred. 
With the concept of holy sin (aveirah lishmah), Jewish theology rec-
ognized that intentions decided the nature of the act, which could 
be blameless however seemingly heinous. Jewish women staked 
their honor to save their people: Lot’s daughters became impreg-
nated by him in order to save the human race as the world seemed 
doomed; Tamar pretended to be a prostitute to entice Judah, her 
father- in- law, to impregnate her, thus continuing the family line; 
and Yael seduced Sisrah before killing him and saving the Jews.66 In 
the modern era, receiving stolen goods was unlawful only when you 
knew their provenance. Treason in US law was committed only by 
those who intended to harm their country, not by those who inad-
vertently aided and abetted an enemy even though their motives 
were patriotic— Jane Fonda in Hanoi or Edward Snowden in Mos-
cow.67 Of course, some crimes were inconceivable without intent. 
Rape, burglary, waylaying, fraud, and treason could not be com-
mitted by mischance. An attempted crime definitionally involved 
intent. Unlawful assembly meant joining a group in public intend-
ing to commit an offense. An insurrection aimed at public goals 
was treason but aimed at private ones merely a riot.68 Many acts 
were defined by the perpetrator’s motives. Killing someone could 
occur with or without intent, by mistake, in self- defense, or on pur-
pose. The victim was dead regardless. But whether you were guilty 
of murder, manslaughter, or negligent homicide depended on the 
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intent with which you had, say, run the red light. Burning down 
the neighbors’ house could be arson or an accident.
Larceny was once defined as the simple possession of stolen goods, 
whether the accused had stolen them or not. But in the thirteenth 
century, Bracton, inspired by the Romans, insisted that there be an 
animus furandi as well, an intent to have stolen. In the late eigh-
teenth century, larceny began to be conceptualized in terms not of 
having the goods, but of having intent. Those who took lost money 
thinking that the owner was unidentifiable were innocent, but if 
they believed the owner could be traced, they were guilty of lar-
ceny.69 Depending on what transpired in the offender’s mind, the 
very same act was criminal or innocent. Theft came to be parsed 
into a variety of actions: borrowing without consent, taking with 
intent to repay, taking for temporary use, taking with the intent of 
returning to gain a reward, and so forth. Each hinged on the cul-
prit’s mental state.70 Someone who offered child pornography or 
drugs for sale could be charged even if turned out that the goods 
were in fact innocuous.71 In these cases, it was the intent that was 
sanctioned. Someone who stirred sugar that he thought was poison 
into another’s tea could be guilty of attempted homicide. Offenses 
are today punished more severely if motivated by hatred of cer-
tain categories of legally protected people (based on race, sex, age, 
homeless status)— in other words, according to their intent.72
Like modern strict liability, early law tended to punish the act 
regardless of its motives, if any.73 In the Homeric epics, a homicide’s 
intentionality did not influence the treatment of the killer. The same 
restitution or punishment applied, regardless of motive.74 In a case of 
death by javelin at a fifth- century BCE Greek sporting event, much 
effort went into explaining how the victim, by running into the jave-
lin’s path, caused his own death and none on distinguishing between 
accidental and intentional acts. Roman law punished attempts as 
though they were accomplished crimes.75 Focused on compensation 
for harm, early Germanic law was likewise uninterested in intent or 
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in deterring future offenses. Regardless of why, the act had caused 
damage, and that had to be made good. No more composition was 
paid for an intentional harm (instigating a serf to kill someone) than 
for one caused negligently.76 The authorities sought above all to quell 
blood feuds, persuading defendants to accept compensation instead. 
They also hoped to present themselves as firm enforcers of laws appli-
cable to all. Not surprisingly, they were reluctant to get caught up in 
the niceties of intent. Ensuring restitution for victims, who would 
otherwise be avenged, was their immediate concern.
Before the twelfth century, criminal intent was not the main 
focus of law enforcement. The Leges Henrici Primi, a compilation of 
English law from the early 1100s, stated that even if an archer killed 
inadvertently, he should pay, for “he who commits evil unknow-
ingly must pay for it knowingly.”77 In the sixteenth century, English 
common law punished only acts, not intent. “The imagination of 
the mind to do wrong, without an act done, is not punishable in 
our law, neither is the resolution to do that wrong, which he does 
not, punishable, but the doing of the act is the only point which 
the law regards; for until the act is done it cannot be an offense to 
the world, and when the act is done it is punishable.”78
This disregard of intent came out in that feature of early law per-
haps most perplexing to modern sensibilities: the punishment of 
animals. In the Code of Hammurabi, oxen that gored people were 
stoned. Ancient Persian laws specified amputation of ears, legs, or 
tails for dogs that bit. Hebrew law condemned homicidal wild ani-
mals to death.79 Plato’s laws prosecuted animals that shed human 
blood. Even inanimate objects that harmed (lightning bolts cast 
by gods excepted) were treated similarly.80 Deodands were things 
that having caused death were forfeited to God via the king— carts, 
boats, mill wheels, cauldrons, and the like. Since the act, regardless 
of intent, was what mattered, why not hold liable a pig that ate a 
baby or a horse that threw its rider? Or block up a well in which 
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someone had drowned?81 Even here, however, intent at times crept 
in. For damages done between fighting animals, the Romans pun-
ished the one that started the scrap. The Roman jurist Ulpian con-
sidered animals subjected to men’s sexual advances partly culpable 
if they had not run away. And raped animals were duly punished— a 
burro in sixteenth- century Seville was hanged, his sodomizer 
burned.82
And yet the distinction between the accidental and the intended 
was intuitive enough to have long been given voice in statute. 
Though early law may not have distinguished clearly or consistently 
between deliberate and accidental acts, it did so often. In the Old 
Testament, someone who killed accidentally could seek refuge in 
one of three cities, but intentional murderers could not.83 Both the 
Old Testament and Middle Assyrian law treated extramarital sex dif-
ferently according to intent, depending on whether it was adultery 
or rape. Both were killed if willing adulterers, but if the woman had 
been coerced, only the man was.84 Ancient Chinese law also classi-
fied crimes according to motivation and recognized intentional mur-
der.85 Both Plato and Aristotle distinguished between premediated 
and unplanned homicide, but Plato demanded that the attempted 
murderer be tried like those who succeeded.86 Athenian law sepa-
rated premeditated from accidental killings, with intent required for 
murder and unintentional homicide punished only by exile.87
Roman law distinguished culpa (unintentional harm) from dolus 
(intentional harm). The Twelve Tables singled out numerous inten-
tional acts for sanction.88 A thief caught trespassing at night, his 
intent to rob thereby evident, could be killed on the spot. Uninten-
tional acts were discounted: if a weapon “escaped from the hand” 
of the offender rather than being thrown, sacrificing a sheep suf-
ficed for expiation.89 Sharia law distinguished willful from acci-
dental homicide. Germanic law, too, changed in this direction. 
Seventh- century Visigothic law had moved beyond early precedents 
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to distinguish between culpable and other killings. And in ninth- 
century Wessex, someone who killed a man inadvertently with a 
spear carried over his shoulder paid the wergeld but not a fine.90
The resurgence of Roman law in the early Middle Ages helped 
emphasize intent as constituent of crime, as did canon law. Medi-
eval theologians assimilated crime once again to the concept of sin, 
where both act and its motivation mattered. In the fourteenth cen-
tury, the Neapolitan jurist Lucas de Penna argued that just as sin 
could be merely a thought, so the crucial element of an offense was 
its intent, which the act itself merely indicated.91 Canonists agreed: 
without intent, no guilt. With Bracton in the thirteenth century, 
intent became integral to defining crime. Someone who killed by 
misadventure was to be acquitted. New techniques adjusted the 
legal outcome to the criminal’s intent by expanding the royal par-
doning powers. Even if offenders had acted without intent, the law 
still found them guilty, and they forfeited their goods. But the king 
could now pardon them, sparing their lives.92
That not every similar act was also legally equivalent became 
broadly accepted. Those who killed inadvertently or by accident dif-
fered from those who acted on purpose, deserving less punishment, 
if any. But to show mercy where it was due, the authorities had to 
probe the accused’s psychic state. Scandinavian law of the twelfth 
and thirteenth centuries distinguished conscious “acts of hand” 
from unintended “handless risks.”93 Taking jurisdiction over homi-
cides in the early twelfth century, the English Crown categorized 
them as culpable, excusable, and justifiable. Killing without intent 
or in self- defense (though defined very restrictively) was excusable 
or justifiable.94 Juries often acquitted defendants who did not, they 
thought, merit death for killing. Conversely, as of the late four-
teenth century, the English king was forbidden to pardon killings 
committed with malice aforethought. Nor, as of the fifteenth, could 
he pardon mala in se.95 Not just the act but an evil intent, too, was 
now required for a felony to have occurred. By the late sixteenth 
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century, the distinctions had emerged between murder and man-
slaughter and between voluntary and involuntary homicide— 
dependent on the motives animating the act.96
Intent as Offense: Inchoate Crimes
The concern with criminal intent continued apace as the develop-
ment of inchoate crimes greatly expanded the law’s reach. Incho-
ate (or nonconsummate) crimes were offenses of intent. They were 
actions designed to lead to another substantive offense, even if the 
latter did not occur. If an act was dangerous enough to forbid— so 
ran the logic— surely the state should also criminalize attempts at it. 
Many offenses had inchoate aspects. In the common law, burglary 
was defined as trespass with the intent to steal. Thrusting a finger 
through a window sufficed to make someone a burglar. Criminal 
assault was an attempt to commit battery combined with the pres-
ent ability to do so.97 The US Model Penal Code defined bribery to 
include those offering money or soliciting or agreeing to accept it 
from another even before anything had changed hands.98 British 
law defined fraud in terms of making false representations intend-
ing to cause gain or loss. The Italian penal code of 1889 made it a 
crime to associate with others in order to commit a crime as well as 
even to declare an intent to offend. These inherently preparatory 
actions occurring before any actual harm had been inflicted were 
punishable.99
Crimes of preparation were inchoate offenses. Possessing other-
wise harmless items might be illegal if it indicated criminal intent: 
implements of forgery, counterfeiting, arson, or burglary (screw-
drivers, pliers, crowbars, and other tools found in most cellars); 
narcotics and their paraphernalia; certain kinds of arms (sawed- off 
shotguns, automatic weapons, tear gas, even toy weapons); gambling 
devices; and pornography.100 New York law eventually recognized 
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153 distinct possession offenses. In 1998, one in five prison sen-
tences there was for possession. A highly flexible charge, construc-
tive possession, a form of second- order offense, could be leveled 
against even those who happened to be in the car or house where 
the implicated items were found.101
Lying in wait, searching, following, and enticing were crimes 
of preparation. Belonging to criminal organizations or associating 
with known offenders was penalized.102 Loitering for purposes of 
prostitution, enticing minors to secluded places for nefarious rea-
sons, transporting females across state lines for immoral ends: all 
were in themselves anticipatory crimes. British law punished sex-
ual grooming of minors, defined as meeting or traveling to meet a 
child with whom one had communicated at least twice, for sexual 
purposes.103 Otherwise innocent actions were punished as  proxies 
for likely offenses. In seventeenth- century England, possessing 
shipwrecked goods with the identifying marks painted over was, in 
itself, punishable— whether they had been obtained legally or not. 
Today, those who import more than a certain amount of cash with-
out declaring it can be prosecuted as likely drug dealers or money 
launderers, whatever the truth of the matter. Possession of a certain 
quantity of illegal drugs is taken to indicate an intent to sell, not just 
to consume. Even an innocent conversation with someone plan-
ning an offense can be proof of conspiracy.104 The intent behind 
an act could heighten the severity of the offense committed. Tres-
pass becomes burglary if done with further offenses in sight. Simple 
assault can be aggravated if carried out with the intent to rape, kill, 
or maim.105
Pursuing inchoate offenses was integral to the state’s hope of pre-
venting crime. The earlier the authorities intervened, getting out 
in front of the act, the less damage ensued. Attempts, solicitation, 
and conspiracy were inchoate crimes— acts aiming to bring about 
another offense. Criminalizing even unsuccessful efforts at crime, 
penal codes developed separate provisions for attempts. Conspiracy 
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reached back even further than attempts into the preparatory chain 
of events leading from intent to commission.106 Solicitation and 
incitation, in turn, delved still earlier than conspiracy, criminalizing 
what may have been only hot air. They were second- order inchoate 
crimes— attempts to conspire to offend. The US Model Penal Code 
penalized attempts to solicit, punishing even solicitors who had 
failed to communicate their criminal scheme.107
Yet intervening earlier in the causal chain threw up problems. 
Was an intent to commit a crime itself an act? If so, was it culpa-
ble? Or were intentions merely states of mind that accompanied 
the legally pertinent behaviors?108 Either way, how did one know 
of intent except as expressed in acts? How far up the causal nexus 
of events could one reasonably assign guilt? Was a daydream, a fan-
tasy, or a stray thought of causing harm culpable? Which thoughts 
were actually dangerous, which harmless musings? How far down 
along the progression from conception through planning to execu-
tion did the offender become guilty? Most agree that, having fired 
a shot, even if it missed, the would- be assassin was guilty at least of 
an attempt. But what about renting the hotel room with the neces-
sary sightlines, buying the gun, taking target lessons, discussing the 
killing with others, hatching the idea, or even just at first forming 
a dislike of the victim? At what point did intent move from wishful 
thinking, fantasy, or desire to become the beginning of the act?109
Conversely, how far down the chain of events did renunciation 
or repentance still absolve the inchoate offender? Having occurred, 
few ordinary crimes were expunged by an offender’s change of 
heart. A thief who returned a stolen object, even before its absence 
was discovered, was still guilty of larceny.110 Some jurisdictions exon-
erated those who voluntarily broke off and thus prevented a crime 
that was being conspired about, prepared, or attempted.111 With 
crimes of intent, renunciation could in practice exonerate, so long 
as no one else knew about it. But up to what point did renunciation 
get the potential offender off the hook? The closer to mere intent 
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the law intervened, the more a change of heart had to be allowed 
for.112
What if the intended crime was conditional on other events 
that affected its likelihood? Did that diminish liability? Agreeing 
to murder someone if you won the lottery: Was that an attempt, 
regardless of the vanishingly small chances?113 Since actual harm 
was not required for culpability, ambiguities multiplied. Was try-
ing to murder someone with a voodoo doll an attempt? Was put-
ting sugar in a potential victim’s tea, thinking that it was poison?114 
When Dorothy Sayers’s fictional detective Lord Peter Wimsey self- 
immunized against arsenic in Strong Poison and then ate Turkish 
delight powdered in it, he caught the would- be murderer Urquhart 
in an attempt even though he was not in fact poisoned.
Was intent itself culpable? Inchoate crimes punished not the 
final offense but the intent to commit it or something close to that. 
Anglo- American law has tended to require an act, refusing to pun-
ish mere intent. Whether a treasonous intent alone, as suggested in 
the English treason act of 1351, was punishable without an overt 
act has been hotly debated. In the fourteenth century, on rare occa-
sions when defendants were convicted on the doctrine of voluntas 
reputabitur pro facto (the intention is to be taken for the deed), in 
fact a completed deed was also required.115 The US Model Penal 
Code required proof of an overt act to show that a conspiracy was 
not just in the minds of the participants. More recent European law, 
in contrast, has not generally required overt acts to prove conspir-
acy.116 German law regarded attempted treason as tantamount to its 
consummation. The Napoleonic penal code held much the same. 
But in 1832 this interpretation was moderated to cover only the 
attempt and its execution, lessening the punishment for the prepa-
ratory stages.117
Either way, even if the first dawning intent was not punishable, 
very closely subsequent acts were: incitation, solicitation, conspiracy, 
attempts. That still distinguished even the inchoate crime from sin, 
Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/books/book-pdf/1963888/book_9780262361507.pdf by guest on 27 December 2021
From Retribution to Prevention  219
which could be committed by intent alone. In the Sermon on the 
Mount, Christ warned that those lusting after women had already 
committed adultery in their hearts.118 In the fourteenth century, 
Lucas de Penna located the nub of the crime in the intent. The act 
was an incidental, practical feature, an external manifestation that 
revealed the criminal’s state of mind.119 But how could intent be 
known except through act? This dilemma was touched on by the 
story of the schoolmaster who warned his charges, “Boys, be pure 
of heart or I’ll flog you.”120 Inchoate crime resembled sin in its focus 
on thoughts and not just acts. Aquinas argued that humans could 
judge only external acts, not inner thoughts. Divine law alone could 
ensure both internal and external goodness.121 Hobbes argued that 
the intent to steal or kill was a sin known only to God. It became a 
crime apparent even to mortals only when manifested in an act.122
Without any other way of knowing intent, acts betrayed a state 
of mind. The law made use of them for that purpose. Nighttime 
trespass, for example, automatically signaled an intent that permit-
ted offenders to be punished on the spot. In eighth- century Eng-
land, a stranger who left the road without signaling his presence by 
shouting or blowing his horn was assumed to be a thief and could 
be slain. In sixteenth- century Nuremberg, anyone on the street 
after dark could be locked up for suspected burglary. An English act 
of 1851 imprisoned those caught at night with lockpicking or other 
burglary tools.123 Yet sometimes it was frustratingly difficult to pros-
ecute even those whose nefarious intent was clear. According to 
fourteenth- century English law, someone who ambushed another 
seemingly with intent to kill and left him for dead had commit-
ted only a trespass, subject merely to a fine. The same was true for 
someone who attacked with intent to rob, wounded his victim, but 
took nothing (probably because there was nothing to steal). How-
ever obvious his intentions, someone who had as yet done nothing 
but lurk menacingly was indictable only as a disturber of the peace 
or a nightwalker. In a case in 1859, a defendant lit a match near a 
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haystack but extinguished it once he was spotted. He was acquitted 
of attempted arson, though convicted of extortion.124
Treason, as we have seen, was arguably the first inchoate crime, 
patterning the law of criminal attempt.125 Treason had to be tack-
led preventively since, if successful, it allowed no second chance 
to prosecute. Attempting, planning, discussing, possibly just think-
ing treason— all were punishable.126 Dionisius, the fourth- century 
ruler of Syracuse, executed a captain for having dreamed of slit-
ting Dionisius’s throat— for surely he contemplated assassination 
while awake, too.127 The seventh- century Visigothic code punished 
not just overt acts against the ruler but also intent and opinion, 
expressed as maledictions, insult, and slander. Both the Edict of 
Rothar (643) and the ninth- century laws of King Alfred made plot-
ting against the monarch high treason.128 Whether the English trea-
son act of 1351 punished the mere imagining of the king’s death is 
debatable, but the statute of 1354 outlawed disloyal words.129 Rich-
ard II’s statute of 1397 did sanction compassing the king’s demise 
even without an overt act, but it was quickly repealed for punishing 
mere intent. Nevertheless, at the trial of the duke of Buckingham in 
1521 words alone were held sufficient to prove treasonous intent.130
Attempts were classic inchoate crimes. Taking part in the run- up 
to a crime, anticipating its committal, thwarted offenders remained 
as guilty from intent as their more successful peers. A fumbler who 
missed the shot was arguably as much an assassin as the expert 
marksman who hit his target. The threat that attempters posed to 
society was as great— possibly more so as they tried again— as that 
from successful offenders. However unfair it was to punish offend-
ers and attempters equally, the same sanctions for both made sense 
for a society seeking to protect itself. And if mere intent was cul-
pable, then morally speaking would- be and actual offenses deserved 
equal punishment. The Nazi regime punished attempts the same as 
crimes, reversing the mitigation built into the imperial penal code, 
and this position lasted well into the postwar period. The US Model 
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Penal Code, too, proposed punishing attempted and executed 
crimes the same.131
Early states did not at first consider attempts to be crimes. Ancient 
China’s Ten Abominations, developed in the sixth century, included 
plots against authorities and parents, but other systems took longer 
to include attempts.132 Ancient Egyptians recognized the intent to 
commit crime, regarding it a moral fault, yet punished only the act 
itself.133 Greek law considered plotters, contrivers, and instigators 
of murder as willful killers but treated them leniently by allowing 
their burial after execution. Planning homicide was distinguished 
from killing with one’s own hand, and the planner could be guilty 
of planning alone. Yet Roman law lacked even a term for attempt 
and prohibited only completed acts.134 Nor did early Germanic law 
properly recognize attempts. Drawing a sword or knife was pun-
ished as an attempt, and instigating a crime was forbidden, like the 
actual carrying- out. But the more general concept was absent.135 In 
medieval France, someone who intending to murder managed only 
to wound was prosecuted merely for blows and harm. The outcome 
remained more important than the impetus. The penal charter of 
Brussels in 1229 charged archers who managed to kill with homi-
cide, but merely fined them if they missed.136
Slowly, however, intent became a determinative element. Both 
the Carolina in 1532 and the Ordonnance de Blois in 1579 rec-
ognized criminal attempts. In the seventeenth century, the Star 
Chamber in England busily punished attempts, whether poison-
ing or waylaying to murder.137 By the late eighteenth century, the 
formal doctrine of criminal attempt existed. Defendants had ear-
lier been convicted even where an offense had failed, but not on 
the basis of a generalized theory of culpable intent or attempt. In 
1784, however, a defendant who had set a lit candle amid flamma-
ble material was convicted of arson even though the house had not 
burned down.138 By the early nineteenth century, solicitation was 
also formalized as a concept in common law. Someone who incited 
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servants to steal from their master, for example, was guilty even if 
the servant refused.139
From here, inchoate crimes were pushed back up the causal chain 
of events. In the mid- nineteenth century, the common law nations 
punished someone for an attempt only when they had performed 
the last proximate act to the crime itself— firing the gun, for exam-
ple.140 Over time, courts began to grant authorities more leeway 
to catch offenders before it was too late. The standards employed 
today are those of proximity: the dangerousness of the offenders’ 
behavior and how close they come to accomplishing their aim. 
More recently, the equivocality standard has been added, gauging 
how dangerous offenders are by what they have already done.141
The doctrine of legal impossibility once curtailed too lush an 
efflorescence of inchoate crimes. A case in 1865 involved a man 
accused of stealing, but from an empty pocket, so that no theft had 
occurred or was even possible.142 Other cases involved abortions 
given to women who were not pregnant, bribes to sway court cases 
offered to those not actually jurors, shooting a stuffed deer out of 
season, guns fired into empty rooms, and the peddling of what 
proved to be uncontrolled substances.143 The would- be offenders 
were let off the hook because they had been mistaken about what 
they were doing. In the twentieth century, however, legal impossi-
bility was whittled down. It was thought unfair to exonerate culprits 
who had clearly intended to offend.144 The definition of inchoate 
crime thus expanded as crime grew increasingly subjectified. Even 
if someone merely thought they were doing something illegal, then 
they had committed a crime.145
The number of inchoate crimes has in the meantime  mushroomed. 
Conspiracy has become more broadly defined. In England, it dated 
from the thirteenth century but became commonly used after the sev-
enteenth. Already in the Middle Ages, unlawful assembly— defined 
as three or more people congregating for nefarious purposes— was 
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outlawed.146 The seventh- century laws of the Wessex king Ine deter-
mined the type of criminals by the size of the group and escalated the 
punishments accordingly: thieves if up to seven, a band of maraud-
ers if up to thirty- five, and a raid if more. Modern antiloitering laws, 
targeting gangs, prostitutes, or teenagers, follow this venerable tradi-
tion.147 In the thirteenth century, those who defended and supported 
heretics were also considered and punished as such.148 Conspiracy 
was an elastic category. Behaviors that were legal when done alone 
were outlawed when undertaken collectively. No criminal action had 
to result; the preparation sufficed. Large- scale conspiracy charges 
were first leveled against workers who were using collective action 
to wrest concessions from employers.149 Today, the US federal code 
specifies at least twenty- eight different forms of conspiracy. They 
range from agreement to commit or attempt a crime to rather more 
tangential connections to the offense: agreement to solicit or aid in 
a crime or its solicitation, attempt, or planning; aid in planning an 
attempt; and agreement to aid in the planning of a solicitation of a 
crime.150
Double- inchoate offenses were once considered a conceptual tau-
tology: attempts to attempt, conspiracies to conspire, and so forth. 
But penal codes have expanded to actions otherwise not criminalized. 
Attempted assault, for example, which can be legally deconstructed 
as an attempt at an attempt at battery, is a double- inchoate crime in 
several US states. A Wisconsin man who invited a child into his car 
for sex was not guilty of enticement since the boy did not enter the 
vehicle, but he could be prosecuted for attempted enticement.151 If 
possession was already a double- inchoate crime (an attempt to use), 
then conspiracy to possess was a triple- inchoate offense.152
More and more statutes came to focus on intent. Making it an 
offense to cross state lines or to enter a building with certain goals in 
mind criminalized otherwise innocent actions. The offense of entic-
ing a minor over the internet allowed intervention even prior to a 
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crime of intent, conspiracy, or solicitation.153 Even substantive crimes 
have come to be phrased in inchoate terms. The British Fraud Act of 
2006 criminalized the dishonest making of false representations for 
gain. It replaced the traditional result crime of obtaining property 
by deception. In the new formulation, no property need have been 
obtained, no loss or gain created. All that was required was the dishon-
est making of a false representation that intended to cause harm.154
In the new age of terrorism, inchoate offenses have been punished 
even when they did not go beyond preparation. Terrorists willing to 
strike even though they will die are unlikely to be deterred. Suicide 
killers date at least to the Assassins of the eleventh century— trained 
and motivated Shiites who attacked Sunni variants of Islam and 
sometimes Christians.155 But as the tactic has become more com-
mon, the need to deter has increased. Preinchoate, preparatory, facil-
itative, associative, and other offenses only distantly connected to 
the act have been made actionable. Since successful suicide bombers 
cannot be convicted, the planners have been targeted. Indeed, even 
those who have not provably planned terror have faced sanctions. 
Britain imposed preventive detention on merely suspected terrorists. 
As due- process objections were raised, the rigor with which it was 
applied decreased. But the restrictions on possible terrorists remain 
far more drastic than for any other suspected offenders. Non- British 
terror suspects have been detained indefinitely. When that proved 
legally objectionable, control orders on house arrest restricted the 
potential terrorists’ movements, communication, association, and 
other activities. At times, they were forcibly relocated to remote 
regions.156
The UK Terrorism Act of 2006 prosecuted anyone preparing to 
give effect to an intention to commit terrorism or helping others do 
so.157 In other words, it criminalized conduct before it even became 
an attempt. It also forbade giving or receiving training and being 
present where it took place. Such statutes went beyond making it 
illegal to help commit actual or attempted offenses. They prohibited 
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activity even without a crime (a terrorist act) and where the tar-
geted behaviors were unrelated to any specific act: buying maps, get-
ting railway timetables or computer manuals, or asking the price of 
certain chemicals. Responsibility was thus imposed at a very early 
stage, when would- be offenders had not yet decided precisely what 
they intended and before the agreement required for conventional 
conspiracy charges.158 Defining offenses widely and vaguely, the 
range of indictable actions has expanded. Recent British antiterror-
ism legislation has punished statements that are likely to be under-
stood by some of the public as direct or indirect encouragement 
of commissioning, preparing, or instigating terror.159 Possession 
of money or of unspecified other property, including documents, 
has been criminalized if the accused intended terroristic uses of it 
or even thought that others might do so.160 Even for other serious 
crimes, recent British legislation has grown studied in its deliber-
ate vagueness. Those “involved” in such acts are liable: not only 
anyone who committed or facilitated the offense but also someone 
who merely “conducted himself in a way that was likely to facilitate 
the commission by himself or another person.”161
The legal net has recently expanded further into inchoate crimes 
of omission. Laws on crimes of omission punish those who have per-
formed no act, on inchoate crimes those who have caused no harm. 
The two intersect to define what would seem to be the absolute min-
imum form of an actus reus: harmless inaction. Inchoate crimes of 
omission statutes target those who fail their duty of responsibility 
to dependents even when, as chance would have it, no lasting harm 
resulted. Guardians have been prosecuted who housed dependents in 
filthy and unsafe conditions, who left them alone in freezing or over-
heated cars, who neglected to provide medical care. Other instances 
include those who failed to report illegal activity, even though fortu-
itously no lasting harm ensued: money laundering, environmental 
offenses, treason, domestic violence, or the like.162
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Preventing Crime
Defining intent, not just acts, as criminal was one early move in the 
state’s larger game of preventing crime. We have seen that deter-
ring through public punishment was rudimentary at best. Ritual-
ized brutality in the town square worked poorly. Nor did pursuing 
inchoate offenses deter as such. Having ignored sanctions for com-
mitting crime, potential offenders were unlikely to fear punishment 
for attempting it. But outlawing inchoate crimes did seek to prevent 
by intervening early. All deterrence prevents, but not all prevention 
deters— that done covertly, for example. As countless embroidered 
samplers attest, prevention beats cure. Indeed, preventive law was 
likened to preventive medicine.163 The analogy from disease to crime 
holds only partly, though (retrospective punishment of offenses is 
not remotely as good as a cure), so the advantages of prevention for 
crime were arguably even greater than for illness.
The virtues of prevention could be argued at various levels. At 
the most general, social conditions caused crime. The immediate 
offenders could be deterred, incapacitated, or rehabilitated. But the 
ultimate culprit was society. Social conditions— whether poverty, 
inequality, exploitation, familial breakdown, or anomie— caused 
crime. Social reform therefore promised to diminish offending. The 
belief in the virtues of social engineering is ancient and has become 
evermore pervasive. Crime in this view is like disease, to be cured 
not punished. The prevention of crime aimed at by most active pol-
icy makers has, in contrast, been narrower and more modest. It has 
sought not major social reform, much less revolution, but techniques 
to nab offending in the bud.
Offenders form their intent, prepare to carry it out, and finally 
commit the act. Laws sought to interrupt this causal chain at var-
ious points: closer to the intent or to the act. Penalizing the act, 
laws have been retrospective, dealing with faits accomplis. Aiming 
at intent, they have hoped to prevent. Post facto punishment of 
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already committed acts remained blind to incipient offenses and— 
purely reactive— contributed little to lowering the overall incidence 
of crime except insofar as it deterred. Preventive interventions, aim-
ing at intent, investigated, judged, and punished mental states that 
might not have led to results if left alone but foiled crime in those 
instances where the intent would have been followed by act.
Prevention thus moved the philosophical basis of punishment 
away from the idea that offenders should make good the harm 
done and that retribution righted society’s moral balance. With pre-
vention, justice ceded pride of place to a victorious utilitarianism, 
concerned primarily with order and tranquility. The Enlightenment 
principles commonly thought to govern sanctions faded. Punish-
ments no longer fit the crime. Nor were they announced clearly and 
determinately in advance for precisely specified behaviors so that, 
as sovereign citizens, potential offenders could calibrate their own 
conduct. Sentences grew increasingly indeterminate and discretion-
ary, tailored to offenders, not to crimes, and fine- tuned for reha-
bilitation more than for justice.164 The clear relationship between 
offense and sanction was severed. Once the goal shifted from just 
retribution to effective prevention, the crime did not necessarily 
determine its punishment.165 A crime might not be punished at all 
if that promised to spare society an offense to come. Or the state 
might impose punishment even on someone who had commit-
ted no tangible act. Prevention overturned many of justice’s usual 
assumptions. Criminals were defined not by what they had done 
but what they might perhaps do. Attending to intent broadened 
the state’s remit.
Preventing crime meant identifying criminals before they acted. 
The easiest prediction was based on past behavior. Many criminals 
committed more than one offense. That criminal tendencies were 
not evenly distributed across society was not a new insight when 
fear of dangerous classes gripped the urban bourgeoisie in the nine-
teenth century. Nor was it when Lombroso formulated his theory 
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of habitual offenders or today when statistics on recidivism inspire 
three- strikes and other serial- offender laws to clamp down hard-
est on those who commit most crime. Already in ancient Athens, 
a third conviction for perjury led to loss of citizens’ rights. Rome 
kept registers of suspicious and dangerous individuals. The infamia 
doctrine punished those whose character was blemished by moral 
turpitude.166 In eighth- century Wessex, repeat thieves had feet or 
hands amputated. The imperial Chinese added the cangue, a kind 
of portable wooden stocks around the neck, for repeat offenders. 
The Carolina, the first German penal code from 1532, had a graded 
scale of increasingly harsh punishments for recidivists. Death as an 
incorrigible followed a third burglary offense in colonial Connecti-
cut, after two rounds of branding. Whipping was the rule for a third 
incident of drunkenness.167
Modern methods of identifying people, undercutting their abil-
ity to game the system by using aliases and the like, have allowed 
contemporary statistics to pinpoint just how much crime is commit-
ted by how few.168 Since the 1970s in the United States, 6 percent 
of offenders have committed half of all crime. In 1986, 3 percent of 
Minneapolis street addresses were the destination of half of all police 
dispatches. For robbery, criminal sexual conduct, and auto theft, 
fully 100 percent of dispatches went to 5 percent of all locations.169 
Conversely, 95 percent of urban space is altogether free of predatory 
crime.170 By targeting crime hot spots, the authorities could antici-
pate and prevent crime. By policing St. Giles, as a London police 
commissioner put it early in the nineteenth century, they were polic-
ing St. James.171
Prevention targeted not the offense but the kind of person who 
might commit it in the first place. It punished character more than 
crime. This approach had a venerable pedigree. Roman law allowed 
judges to accept as proven any information about offenders alleg-
edly known by everyone to be true.172 Among the sixth- century 
Franks, someone identified as a criminal by upstanding community 
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members could be convicted on that basis alone. Under Char-
lemagne, the Rügeverfahren permitted judges to begin an inquest on 
the basis of an offender’s reputation.173 Early medieval law allowed 
only those of good reputation to swear oaths to clear themselves. 
For others, it demanded compurgators to stake their reputations 
alongside the suspect, many of them if the accused’s character was 
not spotless. On occasion, more than a thousand were assembled. 
As the Roman law inquisitorial process was reintroduced in twelfth- 
century Europe, ecclesiastical courts accepted the doctrine of mala 
fama, “bad reputation.”174 An ecclesiastical judge could now try a sus-
pect without a specific accusation or accuser.175 Freemen were sorted 
according to their reputations, leaving the bad eggs with less legal 
standing. Twelfth- century German courts could prosecute on repute 
(Leumund), with officials swearing to the blemished standing of the 
accused.176 A notorious suspect could be accused without other evi-
dence, required to swear a purgative oath, and punished on failure to 
do so. Priests suspected of living in sin and eventually heretics, too, 
were targeted by such techniques.177
Prevention targeted the offender more than the offense. To get 
out in front of the act, the state had to grapple with the actor. But 
how? Blackstone lauded preventive over punitive justice as superior 
in all respects. The matter, he thought, was simple: preventive jus-
tice merely meant obliging those persons whom there was “prob-
able ground” to suspect of future crimes to assure the public that 
they would not offend.178 Rarely had a seemingly innocuous phrase 
glossed over complications so glibly.
How to anticipate the future offender? Two approaches prom-
ised help: psychology and sociology. Offenders might be predicted 
psychologically if discernable traits revealed a propensity to crime. 
Lombroso’s theory of the born criminal was influential in the late 
nineteenth century, harnessing biology and its degeneration to 
explain how the criminal psychology was formed. Countless other 
now discarded theories such as phrenology also claimed to discern 
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transgressive proclivities through somatic or psychological indica-
tors.179 More recently, criminology has sought to predict dangerous-
ness, identifying those who threaten to become offenders. In the 
1960s and 1970s, measures targeting dangerousness, apart from any 
actual offense, were introduced in response to shocking crimes com-
mitted by released inmates. Sociopaths were identified as those who 
inflicted suffering and injury for fun, lacked compassion and impulse 
control, saw themselves as victims, and resented authority. Nonethe-
less, having failed in the past reliably to identify the criminal mind, 
now chastened psychiatrists also cautioned that testing for danger-
ousness was almost impossible and that standard psychiatric diag-
nosis was largely irrelevant. A major study of a large group of the 
supposedly criminally insane in 1966 in New York revealed them to 
be sad old men far more often than predatory psychopaths.180
Besides magic and witchcraft, torture has been the most venerable 
attempt to probe the soul’s secrets. The psychological sciences sought 
to follow suit more methodically, yet their promise disappointed. 
Fearful of false positives, clinicians tended to forecast conserva-
tively who among their patients might offend, thereby hobbling 
their predictive acumen.181 Excepting the seriously mentally ill and 
perhaps drug abusers, few psy- forecasts managed accurately to pre-
dict future offending.182 Even new technologies have done little to 
improve this track record. Psychological testing has recently claimed 
to reveal subconscious attitudes by measuring microsecond differen-
tials in answering questions that confirm or challenge prejudices or 
assumptions. Minute gestures indiscernible to the naked eye, when 
agglomerated by the thousands, allegedly reveal characteristics such 
as sexual proclivity. Penile plethysmographs and their vaginal equiv-
alents unmask involuntary sexual arousal— imperceptible in some 
cases even to the subjects being tested— to detect potentially reoff-
ending pedophiles, rapists, and sadists.183
Hopes of reading others’ minds likely only shortly postdated 
Eve’s encounter with the serpent. The correlation between lying 
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and arousing the sympathetic nervous system was operationalized 
already in ancient China. Suspected liars had to take a mouthful of 
rice and spit it out.184 Those with dry mouths found the task harder 
than normally salivating innocents. It was a trope of racist ideology 
that Blacks and Jews— both allegedly incapable of blushing— were 
inferior because their interior states were less visible to others.185 
Mechanized lie- detection technology began with Lombroso’s hydro-
sphygmograph to measure pulse rates, followed by John Larson’s 
polygraph in the 1920s, correlating deception with increased blood 
pressure. The polygraph was sold to police and public as a means 
of getting at the truth that sidestepped the need for more primitive 
and violent techniques.186 Other methods followed, all sharing the 
assumption that somatic reactions revealed inner states through a 
Pinocchio response, whether respiration rates, epidermal conduc-
tivity, voice stress, heat around the eyeballs, fleeting facial micro 
expressions, or millisecond hesitations.187
MRI scans and electroencephalography went further, measur-
ing something seemingly closer to the inner workings of the brain, 
though still merely a heightened metabolic activity in certain cere-
bral areas.188 Such technologies assumed that lying was more ardu-
ous (a greater cognitive load) than telling the truth, thus stimulating 
the responses detected. They all were unable to distinguish dissem-
bling as such from other brain activities. Nor were they able to locate 
deception in specific and specialized areas of the brain. Moreover, 
liars could also game the system, all the more so when they knew 
what investigators were looking for. On the basis of no particular 
evidence, it is, for example, widely believed that liars avert their 
gaze, so those hoping to appear truthful now catch and hold their 
interlocuter’s eye.189 Perhaps we are entering a new era of predictive 
investigation, but attempts to discern individual thoughts by invol-
untary physical responses have yet to prove very successful.
If the psy- sciences did not fire prediction’s magic bullet, that left 
sociology. Potential offenders could also be identified by extrapolating 
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from statistically characteristic behavior of groups they belonged to. 
Regularities were identified to induce forecasts of conduct, using the 
logic of social science developed by the nineteenth- century Belgian 
astronomer Adolphe Quetelet, who thought that society followed 
patterns as discoverable as nature’s.190 Offending was linked statisti-
cally with various characteristics to develop a sociological criminal 
type. Membership of a group was associated with certain behav-
iors, which in turn could be used to define the group.191 The group 
could thus be targeted, and individual members deemed potentially 
culpable— though merely for sharing the features for which the col-
lective name was shorthand. Armed with— at best— probabilistic 
social science, prevention thus focused on the criminal more than on 
the crime. Did offenders belong to high- risk groups? Were they recid-
ivists? Did they have a propensity for certain crimes? A penchant for 
repeated transgressions? A disposition for specific victims? Most gen-
erally, were they dangerous, posing an ongoing threat? The answers 
determined the appropriate punishment more than did the nature 
of any (eventual) offense, thus weakening retributive justice’s link 
between act and desert. Retributionists’ focus on culpability for the 
act treated each offense alike, even those committed subsequently by 
the same person. Targeting some people as especially dangerous and 
even treating recidivists more harshly, in contrast, meant punishing 
the person as much as the act.
In this logic, those predicted to recommit were to receive differ-
ent sentences from onetimers.192 Kleptomaniacs and drug addicts 
should be treated more harshly than one- off opportunistic offend-
ers even though, acting under a psychological compulsion, they 
were— according to a retributive logic— less culpable. Sentences of 
treatment rather than punition also made sense if they promised 
less crime.193 Inchoate crimes were by definition those that had not 
been consummated. Of interest, therefore, was perpetrators’ intent 
and what it revealed about their state of mind, inclinations, and 
personality. Someone who would attempt, conspire about, solicit, 
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or incite a crime posed a threat. Anyone willing to attempt an 
offense was likely to repeat it. Punishing attempts aimed foremost 
to neutralize threatening individuals and only secondarily to deter 
their offenses. That offenders were dangerous mattered more than 
whether they were guilty.194
Sociological or actuarial prediction raised particular problems. It was 
static. The characteristics that defined someone as likely to offend— 
poverty, unemployment, residence in certain neighborhoods— could 
at best predict lifetime, not imminent, risk.195 Conversely,  predicting 
lifetime offending on the basis of recidivism, as three- strikes laws 
claimed, was hampered by the tendency for transgressing to drop 
off with age. Former serial offenders were locked up just as they 
lapsed into crimogenic senescence.196 To avoid unacceptable false 
negatives— releasing some apparently harmless persons who then 
went on to offend— meant tolerating many false positives, which kept 
innocents behind bars.197 The former set off political fireworks; the 
latter were rarely heard from again.
Not only did actuarial forecasting overpredict, but its logic was 
also circular: those who had stolen were likely to have been unem-
ployed; the former unemployed were therefore potential thieves. 
Not- yet offenders thus had their future behavior forecast on the 
basis of demographic, economic, and social traits they shared with 
already offenders. They were held accountable for characteristics 
that had proven correlative for past culprits, though not yet shown 
to be causally determinative for them. In effect, they were punished 
for the crimes of others. Even sophisticated sociology could not sur-
mount the dilemma famously identified by David Hume: how to 
break out of correlation into causality. However refined the actu-
arial calculations, they still took a leap of faith from past behavior 
to future actions.
Since the popular mind confused correlation with causality, 
crime prevention reinforced the conceptual shorthands we call ste-
reotypes. That the overwhelming majority of rapists are men does 
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not mean that all men are rapists, except perhaps in the fevered 
imagination of Val in Marilyn French’s pathbreaking feminist novel 
The Women’s Room. But that African American men are charged with 
crimes disproportionately to their presence in the population has 
been used to justify the racial profiling that subjects them to more 
than their fair share of preventive encounters with the police. Sim-
ilar discrimination confronts Middle Eastern travelers at airports. 
Such prejudices have been conceptually cemented throughout his-
tory, leaving traces in our vocabulary. Vandals, barbarians, philis-
tines, peons, banshees, troglodytes, plebians, Huns, sycophants, thugs, 
villains, beggars, buggers, coolies, bohemians, berserkers, boors, and the 
other n- words of yore— all were used at one time or another for eth-
nic, national, or (quasi- ) occupational groups now immortalized for 
their pejorative traits. In 1682, Louis XIV banished all “Bohemians” 
and “Egyptians” from France, by which he meant Roma.198
The inherent unfairness of this sociological logic meant that laws 
based on it faced obstacles. That many women, not just prostitutes, 
were swept up in police dragnets and inspected for venereal disease in 
nineteenth- century England helped marshal opposition to the Con-
tagious Disease Acts. Vagrancy laws are ancient, permitting police 
to harass or jail largely anyone found in public.199 Antiloitering laws 
give police broad discretion to target otherwise legal activity, such as 
“wandering or strolling around from place to place without any law-
ful purpose or object.”200 Broadly speaking, any car driver is fair game 
for police attention.201 In recent years, courts have struck down some 
such statutes as too vague, all- inclusive, and broad, thereby justifying 
the targeting of racial, ethnic, and sexual groups only tangentially 
correlated to the relevant crimogenic characteristics. In response, 
the statutes have been refocused on more specific behaviors, such 
as loitering with various intents. Or they have been aimed at crime 
hot spots rather than at entire cities— all to avoid violating the rights 
of innocent bystanders who happen to share certain characteristics 
with the gang members or other groups being targeted.202
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Psychological and sociological techniques of predicting and 
preventing crime alike raised problems. Modern law enforcement 
has therefore tended to retreat to the simplest means of forecast-
ing of all: past behavior. Past actions were empirically and morally 
a more solid foundation for predicting future acts than actuarially 
based demographic or sociological correlations.203 How often and 
how seriously someone had already offended have become the 
most heavily weighted factors in predicting future transgression.204 
Absent a belief in atonement or remorse (hard to test for its sin-
cerity), past offenders were assumed likely to repeat their crimes, 
thereby condemned to a vicious circle.
However prevention formulated its predictions, it thus focused 
more on the criminal than on the crime. Unlike reactive policing, 
with culprits who could in theory be identified, prevention did not 
know who was going to offend. Yet it had to narrow its focus to 
only some citizens. Even before any crime had been committed, it 
too needed suspects. Bad characters, habitual offenders, dangerous 
classes, social parasites, objective enemies, recidivists: through the 
ages, such designations were shorthand for characteristics consid-
ered indicative of likely criminality.205 Profiling is today’s word for 
this use of extrapolation from demographic, social, ethnic, eco-
nomic, behavioral, or other indicators to identify likely offenders.
Rehabilitation and Discretion
Opportunistic crime could be prevented by target hardening the 
environment, not by altering the offender’s nature. Both rehabilita-
tion and prevention instead focused on the character of the criminal. 
Rehabilitating offenders meant going beyond retributive infliction of 
bodily pain to an attempt to change them. It assumed that offend-
ers’ transgressions expressed a character flaw. Rehabilitation has 
usually been presented as an ameliorative and even humanitarian 
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approach. But as Foucault famously noted, rehabilitation means that 
the state no longer just inflicts discomfort; it now seeks to transform 
the soul.206 Already in 1835, Alexis de Tocqueville had argued some-
thing similar. Absolutist monarchies chastised their subjects physi-
cally, he held, while republics left the body alone to delve straight for 
the soul.207
When did the state adopt a rehabilitative ambition? Foucault 
located this sea change in the late eighteenth century with the aspir-
ingly all- powerful absolutist state and then the French Revolution. 
Yet ambitions to change, not just to chastise, offenders have long 
been with us. Shame punishments in ancient China aimed at moral 
improvement or “self- renewal.” The Greeks, like the Chinese, ban-
ished criminals to improve them and allowed their return once they 
were purified by absence. Plato suggested rehabilitating the impi-
ous by isolating them in prisons far from home.208 Once the Roman 
Empire Christianized in the fourth century, it persecuted heretics 
in part to convert them. Augustine, as we have seen, insisted on 
the duty to convert otherwise damned heretics.209 Saul the perse-
cutor of Christians became Paul the apostle. God wants sinners to 
repent, not die, as Wazo, bishop of Liege, preached in the early elev-
enth century.210 Inspired by Aquinas, the interrogators of medieval 
heretics insisted that their willful errors were reversible. Convert-
ing them was the goal.211 Seventeenth- century Dutch houses of cor-
rection aimed not to punish but to reform. Transporting criminals 
to the colonies from seventeenth- century England was thought to 
offer a second chance.212
As Foucault pointed out, rehabilitative outcomes were expected 
from prisons when they were first constructed on a large scale in the 
early nineteenth century. Finely parsed techniques of  solitary confine-
ment were meant to mold inmates’ souls. The very words used for pris-
ons indicated the ambition: houses of correction and penitentiaries— the 
latter derived from penitence, or the guilt and remorse that medieval 
inquisitors sought from heretics. Sixteenth- and seventeenth- century 
Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/books/book-pdf/1963888/book_9780262361507.pdf by guest on 27 December 2021
From Retribution to Prevention  237
European states already sought to rehabilitate vagrants and the idle, 
prostitutes, unmarried mothers, street urchins, and the like.213 But 
conversely, already by the mid- nineteenth century, as prisons grew 
overcrowded, rehabilitative ambitions faded quickly.
In the twentieth century, however, rehabilitation was rehabilitated. 
Indeterminate and individualized sentencing attempted to rope pris-
oners into their own improvement.214 Nonfixed sentences allowed 
authorities to reward good behavior and punish bad. Inmates 
remained inside for times that depended less on how they had 
offended than on their subsequent behavior. As reformers in 1870 
put it, the prisoner would be redeemed “through his own exer-
tions” or not at all.215 In the 1880s, the German reformer Franz von 
Liszt argued for the virtues of preventing future harm by sentenc-
ing according to the danger the convicted posed, not the offense 
they had committed or the punishment they might deserve. Sen-
tences had to be individualized and discretionary, tied to behavioral 
outcomes, and not just an arbitrary duration. Failing to change, 
prisoners would have to remain inside. Incapacitation was the nec-
essary corollary of unsuccessful rehabilitation.216 Pushed to its logi-
cal extreme, indefinite and discretionary sentencing assumed that 
being incarcerated was the normal condition, release exceptional. 
All citizens were on parole.
Parole and probation implemented this approach. Release was 
contingent on prisoners behaving themselves. For preventive rea-
sons, one prisoner might be kept in jail for longer than another, 
despite their having committed the same crime. Institutionalizing 
indeterminate sentencing through parole and probation started in 
the early nineteenth century, first in colonial Australia, then in the 
United States, shortening the sentences of well- behaved inmates. 
At midcentury, US states experimented with good- time credits for 
juveniles in reform schools and by the 1890s for adults. By the 
1920s, most US prisons had indeterminate sentencing or parole.217 
Germany followed suit in 1935, but Britain not until the 1960s.218
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Rehabilitation remained penal orthodoxy through the 1970s, 
before losing ground to neoretributionist reforms. Especially in the 
US and Britain during the 1960s and 1970s as crime increased, the 
response was harsh and retributive. Prison sentences were length-
ened, jails were filled, and public shaming was once again used 
punitively. Rehabilitation was declared a largely bankrupt ideal, 
giving way to just- deserts punishment, and penal ambitions were 
limited to incapacitating offenders. Victims clamored for retribu-
tion, grabbing the spotlight from offenders and the state’s hopes of 
resocializing them. Certain victims (of rape and domestic violence, 
for example) managed to turn retribution into an appealing goal 
even for the Left, which was normally resistant to what counted as 
a conservative cause.219
Sparked by rising crime rates in the 1960s as well as by shocking 
individual cases of savage acts committed by offenders on parole, 
retributionism certainly had a conservative slant, but it was encour-
aged also from the Left by reformers worried by the discriminatory 
potential of individualized punishments. The Right insisted on harsh 
determinate sanctions for brutal crimes. The Left rediscovered the 
Enlightenment egalitarianism of a clear moral bookkeeping that 
specified the consequences of transgression, not permitting class 
or status to differentiate punishments, imposing no demands of 
behavioral conformity beyond serving the sentence, and allow-
ing sovereign citizens to make their decisions accordingly. The 
rehabilitationist project was also eroded by the widespread belief 
that a permanent underclass was forming and by cultural relativ-
ism’s undermining of the bourgeois self- confidence required to set 
the norms to which offenders should be schooled.220 In the late 
twentieth century, the goal increasingly became to punish crimi-
nals in proportion to their deeds, regardless of any effect on their 
subsequent behavior.221 Sentences were determined at conviction; 
parole was ever less available. Even Sweden cut back on its use.222 
Mandatory- sentencing guidelines prescribed minimum durations, 
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including fixed terms, and required that prisoners serve most of 
their time (“honesty in sentencing”). Punishments were increased 
for recidivists, and prison was evermore seen as merely incapacitat-
ing inmates, with few ambitions to help them change.223
This punitive turn was taken especially in the English- speaking 
world, whereas Europe retained more of the rehabilitative ideal. So 
did this turn upend Foucault’s theory that the authorities’ concern 
to mold their subjects’ interiors was a permanent sea change and 
not just a secular oscillation?224 The shift to determinate sentencing 
may have undercut early release, but the same retributive current 
also introduced civil commitment and other means of individualiz-
ing and extending sentences. Sex offenders were often kept inside if 
it was feared they would recommit. In Britain, offenders were some-
times sentenced to life with periodic review even for small crimes in 
cases of past sexual offenses or mental derangement. In Germany, 
Sicherungsverwahrung (preventive detention) allowed the authori-
ties to keep prisoners deemed dangerous locked up beyond their 
sentences. In Italy, “security measures” achieved much the same.225 
In most nations, the mentally ill could be institutionalized for as 
long as deemed advisable. The decline of indeterminate sentenc-
ing made such measures necessary, permitting authorities to adjust 
prison terms to prisoners’ attitudes and progress.226 In other words, 
individualized sentencing actually continued despite neoretribu-
tivist reforms, but it was now harnessed to more, not less, puni-
tive ends. Sharpened sentences for repeat offenders were similarly 
a form of upside indeterminate sentencing, the mirror image of 
parole. When punishments determined purely retributively seemed 
inadequate for still- dangerous offenders, they were extended.
Whatever its oscillating fortunes, rehabilitation required individ-
ualized punishments. Reforming offenders meant taking account of 
their specific circumstances. Rehabilitation was in effect resocializa-
tion or socialization come too late. The state undertook late in life 
what family, school, church, and community had evidently failed 
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at. Not surprisingly, it was work done by the psy- sciences and their 
practitioners: psychologists, psychiatrists, therapists, social work-
ers.227 As we have seen, individualized sentences undermined the 
Enlightenment ideals of predictable and standardized punishments 
for specified offenses that treated all citizens equally, allowing them 
to know and anticipate the consequences of their actions. When 
the United States began experimenting with individualized sen-
tencing in the late nineteenth century, the French regarded its inde-
terminacy as cruel and unusual.228 Many critics today agree, noting 
that ethnic and class prejudice condemns minorities and the poor 
to disproportionately harsh sentences.229 But cookie- cutter pun-
ishments, although abstractly fair, also ignored particulars of the 
offender who was to be rehabilitated.
The Enlightenment reformers had advocated consistency and 
equality before the law, but treating all who had committed the 
same offense in the same way could also be unfair. A theft prompted 
by necessity and one committed on a lark did not merit the same 
punishment— nor did perhaps a first offense and a repeat by a prac-
ticed thief. Were the law not just to react blindly but punish accord-
ing to offenders’ guilt and chances of resocialization, then it had 
to discriminate, treating superficially similar acts according to their 
varied motives, background, and context. Sanctions had to fit the 
criminal, not the crime.
How did the authorities know whether someone had been reha-
bilitated? As with sin, at stake was the congruence between inner 
state and outer act. The worth of human beings depended, John 
Stuart Mill argued, not only on what they did but also on what 
manner of people they were who did it.230 Rehabilitating criminals, 
the state was in the business of producing good humans. Remorse 
was often demanded. Juries, judges, and parole boards looked for 
it. Convicts prepared to turn over new leaves were well advised 
to make a show of it.231 Inmates who convinced their keepers of a 
change of heart were rewarded. When some proved to have gamed 
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the system, offending again after release, the communal feeling of 
betrayal helps explain the backlash against probation in the 1970s. 
But, short of knowing interior states, the only outward measure of 
inner conformity was recidivism. If the state could not produce 
morally good former convicts, then perhaps it could at least turn 
out ones who did not run afoul of the law again.
Strict Liability, Negligence, Risk
Not only did the law elbow its way into citizens’ heads, criminalizing 
their intent to harm before any actual offense, but it also broadened 
its remit to punish acts without any intent at all. In theory, a crime 
involved both the intent to do wrong and the carrying out of that 
wrong act— both mens rea and actus reus. As we have seen, the law 
came close to punishing the mens rea alone, and we return to this 
situation with respect to sex crimes in the next chapter. But it also 
punished acts alone, regardless of their motivation. The earliest laws 
often did not differentiate between purposeful acts and those that 
were unintentional or accidents. Only later did the law take intent 
into consideration. That initial approach, of punishing the act regard-
less of why it occurred, returned with the concept of strict liability.
Strict liability punished actions society wanted to eliminate 
wholly, regardless of why they had happened. Starting in the late 
nineteenth century, it was adopted widely as dense urban civili-
zation’s precariousness reinforced the necessity of discouraging 
harmful behaviors outright.232 In theory, punishing on the basis 
only of negligence led to a socially inefficient underpricing of risk. 
If those engaged in potentially dangerous activities followed only 
the standard of due care required, they would escape liability for 
harm caused nonetheless. In contrast, holding them accountable 
in every instance— negligent or not— forced them to price in the 
true cost of harm.233 The development of strict liability placed the 
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burden of risk on those best able to reduce it, the cheapest- cost 
avoider— in the case of product liability, for example, on produc-
ers.234 A spate of flooding disasters involving mines and reservoirs 
in the mid- nineteenth century spurred on the use of strict liabil-
ity in the United States.235 Manufacturers were later held account-
able for product defects (food adulteration), and highly hazardous 
enterprises, such as nuclear power and aviation, were governed by 
strict liability.236 Statutory rape and bigamy were also strict- liability 
offenses. Regardless of how good a reason someone had for thinking 
a child was of age or that their partner had been properly divorced, 
sex or marriage, respectively, was verboten. Bartenders who served 
the underaged were liable no matter how mature the customer 
appeared, how convincing their fake ID. Having to prove culpable 
intent for each such act would harm the public more than unfair-
ness to the occasional innocent offender.237
Vicarious liability extended this logic, holding the head of a cor-
poration responsible for the actions of underlings. The aforemen-
tioned bartender would be strictly liable; the absentee owner of the 
establishment vicariously liable.238 Regulatory offenses were often 
of this nature, too. They brought the penal code to bear on offenses 
such as the sale of adulterated food or drink, child labor, and envi-
ronmental violations.239 As of the mid- 1980s, the statutes regard-
ing such violations dramatically expanded in the US. Violations 
of federal agency rules were now routinely punished as felonies, 
with more than three hundred thousand federal regulations thus 
enforced. Accomplices, too, were held accountable for the acts of 
their co- offenders, even though they themselves had neither done 
nor even intended to commit a crime.240
Not only was intent criminalized, but the number of other men-
tal states that rendered actors culpable also expanded. Offenders were 
increasingly held liable for negligence, not just for deliberate harms.241 
Though offenders had not intended harm, they were guilty if they had 
not sufficiently anticipated its likelihood. They were punished not for 
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intent but for not having the knowledge of the potentially danger-
ous situation or the insight they should have had.242 A certain stan-
dard of conduct was expected from law- abiding citizens, and those 
who failed to achieve it were penalized.243 The concept of negligence 
thus punished offenders not for their intent but for their ignorance. 
It discounted the mens rea normally required for a criminal offense, 
thereby broadening the range of punishable acts.244
Negligence had long been prosecuted. In Hebrew law, a bull 
known to be dangerous that gored again was to be stoned, and its 
owner killed, too. Roman law punished negligent behavior that 
might lead to injury.245 If a beast’s owner refused to curb it, Wessex 
laws of the eighth century allowed those whose crops it damaged 
to kill it. A century later, owners of animals that repeatedly caused 
harm were punished on a sliding scale.246 By the nineteenth century, 
however, animals were acknowledged to lack intent and ceased being 
punished. They were no longer treated as purposive actors, but now 
largely as property. Their owners were culpable if they had acted neg-
ligently, allowing their charges to harm.247
Though of venerable concern, negligence was increasingly put to 
work as technological sophistication multiplied the consequences 
of inattention far beyond the realm of dangerous domestic crea-
tures. From the 1870s in Europe, laws began holding liable those 
who increased risks of harm to others.248 By the 1920s, criminal 
negligence was being identified as separately punishable. Reckless- 
endangerment statutes later in the twentieth century took matters a 
step further. Negligent offenders did not realize the danger they put 
others in, but reckless offenders ignored it; they were consciously 
negligent.249 Ignoring the potential consequences of actions also 
became punishable, as did bringing about even the possibility of dan-
ger. If an act or omission by someone who did not mean to endanger 
another created a risk, that person could still be punished.250 British 
law did not punish endangerment as such. But the US Model Penal 
Code included a general offense of recklessly engaging in conduct 
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that placed others in danger of death or serious bodily harm. Ger-
man law punished not only the endangering of life and property but 
even abstract endangerment, including slander that might stigmatize 
someone.251
Moreover, general endangerment offenses did not require proof 
of actual or likely danger. They criminalized activities that raised 
unacceptable risks. Even nations that did not criminalize endan-
germent generically did so in practice, heading harm off before it 
occurred by punishing those who put others at risk. Speeding and 
dangerous or drunk driving were offenses everywhere, so the laws 
against them were in effect preventive measures that punished the 
posing of risk.252 As even risk was criminalized, only few actions 
now escaped the authorities’ interest. After all, almost every behav-
ior or action posed some danger. Likely offenders could be consid-
ered threats even if they did not actually commit a crime.253 Was 
not the mere act of being put at risk not also a harm in itself: a 
driver speeding, a surgeon operating after drinking, a pilot flying 
without enough sleep? Even if the harm did not materialize, these 
actors could be offenders. Being exposed to heightened risk might 
be considered a harm as such.254
The law thus narrowed from its earlier blunderbuss approach. It 
now left many behaviors to the private sphere, where citizens made 
their own decisions, largely unencumbered by official attention. But 
in those areas still subject to law and in those newly brought under 
its umbrella, the authorities both broadened and deepened their 
remit. At first, most harms had been punished regardless of intent. 
The requirement of a mens rea then narrowed crimes to intended 
acts, sanctioning only those that deserved it. At the same time, the 
concern with intent also prompted the authorities to delve into citi-
zens’ minds, punishing them for their thoughts and ambitions, not 
just for their acts, and padding the roster of possible offenses. Mean-
while, negligence and recklessness also reversed the focus brought 
by the mens rea requirement, once again punishing acts regardless 
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of intent.255 Civil law nations were happy to prosecute even acts 
presupposing no intent, such as negligent arson, while the com-
mon law countries upped the ante with strict liability, where the 
act alone, regardless of intent, was actionable. More behaviors than 
ever thus fell under the authorities’ purview, and the state also 
drilled into its subjects’ minds, seeking to ferret out intentions and 
anticipate crimes in the making. The ever- expanding law may have 
provided the blueprint, but the boots on the ground belonged to 
the police, the sharp end of the state’s enforcement stick to which 
we now turn.
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Most middle- class white Westerners regard the police as sheep do 
border collies: something they rarely encounter or need worry much 
about, so long as they stick to the center of the flock and do not 
tarry, dawdle, or stray. Such people pass years, decades even, with-
out meeting uniformed officers face- to- face. If they do not drive, 
the frequency of their already rare interactions diminishes further. 
If they do not live in neighborhoods targeted by zero- tolerance 
enforcement, that effect is amplified.1 Policing happens at soci-
ety’s margins, to the disenfranchised, poor, racial minorities, and 
the outcast. For them, the police are all- powerful and all- pervasive 
in their lives. Well- socialized burghers, in contrast, confront the 
state’s enforcement arm infrequently because— policing themselves 
as part of the behavioral compact that assures their station— they 
rarely cross the invisible lines that trigger a statutory response.
Yet policing did not always hover at society’s periphery. It was 
once largely synonymous with government itself. The term policing 
shares its etymology, not coincidentally, with policy and polity, and 
they in turn with polis— or more precisely politeia, Greek for “gov-
ernance of a city.” As we have seen, crime used to encompass many 
behaviors that are now decriminalized: reclassified under private 
law, relegated to the private realm, considered merely sins or minor 
infractions— or redefined as normal, such as being Protestant or 
gay. In tandem, policing once also intervened much more broadly. 
The police used to administer activities that today are not regulated 
Chapter 12
The State as Enforcer: 
From Polizei to Police
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much or at all (sartorial strictures, Sabbatarian rules, morals, reli-
gion, usury) or that are now the province of other arms of govern-
ment (zoning, health and safety, child protection, social services, 
food and drug safety, transportation, animal control, competition).
In its older, all- encompassing mode, to police was to govern, to 
supply the basic infrastructure of a well- regulated society. Today, 
“police states” mean totalitarian dictatorships, unfettered by rule 
of law or due process. In the early modern era, a police state meant 
the opposite. It was a tautology, repeating itself, a “state state.” In 
sixteenth- century France, police was defined simply as the govern-
ment of a republic.2 What the political theorists of absolutist gov-
ernment in seventeenth- century Germany called Polizeiwissenschaft 
is best translated as the “science of governing.” To police was to 
administer. An echo of this tradition lingers in the Anglophone 
notion of “police powers”— the quaintly antiquated public- order 
and welfare regulations that were once among the police’s most 
important duties.3 But, on the whole, the English did not entrust 
the same sort of broad regulatory powers to their police as did the 
continent.4 In contrast, the Scots, the American colonies, and, 
later, the US federal states gave police powers a remit more akin to 
Europe. Nineteenth- century America used morals- related regula-
tions to criminalize behavior of the sort once targeted in Europe 
by Polizei strictures.5 In that sense, the English police were both 
later and more modern— narrowly specialized in enforcing law and 
maintaining order— when first set up in the late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth centuries.6
On the continent, in contrast, early modern policing combined 
enforcing law and maintaining public order with a Noah’s ark of 
regulation. The Romans had already pointed the way. Their city 
prefects kept order, but they were also responsible for fire hazards, 
public buildings, religious ceremonies, public meetings, prostitutes, 
beggars, and foreigners as well as more generally for health, safety, 
and morality. Only in the fifteenth century, with their first laws on 
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Polizei, did Europeans get back to that place.7 These laws entrusted 
the police with a groaning smorgasbord of responsibilities: pota-
ble water; animal control; regulation of prostitutes, foreigners, 
vagrants, nonconforming religionists, and other undesirables; sar-
torial and sumptuary laws; Sabbatarian and opening- hours rules; 
flood abatement; food supply and adulteration; weights and mea-
sures; manufacturing; hiring, firing, and behavior of servants; pur-
chase and sale; guardianship; fire prevention; mendicancy; rubbish 
and waste removal; price controls and profiteering; usury; embez-
zlement; pawn brokers; public drunkenness; arms and weapons; 
cursing; adultery and concubinage; commerce; fairs and markets; 
street cleaning and lighting; passports; transport; building codes; 
public works; bridge maintenance; wet nurses; poor relief; illicit 
publications and censorship; public houses and amusements. The 
police also enforced regulations to ensure salubrity: against immo-
rality, blasphemy, drinking, cursing, and gaming. Weddings were 
closely regulated: who could be invited, what to wear, how expen-
sive the gifts could be, how much food, drink, and music was per-
mitted.8 When not otherwise occupied, local executioners pitched 
in to dispatch stray dogs and pigs and to enforce regulations against 
lepers and prostitutes, sometimes gambling, as well as public def-
ecation and blasphemy. It would arguably be easier to list what did 
not belong to the police’s remit, which included largely everything 
other than perhaps defense and foreign policy.9
Nor did this panoply of functions evaporate entirely under 
modernity’s sun. In early nineteenth- century Toulouse, the police 
still combined the functions of family court and counseling. Offi-
cers took evidence from complainants whose daughters had been 
seduced, whose husbands squandered their earnings, whose jilted 
lovers had stolen their wardrobes, and the like. The French gendar-
merie helped out in times of natural or other disaster.10 In Denver 
in the 1860s, the city marshal removed a noxious slaughterhouse 
and tannery from the town center. Stray dogs occupied much police 
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attention. Officers lodged the down and out and returned errant 
children. When the Russian police took care of abandoned children, 
even deep into the twentieth century, they had little choice but to 
welcome them into their own families.11 In the mid- nineteenth 
century, New York police counted cellar dwellers, inspected steam 
boilers, cleaned streets, and administered elections.12 The English 
phrase “If you want to know the time, ask a policeman” revealed 
that few people owned a watch in the nineteenth century but also 
cynically assumed that most bobbies had lifted a timepiece off a 
drunken reveler.13
Writing in 1915, an American visitor was astounded at the 
range of activity still pursued by German police. Prussia had sepa-
rate police departments for insurance, mining, water and dikes, 
field and forest, cattle disease, hunting, fisheries, trade, fire, poli-
tics, roads, health, and buildings— among other things. Berlin had 
twelve police departments. Only two— uniformed officers and the 
detectives— performed functions also handled by their English law 
enforcement colleagues. The others supervised markets and sale 
of provisions; inspected foodstuffs; controlled public assemblies; 
abated nuisances; oversaw lodging houses, cafes, and amusements; 
regulated druggists, vets, and other professions; and kept watch on 
certain banks. Division Eight oversaw censorship of theaters, control 
of concerts and movie theaters, and the employment of child actors. 
Meanwhile, the Paris police inspected mushrooms as one of their 
duties, and it remained their task to check on buildings and facto-
ries, scrutinize prices, and verify the quality of produce.14 To this 
day, the French gendarmerie collects meteorological data and regu-
lates veterinary clinics and abattoirs.15 The Chinese police, tasked 
also with public- health matters and census registration, investigated 
citizens’ homes and backgrounds.16 Even the London police licensed 
chimney sweeps, shoeblacks, and messengers; kept tradesmen hon-
est; inspected weights, bridges, and lodging houses; and enforced 
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nuisance laws. They could even be asked to wake people in the 
morning for work.17
Even today, the police continue to provide many services and com-
munity functions— if only because no other institution answers the 
phone 24/7/365 but largely because most police work still involves 
maintaining order more than solving crime.18 The vast majority of 
calls today to the police do not report crimes at all, much less seri-
ous ones.19 Many are requests for help in emergencies that might 
quickly deteriorate but do not yet involve law breaking: domestic 
disputes, children on the street alone at night, noises scaring an 
elderly couple, drug overdoses and miscarriages, and accidents of all 
sorts.20 The more developed the country, the more police respond 
to noncrime situations. Arrest is only the third most common out-
come of their interventions (after doing nothing and advising how 
to avoid repeating the incident), occurring some 14 percent of the 
time.21 Even when offenders are arrested, it is mostly over bread- 
and- butter stuff. Only 10 percent are charged with serious offenses. 
In the main, police interact with the public over drunkenness, dis-
orderly conduct, assault, drunk driving, gambling, vandalism, and 
similarly pedestrian matters.22
Nonetheless, policing has narrowed significantly from its blun-
derbuss role in the early modern era. The Enlightenment’s reform-
ers held that the state was to provide the legal framework, thereby 
defining the acceptable, and maintain order but not otherwise use 
its police powers to regulate the particulars of civil society. Citizens 
were left free to arrange matters as they saw fit within legality’s 
parameters.23 Ensuring order, not promoting welfare, became the 
police’s new role. In the Prussian general code of 1794, the police’s 
tasks were to maintain public peace, security, and order and to pre-
vent danger to the public.24 Though that remained a broad remit, 
many of the police’s earlier duties gradually either were not regu-
lated at all or fell to other state agencies. The police’s main role 
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became to ensure order, prevent offenses, and solve those crimes 
not deterred.25 Having once been the state’s Swiss Army knife, 
police became a rapier. Perhaps the closest they come to their earlier 
duties today is regulating traffic, which brings them into frequent 
contact with many different citizens. Yet policing as such has not 
diminished. Yes, it has narrowed its scope to the more precise mod-
ern sense of dealing with crime as violations of the penal code, but 
what this specific definition encompasses has expanded and dra-
matically deepened.
On its way to this new role, policing changed entirely. In Europe’s 
old regimes, up through the eighteenth century, offending was 
widespread and common, committed by many, not just by an easily 
identifiable criminal class, and tolerated in large measure for lack 
of effective means to counter it. The interested parties themselves, 
not the authorities, did most enforcement. Cases were often settled 
informally outside of court. If they reached trial, the unfortunate 
pendant to lax and indifferent enforcement was harsh deterrent 
punishment of the few who had been nabbed. Policing was spo-
radic, localized, and violent.26
With the growth of official policing starting in the eighteenth cen-
tury and a judicial system able to handle the heightened throughput, 
enforcement became professionalized. Property- owning volunteer 
constables or their paid proxies were replaced by uniformed, salaried 
officers. Detecting crime and maintaining order became routinized, 
spreading into poor communities, too. Rather than making exam-
ples of a few, catching and sentencing as many offenders as possible 
were the new goals. Punishments were moderated but inflicted more 
regularly and predictably. Prosecution became the state’s duty and 
the citizen’s right, available to anyone who had been victimized, not 
just to those who could afford to pursue matters.
Policing had earlier enforced the authorities’ will, suppressing not 
just mayhem and disorder but also unrest and revolt. Tsarist police 
in Russia were notorious in this regard. In early nineteenth- century 
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Austria, police still beat civilians for showing disrespect to the rul-
ing house.27 The unrest that roiled European cities in the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries doubtless helped spur the authorities’ 
plans for regularized police forces.28 In the French Revolutions 
of 1830 and 1848, the gendarmerie helped restore order— and 
was temporarily disbanded thereafter in acknowledgment of the 
unpopularity that act had won it.29 But in a longer view, in increas-
ingly democratic societies the police could not be partisan. To avoid 
raising hackles, they had to maintain order and enforce the law 
impartially. That order and legality benefit those at society’s pin-
nacle hardly needs mention; that they equally and possibly espe-
cially favor those with few other means to protect themselves from 
violence and chaos bears repeating.
From its beginnings in the early nineteenth century, the English 
police recognized the virtues of being unpartisan. Unlike the older 
continental European forces, established to shore up dynasties and 
regimes, English policing was instituted less to take sides than to 
enforce the king’s peace.30 The bobbies were carefully controlled, 
largely unarmed, trained to win public sympathy, and subject to 
strict rule of law. They were citizens in uniform, not much more 
powerful than their civilian peers.31 Marinated in an atmosphere 
skeptical of standing armies and anything in uniform, the American 
police were at first scarcely an arm of the state at all and more an 
extension of civil society. Officers were selected to reflect the social, 
national, and ethnic composition of those they policed. They were 
closely tied to local machine politics. Second- generation residents 
of New York City suspected Irish officers of favoritism and inves-
tigated to see whether they were arresting their fellow brethren in 
due numbers.32
As policing became a regular feature, seeping into society’s inter-
stices, an implicit compact was struck between citizens and offi-
cialdom. The rule of law applied to police as much as to civilians. 
Punishing violations of the criminal code was their remit and their 
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legitimacy rested on keeping to that. Rules on how to collect, pro-
cess, and use evidence became detailed. Lettres de cachet of the sort 
issued by the French king before the revolution, locking up miscre-
ants indefinitely without specified charges, were no longer toler-
ated. Most nations eventually forbade coercion, the third degree, 
unauthorized eavesdropping, and similar techniques.33 The job of 
the police was to uphold the law. If the law was fair, all citizens ben-
efitted. When the police favored or persecuted some groups, their 
authority suffered. If anyone other than offenders felt victimized, 
the deal would be off. What counted as legitimate, enforceable law 
evolved as the state extended its powers yet took account of cus-
tom and habit. Social crimes such as poaching and gleaning ceased 
being enforced strictly on behalf of landowners. Laws that clamped 
down on workers’ pleasures— drink above all— were policed only 
sporadically.
Police and citizenry needed each other. Short of an omniscient 
police state, civilian cooperation was crucial. Police were like fish 
swimming in the ocean of the people, as the current Chinese 
authorities have repurposed Mao’s analogy of the People’s Revolu-
tionary Army.34 The police did not just replace civil society’s self- 
policing but also enlisted that function on their own behalf. Even 
in the modern era, most crime reporting originated with the pub-
lic, not with gumshoe detective work. Some crimes, such as domes-
tic violence, were likely to remain unknown if not reported. Tips, 
sightings, snitching, and reports were needed to resolve cases. 
According to one study, 93 percent of arrests were the outcome of 
citizens contacting the police. Unless victims or witnesses helped 
identify offenders, the likelihood of an arrest fell to 10 percent.35 
The most- wanted posters (and their TV variants) that used to fes-
toon post offices were emblematic: appeals to the public for leads. 
Hotlines to report crimes were widespread. Volunteer patrols helped 
the police. Even the supernatural pitched in through its mediums.36 
And if citizens were not mobilized directly by the authorities, then 
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they were indirectly by insurance companies, obliging them to lock 
their homes and cars, report thefts, and register stolen goods. Night 
watchmen in early modern Europe rattled doors, checking to see 
if they were locked as required by law.37 Today officers collect data 
from neighborhood- surveillance cameras to track suspects. Warn-
ings against abandoned luggage alert the public on public transport 
to possible terrorist bombs. Open registers of sex offenders presume 
that their neighbors will— if they have not already driven them 
away— help police them.38
Indeed, self- policing has remained a cornerstone of police work. 
As far back as the thirteenth century, English subjects were required 
to report treasonous plans they knew of— not tarrying more than 
two days or attending to their own business beforehand. Medieval 
Christians were expected to report heresy on pain of being sus-
pected themselves.39 Indonesia has updated this practice with Smart 
Pakem, an app allowing Muslims to denounce heretics from their 
smartphones.40 In the West, anyone who knows of crimes such as 
domestic violence, especially if victims are unlikely to report them, 
is encouraged to alert the police, “thus marking that these offences 
are not a private matter between the parties involved,” in the words 
of a Swedish bill.41 The German legal code criminalizes knowing 
of plans for serious crime without reporting it.42 The common law 
nations achieved much the same by defining accomplices broadly. 
Reporting requirements became standard for professions likely to 
see child or elder abuse.43 Banks have to disclose large cash transac-
tions, corporations disposal of toxic substances. Those who are not 
informers are accomplices— that is the logic.
A successful police system is one citizens want more of. Order and 
security are our first demands of the authorities. True, some forms 
of enforcement were inherently unpopular. Public support for the 
English police suffered in the early nineteenth century when they 
enforced laws that in effect targeted the poor for being poor— being 
drunk in public or sleeping in the open (thus classified as vagrant). 
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The working classes resisted bans on their pleasures: drinking on 
Sundays, street betting, gaming, dog- and cockfighting, hare cours-
ing, rat baiting, and other animal sports (though fox hunting was 
of course not prohibited).44 Attempts to enforce Sabbatarian rules 
in New York City that had been passed in Albany by provincial law-
makers stretched the police beyond what they could or wanted to 
do and undermined their popular support.45 Today, the sense that 
ethnic minorities are singled out for unfair scrutiny and enforce-
ment undermines support in their communities, hampering the 
compliance and cooperation on which successful policing necessar-
ily rests.46
But laws that were not inherently biased have generally been 
popular. When the seventeenth- century English imposed binding- 
over orders on each other, which required good behavior on pain of 
punishment, they were yearning for more policing in an era before 
the state could deliver. Access to the law and its protection of their 
meager property were what the English poor desired in the eigh-
teenth century. Many of the cahiers de doléances (list of grievances) 
drawn up before the French Revolution complained that small 
towns and villages hardly ever saw police patrols and demanded 
enlargement of the maréchaussée (local mounted force).47 The Prus-
sian habeas corpus law of 1848 forbade house searches at night. 
Upright burghers protested that when they reported a theft, the 
goods were long gone by the time the police finally showed up the 
next day.48 Resisted at first, London bobbies soon became popu-
lar, the public complaining that they were not doing enough to 
maintain order. Assaults on police dropped by two- thirds during 
the late nineteenth century.49 At first, bobbies could arrest only for 
crimes they had witnessed. Londoners pressed for changes, which 
passed in 1839 and allowed police to take suspects into custody for 
broader reasons. As theft’s main victims, the nineteenth- century 
poor were eager to prosecute their losses in court.50 Even though 
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they dislike tax increases, citizens have been known to vote to 
finance expanded police patrolling. Faced with neighborhood dis-
order and crime, most residents have supported foot patrols and 
other up- close forms of policing.51 Minority residents of US cities 
often receive unwanted and undeserved police attention, yet they 
have also backed more and stronger enforcement— of drug laws, for 
example.52 Just anecdotes, these stories nevertheless illustrate a tru-
ism: in stable modern societies, many more suffer from crime than 
from police misconduct.
Making the Police
Like the rest of the state’s crime- fighting functions, policing was 
largely a modern invention. True, in ancient Egypt policemen 
patrolled marketplaces, armed with sticks and baboons trained to 
chase wrongdoers. In Athens, a troop of Scythian slaves, brandish-
ing whips and small sabers, was marshaled to guard public meetings, 
control crowds, and make arrests. Yet, their duties were rudimentary 
at best. In Rome, aediles could chastise citizens in specific remits— 
flogging actors, for example, because their duties included policing 
performances at the public games. The tresviri capitales were magis-
trates responsible for public jails, executions, and order in the streets, 
but they lacked their own means of coercion.53 Only in the early 
modern era did recognizable police appear. Even in an ancient civi-
lization such as China, where the wealthy had kept private guards at 
least since the eleventh century, state policing is scarcely a century 
old. Arguably, it began only in the post- Mao period.54
At first, the police were largely volunteers, citizens keeping order 
in their own communities. The sixth- century Frankish king Clo-
thar sought to shift the burden of pursuing thieves from the fam-
ily to the larger territorial community, punishing those who did 
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not pitch in.55 Thirteenth- century England set watches manned by 
constables— part- time volunteers who enforced the hue and cry. A 
crime discovered, the alarm was sounded. Pursuit followed, and if 
the culprits were caught and arrested, sometimes they were sum-
marily executed.56 Local communities in medieval Spain formed 
cuadrillas, town leagues, to guard common pastures against inter-
lopers while also keeping an eye on road traffic. In seventeenth- 
century London, constables were male householders who served a 
year at a time, fulfilling the obligations of the Statute of Winchester 
(1285) to police their communities. By the eighteenth century, the 
gentry were hiring substitutes to serve their time or paying fines, 
which were then used to employ others. The system’s inherent ama-
teurism was thus mitigated as those who served at length acquired 
expertise.57
Parishes also began imposing taxes instead to salary permanent 
watchmen. By 1800, the City of London’s constables were hired men 
for the most part.58 At the time of the revolution, French policing 
was not yet entirely a governmental function. As of 1792, Parisian 
officers of the peace, armed with white sticks, arrested offenders and 
brought them before justices of the peace. Ordinary citizens could 
be ordered to help and jailed if they refused. Nor was policing yet 
professionalized in the United States, where a law in 1789 allowed 
marshals to compel local citizens to do their part on a posse comi-
tatus. Volunteerism lasted even into the era of professional police. 
Nineteenth- century Toulouse had dixainiers, local citizens who broke 
up brawls and reported disorder, alerting the official police. Unpaid 
and sporting no outward signs of authority, they were rewarded by 
exemption from national- guard service and billeting troops. Russian 
peasants mainly policed themselves, as did largely autonomous com-
munities of Latvians, Estonians, Jews, and other minorities in the 
East European countryside.59
Informal policing remains even in our own day. Volunteer secu-
rity personnel patrol gated communities, organize block watches, 
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and escort the elderly at night. And as new crimes have multi-
plied, ordinary citizens have begun serving as indirect enforcers: 
tenants who sue their landlords for unwarranted rent increases; 
the maligned for libel and defamation; consumers who win triple 
damages for prosecuting antitrust violations; retailers, hoteliers, 
and restauranteurs who police and enforce offenses against their 
businesses; citizens who sue fraudsters against the government.60 
Class- action suits allow groups of citizens who share only their vic-
timhood to enforce the law.61
Authorities also outsourced the legwork of policing: to knights 
in medieval Europe, hundreds in England, samurai in Japan, pot-
waris in India, hans in China, and vigilantes in nineteenth- century 
America. In the sixth- century French Merovingian kingdom, those 
helping track down thieves were given a cut of the goods retrieved. 
In sixteenth- century Florence, banditi killed or captured banned 
persons. Prussian Junkers administered justice— using the term 
loosely— on their estates until 1872, Russian landed aristocrats until 
1918.62 Even when enforcement was authorized by the state, the per-
sonnel carrying it out often remained volunteers, with the restric-
tions that imposed. The justice of the peace in England, länsman in 
Sweden, and Schultheiss in Germany: all were legal amateurs acting 
as judges who had to herd their fellow subjects in the right direction 
while not poisoning their own reentry to civilian life.63
In eighteenth- century England, thief takers— frequently former 
criminals— made a lucrative business of apprehending offenders 
and reaping rewards when they were convicted— often of crimes 
the thief takers themselves had instigated. Visiting Assisi in 1786, 
Goethe was shaken down by the sbirri, armed thugs who acted 
as agents of courts and were paid via fees and rewards. In 1798, 
London merchants prevented pilferage from the docks by financ-
ing a marine police force that was so successful it became a pub-
lic body two years later.64 François Vidocq, who ran the Sûreté in 
the early nineteenth century, was a former criminal hired just for 
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that expertise. In the American West, gun slingers such as Wild Bill 
Hickok and Wyatt Earp were employed to keep order as cowboys 
whooped it up on payday. The difference was often slight between 
them and proper outlaws such as John Wesley Hardin, Billy the Kid, 
and Jesse James.65 In the early twentieth century, mining compa-
nies and other corporations broke strikes and enforced labor disci-
pline with private police. Having started by supplying security for 
presidents and the army, Pinkertons then worked for the railroads, 
which as inveterate border crossers were served poorly by territori-
ally organized policing.66 Even today, American bounty hunters are 
privateers fulfilling a public function when they track down bail 
jumpers.67
Indeed, private policing continues in robust health. Far from 
having been displaced by their official colleagues, such forces are 
everywhere: university, school, and mall police; private and cor-
porate guards; airline security; even mercenary quasi- military per-
sonnel sent into war zones.68 Despite the state’s massive expansion 
into enforcement, so unquenchable is the demand for security that 
private forces today outnumber official police, often several times 
over— almost three in the United States.69 There are ten times as 
many private investigators and detectives as FBI agents. Twice as 
much money is spent on private policing in the US as on public. 
Even in statist China, a third of all policing is private, although 
these forces are owned by the Ministry of Public Security. In Shang-
hai, private forces are half as big as the official police; in Beijing, 
the numbers are largely equal.70 Not part of the state’s monopoly of 
violence, private police are restricted in their powers— unless they 
are deputized or are regular police moonlighting. But nor are they 
hampered by the due- process limits imposed by criminal procedure 
or regulation. Private- security forces in the US are not subject to the 
same curbs on conduct as official police. As agents of property own-
ers, they can exclude or eject the unwanted from private premises 
in a way regular police cannot from public spaces.71
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Recognizably modern police forces were established in the late 
eighteenth century on the continent, followed half a century later 
in Britain and then in the United States. The earliest was perhaps 
in France in the mid- 1600s.72 By the early eighteenth century, 
the maréchaussée, mounted officers, had arguably become the first 
national police force— some three thousand men, doubled in size 
after the revolution. Paris in the late seventeenth and early eigh-
teenth centuries was well policed by the standards of the day. In 
1667, the traditional night watch was replaced with a profession-
alized uniformed force reporting to the central government. Cen-
tralized police became the norm already under Louis XIV. It was 
continued by the revolutionaries and the two Napoleons.73 By the 
late eighteenth century, some three thousand officers patrolled a 
city of six hundred thousand, the largest and best- organized force 
in Western Europe. Only about half were police in the modern 
sense. The rest were garbage collectors, firefighters, censors, archi-
tects, and the like.74 London became as well patrolled only half a 
century later.75
Early on, police and army were scarcely distinguishable. Both 
served the ruler, putting down unrest and maintaining order— 
sometimes against external enemies, other times against domestic 
troublemakers. In autocracies, both forces were often made up of 
foreigners to avoid sympathy and fraternization when used domes-
tically. Vikings protected the emperor in tenth- century Byzantium. 
The Swiss Guards quelled unrest for the pope and the French king, 
among others. After the revolutions of 1848, the police in Vienna 
often were Czech or Moravian. In southern Italy, the carabin-
ieri usually hailed from the North, sporting an inbred feeling of 
superiority.76
With nationalism and democracy, however, such disjuncture 
no longer worked. Citizens were now rallied for the patriotic cause 
against foreign enemies and recruited en masse to the military. The 
police, too, began reflecting the population they kept in line.77 
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Barracked officers were separated from civilians, but police gener-
ally lived like and among civilians when off work. True, Russian 
police were recruited heavily from the army and rarely natives of the 
region they supervised. London bobbies were deliberately enlisted 
from the provinces. But New York City cops were chosen from those 
they would police, leading to an informal rapport but also, predict-
ably, more corruption.78 The gendarmes in France under Napoleon 
were supposed to know their local area so well that they implausi-
bly could go to any point in their districts with their eyes closed.79 
More recently, radios and cars have centralized police, who swoop 
in only when summoned. The backlash against such distancing has 
prompted a return to community policing. Foot and bike patrols in 
local neighborhoods now allow citizens and officers to cooperate in 
maintaining order.80
Military and police have become separated. The peacetime Brit-
ish army in the eighteenth century fulfilled discrete functions: sup-
pressing smuggling, putting down riots, and crushing insurrections.81 
Only in extremis was the military— eventually an emanation of the 
nation, even when a professional force— marshaled against civil-
ians. In the Peterloo massacre of 1819, constables, unable to control 
a crowd of sixty thousand demonstrators in Manchester, called in 
the hussars. When a dozen civilians were killed, the authorities real-
ized that the old system of repression no longer worked. Victorian 
Britain used the military against civilians only twice: during riots 
against the ban on Sunday trading in 1855 and during the parlia-
mentary reform agitation of 1866– 1867.82 In the early twentieth 
century, troops were deployed mainly in industrial disputes.83 The 
Emergency Powers Act of 1920 allowed the British army to protect 
food and fuel supplies. In the United States, the Posse Comitatus 
Act of 1878 restricted the use of the army for domestic policing 
duties, something that had become widespread in the South after 
the civil war.84
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The separation between military and police took longer else-
where. In the late nineteenth century, Russian authorities trans-
ferred cases to military tribunals if necessary for public order.85 In 
the early twentieth century, Budapest’s uniformed police were still 
a military troop, armed and barracked like soldiers, ready for service 
at a bugle call. The Italian carabinieri, originally a sixteenth- century 
branch of the Piedmontese army, remained part of the military 
after Italy’s unification. It reported to the Ministry of War and, for 
its more purely policing functions, to the Ministry of the Interior. 
Much the same held for the French gendarmerie and the Span-
ish guardia civil.86 In Germany, the Social Democrats proved disas-
trously willing to use the Freikorps (demilitarized troops employed 
domestically) to suppress the revolution of November 1918. The 
Freikorps’ murder of Communist leaders soured relations between 
the two major parties of the Left, later undermining hopes of a uni-
fied opposition to the Nazis. The Third Reich continued blurring the 
lines, turning the police into the “internal army.”87 In the develop-
ing world, militarized police are still used as, in effect, an occupying 
army, as when Brazil’s federalized police invade favelas and battle 
drug gangs. Recent terrorism has also meant that semi- militarized 
gendarmeries have expanded, especially in border security.88
National guards bridged the gap between police and the mili-
tary, deployed in emergencies without seeming to pit army against 
citizens. In 1842, after riots were quelled by the army, Cincinnati 
created a reserve militia police guard.89 More recently, the police, 
locked in an arms race with offenders, have adopted military equip-
ment and tactics, blurring the line again. Even as the state monopo-
lized violence, pacifying society, armaments technology forced it to 
weaponize at home as military battlefield kit leaked to criminals. 
Nineteenth- century police were armed with sticks and swords. 
London inspectors were allowed to carry pocket pistols as of 1829, 
and constables could draw revolvers from 1883 on.90 The British 
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police still generally do not carry arms when on patrol, but they use 
body armor and updated weapons such as batons, rigid handcuffs, 
and incapacitating spray. Trained officers (5 percent of the force) 
are armed.91 German, French, and US police are armed as a matter 
of routine.92 Legitimized by the “war” against drugs and then ter-
rorism, SWAT teams and other paramilitary units have been used 
against civilians.93 In the United States, deployment of such quasi- 
military teams increased fourteenfold in the late twentieth century, 
often for nonemergencies such as drug searches. Their tactics, weap-
ons, and attitudes have been adopted by regular police forces, too.94
Crowd control upped the ante. Authorities fear mass unrest far 
more than individual crime. To deal with unruly crowds, violent 
crimes, hostage situations, and terrorism, police forces everywhere 
have ratcheted up their technological prowess, maintaining special 
units for emergencies. Water cannons and tear gas are used to dis-
perse crowds. French forces especially have been armed to the teeth. 
Gendarmes use the army’s standard assault rifles, submachine guns, 
and pump- action shotguns. In extreme situations, they marshal 
heavy weaponry, helicopters, armored vehicles with machine guns, 
and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear protection equip-
ment.95 Since the late 1990s, the equivalent forces in the US have 
used surplus military hardware against civilian protests— armored 
vehicles, ballistic helmets, tactical vests, night- vision goggles. In the 
1960s, Britain, too, developed paramilitary forces to control crowds, 
strikes, and riots. Deployed against striking coal miners in the mid- 
1980s, they sported shields and helmets, later water cannon, tear 
gas, and plastic bullets, and eventually robocop armor.96 But there 
has also been technological de- escalation. Less- lethal weapons have 
been developed: stun guns and tasers, water and sound cannons, 
tear- and other gas. Hydraulic equipment and kinetic devices, stun 
grenades, and barricade- breaching technologies have joined the 
armamentarium. New technologies of crisis defusion have also been 
developed: mediation training and hostage negotiation.97
Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/books/book-pdf/1963888/book_9780262361507.pdf by guest on 27 December 2021
The State as Enforcer  265
Professionalizing the Police
Seen in a long historical sweep, the likelihood of an offender 
being punished has moved from possible through plausible to at 
times even probable. The dark figure of undetected crime remains 
obscure— more so the further into the past we go. To claim that the 
proportion of crimes committed that are also convicted is increas-
ing would be a supposition. But we do know that the percentage of 
those indicted who are also punished is growing. The early modern 
state, as we have seen, punished the few criminals in its hands in 
spectacular ways to trumpet its deterrent message. But as the justice 
system and the police were able to accomplish their mission more 
effectively, punishment shifted from sending a message to would- be 
criminals to dealing with those offenders in its grasp. The state was 
in a position to affect their behavior— whether merely by incapaci-
tating them or perhaps also by reforming them. The more prisoners 
in the state’s hands, the better it could influence overall criminality.
How the justice system upped its game can be gauged by its grow-
ing ability to deliver known offenders to their just deserts. Just 10 to 20 
percent of accused killers were convicted in fourteenth- century Eng-
land.98 More than 40 percent of those tried in seventeenth- century 
Sussex were acquitted, 30 of them in late seventeenth- century and 
early eighteenth- century Norfolk and Suffolk. Figures for all of Eng-
land from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries were similar.99 
Conviction rates in Bavaria in the early nineteenth century hovered 
between 40 and 50 percent.100 By the nineteenth century in France, 
they had climbed to 70 percent.101 And modern judiciaries convict 
even more efficiently. In Japan today, 90 percent of those tried plead 
guilty, and acquittal rates are miniscule.102 In Europe and the United 
States, the percentage of prosecutions leading to convictions are uni-
formly higher than 80 percent, sometimes significantly so.103
The judiciary became more efficient in prosecuting criminals for 
reasons explored later in this chapter. More fundamentally, crime 
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and sanction increasingly aligned from the eighteenth century on. 
Punishments were moderated, and death sentences grew rare. Juries 
no longer felt morally compelled to acquit petty criminals who oth-
erwise faced the scaffold. In a virtuous circle, the more offenders 
the state found and prosecuted, the less it had to rely on deterrence 
in the form of grotesque barbarities. The scissors gradually closed 
between what the authorities did to the wretches they caught to 
discourage other would- be criminals and what popular opinion 
regarded as proportionate sanction.
Even without juries to buffer an insistent prosecution, continen-
tal Europe’s inquisitorial systems had built- in circuit breakers in the 
form of pardons and amnesties. They were tripped when crime and 
sanction seemed out of synch or when the numbers of the indicted 
simply grew insurmountable. The Theodosian Code mentions 
thirteen amnesties granted between 332 and 413 CE. The Span-
ish Crown’s pardons extended even into the American colonies. 
When Louis XVI left Paris for exile in June 1791, he deplored how 
the National Assembly had stripped away his prerogative to pardon 
and commute sentences. His subjects, he lamented, would no lon-
ger regard him as their common father.104 Even in republican times, 
that tradition continues. The French prison population has largely 
been stable since 1988 thanks in part to a series of mass pardons 
marking national holidays or presidential inaugurations. Although 
the timing of their use differed from the Western experience, China 
had an even more luxuriant tradition of “great acts of mercy” by 
which entire cohorts of offenders were pardoned on a regular basis— 
every three years, for example, during the last four decades of 
Emperor Wu’s reign, from 128 BCE on.105 Overall, pardons today 
are rare, but they remain as a curiously patriarchal remnant of 
once- feudal relationships. As punishments aligned with offenses, 
the need waned for royal pardons (followed in republics by their 
presidential and gubernatorial versions) to take the edge off earlier 
barbarities. Perfect legislation, as Beccaria pointed out, eliminated 
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the need for pardons. Clemency should be the task of the legislator, 
not the sovereign.106 The state could finally enforce just, measured, 
and— above all— if not likely then at least not implausibly improb-
able punishments.
Starting in the nineteenth century, police numbers and budgets 
marched steadily upward. Figures began being kept in the 1930s, 
showing that police ranks per capita have multiplied almost every-
where.107 Some nations centralized their forces; others left oversight 
to local entities. Regardless, the police slowly professionalized and 
bureaucratized. Having begun as volunteers, officers were first sala-
ried and then subjected to modern bureaucracy’s usual processes of 
examination, training, discipline, and meritocratic advancement. 
In the early nineteenth century, the Russian tsar’s political police 
force was staffed by personnel so ill educated that they quite lit-
erally could not understand the regime opponents they interro-
gated.108 That had to change.
Maintaining order, providing evidence to prosecute offenses, and 
preventing crime were, in that order, largely what police did. The 
medieval hue and cry did rouse citizens in immediate pursuit of an 
offender, but grappling with criminals in flagrante diminished as 
part of police work. Today, only about a tenth of radio calls to patrol 
cars raise even the possibility of law enforcement in the narrow 
sense— stopping a burglary, catching a prowler, making an arrest, 
or investigating something suspicious.109 In New York, even in poor 
neighborhoods in the high- crime 1980s, 40 percent of patrol offi-
cers made not a single felony arrest per year, and 69 percent made 
no more than three. In London, an officer might encounter a bur-
glary in progress once every eight years. Direct crime work took up 
as little as 3 percent of patrol officers’ working hours.110
In the twentieth century, the French police boasted an ability 
to find their culprit anywhere in the nation within twenty- four 
hours. Such powers developed only slowly. Continental police 
could inspect and arrest. In 1666, the officers of the Châtelet, the 
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most important police headquarters in Paris, were given the right 
to enter homes and other buildings. Bearing arms was also concen-
trated largely in their hands, though not wholly— thanks to resistant 
nobles.111 In the Anglo- Saxon nations, police had few powers beyond 
those of civilians. In seventeenth- century Sussex, the old hue and 
cry, obliging all citizens to help corral offenders, gave way to the need 
for written warrants, sworn before a justice of the peace and issued 
to a constable. This requirement made rounding up more of a duty 
for officials. In the eighteenth century, constables began making 
arrests and bringing offenders to court and jail. They also searched 
for the accused and at times for stolen property. Nonetheless, bring-
ing offenders to justice still remained the task of victims.112
Robert Peel founded the London police in 1829. He wanted his 
bobbies regarded as but members of the public who were paid to 
give full- time attention to duties that were in fact incumbent on all 
citizens.113 In colonial America, attacks on constables and sheriffs 
were frequent, and they lacked any effective power to arrest sus-
pects who resisted. In mid- nineteenth- century New York, officers 
who misused firearms (killing a fleeing suspect, for example) were 
arrested by their colleagues like any civilian. Citizens had much the 
same powers of arrest as any official.114 Both New York and Lon-
don officers could be sued in ordinary courts for false arrest. In 
the United States, officers and citizens alike could arrest for misde-
meanors committed in their presence. Both could arrest for felonies 
they had witnessed and for those they had probable cause to believe 
had occurred. But if the felony turned out not to have taken place, 
the civilian, but not the officer, was considered to have committed 
an offense. Some US states also permitted shopkeepers, hoteliers, 
restauranteurs, and the like to arrest and detain suspects until the 
police arrived.115
In many US states today, ordinary citizens may still arrest for 
misdemeanors committed in their presence and for felonies they 
have probable cause to believe have occurred.116 Indeed, in certain 
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respects, citizens retain greater powers over each other than do the 
police. Authorities are bound by due- process restrictions on search-
ing and seizing evidence without warrants; citizens performing 
arrests are not.117 Even today in Britain, policing is theoretically a 
private matter, with the officer in principle but a uniformed citi-
zen. In the mid- 1980s, almost a quarter of criminal court cases were 
prosecutions by nonpolice agencies, such as local authorities or the 
Royal Society for the Protection of Cruelty to Animals, as well as by 
individuals.118 Citizens also retain powers to use proportional force, 
though not to detain, by relying on the doctrines of self- defense, 
defense of others, and defense of property. The right of self- defense 
remains since even modern police cannot always be everywhere. 
Even today, citizens must take responsibility for their own safety.119 
Ultimately, the modern state relies on a vestige of vigilantism.
And yet police were granted significant powers from the start. 
Constables in the late seventeenth century could arrest and imprison, 
break into houses, and disperse unruly crowds. Eighteenth- century 
London watchmen freely stopped odd people at night: a man selling 
cheese in the street at 3:00 a.m., for example, or carrying a sack of 
coal in the wee hours. Night watchmen looked out for suspicious 
people and arrested prostitutes and vagrants. Police in eighteenth- 
century Paris checked pedestrians at night and interrogated irreg-
ular characters, especially if they carried packages of potentially 
stolen goods.120 German cities were well policed within their walls, 
and it was the suburbs where delinquency flourished as authority 
petered out.121
Over time, such powers were enhanced. The Anglo- Saxon com-
mon law gave police but few powers of arrest beyond those of every 
citizen. True, only police could execute arrest warrants, but most 
arrests were made without one. Yet only police could execute search 
warrants and sometimes search without one. And they could com-
mand bystanders. English civilians could arrest without a warrant 
for serious crimes such as murder. Constables, however, could arrest 
Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/books/book-pdf/1963888/book_9780262361507.pdf by guest on 27 December 2021
270  Chapter 12
on suspicion alone. For minor offenses (being drunk and disorderly, 
for example), they needed no warrant.122 Such powers expanded 
in the nineteenth century. The Metropolitan Police Act of 1829 
empowered London bobbies to apprehend loose, idle, and disor-
derly persons whom they merely suspected of evil designs. Their 
New York colleagues could arrest those seemingly intent on a felony 
and their powers to search citizens for stolen goods were modeled 
on the London statutes. The portmanteau concept of disorderly 
conduct gave police on both sides of the Atlantic broad discretion. 
Being tasked to regulate traffic also gave London police expansive 
powers to disperse crowds and to keep thoroughfares open.123
Secret Police
“When a man marries his mistress, he creates a job vacancy” is a 
bon mot often attributed to the financier Jimmy Goldsmith but 
coined in fact by the multiwedded French actor Sacha Guitry.124 So, 
too, with the police. As they became rule bound, regulated by law, 
and tasked with enforcing order in increasingly democratic soci-
eties, the need arose for special forces to sidestep the established 
procedures that now hobbled official inquiry. Once a uniformed 
police presence became commonplace, its deterrent effect lessened. 
Undercover police now became the joker in the deck. Pinkerton’s 
plainclothesmen deterred because no one could be certain whether 
one was lurking nearby.125
Secret police were used against occult crimes in particular, espe-
cially theological and political unorthodoxy. The ancient Greek sky 
and thunder god Zeus, who was not omniscient, ran a spy service 
of thirty thousand immortals who roamed the earth, noting unjust 
deeds. Aristotle recommended a system of spies to keep tabs on dissi-
dents.126 Starting in the thirteenth century, Franciscans and especially 
Dominicans (God’s dogs) were also early covert enforcers— trained 
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to ferret out heresy, operating Europe- wide, and answering directly 
to the pope.127 Many of the techniques later perfected by the mod-
ern secret police were first tested by the Inquisition: evaluating evi-
dence of forbidden thoughts such as ritual practices or refusal to 
participate, ownership of prohibited writings, association with other 
suspects, statements to others. Nonheretics were obliged to report 
and testify; confession was extracted by threatening punishments 
or implying that others had already revealed all; grace periods were 
promised those who confessed now.128 Under Henry VIII, Thomas 
Cromwell used his network of spies to report on subjects’ theologi-
cal shortcomings and doubts about the king’s marital extravagances. 
Sometimes informants pretended to be fellow prisoners to gain the 
trust of papists and other enemies of the throne.129 In Renaissance 
Florence, tracking aristocratic families’ plots against the Medicis was 
the secret police’s main function, as under Nicholas I in Russia.130 
Joseph II, Holy Roman emperor in the late eighteenth century, used 
his undercover police to keep tabs equally on his own officials and 
on revolutionaries.131 The Bourbon secret police in the early nine-
teenth century kidnapped and sometimes murdered political oppo-
nents in exile— as does the Russian government to this day.132
As democratic winds began to blow across Europe, the autoc-
racies feared revolution. In quiet times, the secret police mostly 
tracked the opposition press, followed and sometimes censored 
books and theater, and kept an eye on political meetings. The Prus-
sians banned all German- language papers imported from America, 
fearing democratic tendencies.133 But as protest quickened, things 
turned nastier. The French police speciale and the tsar’s Third Depart-
ment, dating to the sixteenth century, were among the most noto-
rious of Europe’s political police forces, ruthlessly suppressing 
opposition.134 The English Special Branch was established in 1884 
in response to bombings by Irish republicans. Despite much postur-
ing about French- style plainclothesmen being an arm of autocracy, 
even the British found them useful. In 1842, a small detective force 
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was established surreptitiously and not publicly acknowledged 
until the 1870s. From the late nineteenth century on, the British 
police, much like their continental counterparts, made clear their 
interests in political enemies.135 Before unification in the 1870s, the 
German states collaborated across their multiple borders to track 
liberals, socialists, and Communists.136 World War I marked a water-
shed, with the state now massively keeping tabs on its soldiers and 
citizens, including by intercepting and reading mail to measure the 
pulse of public opinion. If the Russian monarchy had forty- nine 
police officers reading the public’s letters in 1913, the Soviets had 
ten thousand doing this work seven years later.137
Agents provocateurs were especially resented, embroiling the state 
in similar questions of complicity as its use of informers and entrap-
ment for regular crime. Joseph Fouché, in service seriatim to the 
revolution, the Directory, and Napoleon, spearheaded the deploy-
ment of political undercover agents.138 So active were the secret 
police under Napoleon III’s Second Empire that all seditious affairs 
were said ultimately to have been their doing, much as Louis XV 
had been assured that wherever three people met, a police spy was at 
hand. Indeed, during the 1880s the police prefect financed the first 
Parisian anarchist newspaper, writing articles in it that prompted 
bombing attempts.139 The Lyon police maintained a certain secret 
society so as to have conspirators to arrest or release as government 
policy demanded.140 When Captain Renault ordered the “usual sus-
pects” rounded up in Casablanca, this was the tradition he drew on.
Detective squads were also established to collect evidence and 
track down offenders. Detectives thus did what is commonly con-
sidered police work, but precisely because most actual patrol work 
was not like that, separate detective outfits were needed. One of the 
first was the criminal investigation division set up in London in 
1842. Detectives’ work habits and tasks differed sharply from the 
regular police: no uniforms, regular beats, or schedules. Detectives 
were reactive, delving deeply to solve crimes post facto. They were 
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in close contact with the underworld, so corruption and graft were 
common among them. Like vice control, detective work was a tan-
gle of mixed motives and quasi- legal temptations.141
The detective quickly became star of the most popular literary 
genre ever, barring perhaps the romance. The public was gripped 
by the narrative thrust, intellectual puzzles, and dramatic punch of 
the common law world’s courtrooms. Dueling attorneys presented 
competing narratives and their evidentiary backup to a jury of 
everymen. Starting with Edgar Allan Poe’s Murders in the Rue Morgue 
in 1841 and Wilkie Collins’s Woman in White in 1859, detective fic-
tion became the reading public’s staple.142 Charles Dickens is said 
to have invented the word detective, identifying Inspector Bucket 
in Bleak House (1852) as a “detective officer.”143 Introduction of the 
jury trial to Russia in 1864 made possible the use of fictional court 
cases with their inherent drama, presented as theater, to educate 
citizens in the early Soviet Union.144 By the mid- twentieth cen-
tury, a quarter of all English- speaking fiction and television pro-
grams were crime stories.145 Poe’s narrator may have emphasized 
his detective’s almost preternatural reasoning, but Dupin himself 
pursued evidence with unbridled empiricism.146 Sherlock Holmes 
spoke often of deduction, but his method was as inductive as scien-
tific method insisted.147 In A Study in Scarlet (1887), Watson noted 
Holmes’s excellent knowledge of chemistry, anatomy, biology, and 
geology but also his profound ignorance of literature and philoso-
phy. “Data! Data! Data!,” Holmes exclaimed in “The Adventure of 
the Copper Breeches” (1892). “I can’t make bricks without clay.”148
What Police Knew
Most important of the commodities traded by the police was 
information— the content, of course, but equally the flow. Tsar 
Nicholas’s secret police were his best— and surprisingly accurate 
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and useful— source of information on the state of his realm in all 
respects.149 Their hierarchical organization, military- style command 
and communications, and strategically located outposts made the 
police efficient conveyors. Someone reporting a crime could expect 
that something might actually happen in response.150 The early 
Russian police in cities were spaced at stations within eyesight or 
earshot of each other. Electronics merely amplified this technique. 
Already in the 1840s, the New York police connected the chief’s 
office with precincts via telegraph.151 With telephone and then two- 
way radio, help could be summoned at greater distances. Motorizing 
officers separated policing even more from the crime scene. Today, 
three- digit emergency phone numbers have annoyingly similar but 
unidentical three- digit codes: 911 (United States), 112 (European 
Union, but with local variants for landlines: 110 in Germany, 999 
in Britain), 100 (India), 110 (China and Japan), 190 (Brazil), 102 
(Russia). Once mastered, they make official emergency responders 
the first and best source of help. Americans know officers swooping 
in via car or helicopter as “911 policing.” Having once been a duty 
for all citizens, rescue became yet another state service, much like 
the government disaster relief that has mushroomed to cover most 
uninsured losses.152 The paparazzi who tailed Princess Diana’s car in 
Paris and then did nothing to save her after the crash were not pros-
ecuted since, as the court noted, one had phoned in the accident. 
With that, their legal duties had been fulfilled.153
The content of what the police knew or could discover was even 
more important. So long as most crimes pursued were tangible ones 
committed by offenders tied into networks of kin and community— 
known people deliverable for revenge or restitution— police were 
largely superfluous. But a private prosecutory system could scarcely 
deal with occult crimes that were not evidently known to others 
or with crimes that had been committed by people who were not 
members of groups that were willing to prosecute or defend.154 For 
the anomic criminal, for offenses requiring investigation, or for 
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crimes knowable only by probing, kin or other informal arrange-
ments did not suffice.
The state had tackled occult crime from the start. Ordeals— God’s 
testimony— were intended to solve crimes that might not have wit-
nesses (individual heresy, infanticide) or where witnesses were party 
to the offense (simony, adultery, incest, sodomy, concubinage, brib-
ery) or could not testify (bestiality).155 Torture, too, was meant to 
uncover hidden evidence. But over time, the judiciary’s verdicts 
came to depend not on supernatural and forced testimony but on 
circumstantial evidence and other simply empirical and scientific 
data. As oaths, ordeals, and torture were replaced by observational, 
scrutinized evidence, policing as an epistemological tool came into 
its own.
The judiciary found and punished ever more offenders as it grew 
better able to marshal evidence, constructing convincing cases. And 
as more merciful sanctions set in, ending popular resistance to how 
offenders were penalized, only faulty evidence impeded the state in 
prosecuting criminals. The civil law’s inquisitorial system was more 
targeted than the common law, with its adversarial confrontation 
before a jury. Prosecutors’ discretion whether to pursue cases varied, 
from largely none in nations such as Finland, Italy, and Germany to 
a great deal in the Netherlands and Norway.156 But after preliminary 
investigation, all civil law prosecutors brought forth those cases 
they considered winnable, thus increasing their hit rate. The com-
mon law states attorneys, in contrast, had to decide whether to pro-
ceed while armed with less information. And they were at the jury’s 
mercy, however watertight their arguments.157
The jury in turn evolved into a mechanism for evaluating evi-
dence. Having been a group of self- informing peers, picked largely 
because they already knew the circumstances, the jury turned into 
a forum for weighing evidence of thirdhand events. In the Middle 
Ages, they had been selected for their personal knowledge of the case. 
But such contact eventually disqualified jurors as nonimpartial.158 
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Once the oath, with its appeal to supernatural intervention, no 
longer promised certainty and a verdict, jurors had to evaluate the 
evidence.159 Sealed in the black box of the jury room, they judged 
witnesses’ credibility, their testimony’s verifiability. “Beyond a rea-
sonable doubt” evolved as the evidentiary legal standard at about 
the same time as the seventeenth century’s scientific revolution 
made testimony of the senses and empiricism more generally the 
most trusted form of knowledge.160
The state won cases largely on the evidence supplied from citizens 
and rounded up by police legwork. Before technology helped them 
much, the police turned to an unsavory ecosystem of spies, snitches, 
snoops, stooges, and informers who passed on gossip, denuncia-
tions, and hints, all prompted by an array of mixed motives: pay, 
reward, exemption from punishment, and sometimes even public- 
spiritedness. Napoleon’s concierges or the dvorniks of St. Petersburg 
were only the most regularized of the bunch.161 Plato required citi-
zens to report impieties they came across.162 In early modern Eng-
land, those who turned in criminals had their own crimes pardoned. 
Informers ratted on tariff and customs violators and religious dis-
senters in the seventeenth century and then on violators of Sabba-
tarian laws and public cursers in the eighteenth. Lutheran pastors 
in sixteenth- century Württemberg were required to inform on each 
other.163 Informants often made serious money from rewards paid 
for leads. In the Victorian era, this use of rewards led to scandal and 
parliamentary inquiries.164
Old- regime France required brothel madams to file reports on 
their clients. Prostitutes were handy sources of information in the 
nineteenth century. French detectives believed that mouchards 
(informants) were as useful to tracking down crime as smoke was 
to locating fire. Chinese Communists took a similar approach in 
the late 1940s.165 The tsarist police enlisted house porters and night 
watchmen.166 The Soviet and Nazi secret police relied heavily on 
denunciations, and no system has ever roped in proportionately as 
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many snitches as the East German Stasi. Former criminals in China 
today provide the bulk of informants and information.167 In mod-
ern liberal democracies, too, informers pull their weight, encourag-
ing religious extremists to become terrorists, for example, and thus 
leading to their arrest.168 The recent lavish development of con-
spiracy law has incentivized criminals to rat on their fellow offend-
ers.169 But, like entrapment, relying on informers means that the 
police must encourage crime in order then to solve it.
Bounties made lay citizens collaborators with the police. In ideol-
ogized states, whether religious or political, denunciation enforced 
orthodoxy.170 But denouncers have been found everywhere. In 
ancient Greece, sycophants were those who turned in offenders for 
a share of the spoils. In the Middle Ages, denunciation allowed pros-
ecution even of those whom no one wished to officially accuse.171 
In seventeenth- century England, neighbors denounced each other 
at extraordinary rates for sexual deviance.172 In fourteenth- century 
Venice, carved lions’ mouths on the sides of buildings hid letter 
slots for denunciations. In Florence a century later, residents’ tam-
burazione, anonymous denunciations to the police, initiated many 
prosecutions. Tsar Paul I placed his infamous yellow box to receive 
denunciations in front of the Winter Palace in St. Petersburg.173 The 
French revolutionaries— like later totalitarian regimes— elevated 
denunciation to a civic virtue. Done publicly, it protected the gen-
eral good against enemies and was therefore allegedly morally supe-
rior to the private gain pursued by the old regime’s snitches.174
Informers played crucial roles in early modern Europe. Eight per-
cent of Florence’s police budget went to paying them, and another 12 
percent to reward those who reported violations of peace and treaty 
agreements. Minor public officials, the sindaci, were selected for each 
neighborhood, tasked with reporting crime and rewarded by the 
case.175 In seventeenth- century England, rewards for evidence lead-
ing to conviction became a lucrative element of the justice system— 
apprehending a highway robber paid £40 and the offender’s horse, 
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arms, and money. Informants on illegal London gin shops collected 
half the fine, as did their colleagues in the American colonies who 
reported shoddy merchandise or retail fraud.176 More than 90 per-
cent of prosecutions under the Statute of Apprentices (1563) were 
brought by private informers. Many made a profession of informing. 
In 1699, the “Tyburn Ticket” was granted to those who helped con-
vict burglars, shoplifters, and horse thieves, exempting them from 
duties in local offices— such as policing their neighborhood as con-
stables. In 1720, the total reward for the conviction of a robber in 
London was £140, thrice a journeyman’s annual income.177
Such incentives continue today. Besides the rewards posted on 
the most- wanted list, information leading to conviction pays off as 
immunity from prosecution for those who testify as state’s evidence. 
Bounty hunters are rewarded, as are whistle- blowers— in tax fraud, 
proportionately to the recouped sums.178 US state attorney gener-
als’ offices keep the fines they impose on banks for malfeasance.179 
Law enforcement agencies retain some of the proceeds of confiscated 
crime- related property.180 Prosecution of some crimes relies heavily 
on covert information, for example, insider trading, where bounties 
can reach 10 percent of penalties (which can be thrice the illicit prof-
its). Up to a third of cleared- up crime may be thanks to informers.181
Other surreptitious means of information gathering have evolved 
with the technology at hand. For centuries, private letters have 
been opened by state officials, leading to an arms race of competing 
techniques of sealing, opening, and resealing them. Eavesdropping 
in the literal sense has occurred ever since there were eaves to stand 
under, the edge of the eaves marking the legal limit of the private, 
domestic space.182 Electronic devices now make for more convenient 
listening, wiretapping phones, secretly recording conversations, and 
audio- surveilling homes and offices. Today, we debate government 
access to email and social media.
Much more of a revolution and not just amplifying the circuits of 
witnessing was the growing acceptance of empirical and scientific 
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evidence independent of human testimony. The judicial system’s 
evidentiary base gradually shifted from confession and witnessing 
to evidence that existed autonomously of anyone involved in the 
offense. Insisting on eyewitness testimony and confession, Roman 
law had discounted circumstantial evidence. Interrogation, with tor-
ture as its most extreme form, never got beyond witnesses, including 
possible perpetrators, and their limited and self- interested vantage. 
Today we forbid torture, not only for humanitarian motives but also 
for epistemological reasons as likely to produce self- serving and 
unreliable information. And we understand eyewitness testimony to 
be inherently unreliable, colored by all manner of influence and but 
a dim reflection of what happened.183 The testimony of facts and the 
traces of our biological and physical trails instead supply the most 
illuminating evidence. We are spared the forceful extraction of con-
fession from our souls by the betrayal of our bodies. Indicia, once 
spurned as merely epiphenomenal, have returned as the queen of 
evidence.
The new evidentiary gold standard relied on induction from 
knowledge of the world to conclude guilt or innocence, entirely 
independent of whether the acts in question had been witnessed 
or even perceived. Knowledge could be uncovered regardless of 
humans encountering it, having it, or testifying to it. One of Roman 
law’s two queen proofs, eyewitness, came to be understood as unre-
liable and often outright misleading. Indeed, false or mistaken 
eyewitness accounts have proven to be the preeminent cause of 
wrongful convictions.184 The apparently stolid facts presented by 
the world instead took their place. Forensic investigations have 
been performed at least since the physician Antistius claimed that 
only one of Julius Caesar’s twenty- three stab wounds had been fatal 
and even two centuries earlier in China. Sung Tz’u’s thirteenth- 
century Chinese text on forensic investigation, The Washing Away of 
Wrongs, explained how to distinguish between corpses killed before 
or after being burned or inundated, how to discern the difference 
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between hanging and strangulation or between drowning and 
being drowned, and how to distinguish murders from suicides com-
mitted so as falsely to implicate others. With a deft noirish touch, 
he recommended checking the anuses of unexpectedly deceased 
elderly husbands married to young wives— to look for hidden pene-
tration wounds.185 In early modern Europe, mothers who gave birth 
while alone and whose child died were often suspected of infan-
ticide. Had the infant been stillborn or killed postpartum? In the 
absence of an unimplicated eyewitness, the lungs of the infant were 
submerged in water. If they floated, that was considered proof that 
the child, born alive, had taken its first gasps to inflate them.186
Early modern Russian peasants killed by beating on planks placed 
on their victims’ swaddled stomachs. This technique destroyed the 
victims’ innards without leaving external traces but was rendered 
obsolete once coroners began their forensic investigations in the 
late nineteenth century.187 In 1905, two murderers were hanged on 
the basis of a thumbprint on a cash box.188 In the late nineteenth 
century, crime photography began to reveal evidence obscure to the 
naked eye. The disturbed dew drops on a park bench next to the 
body of an apparent suicide, for example, betrayed the presence of 
someone else at the scene.189 In such cases— whatever the merits of 
the science of the day— nature spoke directly, though not unaided, 
to the court. We now take cross- examining nature on the stand— 
the dramatis personae of countless courtroom dramas— so much for 
granted that we are blind to the significance of the change.
Fingerprinting emblematized the justice system’s embrace of the 
new scientific evidence. “Every contact leaves a trace” was the man-
tra of the investigatory work that underlay forensic science.190 Fin-
gerprinting was used sporadically in the ancient world and likely 
developed first in China. It caught on systematically in British India 
and then in Europe and the Americas in the 1890s. The first trial 
where fingerprinting provided the main evidence was held in India 
in 1898. The court accepted that the partial print left behind proved 
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the suspect had touched a box with stolen money and so convicted 
him of burglary. But it was still unwilling to accept by the implied 
logic that he had also killed the box’s owner.191
Subsequent technologies have sharpened our observational lens, 
often demonstrating that earlier techniques were faulty or unreli-
able. Crime scenes were photographed to scale, footprints measured 
and cast in plaster, soles typologized, as were automobile and bicy-
cle tires later.192 Particulate residue in earwax as well as nail and hair 
clippings gave evidence of activities undertaken even months ear-
lier. Starting in the 1930s, blood typing began to crudely associate 
suspects with offenses. DNA testing has since become an exact and 
reliable science.193 Together with genetic databases, it now allows 
criminals to be identified even decades after their offense. Dental 
records began identifying murder victims. Tooth isotope analysis 
revealed where victims had grown up and sometimes events of their 
lives— whether they had been weaned and if they had ever starved. 
Toxicology pinpointed more wrongful poison deaths. Microscopic 
examination allowed crime’s implements to be identified. Ballistics, 
the forensic analysis of bullets and firearms, became its own dis-
cipline in the late eighteenth century.194 Chemistry was turned to 
detecting forgeries— of checks, wills, or artworks.
Over time, some technologies were displaced or discredited. 
Now supplanted by DNA analysis, the once popular microscopic 
inspection of hair proved largely worthless.195 Graphology held the 
nineteenth- century world in thrall. It still retains adherents but has 
been largely discredited— indeed, handwriting itself is a technology 
in steep decline. Alphonse Bertillon— inventor of the mugshot— 
helped convict Alfred Dreyfus, the Jewish officer accused of treason 
against France in 1894, with convoluted claims that Dreyfus him-
self had written incriminating documents using a tracing method 
as though someone were forging his actual hand, thus giving him 
deniability.196 Not that we have freed ourselves of charlatanry. 
Doubtful technologies of alleged expertise still sway juries, such as 
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blood- spatter analysis, forensic investigation of clothing, and body- 
language scrutiny.197 DNA analysis has instead become the gold 
standard, revisiting and upending past wrongful convictions based 
on more primitive technologies. “DNA testing is to justice what the 
telescope is for the stars,” one of its early practitioners put it, “a way 
to see things as they really are. It is a revelation machine.”198 But 
its precision can and has been overstated, and its seeming accuracy 
has created problems. A German swab- manufacturing technician 
(dubbed the “Phantom of Heilbronn”) inadvertently spread his 
own DNA to evidentiary samples and so appeared to be a prolific 
serial offender. Transplant recipients receive and incorporate the 
DNA of their donors and can leave it behind as traces. And people 
may plant misleading DNA at crime scenes.199 More generally, such 
evidence supplies evermore ammunition for the common law’s 
adversarial system. Experts duel for both sides, leaving juries to sort 
out whose testimony deserves credence.200
Keeping track of previous offenders has been vital. Mutilation and 
branding were once both an element of punishment and a conve-
nient indicator of recidivism. Now we use the everyday singularities 
of the human body.201 The British compiled a Register of Distinct 
Marks in the 1870s on the assumption that criminals’ bodies were 
individual enough to allow identification.202 Bertillon systematized 
this approach in the 1880s by measuring bodily dimensions for indi-
vidual identification. This cumbersome anthropometrical method, 
Bertillonage, was overtaken by the (re)discovery late in the cen-
tury that fingerprints were unique.203 Fingerprinting also had the 
enormous advantage of combining a system of identification— like 
Bertillonage— with the evaluation of traces left behind at the crime 
scene. And today fingerprints can even be dated.204 The more fin-
gerprints, the more useful the database, and so the race was on to 
expand the files. By 1906, Australian police were routinely collecting 
fingerprints of known “bad characters under arrest.” By the 1950s, 
the volume had become so large that some jurisdictions discontinued 
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printing minors.205 In the United States, the FBI amassed some 
eighty million fingerprints, only some of which belonged to crimi-
nals. Reformers pushed for universal or at least broad fingerprinting 
of all citizens.206
From the 1840s, photography, too, was used to identify offend-
ers. The Prevention of Crimes Act of 1871 in England established 
a national photographic record.207 In the 1880s, the mugshot was 
standardized by Bertillon. Unable to send photographs other than 
by mail, he also developed a system of written portraits to telegraph 
descriptions of suspects. This foreshadowed the algorithms that 
contemporary face- recognition technology uses to express images 
in machine- searchable formats. But, given the technology of the 
day, in fact most of these late nineteenth- century written portraits 
were largely identical, and few suspects without identifying marks 
were arrested on this basis.208 Like fingerprints, DNA records even of 
nonconvicts are kept today. In France as of 2003, DNA profiles were 
collected from suspected offenders, with fines and jail for refusals, 
and of all inmates serving longer sentences.209
Quotidien Policing
As policing joined the state’s machinery, many of its functions 
blended into everyday life. Data gathering hummed along in the 
background. Secret police and informers did their work covertly, 
but information was also amassed openly, often with subjects’ 
active help. This was the “long, laborious, repulsive investigation” 
foreseen by Edwin Chadwick, the great Victorian social reformer, as 
necessary for preventive policing.210
In the Middle Ages, self- governing towns and cities decided who 
could live there, just as guilds and other corporations chose who 
exercised the professions. We take freedom of movement and res-
idence, Freizügigkeit, for granted, at least within each nation, but 
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it was one of the first civil rights won— in France with the revolu-
tion as intermediary organizations were abolished. But the state still 
wanted to know who lived where and worked as what. Deep into the 
twentieth century, localities could deny paupers residence.211 The 
duty to register home addresses, broadly imposed across the Euro-
pean continent, helped police track suspects. Required to record 
visitors, hotels, too, were dragooned into the effort.212 With livrets 
and other work papers, police could monitor apprentices’ and jour-
neymen’s movements as of the mid- eighteenth century. Passports 
did the same for border crossings.213 Their analogues also allowed 
control domestically in nations such as the Soviet Union and China 
today that restrict freedom of residence. When in the midst of the 
Seven Years’ War Mr. Yorick in Laurence Sterne’s novel Sentimental 
Journey (1768) traveled without any papers from London to Paris, 
the modern reader is amazed by the sheer haphazardness of it all.
Security cameras and traffic monitoring gather petabytes of 
data, tamed into intelligibility by face- recognition and other order-
ing technologies. A city dweller in Britain can expect to be filmed 
every five minutes. Police have become eager consumers of mili-
tary and other databases. The satellite photos used by the Los Ange-
les police to place O.  J. Simpson’s white Bronco at the site of his 
wife’s murder were supplied by a commercial company.214 Police 
speed traps were set up in Britain already with the first speed lim-
its in 1903. Radar and other remote monitoring of driving and ran-
dom breathalyzer tests have turned all drivers into potential suspects. 
Even without being considered offenders, we are surveilled.215 DNA 
databases allow authorities to identify offenders using family resem-
blances from samples of relatives, not just to confirm suspicions of 
guilt based on other evidence. Automated face recognition coupled 
with blanket closed- circuit television coverage has undermined the 
anonymity once expected in public.216 Every year the London police 
crack some two thousand cases using fingerprints and another two 
thousand with DNA. But in 2016 they solved twenty- five hundred 
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cases using imagery and face recognition— and more cheaply, too. In 
2018, the Chinese police used face recognition to spot a suspect in a 
concert audience of sixty thousand. The culprit had hoped he would 
blend in.217 Durkheim’s proverb “One is nowhere so well hidden as in 
a crowd” no longer held. Virtual policing at a distance had arrived.218
Computer- analyzed big data have begun to routinize the con-
stant background surveillance of all citizens, suspects and inno-
cents alike, begun by traffic monitoring. By uncovering patterns 
indiscernible to the naked eye, digital analysis lays bare what once 
was secret— criminal or not.219 Indoor marijuana farms in bland 
suburbia have been betrayed in the days of incandescent lighting 
by exorbitant electricity bills. Insider trading has been revealed by 
analyzing stock sales patterns in the run- up to important corporate 
announcements. Radiologists are being displaced by computer-
ized detection of clinical anomalies in medical scans, and doctors 
use pattern- recognition technology to diagnose rare diseases that 
mark our faces. Algorithms have been able to discern the sexuality 
of photographed persons better than human observers, and they 
predict recidivism as well as professionals do.220 The body continues 
to betray the soul. Without torture, observers can still penetrate our 
interiors. More mundanely, big data feed the actuarial calculations 
that foresee who will reoffend. Algorithms analyze homicide data, 
identifying subtle similarities among cases and thus indicating serial 
killers at work.221 Police forces in Chicago and New Orleans have 
data trawled through police records, social media, and auto records 
to identify likely future offenders and crime hot spots. Though the 
results have been mixed, the trend is undeniable.222
Today’s data- drenched surveillance technologies arguably 
reachieve on a global scale the transparency and lack of privacy 
once characteristic of the village community. Urban anonymity and 
the policing functions it required may turn out to have been a two- 
century blip in a longer continuity of panoptic self- policing. As more 
accurate information is gleaned from freely available observation, 
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strengthened privacy may not suffice to shield citizens. Laws protect-
ing privacy assume that legally enforceable ignorance of what you 
want to keep to yourself is a goal in itself, worth defending. In fact, 
privacy is but a crude and indirect means of achieving the real aim: 
ensuring that we do not suffer from others knowing what were once 
our secrets. When we no longer can hide information, privacy prom-
ises little. Assuming instead that greater transparency is inevitable, 
whether privacy protections are beefed up or not, it is arguably better 
to protect against being persecuted by others who now know what 
once was kept under wraps. We achieve autonomy more effectively 
by strengthening other rights than by hiding behind an ever less 
opaque veil of privacy.
Policing has also been baked into everyday life by gradually hard-
ening the environment against crime. Theft, for example, was once 
a different sort of offense. There were fewer things to steal, and they 
were more easily identifiable because hand- made and unique. Even 
coins were once— in medieval Iceland— individually identifiable.223 
With the largely interchangeable artifacts of mass industrialization, 
however, theft is often not worth the bother of investigating. Wom-
en’s jewelry, its sentimental value often greater than its market 
value, is among the last kind of item we seek to retrieve, not just to 
replace. We have instead socialized theft’s cost through compensa-
tion or insurance, simply substituting largely fungible goods. Items 
whose return is worth pursuing we make even more unique by tag-
ging them with serial numbers or other identifiers (and sometimes 
even by swabbing them with human DNA). Yet even with mass con-
sumption, society seeks to make fungible goods less available. Early 
modern burglars often tortured their victims to reveal where valu-
ables were hidden.224 Today safes and bank deposit boxes have the 
musty air of a declining technology. Muggers might force victims to 
reveal their ATM pin codes, but the amount and number of with-
drawals that can be made are limited, anyway. Credit instruments 
have reduced the valuables in circulation. In the early nineteenth 
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century, cattle salesmen who once carried cash began using checks, 
postdating them so that if they were stolen, the funds could be fro-
zen.225 Stripping cash out of retail transactions has diminished the 
incentives for theft. In return, crime has gone cashless, too, target-
ing digital repositories of value— identity theft, internet fraud, and 
the like.
Theft is now an increasingly socialized risk, yet it has also become 
more difficult. The early modern thief faced few obstacles. Today, 
there is more to pilfer, but it is harder to do so. Locks have become 
evermore intricate, resistant, and cheap— allowing everyone the 
security of the rich person’s strongbox. Lockpicking is a skill in ter-
minal decline. As simple bolts, locks merely impeded intrusion into 
an occupied space. The development of the key allowed owners 
privacy and security even when they went out. Homer described 
an early version of such a contraption, and Christ promised Peter 
the keys to heaven.226 Locks were two- faced. They protected people 
from each other and from the state. As in our own debates over 
encryption software (a digital lock), the state also demanded access 
to physical locks for its own authorized purposes. In Plato’s repub-
lic, the Guardians— with nothing to hide— were forbidden locks 
on their doors. When that prohibition was no longer possible, the 
state still demanded entry. Following a bombing of the tsar’s train 
in November 1879, the authorities ordered St. Petersburg students 
to leave their keys in the door, allowing the police to enter at will. 
The Nazis required known criminals to leave duplicate house keys 
with the police.227 The US Transportation Security Administration– 
approved luggage lock is the modern version of this pas de deux 
of citizen and authority. It protects us against each other but not 
against the state and its authorized intrusion.
Making the environment crime resistant goes back almost as far 
as the lock itself. The Statute of Winchester in 1285 prescribed what 
current terminology calls “target hardening” of highways between 
market towns. They were to be broadened, with woods and hedges 
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pruned back on either side to eliminate hiding places for robbers.228 
In the late seventeenth century, London required house owners 
to light public spaces by hanging lanterns in front of their homes 
between nightfall and curfew’s onset. Only in the following cen-
tury did that become a municipal task, centrally organized and paid 
by taxes. Robberies on highways were down, Edwin Chadwick cel-
ebrated in the early nineteenth century, in part because street light-
ing discouraged thieves.229 Just as sunlight is the best disinfectant, 
Supreme Court justice Louis Brandeis agreed, so electric light is the 
most efficient policeman.230 Lest we forget how terrifyingly crimo-
genic darkness was in pre- electric days, recall that committing an 
offense at night was long considered an aggravating element— as 
late as in the Napoleonic penal code. Burglary even today, defined 
as a nocturnal crime in Britain, can be punished more harshly than 
its daylight pendant, housebreaking.231
In our own day, ordinances in Florida hamper robbery by requir-
ing late- night convenience stores to remove window ads, making 
their interiors visible from the street.232 Shopping centers broad-
cast high- pitched sounds audible only to young ears to discour-
age teenagers from congregating. In the United States, post- 9/11 
federal buildings were built to resist bombs, while not resembling 
bunkers.233 Over the years, coins were made harder to shave, paper 
currency less easy to counterfeit, checks more difficult to forge.234 
Credit cards once required signatures, then pin codes; phones needed 
pin codes, then finger prints or face recognition. Safes became harder 
to crack, cars more theft resistant. Ignition keys stopped thieves from 
starting cars, and steering- column immobilizers prevented them 
from being driven even if hotwired. Improved registries of owner-
ship impeded selling stolen vehicles for parts. GPS technology can 
locate stolen automobiles almost instantly, and kill switches immobi-
lize them. Thefts of cars have plummeted (by 96 percent in New York 
City since the 1990s), with only older models still targeted.235 A fully 
crime- resistant environment will eventually leave little to chance, 
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constantly supervise its residents, instantly monitor outsiders, and 
never allow offensive situations to arise. In other words, we will one 
day live in something akin to today’s theme parks.236
Preventive Policing
Policing has been a preventive enterprise from the start. Making 
punishment collective gave many a stake in encouraging would-
 be offenders not to act in the first place. While society was orga-
nized in small communities, the state had little choice but to hope 
for enforcement from families, towns, corporations, and churches. 
Though the state might make the initial move, last- mile policing 
fell to civil society. Sureties and bonds required such intermediary 
groups to vouch for their members’ behavior, often punishing every-
one if individuals strayed. In China, groups of five to ten house-
holds were held responsible for each member’s conduct. The silin 
were the immediately proximate households that were duty bound 
to keep an eye out for illegal or immoral behavior and reform or 
report it. Failure to report criminal activity could result in bisection 
at the waist, while those who turned in offenders were rewarded 
like those returning from battle with an enemy’s head. Family 
members could also sometimes substitute for each other in serving 
prison sentences. In the 1950s, the Communists saddled work units 
with similar collective policing duties.237
Sureties in pre- Norman England held those who had posted 
them— sometimes the entire community— liable for the actions of 
others and subject to the punishment the offenders dodged by fail-
ing to appear for trial. Most extremely, those who acted as sureties 
were required to kill their charges if they continued to offend.238 
The Statute of Winchester continued this system, imposing collec-
tive responsibility on the hundreds. Under the frankpledge, every 
adult male was enrolled in a group of ten (a tithing), and it in turn 
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in a group of one hundred, which guaranteed the appearance of its 
members in court and paid fines in their absence.239 Aztecs punished 
kin for both treason and drunkenness by their family members. In 
fifteenth- and sixteenth- century Russia, communities were collec-
tively fined or flogged for members’ transgressions.240 Revolutionary 
France, which otherwise mandated individual liability, held commu-
nities collectively responsible for violent crimes and damages, except 
when offenders were demonstrably from elsewhere. The Soviets and 
Nazis punished and sometimes executed families of deserters.241 In 
the era of community policing, everyone was in effect a vigilante.
As with most other early means of enforcement, even when polic-
ing finally fell mainly to the state, sureties and bonds remained— 
used against labor leaders in the United States in the 1930s and 
against antiwar demonstrators in the 1960s.242 Canadians can still 
demand sureties, obliging each other to keep the peace. Anyone who 
fears harm to person or property or to spouse or child— for example, 
sex with a minor or publication of intimate photographs— can ask a 
court to require the defendant to sign a recognizance, promising to 
behave, with prison a threat otherwise. In 2014, a Canadian radio 
broadcaster, fired after allegations of sexual harassment, avoided 
one charge by agreeing to a peace bond guaranteeing his good 
behavior for a year.243 Chinese corporations are expected to police 
their employees even outside the workplace and are held account-
able for their offenses.244 Bail grew out of the English variant of this 
approach in the thirteenth century. Prisoners were released into 
the custody of sureties who vouched for them. No distinction was 
drawn, legally speaking, between being in jail and being under the 
guardianship of the surety. This system broadly continues today in 
the United States, where commercial bondsmen have full custodial 
rights over bailees, whom they guarantee to bring to trial.245
Even more obviously preventive were individual pledges of good 
behavior. Ulysses famously tied himself to the mast to avoid suc-
cumbing to temptation. The Egyptians formalized the precautions 
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individuals imposed on themselves. A man whose family tomb 
abutted another’s was made to swear in court that should he steal 
from the neighboring grave, he would be impaled, and his nose 
and ears cut off. Another Egyptian promised in court that if he 
divorced his wife, he would suffer a hundred blows and forfeit his 
share of their common property. Medieval Europe’s peaces obliged 
men to abjure violence, punishing them if they violated their word. 
In fourteenth- century England, the binding- over system gave the 
authorities— often prompted by private parties— power to require 
certain behaviors of someone on payment of a bond, which would 
be forfeited in default.246 Justices of the peace in Britain could 
demand sureties of those who threatened to beat or kill others, who 
brandished unusual weapons, who spoke intemperately, or who were 
quarrelsome. Indeed, anyone could demand sureties if willing to 
swear to the truth of the threat. Those of demonstrably bad character 
were also liable: people who consorted with prostitutes, badmouthed 
the authorities, slept during the day or were out at night, sired illegit-
imate children, or were thieves, eavesdroppers, drunkards, cheats, or 
vagabonds.247 Released prisoners in France had to post a cash security 
and could be ordered to live where the authorities designated, which 
as of 1851 meant outside of Paris or its suburbs.248 More generally, the 
institution of the oath was a form of preventive self- policing, the act 
of committing oneself to a certain standard of conduct.
Policing in the form of Polizei was inherently preventive. It was 
woven into society’s fabric, ordering and regulating almost every 
aspect of the community. As social engineering, it sought to prevent 
not only crime but also poverty, disease, hunger, pollution, unem-
ployment, addiction, bad housing, illiteracy, and, indeed, most other 
social ills. The French revolutionaries designated part of policing 
as administrative, tasked with maintaining public order and thus 
with preventing offenses.249 What the English considered preven-
tive policing— the scarecrow function of men in uniform— was by 
comparison much narrower: deterring by making police presence 
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obvious. Polizei, in contrast, dealt with the causes of crime by regu-
lating society as a whole. Yet even the continental nations eventually 
narrowed the police role to solving crimes and maintaining order in 
the superficial sense of public placidity. Modern policing let society 
run its course, reacting only in a specific and localized manner to 
punish transgressions after the fact.
Nonetheless, modern policing also had its preventive aspects. 
If crime were worth punishing after the fact, all the more reason 
to sidestep it in the first place. Spies and informers gave the police 
a head start on offenses. As we have seen, the law began to inter-
vene evermore anticipatorily. Policing followed suit, expanding 
from a post facto reactive rounding up of miscreants to a preven-
tive throttling of crime in the cradle. Preventive policing had been 
baked into traditional society’s small gemeinschaftlich communities 
where privacy was scant and everyone’s business public knowledge. 
Strangers could not settle there, and no one was unknown. Reputa-
tion was part of society’s informal information control. But in the 
anonymity of big cities, the authorities had to grow their own ears 
and eyes. Surveying the world from the compact urbanity of late 
eighteenth- century Edinburgh, Adam Smith noted that people in 
small communities were known, their actions observed. By misbe-
having, they forfeited their good character and reputation. But in 
large cities residents could do as they pleased.250
Bereft of help from offenders’ kin or community, metropolitan 
police had less chance to solve old crimes and therefore an incentive 
to prevent new ones. By surveillance, spying, warnings, and antici-
patory arrests, police identified and supervised potential offenders, 
seeking to forecast what was coming. When the London bobbies 
were first organized in the 1830s, they were reactive, maintaining a 
public presence to deter crime and responding when that failed. But 
police gradually began investigating on their own initiative, gather-
ing data to foresee and solve crimes, and deciding whom to keep 
tabs on. They even organized or facilitated transgressions to elicit 
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offenses (i.e., soliciting sex, offering bribes or to buy drugs, receiv-
ing stolen property, and even paying for murder), thus entrapping 
the too easily tempted with sting operations.251
Like the law, the police were preventive in different ways. Most 
rudimentarily, they deterred. A constant, uniformed, visible police 
presence reminded citizens they were under scrutiny. London watch-
men occupied their stations throughout the night, while town criers 
walked the streets.252 Nighttime curfews kept potential miscreants in 
bed. Police actively patrolled neighborhoods, seeking out crime and 
not just waiting for burghers to report offenses. The London and 
New York forces made such proactive intervention part of metropol-
itan life.253 In the words of the instructions issued to its superinten-
dent in 1829, the London police should make “it evident to all such 
that they are known and strictly watched, and that certain detection 
will follow any attempt they may make to commit the crime.”254 By 
their continual presence, Patrick Colquhoun’s London river police 
deterred theft of cargo from boats. The French rural police of the 
nineteenth century, the gardes champêtres, were also said to prevent 
merely by being there.255
Uniformed officers were visible deterrents— at least until they 
became taken for granted. As in the military, uniforms held their 
wearers to account. Much as mercenary soldiers in military regalia 
were dissuaded from melting away in battle, so uniforms hampered 
the police from repairing to the nearest bar rather than walk their 
beat in the cold. And it held them responsible. By contrast, plain-
clothes police occasionally shirked duties or acted unaccountably—
as they sometimes do today.256 Uniforms also kept police from secrecy, 
stealth, or subterfuge. The English made much of how their bobbies 
in blue (not red, the military color of the day) were the antithesis of 
the continent’s civilian and therefore secret police. Though not con-
ventionally uniformed, the London police were recognizable in their 
blue- tailed coats and top hats (which were reinforced so that in 
a pinch they served as stools to peer over walls). To avoid being 
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confused with autocratic secret police, bobbies wore their uniform 
even off duty.257 The Parisian police of the eighteenth century also 
patrolled in uniform. The sergents de ville sported blue uniforms, 
bicorne hats, and a white cane during the day but a saber by night. 
By the late nineteenth century, European police were uniformly 
uniformed, with the most splendid regalia found in Hamburg, the 
shabbiest in Glasgow.258
The issue was more complicated in the United States. Uniforms 
were initially resisted to avoid suggestions that police were a military- 
style force but also because they were considered socially degrading. 
In the 1830s, even servants refused livery, as did railroad conductors 
and police. They gave in only later in the century as labor- market 
competition heated up. In 1844, officers in New York trialing new 
blue uniforms were hissed and stoned. Yet uniforms eventually won 
out. They enhanced the police’s moral authority and also helped 
civilians avoid picking inadvertent fights with authorities in civvies. 
In 1853, New York police began wearing them on a regular basis.259
To this day, the police deter crime through an ongoing pub-
lic presence. Zero- tolerance policing, introduced in the 1980s as a 
constant neighborhood patrolling, deliberately turned away from 
the hyperreactive 911 style of policing at a distance. Even with the 
most rapid 911 response times, police nabbed only a tiny fraction of 
criminals in the act (3 percent in some studies). Tactics were there-
fore rejiggered. Officers continuously patrolled on foot, exercising a 
low- level discretionary authority to maintain order. That returned 
them to the scarecrow function implemented by the London bob-
bies more than a century earlier.260 Community policing likewise 
provided a constant uniformed presence and a willingness to handle 
disorder and minor offenses, not just intermittently pursue serious 
crime. This made policing a more persistent, intrusive, and ongo-
ing intervention into communities than the 911 style. Day after 
day, the police warned and advised, sending drunks home in taxis, 
shooing juveniles off the street, warning lovers to shun dangerous 
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parks, cautioning the disorderly.261 Everyday policing approximated 
the Japanese model, where officers behaved more like postal work-
ers, patiently following quotidian routines, than firefighters, rousted 
only in emergencies. Most Japanese police work not in patrol cars, 
but from local mini stations, the Koban, keeping an eye on neigh-
borhoods.262 Similarly, the Chinese use “grid managers” as a form of 
community control to keep an informal check on residents.263
As we have seen, target hardening, or building crime resistance 
into everyday infrastructure, also rudimentarily prevented offend-
ing by tamping down opportunities and temptations. A variant 
was the increasing passive knowledge that police collected on citi-
zens. Routine sobriety checkpoints and other forms of suspicion-
less testing, such as workplace drug probes, identified offenders and 
encouraged compliance by heightening the risk of being caught.264 
Broad, possibly universal DNA collection will likely soon dampen 
offending— at least by rational would- be perpetrators. As the traces 
we leave behind in public reveal evermore information about us 
(about our diets from a dried drop of sweat via metabolite analysis, 
for example), our hope of keeping secrets will diminish.265
Deterrence and everyday keeping order were just the start of 
the preventive effort. Deterrence did not demand any deep inves-
tigation, though omnipresent authority— its trump card— required 
resources. Moving beyond deterrence, the authorities also sought to 
get out ahead of crime. As new crimes were formulated, the police’s 
remit expanded. Thoughts— the motor of potential offenses— had 
long been under the glass. As the concept of inchoate offenses devel-
oped, the authorities had to investigate before or in the absence of 
the fact. Crimes without victims or witnesses could not await first 
being reported, nor could offenses where victims might not even 
know they had been harmed— fraud, say, or toxic- waste dumping.266
Some preventive policing was direct and uncomplicated. In the 
1930s, US police goon squads targeted violent criminals who enforced 
business deals or extorted payments. These offenders were known 
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to the authorities, who cruised in patrol cars until they recognized 
one, beating and disarming him. Decoy units were used to catch rob-
bers, sting operations to nab burglars. Illicit- drug marketplaces were 
patrolled, and special units kept tabs on repeat offenders.267 The 
police sought those most likely to offend. They extrapolated from 
past behavior and the characteristics of specific groups to anticipate 
future acts. Certain categories of people were statistically likely to 
have offended. Belonging to one was therefore often treated as tan-
tamount to having committed a crime. Predictions based on past 
conduct or on characteristics statistically associated with offending 
justified laws that targeted certain statuses or behaviors as proxies for 
others. Being statistically associated with offending often became a 
crime in itself.
Such guilt by proxy was not new. Those classified as landschädlich 
(harmful to the land) in the twelfth century (mainly robber knights 
and peasant vagabonds) were not allowed to defend themselves 
by oath and thus were legally disadvantaged. Nightwalkers were 
considered inherently suspicious and punished. Scolds were chas-
tised in the early modern era for being just that and so made to 
wear bridles.268 In sixteenth- century England, Jesuits were declared 
ipso facto traitors. In early modern and Victorian Britain and in 
the Napoleonic penal code, being a vagrant was punished regard-
less of any specific acts.269 Loiterers could be arrested for that rea-
son alone in England as of 1824. So in 1829 could loose, idle, and 
disorderly Londoners as well as anyone lying down or loitering in 
public between sunset and morning.270 Loitering with intent to com-
mit a felony was punishable, and after 1869 even the intent was not 
required for former convicts. The interwar fascist regimes also singled 
out political opponents and so- called asocial elements, aside from 
their supposedly racial enemies.271 Japanese Americans were interred 
during World War II as enemy sympathizers because of their ethnic-
ity. In 1934, New Jersey outlawed being a gangster, defined— among 
other ways— as possessing a machine gun while not in the military. A 
Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/books/book-pdf/1963888/book_9780262361507.pdf by guest on 27 December 2021
The State as Enforcer  297
Chicago ordinance in the 1970s forbade habitual drunkards, addicts, 
prostitutes, or felons from meeting in public.272
Gang membership has often been criminalized.273 If done in high- 
crime areas, otherwise legal behaviors have allowed police to stop 
suspects. British police gained broad powers to temporarily contain 
suspects, excluding certain categories of people from specific areas, 
stopping and searching, detaining for questioning, and remanding 
them to custody.274 Tax authorities have used algorithms to identify 
filers worth auditing. Terrorists have been targeted as such, before 
any act.275 Airport- security profiles justify pulling aside likely hijack-
ers or drug couriers. Police have employed an array of shorthand 
descriptions of potential offenders: the car- thief profile, the poacher 
profile, the serial- killer profile— and, of course, not forgetting the 
alimentary- canal- smuggler profile. With a touching faith in reverse 
psychology, one Florida state trooper developed a drug- courier pro-
file that targeted those who hoped to avoid drawing attention by 
driving through his remote beat precisely at the speed limit.276
Though modern policing sought more sophisticated criteria, it 
relied most heavily on past offenses to calculate the probability of 
future transgression.277 However crude, bygone behavior proved to 
be the most reliable indicator of that to come. Crime came to be 
seen not just as a one- off, spontaneous fluke but as the outcome of 
character, habit, or proclivity. Sentencing recidivists more harshly 
followed logically as a preventive tactic, even though it targeted 
the person more than the act. Recidivism was a self- fulfilling 
prophecy. As record keeping improved in the late nineteenth cen-
tury, the British and French authorities recognized that crimes 
were disproportionately committed by a small group of hardened 
roués.278 In Britain, the Habitual Criminals Act of 1869 imposed 
seven years of police supervision for second- time felony offend-
ers, with swift summary punishment for subsequent crimes.279 As 
of the 1880s, France relegated repeat offenders to penal colonies 
for life, while Italy used domicilio coatto, a form of internal exile.280 
Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/books/book-pdf/1963888/book_9780262361507.pdf by guest on 27 December 2021
298  Chapter 12
Louisiana passed a habitual offenders statute in 1870, allowing dou-
bled and tripled prison terms for second and third offenses and a 
life term for a fourth. Britain’s Prevention of Crime Act of 1908 tar-
geted repeat offenders with indefinite preventive detention added 
to the sentences already imposed. US laws in the 1930s imposed life 
sentences for fourth felony convictions.281 American three- strikes 
(habitual- offender) laws in the 1990s followed a similar logic. Ever- 
harsher subsequent punishments were not tailored to the crime but 
assumed that past offenses predicted future ones. They were in effect 
a form of preventive detention. Unfortunate results followed, such 
as lifelong prison for petty thefts, which had been haphazardly clas-
sified as felonies.282
Predicting future behavior on the foregone meant believing that 
past acts betrayed a quality likely to repeat itself. Based on psychol-
ogy, as a reading of character or proclivity, this type of prediction 
might have been plausible. Based on actuarial calculations asso-
ciating certain citizens with particular behaviors, however, it had 
at most probability going for it. Two big problems bedeviled such 
reasoning. First, requiring a history of transgression meant that 
offenders were identified as recidivists only late in their criminal 
careers. Yet offending is largely inversely proportional to age, the 
old obeying the law more than the young. When someone could 
finally be identified as a dangerous recidivist, chances were that he 
no longer was.283
Second, if recidivism were a proxy for an underlying causal vari-
able, then the problem had only been pushed back one level. To 
suspect someone on the basis of demographic, economic, social, 
or other indicators came close to criminalizing a certain status. But 
if a status were outlawed, how could being in breach of that sta-
tus ever end? Status based on volitional behaviors was one thing: 
scolds could perhaps bite their tongues, vagrants find housing and 
a job. But being born in a poor neighborhood to immigrant ethnic 
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minority parents was a potentially lifelong condition, impossible to 
overcome. Even so, targeting status rather than act proved a durable 
policing tactic. In 1962, the logic was challenged in the United States 
when a law making it illegal to be an alcoholic was struck down.284 
Yet to distinguish legally between status and act proved difficult. 
Sometimes status made certain acts unavoidable. The homeless had 
no choice but to sleep and drink in the open. So laws forbidding pub-
lic drinking, though technically targeting acts, effectively also pun-
ished status.285 Rarely has jurisprudence come so close to Anatole 
France’s trenchant bon mot about the law in its majestic impartiality 
forbidding both rich and poor from sleeping under bridges.
Despite flaws, actuarial predictions have increasingly been used 
to target recidivists and thus to prolong their sentences by denying 
them probation or parole and supervising them after release. The 
authorities have also moved to prevent future acts by the poten-
tially dangerous. Restraining orders, antistalking orders, antiloiter-
ing laws, limits on residence and employment, and restrictions on 
weapons have been tactics. In Chicago, thousands of young men 
on a “heat list” of those statistically predicted most likely to die in 
violent crime are warned by teams of detectives and social work-
ers of their risk in hopes of turning their lives around. In Kansas 
City, police routinely gather young— often Black and Hispanic— 
lawbreakers to caution them that if caught again even for minor 
infractions, they will suffer the severest penalties possible.286 
Extreme risk protection, or “red flag,” orders allowed authorities to 
deny access to weapons for those thought to pose threats. The US 
“war on drugs” permitted police to serve search- and- arrest warrants 
on sellers and users preemptively through no- knock raids.287 The 
implements of crime were also targeted. As we have seen, possess-
ing the requisite tools has been used as evidence of inchoate crimes 
such as conspiracy and attempt. Targeting mere possession made 
it easier to prosecute. Confiscating tools mixed prevention and 
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punishment.288 Impounding a john’s auto might deter prostitution, 
but it also punished his wife as its co- owner. The same held for the 
house where drugs were stashed. Confiscating the cash intended 
for a drug buy became in effect a fine on intent.289 Together with 
punitive fines, such civil asset forfeitures built on the logic of 
deodands— punishing the things that had offended— and added a 
retributive element to civil cases.290
Preventive sentencing, too, has become a large- caliber weapon 
in the arsenal of anticipatory enforcement. Why, after all, iden-
tify likely offenders if not to render them harmless? Subordinating 
individual rights to the public good, sentencing in anticipation of 
offending has understandably sparked controversy. Law enforce-
ment here adopted a technique long common in public health, 
restricting the freedom of those whose travels, contacts, habits, or 
proclivities made them epidemiological threats. A community dan-
ger justified civil rights restrictions.291 The Old Testament imposed 
isolation and cleansing on those with unclean bodily discharges.292 
In fourteenth- century Venice, arrivals on ships from infected ports 
were detained for the forty days that the medicine of the day took 
to be the plague’s incubation period. Suspected prostitutes were com-
pulsorily tested for venereal disease in the nineteenth century. If 
infected, they were detained and treated. In the 1980s, Swedish 
and US authorities jailed HIV seropositives who continued to have 
unsafe sex.293 Sufferers of drug- resistant tuberculosis have been 
compulsorily medicated and sometimes detained, epileptics and 
narcoleptics forbidden to drive.294 Modern citizens suffer legally 
imposed bodily violations such as vaccination for the communi-
ty’s good. The motives of such interventions mix concern for the 
afflicted with the desire to protect society at large, but the results 
impinge on the rights of individuals. All nations permit drastic 
interventions in emergencies. Faced with the coronavirus pan-
demic in early 2020, China imposed mass quarantines on several 
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cities. Even otherwise liberal Denmark enabled its authorities tem-
porarily to compel inspection, isolation, vaccination, and treatment 
of victims, end public assemblies, blockade neighborhoods, shut 
down transportation, forbid visits to hospitals and care homes, and 
close institutions.295 Thanks to the gravity of the potential conse-
quences for not acquiescing to such public- health legislation, it has 
been broadly uncontroversial despite its draconian effects.
Preventive sentencing— selective incapacitation— expanded this 
logic to more people.296 Those judged to be risks could be detained 
or restrained even before trial. Already imposed sentences could be 
extended. To avoid the penal code’s due- process restrictions, civil 
law was mustered to give the authorities more leeway.297 These 
impositions— not for offenses committed but for ones that might 
occur— moved punishment far from its retributive foundations. Not 
only were predictions unavoidably vague and often inaccurate, but 
even had they been true, holding potential offenders accountable 
for crimes not yet committed also amplified the utilitarian logic of 
subordinating individual rights to community needs.
In principle, an accused is presumptively innocent before being 
convicted and should therefore not be incarcerated, but detaining 
arrestees even before trial and conviction has become more common. 
Many nations make little or no use of bail or other means of pretrial 
release: most of the European continent and Japan, for example.298 
Half of all prisoners in Italy and France remain jailed on remand, 
awaiting trial. Suspects in Japan can be jailed for twenty- three days 
before charges are brought.299 Even in the Anglo- American systems, 
the role of bail, which has been used since the early Middle ages, has 
shrunk. In England, a third of defendants are held in custody before 
trial, on average for nine weeks, though a quarter of those for up to 
half a year. In the United States, the bail bond industry allows release 
for those able to pay (usually 10 percent of bail). Even so, about a 
third of US arrestees remain jailed until trial.300
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Not only those accused of crime were jailed before trial. Pretrial 
detention was the obverse of bail. Rather than assuming innocence 
before guilt was determined, even those whose offense was merely 
being potentially dangerous were jailed. Starting in the 1960s, the 
US and Britain passed laws allowing pretrial preventive detention. 
These laws made explicit judges’ informal ability to detain suspects 
preventively by setting excessive bail. Judges could then deny bail 
to or impose other restrictions on defendants considered likely to 
commit crimes in the interim.301 After trial, the sentences of those 
deemed to be risks have also been extended. Most countries allow 
prolonging the sentences of defendants considered special threats. 
The Netherlands have “detention at the Government’s pleasure,” 
for two years at a time, indefinitely extendable by court decision; 
the Germans have Sicherungsverwahrung. Canada, too, allows pre-
ventive detention for indefinite terms of those considered habitual 
criminals.302 This tactic is also applied to sex offenders, as discussed 
in the next section.
To defang objections to this side- stepping of due- process restric-
tions, the civil law was also roped in. Civil preventive orders were 
marshaled against offenses that although perhaps not quite criminal 
were sufficiently noisome to be worth targeting.303 They imposed 
punishments similar to the penal code, including jail, while having 
to meet only the civil law’s lower standard of proof. In the United 
States, such orders began being levied in the 1970s against gangs 
and juvenile offenders as well as against nuisance and public- order 
behaviors and drug- and alcohol- related conduct. The Supreme 
Court allowed civil commitment of the potentially dangerous with-
out the full due- process protection of criminal cases.304 Britain, too, 
enthusiastically adopted the technique early in the new millen-
nium. A dozen variants emerged, from Anti- Social Behavior Orders 
(ASBOs) to Serious Crime Prevention Orders, Risk of Sexual Harm 
Orders, and Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures.305 
Authorities could close noisy or drug- infested premises, pursue 
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parents of chronically truant or misbehaved children, restrict where 
sex offenders could live or work, restrain people from harassing oth-
ers, and disperse groups in public. ASBOs could last indeterminately 
and apply to offenders as young as ten. Breaching them was a criminal 
offense punishable by prison for up to five years or fines or both.306 
Allowing the authorities broad discretion against low- level behaviors 
that individually might not have triggered sanctions but that collec-
tively and over time were a nuisance, ASBOs were often eccentrically 
applied: the pirate DJ who had broadcast from a top floor forbidden 
ever to set foot in a building taller than four stories; the car thief pro-
hibited from entering any parking lot anywhere for any purpose; the 
suicidal woman who had to promise not to approach rivers, lakes, or 
railway bridges; the hip- hop musicians forbidden to mention death, 
injury, or competing musicians in their songs.307
As the definition of crime expanded, the authorities were evermore 
concerned with risks, not committed offenses. Getting out ahead 
of crime meant investigating plans drawn up, intents formulated, 
conspiracies hatched, and dangers posed. Interrogative techniques 
were developed to ascertain what was being planned. Police noted, 
for example, that although dissembling about past events was 
often less detailed than truthful recounting of what had happened, 
for future plans the level of detail— with no actual experience to 
narrate— between false and true accounts was largely similar.308 
Once the authorities began trying to prevent risk, few behaviors 
were indifferent, and almost all citizens potentially posed a threat.309 
Preventive detention inevitably affected many false positives, people 
who were locked up even though they would have committed no 
crime. But falsely jailed innocents were less conspicuous in the media 
and political debate than the guilty set free to offend. Once estab-
lished, a preventive system thus invariably generated data in favor of 
its expansion.310 The logical extreme was universal preventive deten-
tion, the ability to detain anyone considered a possible threat. In 
effect, all citizens began to be treated as parolees.311
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Catholic inquisitors rooting out Cathar heretics in thirteenth- 
century Languedoc had taken this approach. All sentences were for 
life, in principle. Even after the sinner had been released, the issue 
could be revisited at any moment, adding new penalties for relapses 
or extending existing ones.312 Indeterminate sentencing and condi-
tional release, practiced increasingly in most Western nations as of 
the late nineteenth century, applied a similar logic. Whether in or 
out of prison, offenders remained within the carceral loop. Laws on 
habitual criminality in the English colonies, modeled on the home-
land, permitted police to keep discharged prisoners under surveil-
lance and to search the dwellings of those suspected of receiving 
stolen goods. The Prussian penal code allowed indefinite deten-
tion of thieves and other dangerous offenders until they showed 
they could provide for themselves honestly on release. Napoleon 
imposed postrelease surveillance on former prisoners that lasted 
from two years to life, depending on the offense, with the authori-
ties allowed to decide where they could live.313
In 1877, the prison administrator Zebulon Brockway proposed 
a law in New York to make all sentences indeterminate, releasing 
only the compliant. This law was adopted only partly, and parole 
and probation have fallen out of favor in the United States since the 
1970s. But something like indefinite sentencing is now imposed, as 
we will see, on sex offenders.314 In New York City, a common out-
come of misdemeanor arrests is to adjourn the case for some speci-
fied time, then dismiss it if the defendant has not been rearrested 
in the meantime. The British Criminal Justice Act of 2003 allowed 
mandatory life sentences. Prisoners could be released at the discre-
tion of the parole board but remained on license for life, reincarcer-
ated if judged a risk.315
Universal preventive detention, where all citizens are treated as 
parolees, differs from our own state by degree, not kind. We are all 
on notice. At the end of Franz Kafka’s novel The Trial, the court 
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artist tells Joseph K. that final acquittals are elusive, the court forgets 
nothing, and he can be hauled before it again on renewed charges. 
Any citizen who offends is naturally subject to official attention. 
Yet as the definition of crime has expanded to new acts and to ever- 
earlier preparatory stages of potential offenses, the chances of being 
investigated have expanded, too. In no case is that truer than with 
sex offenders.
Sex Crimes
Though homicide is the oldest crime, rape must have been a close 
second.316 As long as there has been law, it has been punished— 
though motivated at first more by the damage done the property 
interests of father, lord, or husband than by consideration for the 
woman. Male- on- male rape has long been punished, too— primarily 
as a violation of strictures on sodomy.317 Statutory rape expanded 
the offense as the age of consent was raised. That change required 
adjusting for the relative ages of the parties involved, distinguish-
ing between older predators and young lovers. What counted as 
consent has been debated, too, as reformers sought to ensure that 
rape was treated as a real crime, not merely an indiscretion. Allow-
ing adultery to be punished within the family was long tolerated. 
Today, sexual betrayal is no longer considered a crime and excuses 
neither battery nor murder.
Sex crimes became the object of particular attention at the turn 
of the millennium, especially pedophilia. Even while the inci-
dence of rape and sexual assault was falling, convictions for sex 
offenses quadrupled in the 1990s. Between 10 percent and 20 per-
cent of state prisoners in the US are now locked up for such rea-
sons. Incarceration for child porn and other sexually explicit 
material increased more than sixtyfold between 1996 and 2010. 
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Because pedophilia— along with incest and cannibalism— is univer-
sally regarded as viscerally repugnant, few objected as punishments 
grew more severe. Sentences for pedophilia and child pornography 
lengthened. The PROTECT (Prosecutorial Remedies and Other 
Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today) Act of 2003 in the 
United States imposed mandatory life on those convicted of child 
sexual abuse for a second time. Arizona required ten- year sentences 
for each illegal porn image possessed, thus life in most instances. 
The average federal child porn sentence became longer than for all 
other crimes except murder and kidnapping.318 Long criminal sen-
tences for pedophilia are now often supplemented by extensions 
under civil law, allowing offenders believed likely to recommit to 
be held beyond their initial verdicts— sometimes indefinitely.319 In 
1997, the Supreme Court upheld an instance of someone civilly 
committed for life in anticipation of crimes he might commit.320 
The Adam Walsh Act in 2006 allowed sex offenders to be detained 
indefinitely after their sentences were complete if they were con-
sidered dangerous. Nor did such civil detentions count as a double- 
jeopardy bar to criminal prosecution for the same action.321
Sexual harm against children, including real- life pornography, is 
indisputably evil. Virtual pornography— comics, anime, drawings, 
and the like— poses the question of what precisely is being prohib-
ited. If no actual child has been harmed in making it, how and why 
are viewers of it culpable? For their thoughts? For the corruption 
of social morality that follows when some are depraved in private 
(much as Devlin had insisted that private immorality is as impossi-
ble as private subversive activity)? What is the underlying crime? Is 
it enhanced when technologies go beyond two- dimensional porn, 
allowing viewers to participate actively in on- screen or soon- to- be 
fully immersive virtual- reality experiences of seducing, raping, or 
worse? Should it be a crime to sexually violate in cyberspace? Or 
to do things to pretend minors (virtual ageplay) that would be ille-
gal in the wetware world? Second World, a virtual ecosystem, for 
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example, allows sex with minor avatars.322 No doubt it is but a pale 
simulacrum of what fully developed virtual reality will soon deliver. 
The burgeoning sex- robot industry also stands ready to tailor prod-
uct to any taste— including devices resembling specific identifiable 
children.323 Should virtual rape of a facsimile of an actual human be 
treated as similar to inflicting emotional distress?324 Would we then 
be outlawing ideas or fantasies outside of actual harm?
Those who advocate forbidding even virtual pornography have 
marshaled a Devlian logic on the collateral social damage that fol-
lows in immorality’s wake. First, much virtual porn still manipulates 
images of existing children, thus harming actual victims. Arguing that 
their materials were virtual, pornographers have in fact sometimes 
been exonerated.325 But even born- digital images, with no real- world 
referent, might have noxious knock- on effects. Pedophiles could har-
ness virtual porn to convince actual children that joining in was nor-
mal and fun. Perhaps they thus whetted their own sexual appetites, 
raising the chances of an actual sexual encounter.326 But perhaps by 
having such material— as is also argued for pornography in general— 
they thus satiated their desires harmlessly, lessening the chances of 
real- world offenses.327 Did virtual porn encourage the idea of children 
as sexual objects and therefore put them at risk?328 Arguments at this 
level of generality cut both ways. Attempts to prosecute child porn 
also kept the topic in the limelight, helping sexualize children. A case 
in 1993 determined that even images of clothed children (videos of 
young girls striking poses in bathing suits) could be pornographic. 
Cases involving mainstream advertising (Calvin Klein) parsed 
seemingly innocent photos of children and adolescents in terms 
of whether their genitals were discernable beneath the underwear, 
whether they thrust forth their pelvic regions, and the like. Some 
pedophiles find innocent images the most alluring, thus impeding 
hopes of policing, forbidding, or even defining child porn except in 
the most expansive of terms.329 Since even innocuous images can 
prompt outlawed thoughts, what is not illegal?
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Undaunted by these conundrums, the law plowed ahead.  Britain 
outlawed “pseudophotographs” in 1994, apparently aiming at 
computer- generated composite photographs of real people.330 In 
2001, article 9 of the European Convention on Cybercrime defined 
child porn to include both the virtual and the real.331 In 1996, 
the United States banned virtual child pornography, including any 
image that “is, or appears to be, of a minor engaging in sexually 
explicit conduct,” whether a computer- generated minor or an adult 
who looks underage. It was forbidden to possess, produce, sell, trans-
port, ship, receive, mail, and distribute such images in interstate or 
foreign commerce and by any means, including electronic. Also for-
bidden were all pornographic images of children, whether of actual 
or computer- generated or morphed children or of youthful- looking 
adults.332 Aspects of this law were struck down by the Supreme Court 
in 2002 as overbroad violations of free speech. A compromise in 2003 
protected realistic virtual images and nonrealistic ones (drawings, 
cartoons and the like) unless they were deemed obscene (lacking 
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value). Pornographic 
images of actual children remained illegal.333 The code now specifi-
cally stated that it was not a requirement that the child portrayed 
actually existed.334 And it defined child pornography to include com-
puter images “indistinguishable from” images of real minors having 
sex.335 But it explicitly excluded drawings, cartoons, sculptures, and 
paintings.336 And it allowed as an affirmative defense that the child 
pornography in question had been produced with adult actors or 
that it had been created entirely virtually.337
One case under the rewritten law was of a teacher whose com-
puter stored images of the Simpsons cartoon children having sex with 
adults and animals. In theory, that should not have been actionable. 
But the defendant pled guilty and the case never went to trial. His 
computer also held other images depicting actual children in sug-
gestive and clothed poses.338 Another case convicted someone of 
having anime- style child pornography. No actual minors had been 
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involved, but the material was deemed obscene and thus without 
free- speech protections. He was also punished for emails describing 
sexual fantasies with minors— pure speech with no representational 
qualities.339 Though the legal subtleties of these and similar laws are 
difficult to parse, the law here came close to prosecuting desires, 
thoughts, and other mental states. Aiming at the offense of child 
molestation, an overt and tangible crime, the law in fact ended up 
targeting pedophilia, a state of mind that is not always acted on.
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Dominated by Anglophone scholars interested in their own nations 
and engaged by an important political issue, criminology is focused 
largely on the present. Much of the recent historiography reflects 
the American situation— its crime wave of the 1960s and 1970s and 
the attendant incarceration boom. It is preoccupied by the turn to 
retributive justice in the late twentieth century, with its adoption 
of long and harsh jail sentences and abandonment of earlier reha-
bilitative ideals.1 Only recently has the literature begun to address 
the decline of urban crime since the 1980s as many big cities have 
become safer.2
We gain perspective by stepping back from the ripples of imme-
diate events to consider long- term currents. The retributive turn of 
the late twentieth century had most impact on the Anglo- Saxon 
nations, and even there it may be in the process of stabilizing. Letting 
this tail do the wagging obscures our view of the dog. In Europe, a 
tempered rehabilitationism lived on.3 Though rising in the Anglo-
phone nations, most extremely in the US, rates of imprisonment 
remained flat in Scandinavia, Germany, and Japan and only mod-
erately increased elsewhere.4 Britain and France are the European 
nations that most closely followed the neoretributionist path.5 
In Saudi Arabia, Singapore, and China, harsh punishments have 
continued to go hand in hand— whatever the causality— with low 
crime rates and even lower recidivism.6
Conclusion: Still Present  
after All These Years
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If we instead examine how the state has grappled with crime 
over the longue durée of three millennia, recent events appear in a 
broad historical context, revealing some unexpected aspects. Two 
general observations on the deep history of crime merit mention. 
History deals with both ruptures and continuities. Taken over three 
thousand years, as here, both will inevitably figure. Almost every 
era has debated whether punishment’s justification is retributive 
(delivering what offenders deserve) or utilitarian (aiming to dimin-
ish crime). The emphasis has tipped one way, then another. But ele-
ments of both have invariably left traces— as indeed today when 
retributivists pander to public sentiment to be tough on crime at 
the same time as utilitarians seek to reduce offending by ignoring 
desert to focus on result.
Equally notable from a long perspective is how development pro-
ceeds by accretion, not just by substitution. Layers of the old remain, 
a palimpsest of policies. The old is present though partly shunted 
aside, never fully obscured or covered by the new. Much of the old 
privatized approach to crime remains even now when the state 
pretends to have assumed this task wholly. Pardons remind us of 
our feudal past, when the king kindly dispensed justice regardless 
of what the law actually said. Churches remain refuges, an excep-
tion by courtesy to the state’s allegedly all- encompassing territorial 
domination. Parole is a modernized form of surety as the commu-
nity to which the inmate is released fulfills a similar role to com-
purgators. Bail is the obverse of the frankpledge, a guarantee given 
before rather than after the crime.7 Civil asset forfeitures continue 
the medieval idea of deodands, the state confiscating the tools of 
crime. The persistent acceptance of the concept of justifiable homi-
cide suggests that the state cannot be bothered to— or perhaps just 
cannot— impose its will on all our actions, even extreme ones. So 
do the remnants of vigilante justice the state still tolerates, as does 
the private assistance it accepts (and indeed relies on) from civil 
society, whether in the form of vast nonofficial police forces or the 
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cooperation of citizens in investigating crime. Also to be included 
here is the barely polite fiction that the state has imposed a thor-
oughgoing monopoly on violence and its means. In the United 
States, Second Amendment discussions continually raise the primal 
heresy— sedition, really— of civil society’s possible armed revolt 
against its own state, not just against outside enemies. But nations 
defended by citizen armies, such as Switzerland and Israel, face the 
same prospect should major political disagreement erupt. So do 
countries with heavily armed citizenries and living memories of 
partisan strife and civil war, such as Finland and Greece.
That brings us to more specific conclusions about the state’s role 
in dealing with crime over the past several millennia. The first is 
how late the idea of crime as an offense against society emerged 
as distinct from the more immediate sense of wrongs committed 
between private parties and resolved among them independently. 
That broader idea of crime, in turn, was a function of how late 
the state came to what now seems one of its core competencies— 
enforcing law and punishing its violation. As treason’s immediate 
victim, the state did, of course, punish it from the outset. But for 
centuries other offenses were left to be sorted by the implicated par-
ties themselves. The ancient Greeks and Romans established rudi-
mentary judicial and policing systems, taking some matters out of 
private hands. But not until the early modern era did the state once 
again penalize crime. That holds even for the world’s oldest contin-
uous statutory authority, in China. Across the world, most judicial 
and police work was outsourced to civil society, with kin groups and 
other intermediary organizations accountable for their members’ 
transgressions. Today we think of law enforcement as one of the 
state’s primary functions. But policing in the modern sense is in 
fact a very recent activity— arising long after defense, taxation, eco-
nomic regulation, social services, and often even public education.8
Starting in the seventeenth century, as the European state 
became directly involved in enforcing law and penalizing crime, it 
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moved to consolidate its power. Monopolizing violence, confiscat-
ing and regulating weaponry, subordinating private military troops 
to its own armies, running one universally recognized judicial sys-
tem, the state took in hand the business of formulating, promulgat-
ing, and enforcing law. To assert its preeminence despite its limited 
capacities, it acted harshly and publicly. Bloody town- square execu-
tions under emperors in China and monarchs in Europe testified 
both to the state’s claims to obedience and to the patchiness of its 
enforcement. The state’s imperfect knowledge led to only occa-
sional capture of offenders and even rarer conviction. Public tortur-
ing was needed to deter. The miserable bird in the hand suffered for 
all its compatriots in the bush.
From a long historical perspective, the state’s need to demon-
strate its power diminished as its actual strength grew. As the state 
multiplied its capabilities, it could better detect, deter, and pun-
ish transgression. It no longer had to strong- arm and terrorize its 
subjects. The more powerful and self- confident a community, the 
more moderate its penal law, Friedrich Nietzsche pointed out.9 The 
Enlightenment philosophes were right: predictability deterred more 
than ferocity. Torture was the weak state’s route to evidence. Better 
surveillance and detective work made torture redundant. Recali-
brating the correspondence between offense and punishment also 
changed the nature of the evidence required. In the early Middle 
Ages, confession or two eyewitnesses were needed for capital crimes. 
Later, when lesser but factual evidence was admitted, in return pun-
ishments were moderated.10
With the admittedly gaping exception of Europe’s twentieth- 
century totalitarian regimes and arguably today in China, the state’s 
power and its harshness have been inversely correlated. A stronger 
and more pervasive state could police more effectively and there-
fore benignly. With data flowing evermore freely, the reciprocal 
transparency between authority and citizenry reduced the need for 
drastic interventions and in any case limited the extent to which 
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they were tolerated. That historical trend continues today. DNA 
analysis has retrospectively spared innocents convicted on faulty 
testimony, electronic automobile tracking has dramatically reduced 
thefts, and closed- circuit TV evidence has raised detection and con-
viction rates. Riots in Los Angeles followed the acquittal in 1992 of 
the police who had beaten Rodney King while being filmed with 
one of the then- new digital cameras. Today, nearly thirty years later, 
we all inhabit a digital panopticon. Our insistence that police now 
film their encounters with the public demonstrates how transpar-
ency holds both authorities and citizens accountable. The killing in 
broad daylight of George Floyd by Minneapolis police in May 2020 
demonstrated how little some things had changed in three decades. 
That the encounter was filmed from half a dozen vantages and the 
officers quickly arrested and charged suggested that others had.
This inverse correlation between the state’s power and its harsh-
ness leaves a conceptual conundrum. Is the state becoming nicer, 
less intrusive, less draconian? Or is it becoming more pervasive, pos-
sibly less visible, but simultaneously more widespread and embed-
ded in its subjects’ lives? In the early nineteenth century, prison 
reformers heralded solitary confinement as a sea change in puni-
tive techniques. Hoping to resocialize offenders’ souls, its propo-
nents knew they were inflicting a different but no less drastic form 
of pain: “no longer mere animal pain, but a pain that affects the 
whole spirit” or a “slow and daily tampering with the mysteries of 
the brain” that was “immeasurably worse than any torture of the 
body.”11 Was a lesser force being exerted? Or did solitary confine-
ment herald something different but equally imposing? The new, 
apparently more moderate state might simply be more subtle, not 
less strong.
Legions of social control theorists have sought to rip the mask 
from the face of modern state power, revealing how the authorities— 
though more surreptitious— dominate citizens’ lives more than 
ever. Herbert Marcuse’s seeming paradox of “repressive tolerance” 
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emblematized this approach. Even the exercise of democratic rights, 
he argued, merely legitimated suppression.12 That explanation solved 
the dilemma by definition, not by empirical analysis. Did the con-
temporary state’s subtle power mean that it remained as absolute as 
in the era when it pulled no punches and had merely changed tac-
tics? Or did modern moderation indicate that the state had actually 
retreated from centralized authority and its ability to compel? That 
was the crux of the matter.
Michel Foucault famously argued that as the modern state 
evolved from absolutism, it aimed to punish better, not less. That 
was a fence straddle. On the one hand, he spurned the whiggish 
view that growing enlightenment made the democratic state friend-
lier, exerting less immediate sway over its subjects. On the other, 
prison certainly seems preferable to drawing and quartering. His 
solution was to reframe the concept of power, moving from the 
absolutist authorities’ centralized somatic brutality to modernity’s 
“discipline,” a form of coercion that was exerted from multiple 
sources, that was often self- imposed, and that held sway over both 
elites and subordinates. In this reframing, he was following the 
torch brandished by Norbert Elias in his concept of the civilizing 
process. Foucault and Elias share more in common than often real-
ized. Elias focused on individuals learning to control themselves, 
the demand side. This they were spurred to accomplish by a mutual 
dependence arising from society’s growing complexity and inter-
flection as well as by states that encouraged such reciprocal self- 
limitation, as among the French nobles corralled at Versailles before 
the revolution.
Foucault focused more on the supply side, looking at the all- 
pervasive disciplining imposed on subjects in countless ways through 
networks of power.13 Yet Foucault’s only incipiently formulated con-
cept of governmentality followed Elias in looking at civil society’s 
self- disciplining and the mutually reinforcing effects of internal and 
external constraints. Late in his life, he turned away from his earlier 
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preoccupation with state power to examine how individuals took 
care of and cultivated themselves, a task more akin to Elias’s con-
cerns.14 His interest became “to show how the government of self is 
integrated with the government of others.”15 The concept of govern-
mentality was also a move beyond his early concern with social dis-
cipline. Though dispersed, power was still at the heart of discipline, 
exerted over citizens to mold their behavior to align with prevailing 
norms. Elias focused on individual self- discipline, and Foucault on 
the disciplining exerted through institutions, but both were con-
cerned with the shaping of the individual psyche and its habits.
Governmentality was the strategy of managing risk by using 
nondisciplinary techniques. And that, in turn, was but one aspect 
of a broader governance approach to the state that saw it less as 
imposing top- down power and more as coordinating multiple ways 
of regulating independent social actors.16 The averaging of risk 
through insurance, for example, has long been put to use by indi-
viduals, but in the past two centuries it has come to pervade society 
as one of the main technologies imposed by the modern welfare 
state. Businesspeople have shared risk almost as long as humans 
have traded.17 The broader state strategy of averaging the risk of 
social problems threw up issues of free riding and underinsurance. 
Those, in turn, were dealt with once the state marshaled its powers 
of enforcement, requiring evermore citizens to be insured against 
risks that could be quantified, averaged, predicted, and priced. In 
the late nineteenth century, the German social reformer Lujo Bren-
tano advised workers to maintain at least six different insurance 
policies: life insurance for their children, pension insurance for old 
age, burial insurance to pay for their funerals, and coverage for dis-
ability, illness, and unemployment.18 Not all of these risks were pri-
vately insurable, however, and over time the welfare state socialized 
the cost of such eventualities.
The modern state has also effectively mandated public health, 
thus socializing individually beneficial behaviors. It prophylactically 
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vaccinates infants, screens schoolchildren and army recruits, for-
bids noxious habits, quarantines the infected, and determines what 
happens to our bodies after death. In its benign form, such risk 
management became the liberal welfare state, but similar impulses 
prompted other states to assess, categorize, manage, improve, 
mold, and ultimately to deport or kill unwanted subjects. These 
impulses, some scholars have argued, lay at the heart of Stalin’s 
supposedly improving ambitions and even— formulated in racial 
terms— of Nazism.19 Those terror regimes take us beyond our con-
cern with crime and its punishment. In nontotalitarian countries, 
the shift from social disciplining to governmentality was not just 
from meddling with the individual psyche to mustering citizens. 
Managing risks meant combining individual self- discipline and 
social engineering. Citizens were increasingly expected to antici-
pate what needed to be done— adopting healthy habits, curbing 
excesses, training for the work to be done, insuring themselves. 
Only in the absence of or in addition to such individual prudential-
ist approaches did the state then step in.20
Both Elias and Foucault realized that a binary approach to power 
led astray. Both rejected the nineteenth century’s philosophical 
dead end of viewing the state as unilaterally all- powerful. Hegel 
defined the state as a transcendent force above civil society. Marx 
thought he was exposing the state’s faux neutrality by unmask-
ing its role as the tool of the dominant classes. But both agreed in 
regarding the state as being the dominant force in the relationship 
between the two. A century later Elias and Foucault parted with this 
tradition, insisting instead on the interaction between state and 
civil society and on how the state’s role was shaped by the tasks pre-
sented to it by civil society. The modern democratic state could not 
impose itself unbidden on its citizens. Without at least some coop-
eration of the masses, for whom all modern states claimed to rule, 
it would fail. Even Hitler was in no position to force his subjects to 
obey when they refused outright.21 Stalin, governing a much less 
318  Conclusion
Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/books/book-pdf/1963888/book_9780262361507.pdf by guest on 27 December 2021
Still Present after All These Years  319
industrialized and urbanized— thus less self- controlled— population 
than the Germans, used more overt violence against so- called anti-
social elements (the unemployed, petty criminals, drifters, and the 
like) than did the Nazis.22
Democracy required the state to work in tandem with its sub-
jects. They in turn were expected to meet authority halfway, disci-
plining themselves and thus requiring less attention from on high. 
The state’s authority was no longer unilateral. It interacted with 
civil society. That citizens imposed limitations on themselves did 
not necessarily mean that these were self- willed or self- chosen— 
anymore than are the details of our childhood socialization.23 Yet, 
by accomplishing much of what it would otherwise have had to do, 
self- discipline did reduce the state’s remit. The psychic, emotional, 
and instinctual limitations citizens imposed on themselves were 
rewarded with physical freedom from statutory attention.
Both Foucauldian governmentality and Elias’s civilizing process 
thus displaced attention from the unilateral imposition of state 
power to the interaction of authority and civil society.24 Humans 
are hypersocial creatures, our communal existence wholly depen-
dent on the culture that we learn from each other, passed down 
from our ancestors.25 But we are not massified by instinct, like ants 
or bees, blindly slotting into our appointed social roles. Culture, 
not biology, socializes us. How then to ensure human behavior that 
is compatible with organized society?
Social contract theorists have imagined humans discussing the 
terms they would unite under, trading nature’s autonomy— whether 
the bliss of noble savages or a war of all against all— for protection 
in organized society. But that reversed cart and horse. These alleg-
edly presocial negotiators, adeptly parsing the fine points of con-
tract law, had somehow already achieved what they were supposed 
to be accomplishing. Historically, no such ur- constitutional conven-
tion of Robinson Crusoes ever assembled. Humans first organized 
themselves in small bands. Some of these bands eventually joined 
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together in larger associations with incipient social stratification 
and some semblance of durable authority. Finally, some five millen-
nia ago they formed the first recognizable states.
Before states emerged, and in the societies that remain without 
them, small and homogenous groups have governed themselves 
without much formal rule making or vesting of authority beyond 
their clan head.26 Kin alliances forged largely through marriage 
helped create broader unity among disparate members as a matter 
of (sometimes made- up) descent. Polite fictions allowed new fam-
ily members to be incorporated— adoption among the Romans, 
for example— alongside other means of artificially extending con-
sanguinity.27 Existing and historically documented tribes typically 
used such devices.28 Chiefdoms, in turn, represented a halfway step 
between tribes and formalized state structures. They were still based 
on descent from a common ancestor but now had some social strat-
ification. Hereditary leaders ruled, but there was still no formal leg-
islation or enforcement.29
How tribal societies kept the peace by punishing aggressive or aso-
cial members with the cold shoulder or worse is a leitmotiv of the 
anthropological literature.30 With the hyperdense sociability of the 
igloo as their norm, Inuits regarded the Western anthropologists 
who visited them as emotionally incontinent in their petty outbursts 
and everyday irritable flare- ups. Having violated precept, offend-
ers were ostracized into the cold. Shunning and exclusion were 
the most widespread sanctions, formalized in larger- scale societies 
as excommunication. Habitual bullies or other intolerables who 
violated the egalitarian premises of hunter- gatherer societies were 
killed by delegated executioners, the victim’s immediate kin stand-
ing aside.31 Extrapolating backward from such anthropological find-
ings, historians agree that prehistoric societies of hunter- gatherers 
and early agricultural settlements were likely similar.32
Yet such theories of purely informal regulation have also been 
questioned. Anthropologists have disputed the relative roles of custom 
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and law to guide behavior in what used to be called primitive soci-
ety. Bronislaw Malinowski rebelled against the anthropology of his 
day, which argued that group custom, obeyed unthinkingly, gov-
erned tribes and clans, with the individual but a cog in a kinship 
machine. He claimed to discern both criminal and civil law in such 
societies, with autonomous individuals tied into to a web of mutual 
obligation, responding to strictures prescribed for neglecting their 
duties. Much hinged on definition.33 Formal mechanisms of adju-
dication, “codes, courts, and constables,” indicating the presence of 
law, were admittedly absent, but that scarcely meant no regulation. 
Quite the contrary. Early humans were likely governed by a dense 
network of stricture, with law being, as Malinowski put it, but one 
form of custom.34
States, in turn, first arose some five millennia ago because they 
were better able to deal with challenges that stumped smaller, 
less- organized societies. Their organizational prowess delivered a 
competitive advantage, allowing them to prosper, grow, and domi-
nate. Early states were adept at marshaling resources. Armies were 
assembled, economies organized, towering infrastructural projects 
stamped out of the ground— all by institutions with only basic tech-
nology. Homo sapiens lived for three hundred thousand years in 
rudimentary circumstances. Having invented the state, our ances-
tors took but a few thousand years to build pyramids, aqueducts, 
palaces, and roads, start to write, and worship universalist gods. The 
state is arguably the most important invention in human history. It 
is the ultimate organizing tool of our ultrasociable species, whose 
main competitive advantage has been its ability to muster itself col-
lectively and to transmit accumulated knowledge over generations.
Historians of Europe are perhaps at a disadvantage in appreci-
ating how ancient states are. After the fall of the western Roman 
Empire, nearly a millennium passed before European institutions 
again approximated what had been achieved under the Egyptians 
and Greeks, not to mention the Romans. Europe’s early modern 
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history is largely the story of rebuilding the state. We tend there-
fore to think of the state as a recent development. Add Hegel’s insis-
tence that the state of his era was its culmination and Max Weber’s 
precise, exclusive definitions that made the difference between the 
modern state and all earlier states one of kind, not just degree. The 
result has been a historically myopic view of the state as a recent 
and unprecedented invention.
But states have long been with us. Unlike small, informally gov-
erned societies, they imposed the controls required to coordinate 
their many subjects from the top and from outside. Thanks to pains-
taking historical work, we now know, for example, how insufficient 
Weber’s idea is that real bureaucracy developed only in the nine-
teenth century. It may be that the bureaucracy of the Third Dynasty 
of Ur, two millennia before Christ, answered to individual families 
and was thus not rational and impersonal in a Weberian sense.35 
But already the Zhou dynasty of China, in power for some eight 
hundred years starting a millennium before Christ, had developed 
a bureaucratic apparatus independent of the ruler’s person, with 
meritocratic recruitment and advancement as well as specialized 
functions.36
Such efforts were both cumbersome and costly. States with suf-
ficient resources could police and tame their civil societies. Indepen-
dent sources of revenue helped, such as state- owned mines, farms, or 
eventually factories. So did slaves or other forced labor. Early states 
were mechanisms to tame subject populations and extract resources. 
Karl Wittfogel’s theory of hydraulic despotism argued that ancient 
Egypt and other early states organized agricultural water by harness-
ing subjects for public irrigation works. He has been criticized for 
extending this theory too broadly, but it has the virtue of highlight-
ing how states mustered resources and subjugated populations to 
solve collective problems. James Scott has also recently argued that 
early states were predatory, centralizing power to accumulate wealth 
stored as grain.37
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We can thus imagine at one extreme autocratic external  control 
over everything and at the other voluntary conformity  produced by 
autonomous self- regulation. At times, states have been overbearing— 
not just among the Egyptians, Aztecs, or Incas but also in early 
modern Europe’s Polizei regulations, addressing every conceivable 
behavior, and in the twentieth century’s totalitarian autocracies, 
where the state permeated civil society, though perhaps less thor-
oughly than historians first imagined.38 Of the organizational forms 
that governed through pervasive informal behavioral control, we 
find only faint echoes from distant and semidocumented societies 
and from short- lived experiments of the like- minded, withdrawing 
from established society to unite in voluntarily adopted uniformity: 
utopian associations, communes, kibbutzim, and religious com-
munities. That is what Christian society was supposed to be like. 
Christ had only a staff, Luther explained, because Christians were 
sheep and he their shepherd. The wolves and lions of the mundane 
world, in contrast, required force. In historical fact, a few such com-
munities have been successful, such as the Amish, Mennonites, 
and the Hasidic town of Kiryas Joel in New York State. Others went 
spectacularly bad: the Anabaptists in Münster in 1534, the People’s 
Temple in Jonestown in 1978, and the Branch Davidians in Waco 
in 1993.39
Complex societies have traded off between these two techniques 
of behavioral control— outside imposition and internal informal self- 
regulation. At times, civil society has functioned efficiently as the 
engine of socialization, with family and church acculturating com-
munity members. If someone who had violated a deeply felt point of 
honor was shunned and ostracized or left to commit suicide— thus 
sparing the law the unpleasant necessity of an execution— that indi-
cated that custom and code still reinforced each other.40 In ancient 
Egypt, defendants condemned to death were sometimes allowed 
to kill themselves, as was Socrates in Athens. Convicted Japanese 
Samurai, too, were permitted to commit seppuku, or harakiri.41 Early 
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twentieth- century Melanesia considered it a sign of cultural decline 
that those who had seriously violated norms were now jailed rather 
than, as earlier, committing suicide.42
Yet at some point more was needed. Most states began formal-
izing rules that had earlier been implicit. Whom one married, how 
one dressed, what one believed about the supernatural— all became 
matters of law. The state moved into new arenas of behavioral regu-
lation, taking as its remit education, large swaths of childrearing, 
and more generally the socialization of citizens. Laws replaced or 
supplemented informal behavioral molding. Raising the next gen-
eration became evermore a task for institutions beyond the family. 
As the church lost influence, religion ceded pride of place to secular 
morality and etiquette, the last- mile guide to appropriate behav-
ior. And as the informal socialization into correct conduct that had 
been religion and morality’s task dissolved in modernity’s anomic 
acid bath, it was displaced in turn by the law as an immediate guide 
to behavior. Village communities once prodded, scolded, exhorted, 
and shamed their members to toe the line. In urban society, mat-
ters became formalized. In the eighteenth century, laws were passed 
against vagrancy, prostitution, public drunkenness, sloth, and 
other behaviors that had earlier been only informally discouraged. 
Expanding its policing function, the state minutely regulated every 
conceivable behavior: from how children should address their par-
ents to locking doors in the evenings. The state replaced kin as the 
enforcer.
The Civilizing Process
State and civil society thus engaged in a pas de deux. Over the past 
four millennia, the state’s role has expanded enormously— as we 
have seen here in the single sphere of crime control. Yet, despite 
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absolutism’s or even totalitarianism’s pretensions, the state never 
acted alone. First of all, starting some five thousand years ago, the 
state could rely on humans’ own evolutionary history. Compared 
to our surviving primate cousins, humans are generally less violent 
within our own communities. We slaughter others in planned and 
organized raids, skirmishes, and wars, but to those we live with we are 
roughly a hundred times less violent than chimpanzees. Even more 
so than the fairly pacific bonobos, humans are self- domesticated. 
Like dogs and other domesticated animals, but unlike other human 
or near- human species such as Neanderthals, we have developed 
smaller brains and teeth, more gracile limbs, and shorter faces, males 
becoming more like women and adults like children. Such attributes 
of the domestication syndrome go hand in hand with the most 
basic change, the taming of our propensity for violence, allowing 
us to associate peacefully and cooperatively to solve problems col-
lectively. Humans’ evolutionary advantage lay in our ability to learn 
from each other, including elders and ancestors, profiting from accu-
mulated wisdom and experience. From deep time to the present, the 
most successful groups have arguably been those that self- selected for 
cooperation, cultural accretion, and collective problem solving.43
Though they are strikingly clever, no other primates could cooper-
ate sufficiently to form a state. Humans are not happy cheek by jowl 
on long- haul flights, but three hundred chimps crowded together 
in similar circumstances would tear each other apart.44 Elias’s civi-
lizing process is arguably but the tip of a massive evolutionary 
iceberg of behavioral adjustment that has brought forth today’s 
ultrasociable humans. Elias described behavioral changes that were 
culturally driven as pacification was rewarded in increasingly com-
plex and interdependent human societies. But those changes built 
on a broader evolutionary logic of how humanity has housetrained 
itself into sociability. The state relies both on this evolutionary self- 
domestication and on society’s informal self- regulation.
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This has not been a simple trade- off across the board. From the 
state’s perspective, some forms of antisocial behavior were best 
tackled through voluntary means. Others required a bit of steel. 
One could in theory mandate healthy living to achieve public- 
health goals, and to some extent we still do. Public smoking is 
banned today in the most liberal societies, as it once was in auto-
cratic eighteenth- century Prussia. But on the whole states seek to 
convince citizens to adopt healthy habits. They do not mandate 
daily push- ups or muesli for breakfast.
Yet not every public good can be achieved by jollying along wor-
thy habits. Vaccination has to be required and enforced, lest free 
riders undermine herd immunity. Even the most law- abiding soci-
eties, with few citizens in jail, have kept their police departments. 
The better its policing, the less the state has to rely on prison. Yet 
on the whole the relationship between authority and citizen has 
become less enforced and more voluntarily compliant. Today, taxes 
are deducted at source or via bank transfer and not wrested in kind 
from barns and lofts by collectors’ thugs. Military recruits muster 
up; they are no longer dragged off at bayonet point.45 The triumph 
of informal behavioral molding is confirmed more than one hun-
dred thousand times daily in each airplane safety briefing. Passen-
gers politely ignore the stewards’ demonstrations, idly wondering, 
“Where be this mythical creature who in this day boards a plane 
actually ignorant of how to buckle a safety belt?”
Today we are nearly all socialized into the conduct that makes 
dense metropolitan life tolerable and safe. Behaviors we now regard 
as innate have in fact often been only recently learned. The basic 
politeness and civility analyzed by Elias dated mostly from the six-
teenth century.46 Yet, like human evolution, the civilizing process 
continues to socialize us into behaviors that we quickly come to 
regard as necessary or even natural, not recognizing how recent is 
their pedigree. Behaviors as functionally imperative as toilet train-
ing developed only gradually and recently and still vary widely. In 
326  Conclusion
Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/books/book-pdf/1963888/book_9780262361507.pdf by guest on 27 December 2021
Still Present after All These Years  327
many earlier societies, sphincters did not require strict control. Nor 
was privacy in the act prized. The Spaniards conquering Mexico 
in 1519 were amazed that the locals had set up shelters of reed or 
straw along roads to allow discreet excretion and to save the results, 
which they used to tan hides.47 In most agrarian societies as late 
as the 1950s, scheduling and timing toilet use was not pressing. 
In cities, such controls are now being extended from humans also 
to their pets. Already in the 1890s, a quarter of all fines imposed 
by French auxiliary police were for public excretion— human and 
canine.48 It even rose to become a labor issue: How frequent and 
lengthy bathroom breaks did workers need?49 The Indian govern-
ment has recently unrolled a massive campaign to discourage out-
door excretion, which spreads disease and allows rapists to prey 
on women. Even among industrialized nations, toilet training has 
varied dramatically— early, communal, and draconian in East Ger-
many, for example, but more prolonged and forgiving elsewhere.50 
Mainland Chinese still often permit toddlers to relieve themselves 
in the street, while Hong Kong frowns on such crudity.51
Spitting, too, was once regarded as an irrepressible natural instinct, 
like breathing or urinating. In the 1890s, Chicago streets could be 
walked only gingerly, picking one’s way among the expectorations. 
The trams were even worse.52 Nineteenth- century public- health offi-
cials, rightly fearing that public spitting spread tuberculosis, cam-
paigned against it. Spittoons became a fixture of urban life. During the 
Spanish flu epidemic of 1918, New York City punished open cough-
ing or sneezing in public by a $500 fine, close to an average annual 
wage.53 Largely involuntary, coughing and sneezing remain beyond 
the law’s reach, but public spitting has generally been socialized out 
of everyday behavior. Spittoons are but curiosities. Today we judge it 
much as our grandchildren will regard smoking: a nasty habit worthy 
at best of country bumpkins— or the occasional baseball pitcher.
In other aspects of personal hygiene, we have come far from even 
our recent forbears. Asians have long adopted modern habits, but 
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among Europeans washing and cleanliness were until recently con-
sidered enervating and debilitating.54 Oral hygiene today is a $40 
billion industry. But cleansing teeth— except perhaps using urine, 
as the Dutch thought was practiced among the Spanish in the 
1500s— was uncommon before the twentieth century.55 Today, any-
one as dirty as many Europeans were even in the 1950s would be 
ostracized. In those days, an English landlady could eject an Ameri-
can tenant who bathed daily— not so much for wasting water but 
for the contagious dermatological disease self- evidently betrayed 
by such peculiar behavior. Even English toffs, who self- identify by 
scorning bourgeois propriety, are reasonably clean these days. Prin-
cess Margaret once humiliated one of her ladies in waiting by giving 
her a loo brush for Christmas, having noticed the absence of one 
while visiting her home.56 In fact, the mortified lady— as posh of 
course as the princess herself— had merely hidden it while Margaret 
was staying, too embarrassed to leave it out in the open because 
of the implied suggestion that a royal might be expected— Gandhi- 
like— to scrub her own toilet.
To épater les bourgeois, hippies of the 1960s made a virtue of being 
smelly. More recently, habits have become so squeakily clean that 
our children’s asthmas and allergies are likely aggravated because 
their immune systems simply lack practice on now banished micro-
organisms. In the Korean movie Parasite (2019), a chauffeur mur-
ders his employer for humiliating him by complaining about his 
odor— an olfactory class divide now largely unthinkable in the West. 
Westerners, in turn, still suffer a certain chronic humiliation, know-
ing that the Japanese consider them smelly.57 Once extravagances 
of the rich, mani- and pedicures have become everyday groom-
ing. The depilation craze has made pubic hair exotic, akin to mut-
tonchop sideburns. The Brooklyn hipster beard is admittedly a bit 
anomalous, yet the sheer variety of product and the specialized 
implements required for it reveal it to be not a return of untamed 
nature but stylized hirsute adornment.
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Belching, farting, and urinating in public, once commonplace, 
are now frowned upon or illegal. Kibbutzniks in postwar Israel delib-
erately upended the dining rituals of the shtetl. To signal rejection 
of their proper upbringing, they ate communally, unceremoniously, 
and each at their own pace.58 While eating habits are informalizing 
everywhere, the purely bodily aspects have tightened up. We may eat 
dinner off paper plates, supine on the couch before the television, 
but we have also coined a word, misophonia, for the agony of dis-
gust that others’ open- mouthed chewing now inflicts. Something as 
biologically unremarkable as mouth breathing is today lambasted as 
uncouth and evolutionarily harmful.59 Drinking to oblivion on Sat-
urday nights used to be commonplace in the northern and eastern 
European countryside, accompanied by swaggering and fisticuffs. In 
those nations that drink, alcohol consumption remains high, but 
some binge- drinking cultures are shifting to more Mediterranean 
habits, favoring beer or wine over spirits and consuming more mod-
erately with meals.60 Seatbelts were installed in cars beginning in the 
late 1960s, and their use was required globally as of the mid- 1980s. 
Thirty years later, compliance (front- seat use) has become largely 
universal. A few nations (Cambodia, Italy, Argentina) lag, but most 
of the developed world arrays itself in serried ranks, from 90 per-
cent compliance up through the most obedient, the French at 99 
percent.61
Gay sexuality has been normalized over the past several decades. 
In the 1970s, in the first flush of gay liberation but before the AIDS 
epidemic of the early 1980s, male homosexuals celebrated their new-
found erotic freedoms with festive abandon— their polymorphous 
hookups and unabashed promiscuity. The gay bathhouse culture 
of San Francisco and New York, with its pansexual anonymous 
delights, explicitly challenged the bodily restrictions of monoga-
mous heteronormative society. As a visiting professor at Berkeley, 
Foucault may have consciously risked a va banque wager between 
prudently avoiding HIV infection and the Dionysian delights of 
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San Francisco’s bathhouses.62 This was the world of John Rechy and 
his vision of gays as erotic outlaws, defiantly upending convention-
ality. Promiscuity was then seen as the core of gay male sexual prac-
tice, the “righteous form of revolution.”63
This revolution was, alas, an ambition cruelly dashed by AIDS 
and the gradual realization that unprotected promiscuity was epide-
miologically risky.64 Forty years on, the hot topics of debate are no 
longer glory holes, doors on bathhouse cubicles, or condom use but 
gay marriage. Safe sex has gone from being regarded as the public- 
health authorities’ attempt to squelch gay self- expression to the 
price of admission for intercourse. Once resisted as a plot hatched 
by sexual Quislings to bring homosexuals to heel, gay marriage is 
now considered a major rights victory for formerly shunned out-
siders. By abandoning the riskiest sexual practices, male gays were 
able to stave off coercive public- health interventions during the 
AIDS epidemic. They won broad social acceptance as a group distin-
guished by the object of their sexual desire but no longer meaning-
fully by their erotic practices. Heteronormatized, gaydom became 
accepted precisely because it had domesticated itself.
Besides producing ever cleaner and more circumspect citizens, 
the interaction of law and socialization in the civilizing process 
also led to behavioral shifts more closely related to our theme here 
and ultimately more important. We have followed the process by 
which law’s adjudication and enforcement became the state’s man-
date, removing such functions from the hands of kin and commu-
nity. For most of history, civil society was crime’s primary punisher. 
Once the state began playing a role, too, civil society did not of 
course vanish, but the division of labor between the two parties 
changed. Formal detection, adjudication, and enforcement fell to 
the authorities. Civil society was relegated to socializing humans 
into citizenship— in effect ensuring that they would intersect 
with formal sanctions only rarely. Meeting the state halfway, civil 
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society’s ability to regulate itself meant the modern state grew less 
repressive and interventionist. Political freedom was arguably the 
reward for self- discipline.
Taming War
Making crime the state’s problem also became an element of a 
larger pacification in human history. Most significant among its 
effects was the overall decline of pain, cruelty, and violence. Pain 
is something that we have done our best to banish. Anesthesiolo-
gists are among the unsung heroes of civilization, allowing us to 
endure and not just survive childbirth and surgery. Pain medication 
has become so sophisticated that, as with food, its provisioning has 
met needs while creating problems of overconsumption. One fun-
damental remaining global injustice is the divide setting us apart 
from those who still face sickness, age, and accident largely bereft of 
any analgesia.65 Meanwhile, the developed world chokes on its own 
excesses as death rates from addiction to pain relief soar.
The taming of violence is probably the state’s single most signifi-
cant accomplishment. But at the same time, the state, like a protec-
tion racket, may well also have been the main cause of the violence 
it then suppressed. As it subdued its subjects at home, it united them 
in warfare abroad. Domestic peace and outward aggression were flip 
sides of the state’s coin. Yet this was not a hydraulic effect, with 
pressures reduced in one spot erupting elsewhere. Total violence 
decreased. Living as we do in the shadow of half a century of world 
war, it may seem counterintuitive, but violent deaths per capita— 
including the state’s own military acts— have steadily declined over 
the past five millennia. On that there is scholarly consensus. In 
dispute remains what the situation looked like ten thousand years 
ago, in the prestate age of hunter- gatherers. From the behavior of 
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certain primates, from existing human tribes, and from skeletal evi-
dence at prehistoric burial sites, some archaeologists and evolution-
ary psychologists have concluded that warfare was then sufficiently 
endemic (killing perhaps a quarter of all males) to have powered 
the engines of evolution— warlike traits being selected for.66 Others 
have questioned this conclusion, pointing out that the evidence for 
wide- scale warfare in prehistoric times is still scant.
That warfare eventually grew common is undisputed; the ques-
tion is when. Much also hangs on how warfare is defined. Besides 
eradicating most of the planet’s terrestrial megafauna, Homo sapiens 
may also have had a hand in the extinction of Neanderthals, Den-
isovans, Homo floresiensis, and other archaic near- human peoples. 
Whether that happened through outright aggression or a subtler 
outcompetition for resources is unclear. By perhaps thirty thousand 
years ago, Homo sapiens were the lone humanoids on the planet.67 
Given this possible ur- xenocide, the scholarly debate over warfare 
among hunter- gatherers thus deals largely with our aggression 
against ourselves, not our near kin.
The Homo sapien hunter- gatherers of sparsely populated prehis-
toric times likely came into contact with each other only sporadi-
cally, perhaps meeting up at hunting grounds or for ceremonial 
purposes. They probably rarely fought over common resources, 
though this is a guess only. From ten thousand years ago, as with 
most other aspects of human life then, little evidence of warfare has 
survived.68 But as populations densified and settled, social stratifica-
tion multiplied. With the emergence of complex foraging commu-
nities, hereditary leaders arose, and the potential for antagonism 
between now more proximate groups increased. The beginnings of 
agriculture and domesticated livestock intensified the territoriality 
of settlement. At some point, moving in search of new resources put 
groups in conflict with others who were already occupying what 
only seemed to be empty and yielding territory.69 That complex 
hunter- gatherers were violent seems widely agreed upon. Evidence 
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for warfare increased in the Neolithic (starting ca. 5500 BCE). By the 
beginning of the Copper Age (ca. 4500 BCE), it was undeniable.70
Beyond the hunter- gatherer stage, proto- states began, ordering 
the affairs of evermore complex, sedentary, agricultural civilizations. 
Sedentism preceded both widespread grain agriculture and state for-
mation by several millennia. There was no lockstep in which these 
various aspects of human development marched.71 Though sedentism 
did not automatically lead to statehood, states did require sedentary 
subjects. As Neolithic people densified on fertile lands, chiefdoms 
likely emerged, besting smaller, disorganized villages.72
States produced violence, then, but mostly in the sense that the 
circumstances they were called on to tame would have led to war-
fare even in their absence. Proximity, density, and the ability to pro-
duce and store valuables that were vulnerable to plunder, such as 
nuts, grains, textiles, and slaves— all this encouraged raids and wars 
as a shortcut to wealth without work, though of course not without 
the cost of armaments, training, and casualties. States, too, fell for 
this temptation. True, they suppressed violence internally by adju-
dicating and policing, but they encouraged violence externally by 
plundering and conquering neighbors. As tribes and villages became 
chiefdoms, chiefdoms became states, and states eventually empires, 
the internal pacifying effect spread, reducing the number of entities 
in competition and expanding what counted as domestic and thus 
demilitarized territory. States thus both produced and suppressed 
violence. Had humanity remained foragers, with Malthusian pres-
sures checking their numbers, warfare could perhaps have been 
sidestepped. But after the shift to agriculture, states and warfare 
were unavoidable. Having perhaps invented or at least accompa-
nied war, states then also became part of subduing violence.
Those scholars who have most forcefully noted the pacifying 
effect of states compare today’s violent- death rates to the rates sup-
posedly characteristic of hunter- gatherer societies. Among prehis-
toric societies, an average of 15 percent of skeletons examined give 
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evidence of violent death, some of which may have happened in 
hunts. Violent deaths in the twentieth century, including even those 
caused only indirectly, range between 1 and 3 percent.73 Compared 
to stateless societies, states thus successfully suppressed violence. 
The point remains, less forceful but dramatic nonetheless, even if 
we agree that the portion of violent deaths among hunter- gatherers 
has been exaggerated. The life of an ancient forager may not have 
been as violent as supposed, and the state may have helped create 
the problem it then solved. Yet, overall and in the long run, given 
that humanity turned to agriculture and violence intensified, states 
tamed violence.
Living as we do under the state’s thumb, it takes an act of his-
torical imagination or perhaps a comparison with the turmoil of 
contemporary failed states to appreciate the effect on our lives of 
this peaceful ordering. The level of social chaos considered accept-
able even as recently as the eighteenth century would be incon-
ceivable today, absent utter social breakdown. Intent on plunder, 
thousand- strong crowds savagely attacked the crews and the police 
trying to protect them of ships wrecked on the English coast in the 
eighteenth century. During the Gordon riots of 1780, the mob ran 
unchecked in central London. After the elections in 1819, promi-
nent MPs were pelted with mud in public, and the windows of the 
rich were broken if they refused the crowd’s insistence on candles 
in them.74 Rioting was in effect a tolerated form of public expres-
sion, and the authorities were largely unable to do anything about 
it in any case. Today we accept only much lower levels of public 
disorder. Outdoor marches and assemblies require official approval 
and all manner of permits and insurances.75 Universal suffrage has 
made everyone complicit in governing, dramatically raising the 
bar for legitimate rioting by providing other means of being heard. 
Enhanced police power, too, has raised the stakes of unrest.76 When 
riots occur, they are often own goals, the poor damaging their own 
neighborhoods.
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Social Control
How do we understand civil society’s self- regulation? Is it some-
thing undertaken voluntarily in a neo- Kantian spirit of self- willed 
autonomy and freedom? Or is it a subtle but still outside imposi-
tion on unwilling subjects by the state, possibly acting on behalf 
of powerful interests? Where an initial socialization had failed and 
citizens were then brought back into the fold, power relations were 
obvious. Alex’s resocialization in Stanley Kubrick’s dystopian film 
A Clockwork Orange trained him in conventional behavior, spoil-
ing his pleasure in Beethoven as collateral damage. Unsurprisingly, 
state- led socialization often legitimized and favored elite habits, 
activities, and entertainments. Alfred Doolittle, Eliza’s dustman 
father in My Fair Lady, resentfully chides “middle- class morality” 
for spoiling his enjoyment of being one of the undeserving poor. 
Nineteenth- century social workers scrutinized proletarian families 
and their habits, vigilantly encouraging them to adopt middle- class 
mores. Public- health officials forced themselves on often unwilling 
subjects, requiring them to vaccinate their children, send them to 
school, not crowd too densely in their dwellings, give up sharing 
them with animals, and the like. Urban workers resisted antidrink 
campaigns for undermining accustomed rituals of sociability. Sports 
and other leisure activities varied by class. Joys of the elite were pro-
tected, whereas working- class pleasures were denied. Fox hunting 
and falconry flourished; ratting, bearbaiting, and cockfighting were 
banned. Dog racing ceded pride of place to horse racing. Some gam-
bling and often prizefighting were suppressed.77
Yet self- control could be liberating, too. Self- discipline was not 
just a crude class- determined imposition. Social control has often 
been interpreted as a subtle way to ensure what the state or domi-
nant groups sought. But the civilizing process cannot be boiled 
down just to class terms. Did elites force controls on their inferi-
ors in order to maintain their dominance? If so, then, as Elias has 
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shown, they did it only after imposing this self- discipline on them-
selves. Historically, certain elites were the first to control themselves. 
That was the implicit assumption in codes, such as the Islamic, 
which punished more harshly the further down in the social scale 
they went. Inspired by his Calvinist faith, the seventeenth- century 
Great Elector of Prussia, Friedrich Wilhelm, imposed austerity, self- 
discipline, and rigor on his administration, helping by willpower and 
effort his small, poor, distant nation punch far above its geopolitical 
weight.78 The first cohort of aristocrats could by definition not have 
been chosen by lineage. Even as the caste solidified, it recognized and 
folded in outsiders with enviable personal qualities. Having achieved 
social recognition under feudalism, certain families managed to 
remain prominent for centuries thereafter, across revolutions, depres-
sions, crashes, and other misfortunes likely to have undermined their 
unearned social advantage. Was that longevity due to qualities of 
mind and character they managed to pass on to descendants?79
The civilizing process aimed for a self- controlled citizen of mod-
erate, restrained tastes and habits. That selected against the rowdier 
of lower- class pursuits as well as against paupers, with their alleged 
tendency to be insubordinate, footloose, improvident, and unwill-
ing to work.80 But the civilizing process was equally a rejection of 
the sexual libertinage, purposeless blood sports, and lavish con-
sumption of the wealthy. In countless ways, markets, societies, and 
states have socialized modern people into prudent, regular habits, 
bringing forth the disciplined, punctual, reliable, and predictable 
citizens required by complex economies. The meritocracy debate of 
our own era indicates the extent to which the allegedly bourgeois 
virtues of thrift, hard work, tamed instincts, and the cultivation of 
talent and intellect have come to define us all.81 Hedge- fund man-
agers, quants, and technonerds are the new exemplars; landowners 
have lost their allure.
The discipline that drove the civilizing process could be demo-
cratic and liberating in a neo- Kantian way. Much as Kant and Hegel 
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thought that freedom was achieved by following just law, so citi-
zens came to see self- discipline and self- control as means to avoid 
authority’s outside impositions by submitting voluntarily to the 
dictates of civilized cohabitation. The point of socialization was to 
sidestep the need for external interventions. The more self- control 
and self- policing, the fewer the state’s impositions. Nikolas Rose has 
expanded Elias’s theory to argue that self- government is true gov-
ernment and self- discipline not the state’s psychic imposition but 
the means of achieving freedom.82
Social control has been a conceptual black box, concealing vari-
ous approaches to the question “Who wields power?” Social control 
has been innocently interpreted as the means of assuring the behav-
ioral calibration required by life in interdependent industrialized 
society. The nineteenth- century sociologists who first formulated 
the concept meant the way in which necessary behavioral modifi-
cations were achieved through a consensual mutual adjustment by 
everyone.83 Socialization, informal social pressure, and then, only if 
these had failed, the state’s formal apparatus— those were the tools 
to keep citizens in line. The American jurist Roscoe Pound defined 
social control as “the pressure upon each man brought to bear by 
his fellow men in order to constrain him to do his part in uphold-
ing civilized society.”84 Seen thus, social control was necessary and 
benign.
Social control is also more cynically seen as how elites ensure 
their predominance, merely disguising the exertion of power and 
coercion. Precisely by whom and why were the issues. Prisons 
were unmasked as means of turning recalcitrant proletarians into 
a docile reserve army of workers. Mental hospitals made differently 
thinking patients conform. Even welfare or charitable policies or 
organized leisure pursuits— sports and the like— might be means 
of keeping a possibly unruly lower class placid by supplying bread 
and circuses. Exerted as indoctrination, such power left even people 
who felt free toeing a line drawn by someone else— led astray by 
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the ever- malleable false consciousness.85 With some imagination, 
everything short of outright revolution could be interpreted as 
socially stabilizing and functionally coercive.
Self- abnegation, thrift, industriousness, and temperance could 
be taken at face value as habits that helped their practitioners make 
something of themselves. Or they could be interpreted cynically as 
what capitalism required of its workers. Without a clear steer as to 
whose interests governed society, social control arguments easily 
tied themselves in knots. If docility were the goal, why inculcate 
habits of self- discipline that might lead workers to expect a better 
future for themselves?86 Religion, the opium of the masses, might 
be a better ideological control, as it in fact remained in those states 
that recognized the inherent danger of allowing subordinates, 
whether the poor, ethnic minorities, or women, to learn to read or 
otherwise better themselves.
And all this assumed that the institutions of social control actu-
ally performed as planned. But did they? Victorian prisons, for 
example, were rarely the engines of social discipline imagined by 
Foucauldians. More often, they treated their inmates better than 
they were accustomed to in the outside world, imposing little dis-
cipline and scarcely any control. In any case, the prisons were too 
understaffed and kept their charges too briefly to have much influ-
ence one way or the other.87 Ironically, the theorists of disciplin-
ary institutions— Erving Goffman, Michel Foucault, and David 
Rothman— wrote at just that twentieth- century moment when 
they witnessed these institutions’ trajectory reverse.88 Convincing 
anyone that universities and hospitals were institutions of covert 
coercion had always been a long shot. Workhouses and poorhouses 
were long gone. Asylums and orphanages, in turn, emptied out pre-
cisely at the moment their affinity to prisons was being trumpeted. 
Starting in the 1960s, the mentally ill were radically deinstitution-
alized.89 Like the blind, orphans and their institutions have largely 
vanished thanks to a combination of demographic, medical, and 
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social changes. Only the prison— the most obviously  disciplinary of 
the institutions— remained and has expanded. The insight into these 
institutions’ supposed carceral commonality that then seemed so 
trenchant has been considerably blunted since.
Conversely, if social control actually did what was claimed on its 
behalf, why so ineffectually? If modern prisons were supposed to 
keep a reserve labor force off the streets when unemployment was 
high, why should incarceration cost more than the dole? If state 
schools were intended to train the rising generation of worker bees, 
why not do so more effectively? Who were these Machiavellians 
covertly running things? If they were so clever, why did they usu-
ally fail? Like all conspiracy theories, the view of social control as 
an effective force stumbled over the fatal contradiction between an 
allegedly omniscient and omnipotent group of manipulators and 
the hash they were in fact making of things. Nor, in this view, was 
there any room for discipline that individuals underwent for their 
own betterment— abstinence, self- improvement, or even any form 
of training or education.
Whatever their precise formulation, social control arguments still 
approached power as a bilateral encounter: the powerful exerted 
force over the dispossessed, either directly or indirectly, covertly 
or overtly, and the dispossessed in turn resisted as best they could. 
But this view was rife with ambiguities. Who controlled whom, and 
for what purpose? If the powerful were the first to self- discipline, 
if self- control were broadly speaking good for those undertaking it 
and not just something forced on them, then who was to say that 
power was being exerted in only one direction? Hospitals sought 
to cure, schools to educate, factories to produce, and even prisons 
sometimes to rehabilitate. Could all these activities be unmasked 
as somehow serving the dominance of the powerful? Unless one 
were willing to argue that they were ultimately motivated less by 
what they did for their immediate clients than by how they main-
tained the system for elites, then power described only as an act 
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of domination was insufficient. Yes, prisons, factories, hospitals, 
and schools resembled each other in being disciplinary institu-
tions. Inmates, pupils, and workers may have resented the control 
imposed. Patients did not, so long as physicians cured them. Nor 
did the civil servants, managers, scholars, and other professionals 
who spent long years in training to achieve their coveted positions.
Elias willingly accepted the socially ameliorative aspects of 
self- discipline. Rose expanded on that notion, harnessing it to a 
broader Kantian project of freedom achieved through law. Foucault 
shunned the crude Marxism of locating power reductively in the 
hands of dominant classes, with the state but their handmaiden. 
His escape from the dilemma that remained was to obfuscate the 
very idea of power. No longer something exerted by one actor over 
another, power became decentered, a multitude of forces cascading 
hither and yon, controlling elites and subordinates equally. Disci-
pline, not power, became the overarching concept, able to reconcile 
the apparent moderation of the modern state with an insistence 
that the velvet glove still harbored iron. Power, quoth Foucault, is 
“a machine in which everyone is caught, those who exercise power 
just as much as those over whom it is exercised.”90
L’état continue
Whether the state really has become more moderate therefore 
depends on the extent civil society regulates itself. If civil society’s 
(self- )disciplinary efforts in fact have left the state with less enforc-
ing to do, then perhaps it really has been rolled back. The overall 
social control effort may have remained constant but is now appor-
tioned differently— more for civil society, less for the state. Yet there 
lies the rub. “Law varies inversely with other social control,” schol-
ars have assured us.91 If Elias, Foucault, and Rose were right, if the 
disciplinary and normalizing effort was working and controls were 
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increasingly internalized and informalized, we would expect ever 
fewer new laws and less enforcement of existing ones. Indeed, law 
would have been superseded. But has it been?
Cultures have made use of formal and informal controls to differ-
ent extents. To sting, shame punishments require buy- in to shared 
standards. A communitarian society can enforce norms by threaten-
ing to ostracize offenders. An individualistic one relies more heavily 
on the state and its coercive apparatus.92 Nor has every society been 
able to impose the same degree of informal social control. Immi-
grant societies, with few shared values or traditions, have struggled 
to institute broad risk- and cost- sharing social policies, compared 
to the more easily achieved solidarities of nations that— at the 
moment of forming their welfare states— were more ethnically and 
religiously homogenous.93 The citizens of multicultural, immigrant 
nations, especially if their welfare policies do not shore up the tra-
ditional institutions of socialization, are less likely to agree on com-
mon social norms than the inhabitants of countries governed by 
what the Germans call a Leitkultur, a dominant cultural ethos.94 
Multiculturalism’s fissures have come to strain countries whose poli-
cies once could assume a certain behavioral uniformity. Even some-
thing as mundane as ticketing on mass transit spans a range, from 
relying on citizen honesty to up- front uniformed control.95
Within any given culture, the balance between formal and infor-
mal control has also shifted back and forth historically. Inculcated 
behavioral norms sometimes weaken or reverse. Increasing urban-
ization has drained small, tight- knit communities with their every-
day mechanisms of socialization. The recent rise of antivaccination 
movements has undermined once widely adopted, socially benefi-
cial conduct, prompting authorities to reinforce formal obligations— 
subjecting children to the needle before enrolling them in school.96 
For a brief moment in the 1960s, the West seemed to relax informal 
control, lessening behavioral regulation.97 Individual civil rights 
were enhanced, conventional proprieties disregarded. Hedonistic 
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behavior— sexual, emotional, drug- related— spread into even the 
middle classes. Were an older work ethic and norms of social con-
trol more generally unwinding?
Perhaps behavioral control did briefly relax during the 1960s and 
1970s. Nonetheless, looking back half a century later, the continuities 
impress more than the ruptures. Despite some loosening in matters 
sexual and possibly also on inebriation, social self- regulation seems as 
strict today as ever. The shift from blue- to white- collar jobs, from pro-
duction to service, demands ever firmer self- discipline. Ill- educated 
working- class men, smarting at their inability to master new jobs, 
supply the shock troops of today’s populist movements. Educational 
requirements and demands have ratcheted steadily skyward. The 
universities where the sixty- eighters lazily turned on, tuned in, and 
dropped out now expect Stakhanovite hyperaccomplishment. Even 
adolescents have lengthy CVs. Far from relaxing, informal controls 
have arguably strengthened in the past half century. Jerry Rubin, for 
example, went from Yippie to yuppie. He led Berkeley protests in the 
1960s, taunted brokers by throwing dollar bills onto the New York 
Stock Exchange floor, and was tried as part of the Chicago Seven after 
riots at the Democratic National Convention in 1968. In the 1970s, 
however, he became a businessman and multimillionaire before 
being killed while jaywalking across Wilshire Avenue in Los Angeles. 
Jane Fonda trod a similar path toward self- discipline, from the sex- 
kitten Barbarella to antiwar protester to the queen of the autoregulat-
ing rigor of fitness and diet.
Informal social control and formal law have counterintuitively 
increased in tandem. As society has become more complicated and 
less homogeneous, increasingly rift by social, religious, ethnic, and 
other multicultural divides, control has shifted. Formal imposition 
has arguably made a comeback, supplementing informal socializa-
tion. A neoretributionist wave of penal policy has hit some nations, 
with more people imprisoned. And police numbers have grown 
across the world, with vast private forces now enhancing the official. 
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But, more important and less expected, new laws and novel kinds of 
regulations have expanded the state’s reach into our lives, indeed our 
minds. Even as we exert more self- control, and even as the engines 
of informal socialization turn more swiftly, we also have more overt 
law— not just regulatory but penal too. More and different behav-
iors have been criminalized. Thoughts and intentions have increas-
ingly become actionable. Even when multiple laws merely duplicate 
prohibitions, the state has arrogated to itself unprecedented powers 
through charge stacking— that is, targeting the same behavior via 
multiple avenues of prosecution.98 Prosecutors have gained greater 
leverage to insist on plea bargains— effectively coercing defendants 
into pleading guilty, increasing the court system’s throughput, and 
sparing themselves work. The charge that overcriminalization is 
now a problem has come from both Left and Right.99
Following Tocqueville, Foucault argued that modern regimes 
sought to change citizens’ souls and did not just require correct out-
ward behavior. These two thinkers focused on prisoners and men-
tal patients, those pitiful, deviant marginals who bore the brunt of 
society’s disapproval and discipline. Yet, as we have seen, the state’s 
ambitions went even further. It aimed not only to criminalize more 
behaviors but also to apply formal statute ever deeper into citizens’ 
psyches, holding them accountable for a wider palette of offenses 
at ever earlier stages of planning or even just consciousness. As the 
state sought to prevent— and not just punish— crimes, simple ret-
ributionist verities dissipated. It was no longer clear precisely what 
was forbidden, nor was the punishment for each offense set. Even 
the fundamental principle of no punishment without law seemed 
up for grabs. Expanding into inchoate offenses and crimes of omis-
sion, the law pushed past our actions to peer into our thoughts, 
holding us responsible for what went on in our minds, too.
Setting itself ever more tasks and motivated by the best of inten-
tions, the modern state willy- nilly became a bigger part of the every-
day. Modern life, it seemed, required more law. New technologies of 
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course demanded new regulation, but the state was also asked to do 
more. We have more immigration law than ever before, not because 
we have more immigration than in, say, the late nineteenth cen-
tury but because citizens expect the state to regulate it. Preserving 
the environment, ensuring workplace health and safety, protecting 
women from abuse, minorities from discrimination, children from 
predation, and consumers from fraud: all have become state tasks. 
Environmental legislation alone now makes up 15 percent of US 
federal regulations.100 That would have surprised the early modern 
state. And the development of inchoate law in effect quadrupled 
the range of possible offenses, as planning, conspiring, and intend-
ing crimes were added to the acts themselves.
As the law expanded to an ever broader array of both overt and 
covert behaviors, more citizens became potential offenders— 
defendants who had just not yet been caught, the sword of Damocles 
ever pendant over them. As more actions became crimes, more citi-
zens became criminals. Wanting to preserve First Nation artifacts, the 
state prosecuted campers on federal land who dug for arrowheads. 
Hoping to corral toxic poisons, it jailed entrepreneurs who shipped 
chemicals in nonregulated containers. Intending to preserve marine 
life, authorities went after food wholesalers who imported undersize 
lobsters. Worried at growing drug use, the state punished as complicit 
not just narcotics dealers but also the realtors who sold them houses 
and the interior decorators who chose their carpets.101 Indeed, as one 
wag has pointed out, legal codes “are full of ingenious suggestions for 
committing crimes.”102
Seeking to make life safer, healthier, and happier, US lawmakers 
have at one time or another prohibited hat pins of certain lengths, 
the public eating of reptiles, masked balls, hats at theatrical perfor-
mances, and hotel sheets less than nine feet in length. In the 1880s, 
James Bryce, British ambassador to the United States, followed in 
the footsteps of Tocqueville’s earlier travels throughout the country 
and reported wryly on the state- level regulations governing every 
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conceivable topic. His irony extended not just to how it was forbid-
den to send annoying letters or employ the color- blind on trains but 
also to what we might consider sensible, indeed prescient, measures: 
requiring doctors and dentists to be licensed, obliging buildings 
taller than a certain height to have fireproof staircases, and prohib-
iting hotels and insurance companies from discriminating against 
Blacks and Jews. All such measures, he seemed to think, were wildly 
beyond anything at home in Britain.103 Already in 1900, long before 
our own era’s tsunami of new legislation, an observer imagined 
Dracon and Solon, the Greek legislators whose names live on in their 
codes, shaking their heads in bemusement at the panoply of laws 
governing the lives of modern Americans: punished for jumping 
off trains in motion, sleeping in bakeries, killing partridges out of 
season, failing to report infants’ infected eyes, serving margarine in 
prisons, riding horses on the sidewalks of unincorporated villages, 
and so forth in all their eccentric glory.104
In sum, across the past several centuries, civil society has grown 
evermore orderly and regulated, but the state has also continued to 
expand in parallel. The retributive turn of the 1980s, with harsher 
punishments and more incarceration, was an Anglo- Saxon blip on 
larger secular developments. The state’s interventions here were 
naked and undeniable. But more subtle states expanded their role, 
too, even as civil society’s self- regulation continued apace. Inso-
far as sexual relations were governed at all, for example, they used 
to be regulated by morality, propriety, deference, and some local 
police powers. Only in extremis did law and employment regula-
tion enter the picture, which left a wide field for sexual predators, 
ranging from workplace pests to flashers, molesters, and rapists. 
Today, protection from predation in homes, schools, workplaces, 
and public spaces has been legalified. Much mocked at the time, the 
Antioch College rules from the early 1990s were a harbinger, set-
ting out procedures to ensure explicit verbal consent at each stage 
of the courtship ritual.105 Similar formalization has spread from 
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universities to the workplace. Men patting or pinching waitresses’ 
or secretaries’ bottoms, framed as harmless fun half a century ago, 
is now an offense. Domestic violence has been dealt with evermore 
formally. Injury to wives and children was specifically forbidden, as 
in England in 1853, and marital rape was finally explicitly outlawed 
there in 2003. In the past, police came only when domestic disputes 
spilled into public view, prompting someone to summon help. The 
authorities often sought to calm matters, resolving them without 
arrest. Today, this approach is seen as tolerating abuse. Police are 
now often required to arrest, turning what was once husbands’ legal 
right to attack and batter their wives into a public offense. Abusive 
partners can be banished from the common home, imposing a de 
facto divorce.106
Once- tolerated behaviors have evermore become law’s object. 
Although we might smile at the painstakingly officious and metic-
ulous Polizei regulations of the eighteenth century, much of their 
intent remains in effect. Modern microregulation is often adminis-
tered through regulatory law rather than through the penal code, but 
it is enforced more effectively. Use of inebriants is subject to law, even 
as some are exempted from statute’s attention— as most recently 
with marijuana. Of course, states have regulated consumption for 
centuries, but rarely on today’s scale. America’s war on drugs— heir 
to similar battles against alcohol— has formalized behavioral con-
trol as it massively applies semi- militarized state force against deeply 
engrained and widespread behaviors. Drug- using Americans, espe-
cially ethnic minorities, were sent to prison ten times as often in the 
late 1990s as a decade earlier.107
Even sartorial regulations— seemingly pointless in the era of 
spandex worn in public— remain with us. East Germany outlawed 
long hair on men and short skirts on women. The Chinese use their 
digital panopticon surveillance to harass old folks who wear paja-
mas in public. But liberal democracies, too, intervene. Until 1937, 
a Yonkers ordinance prohibited appearing in public in “other than 
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customary street attire.” More recently, municipalities have forbid-
den baggy pants, the wearing of baseball caps backward, certain col-
ors associated with gang membership, as well as ceremonial daggers 
borne by Sikhs. Japanese schools have required brown- haired pupils 
to dye their hair black to fit in. France and Denmark have banned 
burqas and other face coverings.108 And the quickest way to end up 
in detention almost anywhere is to strip in public— or even in pri-
vate if one is publicly visible.109
At the same time, as noted, citizens are more self- controlled than 
in the past. Cultural conservatives often lament that we are losing 
our sense of humor, by which they mean that we are no longer per-
mitted to mock or sneer at the downtrodden and vulnerable. This 
change testifies to the success of shifting informal standards: “Mean 
jokes go out of style because civilization moves on.”110 Old coots 
may lament being reprimanded for telling Polish or mother- in- law 
jokes. But few would desire a return to the early twentieth century, 
when victims of discrimination often turned to libel or defamation 
law to protect themselves against “accusations” that we no lon-
ger regard as calumnious. In those days, it was considered a libel 
or slander per se (one that was actionable even without causing 
harm) to be called Black and, later, Communist or homosexual.111 
Similarly those called Jewish who did not consider themselves such 
could and did sue for having been vilified.112
Society exerts all manner of restraint on us. Foucauldians are right 
to have emphasized that. But the expected corollary— that overt, 
formal, statutory control ceded pride of place to the new disciplin-
ary regime— rings false. As we have seen, along with the growth 
of informal social discipline, the state has also vastly expanded its 
formal regulatory powers. It passes new laws on a massive scale, 
sharpens existing ones, and intervenes ever deeper into civil soci-
ety. As has often been pointed out, new laws proliferate, while old 
ones remain. Accretion of old and disused statutes explains only 
in part the mushrooming quantity of law. The US Congress has 
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created fifty new crimes annually for the past several decades, the 
US states some forty.113 Of the federal criminal provisions put on 
the books since the American Civil War, a calculation in 1998 put 
the figure enacted since 1970 at an astonishing 40 percent.114 Brit-
ain instituted seventy immigration offenses over the entire twen-
tieth century. A further eighty- four arrived in the first decade of 
the following millennium. The twelve years after 1979 saw half of 
all Chinese laws on public security enacted.115 Add to this the way 
courts have expansively interpreted these burgeoning laws, further 
extending the state’s reach.116
Policing has also expanded accordingly. The state once took as its 
primary function the protection against external enemies. Today, 
internal adversaries are considered equally important. The man-
power allotted to policing once paled in comparison to the armed 
forces. Today it has largely pulled even, and that counts just official 
police. Add in private policing, and the point is hammered home. 
The first national police force, the French maréchaussée from the 
1760s, had 3,000 men, the French army 400,000.117 Today the US 
military has more than a million active personnel. Official policing 
institutions have somewhat less than a million, and there are about 
a million and a half police if the private forces are added in.118 In 
Britain, the military has 192,000 personnel, and the official police 
force has 150,000 or 381,000 if private security forces are counted, 
too, bringing it to twice the size of the military.119
As the number of laws and potential crimes increased, the the-
oretical chances of the average citizen crossing the line has also 
multiplied. “The vehicle code gives me fifteen hundred reasons to 
pull you over,” as one California highway patrolman put it.120 No 
one disputes that the poor are punished disproportionately or that 
white- collar offenses are often treated lightly.121 But the law has also 
taken aim at behaviors that were once not criminal at all. Today’s 
good burghers, whose forebears might rarely have encountered the 
police, now often will— at least in theory. Citizens did not become 
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more evil, but as the arena of illegality extended, they were likelier 
than ever to offend. We thus face an apparent paradox. Did expand-
ing and deepening the law’s reach mean that more citizens became 
potential criminals? The expansion of drug laws has fueled Ameri-
ca’s jail boom. Many current white- collar crimes were once legal or 
at least ignored. Bankers are now perp- walked to prison. Could it be 
that the civilizing process actually increased criminality?
Writing in 1902, Arthur Cleveland Hall welcomed the growth of 
convictions and imprisonment as signs of civilization and progress. 
As society became more complex and sophisticated, he thought, 
it required more laws. Since that, in turn, forbade more actions, 
society necessarily pushed more people beyond the pale. But the 
nature of crime changed. The number of archaic, primitive crimes 
committed— assault, mayhem, homicide— declined. The number 
of new, more genteel offenses— fraud, forgery— increased.122
How true that may be is hard to measure. Conviction rates have 
increased, though not in all nations.123 Today, proportionately twice 
as many Americans have spent time in jail than half a century 
ago.124 Almost twice the percentage of Britons were in jail in 2008 
compared to in 1900.125 Since more citizens have likely violated the 
law than we can ever pursue, the decision of who is a criminal now 
rests less with legislators than with the police and prosecutors.126 
Contacts between authorities and citizens that lead neither to arrest 
nor conviction yet serve a broader sense of enforcement have 
increased. Being stopped by police has become the most common 
form of citizen contact with criminal justice. Zero- tolerance polic-
ing has consigned a whole new class of petty misdemeanants to a 
system of official chicanery and invasive social control that stops 
short of conviction and incarceration.127
But to know whether the average citizen is more likely to be 
arrested and convicted, we need to know about recidivism, too. Are 
some people being convicted multiple times even as more people 
avoid entanglement altogether? In the United States, three- quarters 
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of federal state prisoners released in 2005 were arrested again within 
five years.128 What we do know is that even though the possibilities 
of offending have mushroomed, the overwhelming majority of citi-
zens pass their lives without seriously confronting the law. Prison 
populations have skyrocketed, but over a lifetime “only” 5 percent 
of Americans will spend time in jail.129 Given the exceptionally 
high incarceration rates in the United States, far fewer people go to 
prison almost anywhere else in the world. Though Hall’s extrapola-
tion was logical, more laws would have led to more criminals only if 
average citizens did not adjust their behavior in tune with the ever- 
wider web of potential ensnarlments. Exercising even greater self- 
control, they may have fallen no more afoul of the law than they 
did earlier— even as the law expanded to dig more potential pitfalls. 
If so, then the law spurred further efforts at self- control by defining 
the parameters of the acceptable ever more precisely.
By contrast, those least adept at self- control were likely to have had 
difficulty navigating the ever- narrower roads of legality. In theory, 
more citizens could offend since there was more to offend against. 
But they may not have. A small minority, however, has been caught 
in the unforgiving forcefield between expanding formal prohibi-
tions and ever- higher demands on personal restraint. Society seems 
increasingly to have bisected: the majority self- regulated, only rarely 
encountering the business end of authority. Meanwhile, a smallish 
group of outsiders, downtrodden, and unfortunates bore the law’s 
full brunt. For them, law became the last remaining engine of social-
ization. Law enforcement targeted racial and class outsiders, foreign-
ers, the mentally ill, drug addicts, and others who violated society’s 
increasingly numerous and elaborate norms, insufficiently reined in 
by informal guidance. Even when these outsiders were not convicted 
or locked up, a persistent barrage of petty violations (subway free-
loading, marijuana use, and knife possession) sought to identify and 
control them.130
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The world over, prisons are filled with ethnic and national out-
siders. The story of America’s jails is well known. The prison boom 
of the late twentieth century has not made inmates more represen-
tative of society as a whole. Quite the opposite, most prisoners are 
Black and Latino men. In Europe, racial minorities are even more 
overrepresented behind bars. In the United States, Blacks are rep-
resented six times disproportionately in the prison population. In 
Britain, it is seven times. It is twelve times for Aborigines in Austra-
lia, and sixteen times for Afro- Caribbeans in Canada.131 In the US 
foreign nationals are underrepresented in prison— only 6 percent. 
Across Western Europe, however, foreigners often make up a large 
fraction and sometimes the majority of prisoners.132 In North Rhine 
Westphalia, Romanians are arrested at forty- four times the rate of 
Germans and jailed twenty- one times as often.133 Seventy percent 
of the Swiss prison population is foreign born, 45 percent in Aus-
tria, and 30 percent in Germany.134 Banishment is added to lockup, 
and foreign prisoners in Europe are often expelled once their sen-
tences are over— frequently to “homes” they have never actually 
lived in.135
Even as the state has grown relentlessly— with only few setbacks— 
over the past five thousand years, humans still dream of life without 
it. That law would eventually become unnecessary has been a fond 
illusion. The ancient Chinese expected law to vanish— Confucians 
because right living would become second nature, Legalists because 
punishments would be so cruel that no one would dare transgress.136 
In the fourth century, Augustine regarded the state as a necessar-
ily coercive relationship between authority and humans, whose evil 
nature required subjugation, so it would be unnecessary in para-
dise.137 Utopians have long hoped for communities held together 
by common sympathy and purpose, with no need for law.138 Anar-
chists definitionally shunned the law when outlining their ideal 
futures. Like today’s neoliberals, Proudhon imagined that contract 
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would substitute for it. Indeed, neoliberals aim to limit the state’s 
task to fighting crime, thus leaving markets free to arrange most 
other social relations.139
Marx and especially Friedrich Engels argued that after a proletar-
ian dictatorship, when new rulers made use of old- regime power, the 
state would wither away. Absent private property, social contradic-
tions would dissipate, and so, too, would the state. We all recognize 
the naïveté of this messianic expectation that law and policing would 
vanish as capitalism’s social tensions evaporated under socialism’s 
warm sun. Stalin certainly made short shrift of such yearnings. The 
illusion of doing without law was condemned, and socialist legality 
was declared statute’s highest form, rigorously enforced.140 Nonethe-
less, in the West today a related assumption remains widespread— 
the Foucauldian conviction that modernity shifts social control 
from state to society. These theorists insist that despite the illusion 
of liberalization, power remains, but it has moved from the state’s 
heavy, centralized authority to subtle, diffuse, dispersed forms of dis-
cipline within society’s institutions. The law has been expelled.141
Has no one recognized the continuing importance of the law? 
History has not been kind to Durkheim’s understanding of why 
offending is sanctioned. He argued that society punishes crime not 
to revenge itself or to deter future offenses but ritually to express its 
communal ties, to reaffirm the unity of law- abiders against trans-
gressors. The point of punishment was to influence not the offender 
but honest citizens, thus rallying the troops. In his early writings, 
Durkheim defined crime as acts that most people agree are trans-
gressions, ones that offend the “collective consciousness” (society’s 
“psychological type”), which he imagined present everywhere and 
across generations.142 This definition presupposed a communal 
mind, an essentialist cultural unity of a sort now largely rejected 
by social scientists.143 At best, it would describe only a small frac-
tion of all statute. Unsurprisingly, however, lawyers have been grati-
fied by the importance Durkheim attributed to the law. Some have 
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arrogated to themselves the role once served by high priests. They 
argue that in the absence of shared national religions, law expresses 
our common beliefs of what must be condemned and helps create 
norms.144
Durkheim’s later writings, elaborating the development of indi-
vidualism, more plausibly argued for a collective sense of justice 
and has influenced thinking on human rights.145 Restorative jus-
tice, returning punishment to its traditional prestate role of making 
good the damage done, has Durkheimian roots. Though Durkheim 
had a curiously mystical view of the law as expressing the collec-
tive nous, he also made other points of interest here. Early gods 
were enforcers. Religious transgressions were the first public crimes, 
affecting the whole community. The state eventually assumed the 
divine’s role in enforcing. The law socializes us, though he under-
stood it as the expression of shared communal values and not— as 
seems more plausible today— a tool wielded by powerful social 
groups. Durkheim also thought that punishments moderated as 
society developed, though not, as argued here, because the state 
strengthened but because human sympathy extended from victims 
to criminals.146
The argument made here is simple. Seen in the longue durée of 
global history, the state came late to making and enforcing law. 
But once started, it never looked back. Today, we are governed by 
more law than ever before. And yet even outside the law we are also 
increasingly socialized into correct behavior by an array of other 
means. So powerful is this socializing process that it raises the ques-
tion: Why do we need the law any longer, especially more of it? 
Belt and suspenders? Clearly, the law persists. Despite our ever 
better- mannered and docile citizenry, law remains the workhorse of 
social control, defining and deepening the parameters of our social-
ization. Time therefore to bring the law back in, to move beyond 
Foucault. Today’s penal codes are an absolutist ruler’s wet dream, 
bestowing real power such monarchs would have envied. Yet most 
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of us— the codes’ subjects— scarcely notice them in our daily lives. 
In The Devil’s Dictionary, Ambrose Bierce defined opiate as “an 
unlocked door in the prison of identity. It leads into the jail yard.” 
We might say something similar of the Foucauldian vision of social 
discipline— the yard where inmates catch a glimpse of sky, run a 
few laps, and imagine the world beyond the prison walls. It remains 
in fact wholly under the state’s umbrella.147 To deter and otherwise 
shape our behavior, the law must exist, and it must be enforced. 
The rule of law requires laws, indeed ever more of them as mat-
ters become complex. A more advanced society may not have more 
criminals, as Hall thought, but it certainly has more laws, and those 
statutes require and encourage most citizens to toe the line. Ever 
new behaviors are forbidden, even as formerly offending conduct 
is gradually socialized away. To gain more self- control, it seems, we 
need more law.
Although the state may lay low, in dealing with crime it does not 
wither away.
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